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International shipping carries 80 per cent of global trade by volume and over 70 per cent 
by value. This significant global activity comes with the concern that the greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions from international shipping lead to adverse effects on climate, 
human health and marine ecosystems. There have been international efforts to address 
this problem by improving regulation, principally by the United Nations (UN), the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), the shipping industry, flag States and port 
States. The international climate change regime under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process and the IMO through its Marine 
Environment Protection Committee have been grappling with this issue, and GHG 
emissions from international shipping have been partially regulated by amendments to 
Annex VI to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL 73/78) in 2011 and 2014.  
 
This thesis examines the evolution and adequacy of the current regulatory framework 
for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. It discusses the 
applicability of international environmental law principles to the reduction of GHG 
emissions from ships and assesses the responses of the key stakeholders to the challenge 
of reducing GHG emissions. These responses and legal principles are then analysed to 
identify gaps in the regulatory framework. It concludes that there are deficiencies in the 
current legal, policy and institutional frameworks regulating GHG emissions from 
international shipping. The thesis proposes options for legal and institutional reforms to 
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Climate change has been discussed broadly around the world and is recognised as a 
factor contributing to all global issues. 1 As an environmental, cultural and political 
phenomenon, climate change has been reshaping the way that people think about 
themselves, about their societies and about humanity’s place on earth.2 Greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions constitute the largest contribution to climate change,3 and have thus 
attracted mounting attention from the international community as to how to effectively 
reduce GHG emissions on a global scale. One of the crucial global efforts is the 
international climate change regime, which comprises rules, norms, principles and 
procedures applicable to a range of activities. 4  International, regional and national 
regulations have been developed since the late 1970s to reduce GHG emissions. 5 
Among them, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) 6  and its Kyoto Protocol 7  have provided the foundation for subsequent 
efforts to promote the international climate change regime. Various global efforts and 
outcomes, including the 2007 Bali Road Map, 8  2010 Cancun Agreements, 9  2011 
                                                 
1 Milke Hulme, 'The Idea of Climate Change' (2010) 19(3) GAIA: Ecological Perspectives for Science & Society 171, 
171. Hulme asserts that climate change has become an idea that now travels well beyond its origins in the natural 
sciences. Climate change takes on new meanings and serves new purposes, and has thus become ‘the mother of all 
issues’. See also Susanne Moser, Heide Hackmann and Françoise Caillods, 'Global Environmental Change Changes 
Everything: Key Messages and Recommendations' in ISSC/UNESCO (ed), World Social Science Report 2013: 
Changing Global Environments (OECD Publishing and Unesco Publishing, 2013) 50. This report concludes that ‘the 
social sciences must help to fundamentally reframe climate and global environmental change from a physical into a 
social problem’. 
2 Hulme, above n 1.  
3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 'Fifth Assessment Report: Working Group I Report' (2013) 
<http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/WGIAR5-SPM_Approved27Sep2013.pdf> accessed 17 
November 2013, Summary for Policymakers, p 8. The summary for policymakers of the Working Group I Report 
asserts that ‘the largest contribution to total radiative forcing [of climate change] is caused by the increase in the 
atmospheric concentration of CO2 since 1750’.  
4 Xinyuan Dai, 'Global Regime and National Change' (2010) 10(6) Climate Policy 622, 623. See also Patricia W. 
Birnie, Alan E. Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Oxford University Press, 3rd 
ed, 2009) 336.  
5 See, eg, Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature 13 November 1979, 18 ILM 
1442 (entered into force 16 March 1983); Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for 
signature 22 March 1985, 26 ILM 1529 (entered into force 22 September 1988); Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Accord, signed on 15 November 2007, <http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/regional-climate-initiatives/mggra> 
accessed 17 November 2013; Clean Air Act of the United States of America, 17 December 1963, 42 USC 7401-7626.  
6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 31 ILM 848 (entered 
into force 21 March 1994) (‘UNFCCC’).  
7 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 16 March 
1998, 37 ILM 22 (entered into force 16 February 2005) (‘Kyoto Protocol’). 
8  Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, Doc 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008).  




Durban Package,10 2012 Doha Climate Gateway,11 2013 Warsaw Outcomes,12 as well 
as a scheduled global climate change agreement in 2015, have been shaping and will 
continue to shape the current international climate change regime.13  
 
One shortcoming of the international climate change regime is that producers of GHG 
emissions from international shipping are exempt from liabilities under the Kyoto 
Protocol, notwithstanding that the contribution of GHG emissions from international 
shipping to climate change is significant and has been increasing.14 Given the urgency 
of emission reduction and the global nature of the shipping industry, a global approach 
must be employed to regulate GHG emissions from shipping. The UNFCCC and the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) have responded to this imperative and have 
commenced development of a regulatory framework.  
 
GHG emissions from international shipping have been partially regulated by the IMO in 
the form of amendments to Annex VI to the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78).15 However, this regulation was 
adopted by a majority vote within the IMO rather than by a consensus. It is thus 
                                                                                                                                               
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its Sixth Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.1 (15 March 2011); Decision 
1/CP.16, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (15 March 2011).  
10  UNFCCC, Durban: Towards Full Implementation of the UN Climate Change Convention (2011) 
<http://unfccc.int/key_steps/durban_outcomes/items/6825.php> accessed 17 November 2013.  
11  UNFCCC, The Doha Climate Gateway (2012) 
<http://unfccc.int/key_steps/doha_climate_gateway/items/7389.php> accessed 17 November 2013.  
12 UNFCCC, Warsaw Outcomes (2013) <http://unfccc.int/key_steps/warsaw_outcomes/items/8006.php> accessed 19 
April 2014.  
13 Although most of these outcomes are not legally binding, these achievements advanced the process of the global 
joint efforts effectively and to some extent could be deemed as ‘a more elaborate and extended version of the 1992 
UNFCCC’. Michael Grubb, 'Cancun: the Art of the Possible' (2011) 11(2) Climate Policy 847, 847. See also Navroz 
K. Dubash and Lavanya Rajamani, 'Beyond Copenhagen: Next Steps' (2010) 10(6) Climate Policy 593, 593.  
14 The specific data on GHG emissions from international shipping is provided at 1.2.2.2 of this chapter.  
15 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), signed 2 November 1973, 
12 ILM 1319, as amended by the 1978 Protocol to the 1973 Convention, 1341 UNTS 3, 17 ILM 546 (entered into 
force 2 October 1983). To date, MARPOL 73/78 has adopted 6 annexes and their revisions, namely, Annex I. Oil 
(entered into force 2 October 1983), Annex II. Noxious Liquid Substances carried in Bulk (entered into force 6 April 
1987), Annex III. Harmful Substances carried in Packaged Form (entered into force 1 July 1992), Annex IV. Sewage 
(entered into force 27 September 2003), Annex V. Garbage (entered into force 31 December 1988), and Annex VI. 
Air Pollution from Ships (entered into force 19 May 2005).  
 
The reason why GHG emissions from international shipping have been ‘partially’ regulated lies in the fact that only 
certain types of ships engaged in international shipping have been regulated by amended Annex VI to MARPOL 
73/78, and of the three routes within the IMO to regulate this GHG issue, only technical and operational measures 




uncertain whether this regulation can be implemented uniformly by the global shipping 
industry. Meanwhile, it is important to identify the deficiencies existing in the current 
regulatory framework for this GHG issue and to provide measures for its improvement. 
The IMO is currently discussing the next step in addressing GHG emissions from 
shipping, and a global climate change agreement which may involve this GHG issue is 
under negotiation with the aim for it to be adopted by 2015 and then enter into force in 
2020. Therefore, it is timely to examine the issues. This thesis responds to the need for 
an effective international regime to address GHG emissions from international shipping 
by exploring the application of international law principles. It analyses and assesses the 
responses from the UN, the IMO, the shipping industry, flag States and port States, and 
proposes legal, policy and institutional reforms to address gaps in the existing 
framework. 
 
This introductory chapter provides a background to the global concern about GHG 
emissions from international shipping and identifies the central issue to be addressed by 
the thesis: how to improve the current regulatory framework in reducing GHG 
emissions from international shipping? The chapter is divided into three parts. The first 
part examines the relationship between GHG emissions and climate change and 
identifies the transboundary nature of GHG emissions. The second part analyses the 
sources and impacts of GHG emissions from international shipping. The third part 
explains the problem addressed by the thesis, presents the thesis objective, research 
questions and methods, and outlines the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Greenhouse Gas Emissions as a Regulatory Challenge 
 
In a broad sense, GHGs consist of natural gases and anthropogenically produced gases. 
The former comprises water vapour (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
methane (CH4) and ozone (O3 ), and the latter includes the halocarbons, and other 
chlorine and bromine – containing substances regulated under the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.16 However, only seven types of GHGs are 
                                                 
16  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 'Fourth Assessment Report' (2007) 




listed in the Kyoto Protocol, namely carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous 
oxide ( N2O ), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6) and nitrogen trifluoride (NF3).17 For the purposes of this thesis, the 
scope of GHGs is that defined in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
As a gaseous constituent in the atmosphere, GHGs absorb thermal infrared radiation, 
emitted by the Earth’s surface, the atmosphere and clouds. Atmospheric radiation is 
emitted in all directions, including downward to the Earth’s surface. In this way, GHGs 
trap heat within the surface-troposphere system. This is called the ‘greenhouse effect’.18 
The earth’s ‘greenhouse effect’ is what makes this planet suitable for life since without 
it the earth’s surface would be much colder.19 Therefore, GHGs are indispensable for 
the earth. However, apart from purely human-produced synthetic halocarbons, most 
GHGs have both natural and anthropogenic sources, and it is the latter — 
anthropogenically induced GHG emissions — that are ‘extremely likely’ to cause 
climate change. 20  The relationship between GHG emissions and climate change, 
together with the transboundary nature of GHG emissions, makes it a challenge to 
regulate GHG emissions under an international regulatory regime. 
 
1.1.1 Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change 
 
Excessive GHG emissions have been regarded as the main contribution to global 
climate change. However, this view has not been agreed by all. This section briefly 
reviews the debate on climate change and examines how GHG emissions contribute to 
climate change. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Glossary; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 16 September 1987, 
26 ILM 1550 (entered into force 1 January 1989) (‘Montreal Protocol’).  
17 Kyoto Protocol, Annex A. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol only listed six types of GHGs, namely CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, 
PFCs and SF6, but a seventh type of GHG, NF3,was added to the category in the Durban Climate Change Conference 
in 2011. NF3 only applies from the beginning of the second commitment period (1 January 2013). Doha Amendment 
to the Kyoto Protocol, adopted 8 December 2012, Decision 1/CMP.8, C.N.718.2012.TREATIES-XXVII.7.c (not yet 
in force)  
18 IPCC, above n 16.  
19 Ibid.  




1.1.1.1 An Overview of Climate Change 
 
Technically, climate change refers to ‘a change in the state of the climate that can be 
identified by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that 
persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer’, which may result from 
either natural internal processes and ‘external forcings’ or anthropogenically - induced 
activities.21 From the perspective of law, climate change has been defined as ‘a change 
of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the 
composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate 
variability observed over comparable time periods’. 22  Climate change is a 
comparatively broad concept and the popular term ‘global warming’ only serves as a 
part of that.23 The distinction between climate change and global warming, however, is 
often ignored or misinterpreted by the media.24 
 
Beginning in the early 1970s, scientists came to understand the major trends occurring 
in many of the drivers of environmental change, including air pollution and climate 
change. The international community commenced efforts, through the Stockholm 
Declaration, 25 Rio Declaration, 26 and the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable 
Development, 27  to raise global consciousness on environmental protection, and also 
adopted international environmental conventions. Examples include the 1979 
                                                 
21 IPCC, above n 16. ‘External forcing’ refers to a forcing agent outside the climate system causing a change in the 
climate system, and some of its examples include volcanic eruptions, solar variations and anthropogenic changes in 
the composition of the atmosphere and land-use change.  
22 UNFCCC art 1(2).  
23 The manifestations of climate change include but are not limited to: global warming, humidity, rainfall, wind, and 
severe weather events, although global warming also contributes to climate change. See IPCC, above n 16.  
24  See, eg, Dorothy Parker, Paul Sheehan, Ian Plimer, Heaven and Earth, and Is It Safe? 
<http://themichaelduffyfiles.blogspot.com/2009/04/paul-sheehan-ian-plimer-heaven-and.html> accessed 10 May 
2011; James Delingpole, Meet the Man Who has Exposed the Great Climate Change Con Trick (11 July 2009) 
<http://www.mannkal.org/downloads/environment/meetthemanwhohasexposedthegreatclimatechangecontrick.pdf> 
accessed 19 April 2014. In this literature, the authors often treat climate change and global warming as the same 
concept.  
25 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 11 ILM 1416 (16 June 1972).  
26 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 ILM 874 (14 June 1992).  
27  Declaration on Sustainable Development and Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable 




Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution,28 the 1985 Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer,29 and the 1992 UNFCCC. 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) in 1988 to provide knowledge and assessment of climate change.30 On the basis 
of input from thousands of scientists throughout the world, IPCC has published four 
assessment reports (1990, 1995, 2001 and 2007) and parts of the fifth assessment report 
which confirm the existence of climate change. The Working Group I report of the fifth 
assessment report, which was released in September 2013, states that 
 
‘[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed 
changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have 
warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the 
concentrations of greenhouse gas have increased.’31 
 
Compared with previous IPCC reports, this latest IPCC report is unequivocal about the 
seriousness of anthropogenic climate change, and leaves ‘fewer uncertainties about the 
serious consequences of inaction, in spite of the fact that there remain knowledge gaps 
and uncertainties in some areas of climate science’.32 Furthermore, this report points out 
that limiting climate change ‘require[s] substantial and sustained reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions’.33  
 
The IPCC assessment reports are not universally welcomed. Various sustained 
criticisms exist. For example, Horner has asserted that ‘environmentalism has served for 
decades as the best excuse to increase government control over actions [by most people 
in the society]’ and that global warming may not be true in that: (a) heat has always 
                                                 
28 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature 13 November 1979, 18 ILM 1442 
(entered into force 16 March 1983). 
29 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 22 March 1985, 26 ILM 1529 
(entered into force 22 September 1988).  
30 IPCC, Organization <http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml> accessed 19 April 2014.  
31 IPCC, above n 3, 3.  
32  Dahe Qin, Opening Remark at Working Group I - Twelfth Session (23 September 2013) 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/meetings/session36/speeches/op_wg1_p12_Dahe_Qin.pdf> accessed 9 April 2014, p 2.  




benefited life when the earth has been warmer in the past; (b) only a small portion of 
greenhouse gases are anthropogenically induced; (c) some places of the world, 
Antarctica as an example, are getting colder; (d) ‘the media only recently abandoned the 
“global cooling” scare’; and (e) ‘global warming has not made hurricanes worse’.34 As 
the coordinating lead author for the chapter on ‘Climate scenario development’ for the 
IPCC Third Assessment Report and contributing author for several other chapters, 
Hulme queried the rationality of reducing GHG emissions and its outcomes in 
practice. 35  To prove his opinions, Hulme put forward two ways of seeing climate 
change—treat it as an idea to be debated, adapted and used, or regard it as a physical 
phenomenon that can be observed, quantified and measured.36 He preferred the first 
view in that it is more practical and a solution to climate change ‘seemingly remains 
beyond our reach’.37 The debate about global warming is certain to continue. However, 
the phenomenon of climate change has been generally accepted by most international 
organisations and scholars.38 This thesis proceeds on the assumption that climate change 
exists, that it is exacerbated by human activities, and that it warrants serious 
examination to identify effective mitigation strategies. 
 
1.1.1.2 Contribution of Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Climate Change 
 
Although many factors contribute to global climate change, 39 the preponderance of 
scientific evidence maintains that the principal cause is anthropogenically – induced 
GHG emissions. The IPCC Third Assessment Report stated that ‘most of the observed 
warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in GHG 
                                                 
34  Christopher Horner, The Politically Incorrect Guide to Global Warming and Environmentalism (Regnery 
Publishing, 2007) preface.  
35 Hulme, above n 1, 171-172.  
36 Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree about Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 32.  
37 Hulme, above n 1, 172. Hulme asserts that reducing GHG emissions is ‘beyond our reach’ on the grounds that 
global GHG emissions have accelerated rather than reduced after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. However, 
Hulme does not take the projected growth of international trade into account, which makes his argument less 
persuasive.  
38 See, eg, United Nations Environment Programme, 'Annual Report 2010' (2011) <www.unep.org/annualreport> 
accessed 10 May 2011; IPCC, above n 3; ø. Buhaug et al, 'Second IMO GHG Study 2009' (International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), 2009); Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2nd ed, 2003) 358; Birnie et al, above n 4, 335.  
39 IPCC, above n 3, 8-9. Theoretically both natural and manmade substances and processes that alter the Earth’s 




concentrations’. 40  The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report reinforced this assessment, 
stating that ‘most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-
20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG 
concentrations’.41 The Working Group I report of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report 
asserted that ‘it is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of 
the observed warming since the mid-20th century’.42 The scientific evidence provided 
by these IPCC reports has been strengthened and GHGs are regarded as the largest 
contribution to this phenomenon.43  
 
The roles of different GHGs in global anthropogenic GHG emissions are illustrated in 
Figure 1.1. In the period 1970 to 2004, global GHG emissions from human activities 
increased by 70 per cent, and CO2 increased by 80 per cent. It represented 77 per cent of 
total GHG emissions in 2004 indicating that it is the most important anthropogenic 
GHG.44 However, CH4 and N2O accounted for only 14.3 per cent and 7.9 per cent of 
total GHG emissions respectively in 2004. 
                                                 
40  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 'Third Assessment Report' (2001) 
<http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/> accessed 10 May 2011, Synthesis Report, p 51.  
41 IPCC, above n 16, Synthesis Report, p 39.  
42 IPCC, above n 3, 12.  
43 Ibid 3.  





Figure 1.1 Global Anthropogenic GHG Emissions45 
 
1.1.2 Transboundary Nature of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 
As far as climate change is concerned, oceans have been treated ‘both as victims of the 
problem and as part of the solution.’46 On the positive side, the oceans can transfer the 
heat between surface waters of the ocean and the lower atmosphere so as to adjust the 
global climate and weather; they also serve as a vital sink for absorbing authropogenic 
GHG emissions.47 On the negative side, scientific data from all continents and most 
oceans has revealed that climate changes resulting from GHG emissions have 
endangered marine systems, leading to global marine-species redistribution and marine-
biodiversity reduction in sensitive regions, ocean acidification, and other future risks.48 
The impacts from GHG emissions have provided further reasons to combat climate 
change. However, the transboundary nature of GHG emissions makes it a challenge to 
regulate. Given the transboundary nature of GHG emissions, the regulation of this GHG 
issue needs to be conducted globally. Nevertheless, differing interests from various 
                                                 
45 Ibid. In Figure 1, a) Global annual emissions of anthropogenic GHGs from 1970 to 2004; b) Share of different 
anthropogenic GHGs in total emissions in 2004 in terms of C O2 -eq; c) Share of different sectors in total 
anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2004 in terms of CO2-eq. (Forestry includes deforestation.).  
46 David Freestone, 'Climate Change and the Oceans' (2009) 3(4) Carbon & Climate Law Review 383, 383.  
47 Duncan E. J. Currie and Kateryna Wowk, 'Climate Change and CO2 in the Oceans and Global Oceans Governance' 
(2009) 3(4) Carbon & Climate Law Review 387, 388.  
48 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 'Fifth Assessment Report: Working Group II Report' (2014) 
<http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/IPCC_WG2AR5_SPM_Approved.pdf> accessed 19 April 2014, Summary 




countries have made it a regulatory challenge to reach a consensus in relation to the 
reduction of GHG emissions. This section examines how GHG emissions influence the 
marine environment in a transboundary context, rendering it a regulatory challenge. 
 
GHG emissions may come from various sources, including land-based sources and 
marine shipping sources. Examples are automobile exhaust and shipping discharges. As 
a gaseous constituent in the atmosphere, GHG emissions often travel with the wind 
from the territory of or in other places under the jurisdiction or control of one country, 
to another place under the jurisdiction or control of another country or a place beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction. Hence, GHG emissions are often transboundary in 
nature.49 The impacts of GHG emissions on the marine environment in a transboundary 
context include but are not limited to the following four aspects.50 
 
Firstly, GHG emissions may gradually lead to the rise of ocean temperature so as to 
alter the dynamics of the marine environment. As a result of excessive emissions from 
GHGs, atmospheric CO2 concentrations have increased from 280 to 380 ppm since the 
beginning of the industrial revolution, which is estimated to have led to a 0.74°C + 
0.18°C global temperature rise during the past 100 years.51 It is ‘virtually certain’ that 
the upper ocean (0-700 metres depths) warmed from 1971 to 2010, and ‘likely’ that the 
ocean warmed from depths between 700 to 2000 metres over the period 1957- 2009.52 
Under these circumstances, species distribution, polar systems, and global and regional 
weather patterns may be changed.53 Some of the carbon stored in the form of methane 
hydrates from the seabed may ultimately be released once the deep ocean warms,54 and 
the dynamics, structure and biodiversity of marine ecosystems is also likely to shift.55 
                                                 
49 See ch 2, 2.3.  
50 Ibid. According to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, the four aspects are generally the results of GHG emissions 
after quite a long period, and these approaches are obviously transboundary on the ground that they all involve the 
jurisdiction or control of several countries or places beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.  
51 R. Hale et al, 'Predicted Levels of Future Ocean Acidification and Temperature Rise could Alter Community 
Structure and Biodiversity in Marine Benthic Communities' (2011) 120(5) Oikos 661, 661.  
52 IPCC, above n 3, 4-5.  
53 Currie and Wowk, above n 47, 389.  
54 Ibid.  





Secondly, GHG emissions may result in sea-level rise and engender adverse impacts. 
Observations indicate that sea levels have risen by an average of 1.7 + 0.3 mm per year 
since 1950, and that this rate increased to 3.3 + 0.4 mm per year from 1993 to 2009, 
suggesting that the seal level rise is not only happening but that it is also accelerating.56 
The 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report concluded that under global warming 
conditions caused by excessive GHG emissions and ignoring the contribution from 
melting sea ice, global sea level will rise by 18 to 59 centimetres (cm) in this century 
and reach 59 cm by 2099.57 Even though, the IPCC’s predictions on sea level rise are 
regarded as ‘remarkably conservative’ and ‘wildly optimistic’, largely owing to the 
IPCC’s methodology of not taking into account the potential melting land ice.58 The 
2013 IPCC Fifth Assessment Report strengthened this trend and asserted that more than 
95 per cent of the ocean area will experience sea level rise by the end of the 21st 
century. 59 It was further confirmed that global sea-level rise rates are ‘very likely’ 
accelerating.60 Due to sea level rise, certain coastal hazards are more likely, such as 
flooding of coastal land, storm surges, erosion, destruction of infrastructure, settlements 
and facilities. Coastal residents may need to move so as to avoid larger losses and seek 
more secure shelter,61 and some low-lying coastal States, for instance the Maldives and 
Tuvalu, are even facing the risk of disappearance.62 In 2009 the Carteret Islanders of 
Papua New Guinea became the world’s first entire community to be displaced by 
climate change. 63  Vanuatu communities have also been displaced from the Torres 
                                                 
56 Robert J. Nicholls and Anny Cazenave, 'Sea-Level Rise and Its Impact on Coastal Zones' (2010) 328 (18 June 
2010) Science 1517, 1517; See also A. Church John and J. White Neil, 'A 20th Century Acceleration in Global Sea-
level Rise' (2006) 33(L01602) Geophysical Research Letters 1, 1.  
57 IPCC, above n 16, Synthesis Report, p 45.  
58 Clive Schofield, 'Shifting Limits? Sea Level Rise and Options to Secure Maritime Jurisdictional Claims' (2009) 
3(4) Carbon & Climate Law Review 405, 406.  
59 IPCC, above n 3, 19.  
60 Ibid 18.  
61  Peter Boehm, Global Warning: Devastation of an Atoll The Independent 
<http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0830-07.htm> accessed 18 August 2011. In this case, an entire coastal 
village in the north of Tegua Island in Vanuatu was relocated to higher ground in late 2005.  
62 Currie and Wowk, above n 47, 390.   
63 Brian Merchant, First Official Climate Change Refugees Evacuate Their Island Homes for Good (8 May 2009) 
<http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/first-official-climate-change-refugees-evacuate-their-island-




Islands as a result of sea-level rise.64 Additionally, sea level rise may influence maritime 
jurisdictional claims by coastal States due to the changes in their baselines.65 
 
Thirdly, GHG emissions may cause ocean acidification and influence marine 
ecosystems negatively. Given the ocean’s role as a carbon sink, growing CO2 levels 
have led to enhanced absorption of CO2 into the surface water of the ocean. As the CO2 
dissolves into the seawater and acts as a weak acid, the carbonates in the ocean are 
reduced.66 This chemical process is known as ocean acidification. Acidification of the 
deep ocean may occur as one of the potential side effects of a process known as ocean 
fertilisation,67 an activity designed to mitigate the deleterious effects of excess GHG 
emissions. 68  To date, the oceans have taken up one-third of all anthropogenically 
sourced CO2.69 The mean surface ocean pH has dropped 0.1 units from 8.2 to 8.1 since 
1750, and this number is projected to drop an extra 0.3 to 0.4 units by the end of the 
century.70 
 
The impacts of ocean acidification on marine ecosystems and biodiversity are profound. 
First, ocean acidification can affect the growth and viability of calcifying organisms, 
such as corals, bivalves, crustaceans and plankton, in that these marine organisms need 
carbonate to build their shells and skeletons while the decreased carbonate ion 
concentration makes this impossible.71 Second, lower pH levels can alter the acid-base 
regulation, reproduction, respiration, metabolism and behaviour of some marine 
                                                 
64 IPCC, above n 48, ch 29, p 6.  
65 Schofield, above n 58, 405.  
66 Currie and Wowk, above n 47, 391.  
67 Rosemary Rayfuse, Mark G. Lawrence and Kristina M. Gjerde, 'Ocean Fertilisation and Climate Change: The 
Need to Regulate Emerging High Seas Uses' (2008) 23(2) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 297, 
298, 305-306. Generally the term ‘ocean fertilisation’ refers to the process of ‘large-scale fertilising of the ocean with 
nutrients such as iron, nitrogen or phosphorus in an attempt to produce massive phytoplankton blooms which may 
assist in increasing absorption of CO2 from the atmosphere’. 
68 Robin Warner, 'Marine Snow Storms: Assessing the Environmental Risks of Ocean Fertilization' (2009) 3(4) 
Carbon & Climate Law Review 426, 427.  
69 Ibid 426.  
70 James Orr et al, 'Anthropogenic Ocean Acidification over the Twenty-first Century and Its Impact on Calcifying 
Organisms' (2005) 437 Nature 681, 681. Measured on a logarithmic scale, pH is a dimensionless measure of the 
acidity of water or any solution. Given that pure water’s pH is 7, acid solutions’ pH is smaller than 7 while basic 
solutions’ pH is larger than 7. IPCC, above n 16, Appendix Glossary, p 85.  




species.72 Third, the photosynthesis necessary for some primary producers in the oceans 
can be shifted due to incrementally dissolved CO2.73 Last but not least, GHG emissions 
may shift ranges and distribution of marine species. There is mounting evidence that 
species distribution and abundance could be affected by climate change,74 and this is 
also the case for marine species. Due to increased ocean temperature and decreased pH 
resulting from excess GHG emissions, the ranges and distribution of marine species 
have been altered.75  
 
Species’ ranges are generally projected to shift towards higher latitudes and the spread 
of diseases, parasites, and non-native invasive species may be accelerated.76 In marine 
areas where upwelling is important, any decrease in upwelling frequency or intensity 
could lead to reduced productivity.77 With sea temperature rising, species distribution 
tends to favour those species that are better adapted to warmer, lower pH conditions, in 
which harmful algal blooms grow rampantly.78 Major mortality of fish, crustaceans, and 
other organisms may occur in hypoxic zones.79 Some ecologically rich zones, including 
the Great Barrier Reef and Queensland Wet Tropics, are projected to suffer a significant 
loss of biodiversity by 2020.80 Besides the above direct impacts on marine species from 
exorbitant GHG emissions, some indirect effects are also obvious. For example, people 
may need to change their traditional fishing practices, and top predators such as sharks 
are more likely to be affected indirectly through prey and habitat changes.81 Generally 
speaking, ocean acidification reduces the ocean’s capacity to absorb humanmade CO2, 
                                                 
72 Cheryl Logan, 'A Review of Ocean Acidification and America's Response' (2010) 60(10) BioScience 819, 823.  
73 Ibid 821.  
74  See, eg, Wim H. Van der Putten, Mirka Macel and Marcel E. Visser, 'Predicting Species Distribution and 
Abundance Responses to Climate Change: Why It is Essential to Include Biotic Interactions across Trophic Levels' 
(2010) 365 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 2025, 2025.  
75 Currie and Wowk, above n 47, 393.  
76 Jennifer Hoffman, Ana Fonseca and Carlos Drews(eds), 'Cetaceans and Other Marine Biodiversity of the Eastern 
Tropical Pacific: Options for Adapting to Climate Change' (Report from a workshop held at San Jose, Costa Rica, 
2009) <http://wwf.panda.org/?uNewsID=166824> accessed 15 May 2011, p 13.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid.  
80 IPCC, above n 16, Synthesis Report, p 50. 




leads to economic loss and engenders food security.82 Limiting CO2 emissions is ‘the 
only’ realistic mitigation option to address ocean acidification.83  
 
1.2 Contribution of International Shipping to Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 
The contribution of GHG emissions to climate change has been underpinned by 
increasing scientific observations and analyses, and there has also been mounting 
evidence that international shipping contributes to GHG emissions and the 
consequential climate change impacts.84 This section reviews the sources and impacts of 
GHG emissions from international shipping. It also provides an overview of 
international shipping and explains the contributions to its current GHG emissions. 
 
1.2.1 Introduction to International Shipping 
 
International shipping has been defined by the IMO as ‘shipping between ports of 
different countries, as opposed to domestic shipping’, 85  and excludes military and 
fishing vessels engaged on such voyages. For the purpose of this thesis, the definition 
by the IMO is adopted although military and fishing vessels can be on international 
voyages.86 Consistent with the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas 
                                                 
82 The International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission and The 
Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research, 'Ocean Acifidication Summary for Policymakers - Third Symposium on 
the Ocean in a High-CO2 World' (International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, Stockholm, Sweden, 2013) 1.  
83 Ibid.  
84  See, eg, Veronika Eyring et al, 'Transport Impacts on Atmosphere and Climate: Shipping' (2010) 44(37) 
Atmospheric Environment 4735; Stathis Palassis, 'Climate Change and Shipping' in Robin Warner and Clive 
Schofield (eds), Climate Change and the Oceans: Gauging the Legal and Policy Currents in the Asia Pacific and 
Beyond (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012) 200.  
85 Buhaug et al, above n 38, 13. According to the Second IMO GHG Study 2009, ‘domestic shipping’ refers to 
‘shipping between ports of the same country, as opposed to international shipping’, and excludes military and fishing 
vessels. 
86 In 2012 the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) decided to address GHG emissions from fishing vessels 
engaged on international voyages due to the growing contribution of fishing vessels to marine environmental 
deterioration and global climate change. Theoretically the amended Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 applies to fishing 
vessels of 400 gross tonnage and above. However, in practice most fishing vessels are below 400 gross tonnage, 
which makes it necessary for the FAO or other competent international organisations to address GHG emissions from 
fishing vessels engaged on international voyages. This issue will not be discussed in this thesis due to the different 
nature of the fishing industry. Follow-Up to the Recommendations of the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Committee on 
Fisheries, Rome, Italy, 31 January - 4 February 2011, COFI 30th Session, FAO Doc COFI/2012/Inf.5 (9-13 July 
2012) Agenda Item 8, xxx. Due to the complex sovereignty and international politics considerations involved, it is 





Inventories (IPCC 2006 Guidelines),87 this definition also indicates that the same ship 
under an international voyage may frequently be engaged in both international and 
domestic shipping operations.88 Indeed, this feature of international shipping constitutes 
the main barrier to including GHG emissions from international shipping in the State-
based Kyoto Protocol.89 
 
A number of differing definitions of ‘ship’ or ‘vessel’ exist in international law 
depending on the distinct purposes of treaties.90 Based on the nature of the issue under 
discussion, this thesis adopts the definition of ship contained in MARPOL 73/78. It 
defines ‘ship’ as ‘a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment 
and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and fixed 
or floating platforms’. 91 This definition underscores different ships’ operation in the 
marine environment, and is consistent with the purpose of international shipping.92 
Technically not all ships are used for international shipping due to their different 
                                                 
87 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 'IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories' 
(2006) <http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/vol2.html> accessed 22 August 2011, Volume 2, Chapter 3, 
3.5.1, p3.48. Under the IPCC 2006 Guidelines, international shipping is called ‘international water-borne navigation’ 
which may take place at sea, on inland lakes and waterways and in coastal waters. It includes journeys that depart in 
one country and arrive in a different country, but excludes such voyages by fishing vessels. International military 
navigation can be included as a separate sub-category of international shipping ‘provided that the same definitional 
distinction is applied and data are available to support the definition’. Due to confidentiality issues, many inventory 
compilers may have difficulty obtaining data for the quantity of military fuel use. In this case, generally such voyages 
by military vessels are also excluded from the definition of international shipping. 
88 Buhaug et al, above n 38, 13.  
89 See ch 3, 3.2.2.1.  
90 Mikhail Kashubsky, Offshore Petroleum Security: Analysis of Offshore Security Threats, Target Attractiveness, and 
the International Legal Framework for the Protection and Security of Offshore Petroleum Installations (PhD Thesis, 
University of Wollongong, 2011) 155-156. For example, the 2001 International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Bunker Oil Pollution Damage defines ‘ship’ as ‘any seagoing vessel and seaborne craft, of any type whatsoever’. 
IMO International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature 27 March 
2001, 40 ILM 1493 (entered into force 21 November 2008 ) art 1(1). The 1989 International Convention on Salvage 
defines ‘vessel’ as ‘any ship or craft, or any structure capable of navigation’. International Convention on Salvage, 
opened for signature 28 April 1989, 1953 UNTS 165 (entered into force 14 July 1996) art 1(b). The 1924 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading for the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea defines ‘ship’ as ‘any vessel used for the carriage of goods by sea’. International Convention for the Unification 
of Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading for the Carriage of Goods by Sea, opened for signature 25 August 1924, 
120 LNTS 155 (entered into force 2 June 1931) art 1(d).  
91 MARPOL 73/78 art 2(4).  
92 Kashubsky, above n 90, 155; Michael Summerskill, Oil Rigs: Law and Insurance (Stevens & Sons, 1979) 13. 
Summerskill asserts that the term ‘vessel’ has ‘a broader meaning than ship’ and that ‘the term “vessel” designates a 
variety of maritime craft, while the term “ship” is limited to a few species of the same genus’. However, some 
treaties, LOSC as an example, do not distinguish the two terms. The terms ‘ship’ and ‘vessel’ are used 




operational capacity. Therefore it is easier to rely on this definition to identify which 
type of ships may be utilised to engage in international shipping.  
 
Ship categories may vary depending on the different purposes of particular voyages, and 
they are often regulated or listed diversely under different treaties or legal documents. 
For instance, only seven types of ships were regulated by the revised Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78 in 2011 under the new Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) 
requirements. 93 However, the amendments of MARPOL Annex VI adopted in April 
2014 extended these seven types of ships to 12 due to technological and regulatory 
improvements resulting in more types of vessels. 94 In the context of global climate 
change, ships are characterised by the types of cargo they are designed to carry. Ship 
categories may be classified as in Table 1.1. Table 1.1 lists the definitions of primary 
ship categories that have been used in the emissions inventory by the IMO. 
 




Sub-type of Ships and Their Definitions 
Cargo 
Ships 
Crude Carriers: include tankers which are intended for carrying crude oil. 
Bulk Carriers: ships designed to carry bulk goods such as grain, iron ore, coal and 
more. 
 General Cargo Carriers: include a wide variety of cargo ships from small one-hold 
vessels to highly advanced multi-purpose vessels. Some of the ships are designed to 
carry containers as well as break-bulk cargos. Many of these ships are equipped with 
their own lifting gear. 
Other Dry Carriers: carriers of refrigerated cargo and other special dry cargo ships. 
Products Tankers: carry various types of refined petroleum products. 
Chemical Tankers: carry various types of industrial chemicals. 
LPG Tankers: specialised tankers for the carriage of liquefied petroleum gas and 
often also other products, for example ammonia. 
LNG Tankers: specialised tankers for the carriage of liquefied natural gas. 
Other Tankers: include a large number of bunker tankers and also those that carry a 
wide range of liquid niche products such as orange juice, bitumen, wine and water. 
Container Ships: built to carry containerised cargo and nothing else, i.e. fully 
cellular ships designed to carry containers both on deck and under deck. 
                                                 
93 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) regs 20-21. In accordance with the new EEDI requirement, seven 
types of ships are listed, namely bulk carrier, gas tanker, tanker, container ship, general cargo ship, refrigerated cargo 
carrier and combination carrier.  
94 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2014 amendments) regs 20-21. These added five types of ships are Liquefied Natural 
Gas (LNG) carriers, roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) cargo ships (vehicle carriers), ro-ro cargo ships, ro-ro passenger ships and 
cruise passenger ships having non-conventional propulsion.  




Vehicle Ships: designed to carry (new) cars, trucks and sometimes other special 
cargo on wheels. 
Ro-Ro Ships: ships that are loaded and discharged by driving the cargo on board on 
wheels.96  
Other Ferries: carry cars and passengers on regular schedules. This also includes overnight 
ferries. 
Cruise Ships: carry passengers on pleasure voyages. 
Yachts: large pleasure vessels. 
Offshore: encompasses a wide range of platform supply vessels and offshore support 
vessels. Drilling rigs are not included in this figure. 
Service: mainly tugs but also work-boats, dredgers, research vessels and more. 
 
As a comparatively cost effective, clean and safe method of transportation, 97 
international shipping offers an important means of moving goods internationally and 
enables other activities such as leisure cruising. International shipping is the backbone 
of global trade and a driving force of economic globalisation.98 Many factors contribute 
to the development of international shipping. As an example, the evolution of ship 
propulsion has progressed from sailing ships to steam ships powered by coal and then to 
an almost universal use of diesel engines, significantly accelerating international trade.99 
Similarly, advances in telecommunication and information and communications 
technology (ICT) infrastructure,100 reductions in trade barriers, and low energy costs 
have also contributed to the expansion of international shipping and seaborne trade.101 
 
                                                 
96 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI, Regulation 2, 3.33-3.36. Broadly speaking, Ro-Ro Ships consist of Ro-Ro Passenger 
Ships and Ro-Ro Cargo Ships, whereas the latter also include vehicle carriers, volume carriers and weight carriers. 
97 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Introduction to IMO <http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx> 
accessed 17 May 2011; see also Rajiv Saxena, 'Overseas Shipping Made Cheaper' (2010) 42(7) Industrial Engineer: 
IE 24. But see Oceans Beyond Piracy, 'The Economics Cost of Somali Piracy 2012' (2013) 
<http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/View%20Full%20Report_1.pdf> accessed 22 
November 2013, pp1-4. This 2012 report by Oceans Beyond Piracy reveals that maritime piracy costs the global 
economy between $5.7 and $6.1 billion in 2012, and has made international shipping costly. The increased cost 
includes increased ‘per incident’ costs, increased cost of armed guards, increased cost of increased speeds, consistent 
ratio of recurring costs vs. investments, ransoms and recovery, military operations, security equipment and guards, re-
routing, increased speed, labour, prosecutions and imprisonment, insurance, and counter-piracy organisations.  
98 International shipping carries around 80 per cent of global trade by volume. United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), 'Review of Maritime Transport 2013' (2013) 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2013_en.pdf> accessed 14 April 2014, xi. See also Martin Stopford, 
Martin Economics (Routledge, 3rd ed, 2009) 3; G. P. Pamborides, International Shipping Law: Legislation and 
Enforcement (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 145. Pamborides asserts that ‘shipping is too valuable to the world’s 
economy to jeopardise’.  
99 Sujith Kollamthodi et al, 'Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Shipping: Trends, Projections and Abatement Potential: 
Final Report' (The Shadow Committee on Climate Change, 2008) 3.  
100 ICT infrastructure is an overall name used to describe all the computer and communications hardware and 
software used to manage clerical, administrative, and management tasks in organisations. 




The world’s merchant fleet is the main component of international shipping, and its 
development has been facilitated by world seaborne trade. The relationship between the 
world’s merchant fleet and seaborne trade is displayed in Figure 1.2. With the rapid 
development of seaborne trade, the gross tonnage of the global merchant fleet has 
expanded significantly since 1985. In 2012 international seaborne trade by volume 
increased 4.3 per cent, nearly the same rate as 2011; whereas in the same year the world 
economy decelerated with gross domestic product (GDP) increasing by 2.2 per cent, 
down from 2.8 per cent in 2011.102 It appears that international shipping performed 
better than the global economy. 103  Therefore it is important to take the projected 
growing seaborne trade into account in the development of regulatory measures in 
tacking GHG emissions from international shipping.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 World Seaborne Trade and Merchant Fleet (Fearnleys Review) 104 
 
 
                                                 
102 UNCTAD, above n 98, 2,6.  
103 Ibid 6.  




1.2.2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping 
 
The increase in fuel consumption associated with growing seaborne trade has led to a 
rise in atmospheric emissions from international shipping, which has attracted growing 
global attention.105 This section examines the categories, statistics and impacts of GHG 
emissions from international shipping. 
 
1.2.2.1 Categories of Emissions from Ships 
 
In view of the nature of emissions from ships and using the definition of international 
shipping, it is not necessary to divide emissions categories into international and 
domestic emissions for the purposes of discussing them in this section. 106  GHG 
emissions from ships can be categorised differently based on differing criteria. This 
section briefly discusses two of these classifications. 
 
Based on the sources of emissions, GHG emissions from ships can be classified into the 
following four categories:107 
 
• Emissions of exhaust gases. As the main emissions from ships, exhaust gas emissions come 
from sources such as main engines, auxiliary engines, boilers and incinerators.108 However, 
exhaust from incinerators is regarded as being a very small contribution to emissions and is 
often ignored.109 
• Emissions of refrigerants. As a necessity for the refrigeration and/or freezing of cargo and 
provisions and in air-conditioners, refrigerants generally emit through two main channels: 
leaks during operation and during maintenance of refrigeration and air-conditioning 
equipment, or during the dismantling process when the emissions are usually allocated to 
the country in which the ship was scrapped.110 
• Cargo emissions. The emissions comprise various emissions and leakages, in particular 
                                                 
105 For example, the regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping has been widely discussed under the 
UNFCCC process and within the IMO. Meanwhile, the global shipping industry and various flag and port States have 
also responded actively to this GHG issue. The discussion of these issues is provided in the following chapters. 
106 According to the above definition of international shipping, the same ship may frequently be engaged in both 
international and domestic shipping, which means that total emissions from international shipping may also include 
emissions from parts of domestic shipping. It is also not possible to split emissions into domestic emissions and 
international emissions technically.  
107 Buhaug et al, above n 38, 23.  
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid.  




leaks of refrigerant from refrigerated containers and trucks, and volatile compounds 
emissions (CH4 and Non-methane Volatile Organic Compounds (NMVOCs)) from liquid 
cargoes.111 
• Other emissions. This category includes emissions from testing and maintenance of fire-
fighting equipment, and other equipment.112 
 
According to their relations with combustion, emissions from ships can be divided into 
direct emissions and indirect emissions. Direct emissions are the results of combustion, 
whereas indirect emissions refer to those from non-combustible sources and fugitive 
emissions.113 
 
Regarding direct emissions, the dominance of CO2 emissions is obvious which can be 
seen clearly from Table 1.2. CO2  is produced from vessels as a by-product of the 
oxidation of carbon in diesel fuel.114 The second direct emission is from N2O which 
arises from combustion but there has been little research into this type of emission in the 
context of the shipping sector because it is regarded as a relatively minor source of 
emissions.115 The third direct type of emission is from CH4 which is also a small source 
of emissions (see Table 1.2). Additionally, some GHG relevant substances also fit 
within this category, such as Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), which are emitted 
from fuel tankers during loading and unloading operations and the transport of crude 
oil.116 
 
Indirect emissions mainly consist of refrigerant gases HCFC-22, CFCs and halons from 
shipping.117 Emissions of these gases are relatively small and hence have not been the 
focus of assessment. Further, these gases are not GHGs regulated under the Kyoto 
Protocol but are regulated under the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
                                                 
111 Ibid.  
112 Ibid.  
113 Kollamthodi et al, above n 99, 5; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), above n 87, Volume 2, 
Chapter 4, 4.1, p 4.6. The IPCC defines ‘fugitive emissions’ as the ‘intentional or unintentional release of GHGs 
during the extraction, processing and delivery of fossil fuels to the point of final use’.  
114 Ibid.  
115 Ibid.  
116 Ibid.  




Ozone Layer, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and 
its successive adjustments.118 
 
It is clear that exhaust gases are the primary source of ship emissions with CO2 being 
the most important GHG emitted by ships. Other GHG emissions from ships are less 
important in terms of quantity and of global warming potential. 119  In view of the 
dominance of C O2  in GHG emissions from international shipping, in practice the 
question of how to reduce GHG emissions from international shipping is often narrowly 
interpreted as how to reduce CO2 emissions from international shipping.120 
 
1.2.2.2 General Emissions Statistics from International Shipping 
 
The emissions from shipping, especially international shipping, have been increasing in 
recent years at a high rate. In 2007, CO2 emissions from international shipping reached 
870 million tonnes (Table 1.2), which accounted for 2.7 per cent of the global emissions 
of C O2  (Figure 1.3). However, in the same year, the contribution of international 
aviation to global total CO2 emissions was only 1.9 per cent (Figure 1.3). Furthermore, 
if no aggressive regulatory policies are introduced, CO2 emissions from international 
shipping may grow by 150-250 per cent by 2050 compared with 2007 due to projected 
growth in demand for maritime transport services. 121 These statistics reveal that the 
increasing trend of GHG emissions from international shipping will be maintained in 
the long term, and should be recognised as a growing problem for scientists, industry 
and environmental policy makers.  
 
                                                 
118 The 1987 Montreal Protocol was adjusted and/or amended in London 1990, Copenhagen 1992, Vienna 1995, 
Montreal 1997 and Beijing 1990 respectively, regulating HCFC-22, CFCs, halons and other relevant substances. 
Whereas the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer is basically a framework and requires 
further actions by the parties. 
119 These conclusions have been confirmed by the ‘Second IMO GHG Study 2009’. See Buhaug et al, above n 38, 1.  
120 See, eg, when the IMO started its work on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships in 1997, it adopted 
Resolution 8 on ‘CO2 emissions from ships’ which requests the IMO to undertake a study on GHG emissions from 
ships and to consider feasible emissions-reduction strategies. International Maritime Organisation (IMO), 'Main 
Events in IMO's Work on Limitation and Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping' 
(2011) <http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/resources/Pages/Greenhouse%20gas%20emissions.aspx> accessed 22 
November 2013, p 3.  




Table 1.2 Summary of GHG Emissions from Shipping* during 2007 
 
(Source: Second IMO GHG Study 2009) 




Figure 1.3 Emissions of C𝐎𝟐 from Shipping Compared with Global Total 
Emissions 




                                                 
122 The data provided in Table 1.2 and Figure 1.3 have been criticised because they do not take account of the global 
economic downturn since 2009. To provide a better foundation for IMO’s future work, an update of the 2009 IMO 
Study of GHG Emissions Estimates for International Shipping is currently being carried out and the final report is 
scheduled to be submitted to the IMO in October 2014. Report of the Expert Workshop on the Update of GHG 
Emissions Estimate for International Shipping (Update-EW), note by the Secretariat, MEPC 65th Session, Agenda 




1.2.2.3 Impacts of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping 
 
In addition to the impacts of GHG emissions on the marine environment in a 
transboundary context, discussed in Section 1.1.2, GHG emissions from international 
shipping also have some unique effects on the environment. These adverse effects 
involve atmospheric composition, human health and climate,123 and are by their nature 
transboundary and chronically accumulative.  
 
Firstly, most ships’ emissions, excluding those in ports and in the vicinity of coastlines, 
are emitted in or transported to the marine boundary layer (MBL)124 where they affect 
atmospheric composition negatively.125 Generally a ship emits locally at relatively high 
concentrations.126 Therefore, once GHG emissions from shipping are injected into the 
atmosphere, they mix with the ambient air and become diluted.127 Meanwhile, these 
emissions are chemically transformed before new secondary species (such as ozone) are 
produced, and some of them are subsequently removed from the atmosphere by wet and 
dry deposition.128 As a result, the atmosphere’s composition will be affected.  
 
Secondly, GHG emissions from international shipping may also indirectly affect human 
health by means of the formation of ground-level ozone and particulate matter. 129 
Nearly 70 per cent of the emissions from oceangoing shipping take place within 400 km 
of the coastline along the main seaborne trade routes.130 It can thus be deduced that 
most of the emissions from international shipping also occur within this distance from 
                                                 
123 See ibid 124; Eyring et al, above n 84, 4744-4759.  
124 The marine boundary layer (MBL), also known as marine atmospheric boundary layer (MABL), is where the 
ocean and atmosphere exchange large amounts of heat, moisture, and momentum, primarily via turbulent transport. It 
is that part of the atmosphere that has direct contact and, hence, is directly influenced by the ocean. See Alvaro 
Semedo et al, 'Wave-Induced Wind in the Marine Boundary Layer' (2009) 66(8) JOURNAL OF THE 
ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES 2256, 2256.  
125 Eyring et al, above n 84, 4744-4745, 4752-4753. 
126 Ibid 4744.  
127 Ibid.  
128 Ibid 4744-4745.  
129 Ibid 4752-4754. 
130 James J. Corbett, Paul S. Fischbeck and Spyros N. Pandis, 'Global Nitrogen and Sulfur Inventories for Oceangoing 
Ships' (1999) 104(3) Journal of Geophysical Research 3457, 3465. Generally ‘oceangoing shipping’ refers to large 




coastlines. If this is the case, these emissions may be transported hundreds of kilometres 
inland, bringing about air quality problems and impacting on human health.131 
 
Thirdly, ship emissions have an impact on climate – changing clouds and radiative 
forcing (RF).132 As a residual product remaining at the end of the crude oil refining 
chain, heavy fuel oil (HFO) has been widely used by various ships due to its 
competitive price. 133 However, the by-products of combustion from HFO, including 
CO2 , black carbon (BC), nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and carbon 
monoxide (CO), produce significant impacts on climate by means of various physical 
and chemical interactions.134 
 
As discussed earlier, GHG emissions from international shipping are also transboundary 
and borderless. This constitutes a feature of international shipping and makes it difficult 
to allocate these emissions to specific countries. This is illustrated by the following 
hypothetical scenario: A ship was built in South Korea, owned by Greeks but registered 
in Panama. It was chartered by Japanese and received an order to transport iron ore from 
Australia to China. The officers and crew were Filipinos. The iron ore was eventually 
processed to produce steel products for export to Germany. In this case, there will be 




                                                 
131 Eyring et al, above n 84, 4752-4754. See also Axel Michaelowa and Karsten Krause, 'International Maritime 
Transport and Climate Policy' (2000) 35(3) Intereconomics 127, 130-131. Michaelowa and Krause assert that climate 
change also has potential positive and negative impacts on international shipping. For instance, reduction of sea ice in 
certain areas due to global warming would save the shipping cost, enhanced public awareness of the greenhouse 
effect and the implementation of the Kyoto commitments in Annex I States would make more people choose 
seaborne transport; but meanwhile sea level rise would increase the cost for protecting current port infrastructure, and 
increased run-off and precipitation would cause higher sediment load in rivers.  
132 Buhaug et al, above n 38, 112. As a common metric to quantify climate impacts from different sources in units of 
W/m2, RF refers to ‘the change in the Earth - atmosphere energy balance since the pre-industrial period’.  
133 P. Crist, 'Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Potential from International Shipping' (OECD/ITF, 2009). In this 
report, Crist asserts that vessels engaged in coastal trips use either HFO or lighter marine distillate oil, and HFO 
accounts for about 77 per cent of total maritime transport fuel usage. 
134 See Buhaug et al, above n 38, 112; Eyring et al, above n 84, 4766.  
135 The nature of GHG emissions from international shipping was one of the main reasons why the SBSTA of the 
UNFCCC did not reach consensus on the allocation of GHG emissions from bunker fuels to specific countries in 




1.3 Statement of the Problem 
 
The global community is experiencing rapid physical and technological changes, 
shaping every aspect of human life. Climate change is altering ecosystems and affecting 
communities around the globe. It has become one of the most prominent issues of 
global concern. There is mounting evidence that GHG emissions from international 
shipping contribute significantly to climate change.136 Since limiting climate change 
requires ‘substantial and sustained reductions’ of GHG emissions, 137  the global 
community has turned its attention to mitigating these emissions. The 1992 UNFCCC 
and its Kyoto Protocol represent some of these achievements.  
 
Given the growing contribution of GHG emissions from international shipping to global 
climate change, the international community has realised the importance of reducing 
shipping emissions and has made some regulatory efforts. To date international 
regulatory initiatives on addressing GHG emissions from international shipping have 
been conducted within two parallel regimes: the international climate change regime 
and the IMO GHG reductions regime. Under the international climate regulatory 
process, the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, as well as their various Conferences of 
the Parties (COPs) and the COPs serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (CMPs), have been discussing this GHG issue since 1996. Within the IMO, 
Party members have been discussing and negotiating the approaches to regulating the 
GHG emissions issue since 1997 when the IMO adopted Resolution 8 on ‘C O2 
emissions from ships’, which requested the IMO to undertake a study on GHG 
emissions from ships and consider feasible CO2 reduction strategies.  
 
No substantial outcomes on the reduction of GHG emissions from international 
shipping have been achieved under the UNFCCC process. Within the IMO the 
regulatory framework for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping 
is in the preliminary stages of its development although other vessel source pollution 
has been comprehensively regulated by the IMO. On 15 July 2011, the IMO adopted 
                                                 
136 See, eg, IPCC, above n 3; Buhaug et al, above n 38; Eyring et al, above n 84.  




amendments to Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 from technical and operational 
perspectives. This revision makes mandatory the Energy Efficiency Design Index 
(EEDI) for new ships and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) for 
all ships, representing ‘the first ever mandatory global greenhouse gas reduction regime’ 
for the international shipping industry. 138 However, it is still arguable whether this 
regulation can lead to an absolute GHG emissions reduction,139 and whether market-
based measures (MBMs) should be adopted for furthering the reduction of GHG 
emissions from international shipping. These controversies still remain even after 
further amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 were adopted in April 2014.  
 
The goal of the international community in tackling climate change is to limit to two 
degrees Celsius the increase in the global average temperature by 2100.140 However, a 
report in 2013 by the Asian Development Bank reveals that an increase of two degrees 
Celsius by 2050 is ‘almost unavoidable’.141 With the exponential growth in international 
seaborne trade, GHG emissions from international shipping will continue to have 
adverse impacts on the environment, human health and climate change. As such, a 
recent study suggests that the above two degrees goal might be achievable provided that 
international shipping is to make its ‘fair and proportionate contribution’, namely CO2 
emissions from international shipping need to be cut within the next decade and fall by 
at least 80 per cent by 2050 compared to their 1990 levels.142 The 2011 amendments to 
Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 are the first mandatory reduction regime on this GHG 
                                                 
138 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Mandatory Energy Efficiency Measures for International Shipping 
Adopted at IMO Environment Meeting (15 July 2011) <http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/42-
mepc-ghg.aspx> accessed 25 August 2011.  
139 See, eg, an IMO-commissioned assessment study in 2011 indicates that based on the 2010 CO2 emissions level, it 
is almost impossible to achieve absolute emission reduction from 2010 to 2050 using the EEDI and SEEMP alone. 
Zabi Bazari and Tore Longva, 'Assessment of IMO Mandated Energy Efficiency Measures for International Shipping' 
( IMO Doc MEPC 63/INF.2, Annex, 31 October 2011) executive summary, p 8.  
140 The two degrees Celsius goal was first put forward by the G-8 in 2009, and later agreed in the Copenhagen 
Accord. In 2010 this goal was formally incorporated into the UNFCCC process. Nevertheless, the specific reduction 
targets and time frame for achieving this goal have not yet been agreed under the UNFCCC process. Lavanya 
Rajamani, 'The Cancun Climate Agreements: Reading the Text, Subtext and Tea Leaves' (2011) 60(2) The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 499, 501.  
141 Michael Westphal, Gordon Hughes and Jorn Brommelhorster (eds), Economics of Climate Change in East Asia 
(Asian Development Bank, 2013) executive summary, xvi.  
142 A. Bows-Larkin et al, 'High Seas, High Stakes: High Seas Project Final Report' (Tyndall Centre for Climate 
Change Research, University of Manchester, 2014) 
<http://www.mace.manchester.ac.uk/media/eps/schoolofmechanicalaerospaceandcivilengineering/research/centres/ty




issue, but they were not adopted by consensus and only entered into force on 1 January 
2013. It is thus not easy to achieve the 80 per cent reduction target as suggested in this 
study. Accordingly, how to construct a sound regulatory framework for the reduction of 
GHG emissions from international shipping becomes the key to addressing this 
problem, which involves balancing the interests of different stakeholders, including the 
UN, the IMO, the shipping industry, and various flag and port States.  
 
1.4 Objective of the Research 
 
The objective of this thesis is to provide an analysis of international law principles 
relevant to the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping, and the legal 
and policy responses to this issue from the key stakeholders: the UN, the IMO, the 
shipping industry and various flag and port States. This analysis underpins the 
subsequent suggestions regarding the ways to improve the current legal, policy and 
institutional framework for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping 
so as to mitigate these emissions more effectively and efficiently. To achieve this goal, 
the structure of the analysis proceeds as follows: 
 
(1) Examining the sources of GHG emissions from international shipping and how they 
affect the climate, the marine environment and human health;  
(2) Examining relevant international law principles and how they apply to the reduction 
of GHG emissions from international shipping;  
(3) Analysing the legal, policy and institutional responses by the UN, IMO, the shipping 
industry, and flag and port States;  
(4) Identifying gaps existing in the current regulatory framework; and 
(5) Proposing gap-filling options for improving the current regulatory framework for the 
reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping.  
 
1.5 Research Questions and Methods 
 




(1) What is the current regulatory framework for the reduction of GHG emissions from 
international shipping? 
(2) What are the possible deficiencies or gaps in the current regulatory framework for 
the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping? and,  
(3) What are the main options for improving the current regulatory regime in reducing 
GHG emissions from international shipping? 
 
In order to answer these questions, eight sub-questions will be considered: 
(1) Does international shipping contribute to GHG emissions and climate change? 
(2) If so, how does international shipping contribute to GHG emissions and climate 
change? 
(3) Has the international community, including the UN, IMO, the shipping industry and 
flag and port States, responded to the issue of GHG emissions from international 
shipping? If yes, what are the responses? 
(4) Does the current regulatory regime work well? If not, what aspects need to be 
improved? 
(5) What are the main options to improve these deficiencies existing in current 
regulatory frameworks? What is the nature and purpose of each option and how would 
it be implemented? 
(6) How can the relevant international law principles be incorporated into options to 
reduce GHG emissions from international shipping? 
(7) How can the interests of developed countries and developing countries (also in this 
context known as, UNFCCC Annex I countries and non-Annex I countries) be 
balanced? and,  
(8) What kind of institutional arrangements should be established if these adopted 
technical and operational measures are to be improved and proposed MBMs are to be 
adopted? 
 
The global regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping is currently in its 
preliminary stage. Accordingly, the benchmark that is to be employed to assess legal 
frameworks relating to this GHG issue is mainly relevant international law principles. 




questions, the identification, collection, review, and assessment of broad primary and 
secondary sources will be conducted. Comparative and analytic research methods play 
an essential role throughout the thesis. For instance, to examine the responses from the 
UN, IMO, the shipping industry and flag and port States, the primary resources relied 
upon are various international, regional, bilateral, and national binding and non-binding 
instruments and cases relating to climate change and GHG emissions from international 
shipping. Examples are UN conventions, IMO treaties, resolutions, codes, guidelines 
and reports, and other policy documents including the proceedings of meetings and 
workshops relating to the GHG emissions from international shipping. These materials 
make it possible to compare different State practices and analyse the documents 
submitted by various States and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to the IMO. 
The interests of both developing and developed countries therefore become clearer, 
which serve as one of the vital criteria for providing gap-filling options. This thesis 
relies on primary sources from various international fora dated before July 2014. 
Another example is the analysis of a broad range of secondary resources including 
books, articles and reports. The literature review deepens the understanding of 
international law principles, and underpins the application of these principles to GHG 
emissions from international shipping. 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is composed of eight chapters. Chapter 1, the introductory chapter, 
introduces the relationship between climate change and GHG emissions, in particular 
GHG emissions from international shipping. This provides a background for addressing 
GHG emissions from international shipping. The introductory chapter also summarises 
the statement of the problem, objective of the research, research questions and methods 
and the thesis structure. Chapter 2 examines international law principles regarding 
international environmental responsibility and explores the possibility of applying these 
principles to the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. These 
principles are liability for transboundary harm, the precautionary principle, common but 
differentiated responsibility, no more favourable treatment, and the polluter-pays 




IMO, the shipping industry, and flag and port States, as well as the final gap-filling 
options.  
 
The UN, IMO, the shipping industry, flag States and port States are the main 
stakeholders of this GHG emissions issue. Chapters 3 to 6 analyse and assess the legal, 
policy and institutional responses from these stakeholders in order to understand the 
current regulatory framework for this issue as well as to identify the gaps existing in this 
framework. It is hypothesised that the differing regulatory interests of these 
stakeholders have prevented them from making significant efforts to address this issue 
and achieving more progress. 
 
Chapter 7 identifies the gaps existing in the current regulatory framework for this GHG 
emissions issue, and explores gap-filling options based on international law principles 
and responses from main stakeholders as analysed in previous chapters. The final 
chapter synthesises the results of the research and concludes with a summary of findings 
and recommendations from previous chapters. Table 1.3 provides the line of argument 





Table 1.3 Thesis Chapters and Main Line of Argument 
 Chapter  Main line of argument 
One 
Introduction 
Introduction to thesis topic, an overview of research objective, 
questions and methods, and main line of argument. 
Two 
International environmental 
law responsibility and its 
application to the issue of GHG 
emissions from international 
shipping 
This chapter examines the possibility of applying international 
law principles to the reduction of GHG emissions from 
international shipping. These principles are: liability for 
transboundary harm, the precautionary principle, common but 
differentiated responsibility, no more favourable treatment, and 
the polluter-pays principle. It is argued that these principles are 
applicable to this GHG emissions issue. 
Three 
UN response to the issue of 
GHG emissions from 
international shipping 
The UN’s legal and institutional response to the GHG emissions 
issue, in particular its initiatives under the global climate change 
regime, is analysed. It is suggested that the UN needs to make 
more efforts in tackling this GHG emissions issue.  
Four 
IMO response to the issue of 
GHG emissions from 
international shipping 
The IMO’s GHG mandate and the IMO GHG emissions regime, 
in particular the outcomes achieved within the MEPC, are 
discussed. It is argued that the IMO’s regulatory initiatives 
represent an advance in addressing this GHG issue but also 
create challenges for their implementation. 
Five 
Response from the shipping 
industry to the issue of GHG 
emissions from international 
shipping 
This chapter examines the response from international and 
regional shipping organisations to this GHG emissions issue, 
and then discusses the responses from the shipping industries in 
UNFCCC Annex I States and non-Annex I States respectively. 
Case studies suggest that national shipping industries took 
divergent views on this GHG emissions issue due to their 
differing regulatory interests. 
Six 
Response from flag States and 
port States to the issue of GHG 
emissions from international 
shipping 
Based on the analyses of flag State control and port State 
control, this chapter examines the responses from main flag 
States and port States, as well as global and regional port State 
organisations, to this GHG emissions issue. Case studies suggest 
that in comparison with UNFCCC Annex I flag States, non-
Annex I flag States have more diverse responses towards this 
GHG issue due to their differing regulatory interests.  
Seven 
The future development of 
legal and institutional 
frameworks to reduce GHG 
emissions from international 
shipping 
This chapter identifies the gaps existing in the current regulatory 
framework for this GHG emissions issue, and explores gap-
filling options based on international law principles and 




The responses from main stakeholders to this GHG emissions 
issue are synthesised, which combined with the application of 
relevant international law principles, underpin the 
recommendations for furthering the reduction of GHG 
emissions from international shipping. Suggestions for steps 
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Customary international law, general principles of law, and normative instruments have 
shaped and advanced the development of international environmental law, and with its 
evolution new norms and principles have emerged to meet new challenges.1 One of 
these challenges is how to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from international 
shipping. As the regulatory framework for GHG emissions from international shipping 
is still in the preliminary stages of its development, the application of the current or new 
principles of international environmental law to this issue will provide theoretical 
support for the further development of this framework. 
 
This chapter examines the key principles and rules of international environmental law as 
reflected in treaties, binding acts of international organisations, state practice and soft 
law commitments, and applies them to the problem of GHG emissions from 
international shipping. This chapter is set out in six parts. The first part discusses the 
concept of ‘pollution’ and its relationship with GHG emissions from international 
shipping. The second part identifies the jurisdiction over this problem. The third part 
explores the environmental liability for transboundary harm caused by GHG emissions 
from international shipping. The fourth part examines the precautionary principle as it 
applies to the issue. The fifth part reviews the evolution and implications of the 
principle of ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibility’ (CBDR) and the ‘No More 
Favourable Treatment’ (NMFT) principle, and examines how to apply these principles 
to the problem under review. The last part seeks to identify the optimal allocation of 
responsibility among the relevant stakeholders in GHG emissions from international 
shipping in accordance with the ‘Polluter-Pays’ principle. 
 
To better understand the nature of GHG emissions from international shipping and 
relate the problem to current treaties, the relationship between this GHG emissions issue 
and ‘pollution’ will first be examined. Various law of the sea obligations will apply if 
                                                 
1 Alexandre Charles Kiss and Dinah Shelton, International Environmental Law (Transnational Publishers, 3rd ed, 




the GHG emissions from international shipping come under the definition of ‘pollution’ 
in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).2 
 
2.1.1 The Concept of ‘Pollution’ 
 
There is no uniform definition of ‘pollution’ in international law.3 The term ‘pollution’ 
is used with different meanings depending on differing contexts and purposes.4 For the 
purpose of this thesis, a definition of ‘marine pollution’ or ‘pollution of the marine 
environment’ is examined. Treaty definitions of ‘pollution’, in particular ‘marine 
pollution’, have expanded over time. Among various definitions, two typically reflect a 
change of views over time by the international community. One example is the narrow 
definition of ‘marine pollution’ initially adopted by the Joint Group of Experts on 
Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP) in 1969. Under the GESAMP 
definition, ‘marine pollution’ means 
 
‘the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances into the marine environment 
(including estuaries) resulting in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources, hazards 
to human health, hindrance to marine activities including fishing, impairment of quality for use 
of sea water and reduction of amenities.’5 [emphasis added] 
 
This definition was adopted by the 1972 Stockholm United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment and the 1976 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution but added the words ‘or energy’ after the word 
‘substances’. 6  The 1974 Paris Convention on Prevention of Marine Pollution from 
                                                 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 16 November 1994) (‘LOSC’).  
3 See, eg, V. S. Russell, 'Pollution: Concept and Definition' (1974) 6(3) Biological Conservation 157, 157; Timothy J. 
Sullivan, 'Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution' (1984) 12(2) Ecology 
Law Quarterly 423, 423.  
4  Patricia W. Birnie, Alan E. Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2009) 189; R.B. Clark, Marine Pollution (Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2001) 8-9. Clark 
asserts that the word ‘pollution’ may be utilised broadly to refer to ‘the environmental damage caused by wastes 
discharged into the sea (“inputs”)’, ‘the occurrence of wastes in the sea (“contamination”)’, or ‘the wastes themselves 
(“pollution”)’. However, ‘pollution’ often means ‘the wastes themselves’ in the context of marine environment. There 
is also no generally accepted definition of pollution in municipal law. This issue is further discussed in next section.  
5 Qing-nan Meng, Land-based Marine Pollution: International Law Development (Graham & Trotman, 1987) 4; Joint 
Group of Experts on Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP), 'Report of the First Session (London, UN 
Doc.GESAMP I/11, 1969) ' (1969) 5.  
6 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, signed 16 February 1976, 15 ILM 300 
(entered into force 12 February 1978) art 2(a). See also, Daud Hassan, Protecting the Marine Environment from Land 




Land-based Sources developed this definition by expanding the scope of harms to 
‘marine ecosystems and other legitimate uses of the sea’.7 Generally the definitions of 
pollution in the above conventions encompass a comparatively narrow scope of harms 
to the marine environment. 
 
Subsequently, a broader definition of pollution was adopted by treaties such as the 1979 
Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP),8 and the 
1982 LOSC.9 Under this later definition, ‘pollution (of the marine environment)’ refers 
to 
 
‘the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine 
environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects 
as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine 
activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use 
of sea water and reduction of amenities.’10 [emphasis added] 
 
Through the comparison of the above italicised parts, we can find that the second 
definition of pollution represents at least two improvements on the first one. In the first 
place, the definition in the LOSC also includes the risk of harm to ecosystems, 
endangered species and other forms of marine life while the first one only refers to 
actual harms. This approach is more consistent with the precautionary principle,11 and 
can be deemed as an advance on the ground that it can better protect the environment or 
human health from potential damage. In the second place, concerning the adverse effect 
of pollution, the second definition focuses on environmental conservation broadly while 
the first one is more anthropocentric, stressing the ‘impact on resources or amenities 
useful to man’ narrowly.12 Generally the LOSC definition predominates in definitions 
favoured by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 
                                                 
7 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources, opened for signature 4 June 1974, 13 
ILM 352 (entered into force 6 May 1978) art 1(1).  
8 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature 13 November 1979, 18 ILM 1442 
(entered into force 16 March 1983) art 1(a) (‘CLRTAP’).  
9 LOSC art 1(4).  
10 Ibid.  
11 See below 2.4. The precautionary principle, sometimes called ‘the precautionary approach’, exhorts decision-
makers, ‘where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage’, not to use ‘lack of full scientific certainty…as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’. See also Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, 31 ILM 874 (14 June 1992) principle 15 (‘Rio Declaration’).  




the International Law Association (ILA) in that it ‘presents a much more clear 
environmental perspective’. 13  However, some scholars advocate that there are only 
‘slight amendments’ between the two definitions.14  
 
Several implications of the LOSC definition of marine pollution are notable. Firstly, 
‘introduction by man’ indicates that pollution occurs only due to human activities. 
Secondly, ‘directly or indirectly’ ‘into the marine environment’ refers to the marine 
environment including all maritime zones (high seas, exclusive economic zone, 
continental shelf, contiguous zone, territorial sea and internal waters), water column, 
seabed and subsoil. Thirdly, the expression ‘substances or energy’ encompasses solid, 
liquid, gaseous materials objects, noise, vibrations, heat and radiation.15 However, this 
scope may be adjusted and potential new pollutants may be added with advancing 
technology and amendments to international treaties.  
 
Fourthly, the expression ‘deleterious effects’ indicates that the threshold for pollution is 
that human activity leads to ‘significant’ environmental impact, such as endangering 
human health or resources.16 Based on the International Law Commission (ILC) First 
Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of Loss in Case of Transboundary Harm 
Arising out of Hazardous Activities, ‘significant’ harm may be judged from two factors: 
one is that it is “more than de minimis, ‘negligible’, ‘detectable’, or ‘appreciable’ but 
need not be at the level of ‘serious’ or ‘substantial’”; the other is that it “must lead to 
real detrimental effects on such aspects as human health, industry, property, the 
environment or agriculture in other states, measured by factual and objective 
standards”.17 Since ‘pollution’ falls into a category of environmental harm, it is arguable 
                                                 
13 Ibid, 189. 
14 See, eg, Meng, above n 5.  
15 Kiss and Shelton, above n 1, 176.  
16 Ibid 177. But see Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 186-188. Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell assert that it is very 
controversial to determine the threshold at which harm to the environment becomes a breach of obligation. Many 
treaties and cases impose ‘significant’ or ‘serious or irreversible damage’ to qualify reference to deleterious effects, 
while none of the relevant civil-liability conventions requires environmental harm to be serious or significant. Thus, 
they criticise that this difference may allow the utility of the activity to outweigh the seriousness of the harm (for 
instance, caused by pollution) and have the effect of converting an obligation to prevent harm (an absolute obligation) 
into an obligation of diligence or into a constraint on abuse of rights. 
17 Pemmaraju Sreenivasa  Rao, 'First Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of Loss in Case of Transboundary 
Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, International Law Commission, 55th Session, 5 May-6 June and 7 July-8 




that if a type of transbounary harm is ‘more than detectable’ and has caused actual 
detrimental effects, this harm meets the threshold of being a type of pollution even 
though this harm is not ‘serious’ or ‘substantial’.  
 
Technically the LOSC definition of marine pollution adopts a traditional approach, 
which relates pollution to ‘a certain level of seriousness either in volume or in the 
context of their location’.18 While this approach has been widely adopted by various 
treaties, the 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 (1996 Protocol to London Dumping 
Convention)19 provided an alternative. This opposite approach is called the ‘reverse 
listing’ where all waste dumping is deemed as pollution unless it can be proved 
harmless. 20  It appears that the 1996 Protocol provides more stringent criteria on 
pollution. However, this Protocol essentially adopts the LOSC definition of pollution 
except that the term ‘substances or energy’ is replaced by ‘wastes or other matter’.21 
Therefore, it is vital to judge whether something is a ‘waste or other matter’ before 
putting it under the category of pollution in this treaty. The Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 (London 
Dumping Convention) provides that, 
 
‘The Contracting Parties pledge themselves to promote, within the competent 
specialised agencies and other international bodies, measures to protect the marine 
environment against pollution caused by: 
(c) wastes generated in the course of operation of vessels, aircraft platforms and other 
man-made structures at sea.’22 [emphasis added] 
 
                                                 
18 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 189.  
19 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, opened 
for signature 7 November 1996, EMuT 972:96/D (entered into force 24 March 2006) (‘1996 Protocol to London 
Dumping Convention’).  
20 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 189.  
21 1996 Protocol to London Dumping Convention art 1(10). This article provides that,  
‘“pollution” means the introduction, directly or indirectly, by human activity, of wastes or other matter into the sea 
which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine ecosystems, 
hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, 
impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.’ 
22 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature 




This provision indicates that wastes generated from shipping operations could cause 
pollution. In other words, these wastes could be regarded as pollution under the London 
Dumping Convention.  
 
Finally, ‘deleterious effects’ should result from these ‘substances or energy’. This 
cause-effect relationship, however, is sometimes difficult to measure in practice and 
relies heavily on scientific evidence.23 It is arguable that these five factors could be 
utilised to judge whether a substance or energy is a type of marine pollution, if the 
LOSC definition of marine pollution is set as a criterion.  
 
2.1.2 ‘Pollution’ and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, GHG emissions from international shipping mainly include 
CO2 , CH4 , N2O and HFC with CO2  as the most important GHG. The question of 
whether GHG emissions from international shipping are a type of pollution is 
controversial and fiercely debated. It is also important to identify the nature of shipping 
GHG emissions as GHG emissions, being a type of pollution, may trigger the 
application of many pollution-related treaties to this issue. This section examines this 
issue from two perspectives, namely whether shipping GHG emissions meet the treaty 
definition of marine pollution, and using a comparative analysis of national legislations 
on the nature of shipping GHG emissions.  
 
2.1.2.1 Legal Analysis of Treaty Definition of Pollution 
 
The five implications drawn from the LOSC definition of pollution as discussed in the 
previous section can be summarised into three questions in the context of GHG 
emissions from international shipping. They are: (1) whether GHG emissions from 
international shipping are anthropogenic? (2) Whether they are ‘substances or energy’ 
or ‘wastes or other matter’ being brought into the marine environment? And, (3) 
whether they lead to ‘deleterious effects’? GHG emissions from international shipping 
                                                 
23 For example, to identify the adverse effects from GHG emissions by international shipping is often difficult. This 




can be treated as a type of pollution if they meet the three criteria incorporated in the 
three questions.  
 
Firstly, are GHG emissions from international shipping all anthropogenic? According to 
the analysis in Chapter 1, GHGs consist of natural gases and anthropogenic sources of 
emissions and GHG emissions from international shipping include emissions of exhaust 
gases, emissions of refrigerants, cargo emissions and other emissions. Emissions of 
exhaust gases mainly come from engines, boilers and incinerators, and cargo emissions 
result from leakages of refrigerant and volatile compounds emissions from liquid cargo. 
Such emissions mainly come from engines, refrigerants and other equipment. Therefore 
it is axiomatic that GHG emissions from international shipping are human-induced. 
 
Secondly, are GHG emissions from international shipping ‘substances or energy’ or 
‘wastes or other matter’ being brought into the marine environment? Based on the 
above definition of ‘substances or energy’, gaseous materials including GHG emissions 
from international shipping are within this category. Indeed, GHG emissions from ships 
have been deemed to be a kind of ‘substance’, both theoretically and practically. Annex 
VI to International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 
73/78) provides that ‘[e]mission means any release of substances subject to control by 
this Annex from ships into the atmosphere or sea’.24 The Australian Government and 
some Australian States and Territories have regulated carbon-based products in onshore 
underground storage areas in order to facilitate, promote and encourage the storage of 
GHG substances in geological formations. 25  Examples include Greenhouse Gas 
Geological Sequestration Act 2008 (Vic) section 1, Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 
(Qld) section 3, Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Act 2000 (SA) section 3(a), Barrow 
Island Act 2003 (WA), Carbon Capture and Storage Act (Cth) section 3. GHG 
emissions are treated as ‘substances’ under MARPOL 73/78 and above national 
legislations.  
 
                                                 
24 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), signed 2 November 1973, 
12 ILM 1319, as amended by the 1978 Protocol to the 1973 Convention, 1341 UNTS 3, 17 ILM 546 (entered into 
force 2 October 1983) annex VI reg 2(7).  
25 Nicola Durrant, 'Carbon Capture and Storage Laws in Australia: Project Facilitation or a Precautionary Approach?' 




Whether GHG emissions from international shipping are ‘wastes or other matter’ as 
defined under the London Dumping Convention is not so straightforward. The London 
Dumping Convention prohibits the dumping of all ‘wastes and other matter’ listed in 
Annex I and requires a prior special permit for the dumping of wastes listed in Annex 
II.26 However, as the most important shipping GHG emission, CO2 is not specifically 
referred to in either Annex I or Annex II. It was argued that CO2 would fall under the 
‘industrial waste’ category in Annex I if it is produced from a ‘manufacturing or 
processing operation’.27 Based on this understanding, CO2 derived from fossil fuels has 
been regarded as an ‘industrial waste’ by the Scientific Group of the London Dumping 
Convention, as well as the United Kingdom Government.28 Furthermore, CO2 streams 
from CO2 capture processes for sequestration have been formally regarded as ‘may be 
considered for dumping being mindful of the Objectives and General Obligations of the 
[1996] Protocol set out in articles 2 and 3’.29 While shipping CO2 may derive from a 
ship’s ‘manufacturing or processing operation’, it is arguable that shipping CO2 may 
fall within the category of ‘industrial waste’ and thus make it a type of pollution under 
the London Dumping Convention. The amended 1996 Protocol to London Dumping 
Convention only treats CO2 streams from CO2 capture processes for sequestration as a 
type of dumping. Nevertheless, the fact that shipping C O2  may dissolve into the 
seawater and be absorbed into the seabed30 reveals that shipping CO2 is of a similar 
nature to CO2 from CO2 capture processes for sequestration. Thus theoretically shipping 
C O2  may also be treated as dumping, or pollution under the London Dumping 
Convention. 
 
Thirdly, do GHG emissions from international shipping lead to ‘deleterious effects’? As 
discussed earlier, the environmental harm caused by pollution needs to be ‘more than 
detectable’, but it need not be ‘serious’ or ‘substantial’. GHGs are emitted during the 
                                                 
26 London Dumping Convention art IV(1).  
27 Yvette Carr, 'The International Legal Issues Relating to the Facilitation of Sub-seabed CO2 Sequestration Projects 
in Australia' (2007) 14 Australian International Law Journal 137, 143; Ray Purdy and Richard Macrory, Geological 
Carbon Sequestration: Critical Legal Issues (January 2004) Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research 
<http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/wp45.pdf> accessed 1 May 2014, p 21.  
28 Purdy and Macrory, above n 27. However, this view has not achieved consensus among various countries.  
29 1996 Protocol to London Dumping Convention (as amended in 2006) annex I, 1.8.  
30 Duncan E. J. Currie and Kateryna Wowk, 'Climate Change and CO2 in the Oceans and Global Oceans Governance' 




whole voyage of a vessel. The amount of discharge depends on many factors such as 
engine and ship design, cargo volume, and shipping speed.31 These features make GHG 
emissions from international shipping cumulative, and indicate that not all such 
emissions bring about ‘significant’ environmental impact so as to be ‘more than 
detectable’. However, in practice, the problem of how to measure whether GHG 
emissions are ‘significant’ is not straightforward. It needs to be assessed on a case-by-
case basis. What is significant also depends on the specific context of each case, such as 
‘the nature of the harm in question, the risk it poses, the location of the harm in relation 
to natural features and human activity’, and ‘the particular capabilities of the state in 
question’, and these factors may vary over time.32 The inevitable subjective elements 
incorporated in these factors suggest that the judgement of ‘deleterious effects’ caused 
by shipping GHG emissions can never be totally objective. 
 
It may be concluded that theoretically GHG emissions from international shipping meet 
the main characteristics reflected from the treaty definition of pollution and hence could 
be regarded as a type of pollution provided that these emissions engender ‘deleterious 
effects’ or lead to ‘significant’ environmental impact, or they could be treated as 
‘wastes’ under the London Dumping Convention. Therefore, it is arguable that GHG 
emissions from international shipping are by their nature a type of ‘conditional’ 
pollution. In other words, GHG emissions from ships can be treated as pollution under 
certain circumstances. This view is also consistent with the regulatory practice within 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO). In July 2011 the reduction of GHG 
emissions from international shipping was regulated in the form of amendments of 
Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, which relates to air ‘pollution’ from ships. 
 
2.1.2.2 National Legislation on the Legal Nature of GHG Emissions 
 
                                                 
31 These can be inferred according to the categories of GHG emissions from international shipping as discussed in 
Chapter 1, 1.2.2.2. There are mainly four categories of GHG emissions from international shipping, namely emissions 
of exhaust gases (from sources such as engines, auxiliary engines, boilers and incinerators), emissions of refrigerants, 
cargo emissions and others.  
32 Rebecca M. Bratspies and Russell A. Miller (eds), Transboundary Harm in International Law: Lessons from the 
Trail Smelter Arbitration (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 112. See also Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 




Given that GHG emissions from ships are a type of ‘conditional’ pollution, different 
countries have adopted national legislation on the basis that GHG emissions, including 
those from international shipping, are pollutants. Some countries listed in Annex I to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have regulated 
GHG emissions as pollutants, 33 whereas many non-Annex I countries to the UNFCCC 
leave GHG emissions unregulated. 
 
The United States of America (US) is one of those countries that have regulated GHG 
emissions as air pollutants. The Clean Air Act of the US provides that,  
 
‘the Administration [Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)] shall conduct a basic 
engineering research and technology program to develop, evaluate, and demonstrate 
nonregulatory strategies and technologies for air pollution prevention….Such program 
shall include the following elements: 
(1) Improvements in nonregulatory strategies and technologies for preventing or 
reducing multiple air pollutants, including sulphur oxides, nitrogen oxides, heavy 
metals, PM-10 (particular matter), carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide, from 
stationary sources, including fossil fuel power plants.’34 [emphasis added] 
 
As the most important GHG, carbon dioxide (CO2) is regulated as an air pollutant in 
this Act. In 2009 the Environmental Protection Agency of the US announced that CO2 
and five other GHGs threaten public health and the environment, and thus should be 
treated as ‘dangerous pollutants’. 35  In 2005, the New Jersey State Department of 
Environmental Protection, based on the authorisation conferred on by the Air Pollution 
Control Act of New Jersey, regulated CO2  as a pollutant, 36  thereby allowing State 
regulators to cap CO2 emissions in tackling climate change. Case law has also played an 
important role in pushing and shaping this expansion of the pollution concept. In 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 37 the US Supreme Court 
held that the EPA has the authority to regulate GHG emissions as a response to petitions 
                                                 
33 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 31 ILM 848 
(entered into force 21 March 1994) (‘UNFCCC’). 
34 Clean Air Act of the United States of America, Pub L No 108-201, Stat, 42 USC §7401 et seq. (1970, as amended in 
1977 and 1990) Sec 103(g)(1).  
35  Nicolas Loris, EPA Formally Declares CO2 a Dangerous Pollutant (7 December 2009) 
<http://blog.heritage.org/2009/12/07/epa-formally-declares-co2-a-dangerous-pollutant/> accessed 1 May 2014.  
36 Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions, New Jersey Classifies Carbon Dioxide as Air Contaminant (18 October 
2005) <http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/news/2005/new-jersey-classifies-carbon-dioxide-air-contaminant> 
accessed 1 May 2014.  




filed by environmental groups and the California Attorney General. Some 
environmental groups petitioned the EPA to take actions to reduce marine emissions, 
and the California Attorney General requested the EPA to regulate GHG emissions 
from oceangoing vessels.38 The Supreme Court’s decision not only addressed similar 
petitions from other entities,39 but also accelerated the regulatory process of the US on 
GHG emissions.  
 
GHG emissions have not been explicitly regulated as air pollutants in Australia, but 
they have been treated as pollutants in some proposed schemes. The Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme (CPRS) was a cap-and-trade emission trading scheme proposed by 
the Rudd Government to the Australian Parliament in 2009.40 The aim of this scheme is 
to reduce GHG emissions through adding a price to carbon emissions. It can be 
regarded as the predecessor of the Carbon Tax scheme in Australia. 41 Although the 
CPRS failed for lack of public support, 42 the title of the scheme reveals that GHG 
emissions were regarded as a type of pollution by Australian policy makers. 
 
Compared with the US and Australia, China, as the largest developing country, has not 
regulated or limited GHG emissions in its domestic legislation. The definition and scope 
of air pollutants are not provided for in Chinese regulation such as its Environmental 
Protection Law,43 and the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law.44 It is anticipated 
                                                 
38 Timothy Nast, 'The Reponse of the International Shipping Industry to Global Climate Change' (2013) 44(1) 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commence 29, 32.  
39 Ibid 33.  
40  Parliament of Australia, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (22 October 2010) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Browse_by_Topic/Cli
mateChange/Governance/Domestic/national/cprs> accessed 1 May 2014.  
41 Australian Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Explanatory Memorandum), adopted by the Parliament of the Commonwealth 
of Australia and House of Representatives (2010-2011), Policy Context, p 12. Australia’s carbon tax scheme, also 
called carbon pricing mechanism, is incorporated into the Australian Clean Energy Bill 2011. This scheme 
commenced on 1 July 2012 with a price that will be fixed for the first three years, and it was expected that on 1 July 
2015 the carbon price will transition to a fully flexible price under an emissions trading scheme when the price will 
be determined by the market. However, this scheme was finally abolished by the current Abbott Government on 17 
July 2014. See Lenore Tayor, Australia Kills Off Carbon Tax (17 July 2014) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/17/australia-kills-off-carbon-tax> accessed 17 July 2014.  
42 Parliament of Australia, above n 40.  
43 Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the 11th Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on 26 December 1989, and amended on 24 April 2014 . 
44 Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted in 1987 and amended in 




that GHGs will not be regulated as a type of pollution in Chinese legislation in the short 
term. It was argued that the regulation of GHGs (mainly CO2,) as air pollutants would 
slow down Chinese economic development and trigger the application of more 
international treaty obligations.45 As a non-Annex I State to the UNFCCC, China does 
not have compulsory emissions reduction targets which justify China’s deregulation of 
GHG emissions. Similar to China, other large developing countries such as India, Brazil 
and South Africa also have not regulated GHG emissions in their national legislation.  
 
It is concluded that theoretically GHG emissions from international shipping can be 
regarded as a type of ‘conditional’ pollution. This theoretical assertion provides 
considerable scope for various countries to adopt differing legislative choices on the 
legal nature of GHG emissions. In practice some developed countries have regulated 
GHG emissions as pollutants while most developing countries have not regulated GHG 
emissions, which is consistent with their respective obligations under the Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC.46  
 
2.2 Jurisdiction over Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping 
 
In international law, responsibility occurs when the legal interest of one subject of the 
law is invaded by another legal person.47 To determine international environmental law 
responsibility and how it applies to specific areas, a good understanding of the 
principles of State jurisdiction is fundamental. Given that GHG emissions from 
international shipping can be regarded as a type of ‘conditional’ pollution, many treaties 
relating to marine environmental pollution, including the 1982 LOSC and MARPOL 
73/78, will apply to this GHG issue. The next part discusses the concept of jurisdiction, 
and examines State jurisdiction over GHG emissions from international shipping from 
                                                 
45 李志文[Li Zhiwen], '《船舶温室气体减排国际立法的新发展及其启示》[New Development of International 
Regulation in Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships and Enlightenments to China]' (2012) 152(6) 法商研
究 Journal of Studies in Law and Business 141, 145.  
46 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 16 March 
1998, 37 ILM 22 (entered into force 16 February 2005) .  




three perspectives, namely flag State jurisdiction, coastal State jurisdiction and port 
State jurisdiction.48  
 
2.2.1 The Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’ 
 
As a fundamental concept of international law, State jurisdiction over a particular event 
is a key to analysing many international disputes. In the context of marine pollution 
regulation, ‘jurisdiction’ refers to ‘the competence of states to prescribe and enforce 
legislation against vessels engaged in pollution’.49 This definition indicates that there 
are two types of jurisdiction. One is ‘prescriptive’ or ‘legislative’ jurisdiction, which 
empowers a State to ‘enact or promulgate substantive pollution control standards’.50 
These standards, especially those applying in zones beyond the internal waters and 
territorial sea of a State, should comply with ‘generally accepted’ international 
standards and are often consistent with ‘internationally agreed’ standards.51 They are 
generally not beyond internationally accepted standards in order to ensure the freedom 
of navigation.52 In the case of GHG emissions from international shipping, the IMO is 
the international organisation which drafts such standards. The second type of 
jurisdiction is ‘enforcement’ jurisdiction, which authorises a State to ‘prevent or punish 
the actual violation of the relevant standards’.53 Some scholars have raised another so 
called ‘adjudicative’ or ‘judicial’ jurisdiction, referring to ‘the power of national courts 
or tribunals to adjudicate prosecutions against a vessel or a person for transgressions of 
prescribed standards’. 54  In this thesis ‘enforcement’ jurisdiction is interpreted as 
encompassing the ‘adjudicative’ or ‘judicial’ authority of States consistent with the 
                                                 
48 Flag State control and the issue of ‘Flag of Convenience’, and port State control, are examined separately in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
49 Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution: the Law and Politics of International Regulation (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 176.  
50 Ibid.  
51 LOSC arts 211(2), 212(1). See also ibid. Tan asserts that under certain circumstances, international law may 
endorse the prescription of national standards. 
52 See LOSC arts 17, 58.  
53 Tan, above n 49, 176.  
54 Ibid. See also R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 3rd ed, 1999) 344. 
Churchill and Lowe subdivide enforcement jurisdiction into the competence to arrest (arrest jurisdiction) and the 




interpretation of jurisdiction adopted in international agreements such as the LOSC and 
IMO instruments55 and the approach that has been adopted by some scholars.56 
 
A flag, coastal or port State of a particular vessel has different prescriptive or 
enforcement jurisdiction.57 Historically, in order to gain an equitable balance between 
coastal and navigational interests, the jurisdiction reallocation between different State 
actors was eventually formed with the joint effort of the whole international 
community.58 Among the international achievements, the LOSC and MARPOL 73/78 
form the current jurisdiction regime in the context of vessel-source pollution. 59 
Jurisdiction under the LOSC and MARPOL 73/78 regime, however, should also apply to 
the GHG emissions from international shipping due to the nature of such emissions 
being a kind of pollution. Thus, jurisdiction over GHG emissions from international 
shipping is examined from the perspective of flag, coastal and port States respectively 
in the following parts of this section.  
 
2.2.2 Flag State Jurisdiction  
 
A flag State refers to ‘the State whose nationality a particular vessel has’,60 or in other 
words, ‘the State in which the vessel is registered or whose flag it is entitled to [fly]’.61 
In customary law, the flag State enjoys the primary jurisdiction over the ship flying its 
flag, and it is the only subject which has jurisdiction to enforce regulations applicable to 
ships on the high seas. 62 This form of jurisdiction is reflected in the provisions of 
MARPOL 73/78 and the 1982 LOSC. 
                                                 
55 For instance, in section 6 (enforcement) of LOSC, art 217(4) and art 218(1) stipulate that the flag State and port 
State may institute proceedings under certain circumstances, which are of the nature of adjudicative or judicial 
jurisdiction. See also LOSC art 62.  
56 See, eg, Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2008) 572; Tan, above n 49, 
177.  
57 Churchill and Lowe, above n 54, 344.  
58 Tan, above n 49, 177; Churchill and Lowe, above n  344-353. Through three United Nations Law of the Sea 
Conferences, coastal and port State jurisdiction expanded; flag State jurisdiction diminished but still remained 
prominent.  
59 See, eg, Churchill and Lowe, above n 54, 344-352; Tan, above n 49, 184-222; Donald Rothwell and Tim Stephens, 
The International Law of the Sea (Hart Publishing, 2010) 353-358.  
60 Churchill and Lowe, above n 54, 344.  
61 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 400.  





Under the MARPOL 73/78 regime, the flag State enjoys both prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction. Regarding prescriptive jurisdiction, flag States are required to 
adopt laws to ensure that the regulatory provisions of MARPOL 73/78 are applied to 
ships on their registries.63 Any violation of MARPOL 73/78 is to be prohibited wherever 
it occurs, and sanctions shall be established under the law of the flag State. 64 
Additionally, the penalties specified under flag State law shall be adequate in severity to 
discourage violations of MARPOL 73/78, and shall be equally severe irrespective of 
where the violations occur.65 As for enforcement jurisdiction, flag States have three 
obligations under MARPOL 73/78. Firstly, flag States are obliged to institute 
proceedings against any of their ships suspected of having violated MARPOL 73/78.66 
In order to facilitate flag State prosecution of such offences, all parties to MARPOL 
73/78 are required to report incidents at sea involving harmful substances,67no matter 
where the offence is committed. Secondly, flag States shall act appropriately to either 
inspect, investigate, or detect the ship on suspected violation of MARPOL 73/78 when 
informed of suspected violations by other parties, or impose penalties when such 
violations have been proved.68 Thirdly, flag States are to conduct surveys, to issue or 
authorise other parties to issue certificates, to ensure the compliance of their ships with 
the convention.69  
 
It is primarily the responsibility of flag States to regulate the issue of GHG emissions 
from international shipping. For instance, flag States that have ratified amendments of 
Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 shall incorporate the energy efficiency requirements for 
ships as specified in amended Annex VI into their domestic legislation, and, if 
                                                                                                                                               
Permanent Court of International Justice cited the principle that ‘no state may exercise any kind of jurisdiction over 
foreign ships on the high seas’, which indicated that foreign ships should not be arrested or detained while they are on 
the high seas. However, the flag State still exercises its jurisdiction over the ships flying its flag no matter where it is 
operating.  
63 MARPOL 73/78 art 3.  
64 MARPOL 73/78 art 4(1).  
65 MARPOL 73/78 art 4(4).  
66 MARPOL 73/78 art 4(1).  
67 MARPOL 73/78 arts 4(2), 6(3).  
68 MARPOL 73/78 art 8.  




violations occur, institute proceedings in relation to such offences. When informed of a 
suspected violation of MARPOL 73/78, the flag State is obliged to cooperate with 
relevant parties in detecting, inspecting or investigating the violation. Furthermore, flag 
States that are parties to MARPOL Annex VI shall conduct regular surveys, issue or 
empower other parties to issue the International Energy Efficiency Certificate (IEE 
Certificate) so as to comply with IMO standards.70 
 
The jurisdictional competence of flag States under LOSC is consistent with MARPOL 
73/78. Flag States are obliged to pass pollution control laws for their ships under LOSC 
provisions.71 Article 211(2) requires flag States to adopt laws and regulations to prevent 
marine pollution that ‘at least have the same effect’ as that of generally accepted 
international rules and standards.72 Since MARPOL 73/78 has been regarded by some 
scholars as representing ‘generally accepted international rules and standards [in the 
context of regulation of vessel pollution]’, it was argued that Article 211 of the LOSC 
has made MARPOL 73/78 and ‘other relevant international standards’ ‘an obligatory 
minimum’.73 Another similar view is that MARPOL 73/78 and all of its annexes ‘which 
have entered into force, and have attracted high participation’ could be treated as 
‘generally accepted international standards’. 74  However, how to judge ‘high 
participation’ remains unclear. It is arguable that both views should not apply to the 
2011 amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. This is because the 2011 
amendments to MARPOL Annex VI were adopted by a majority vote rather than a 
consensus, and some major shipping nations, such as China, Brazil, Kuwait, and Saudi 
Arabia, voted against the amendments.75 The participation was still high (49 out of 59 
parties to Annex VI voted yes), and the 2011 amendments entered into force on 1 
                                                 
70 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI regs 5-9.  
71 See, eg, LOSC art 94(1). This article reads that, ‘Every [flag] State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and 
control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag [on the high seas].’ 
72 LOSC art 211(2). This article stipulates that, 
‘States shall adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine 
environment from vessels flying their flag or of their registry. Such laws and regulations shall at least have the same 
effect as that of generally accepted international rules and standards established through the competent international 
organization or general diplomatic conference.’ 
73 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 413.  
74 Rothwell and Stephens, above n 59, 355.  
75 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Second Session, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda 




January 2013. However, it is less persuasive for the 2011 amendments of Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78 to be ‘generally accepted’ although the amendments may fall within 
the ‘internationally agreed rules’ as specified in Article 212(1) of the LOSC.76 Based on 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1969,77 Article 212(1) of 
the LOSC might be interpreted as meaning that rules adopted at the international level 
could be treated as ‘internationally agreed rules’.78 Nevertheless, Article 212(1) of the 
LOSC only requested States to ‘take into account internationally agreed rules, standards 
and recommended practices and procedures’ when they adopt laws and regulations to 
prevent, reduce and control marine pollution from or through the atmosphere. This 
provision imposes a very weak obligation on flag States.79  
 
Concerning the enforcement jurisdiction of flag States, LOSC requires flag States to 
take necessary measures for the implementation and enforcement of international rules 
and standards. 80  These measures include the investigation of pollution offences, 
inspection, certification, and instituting proceedings under certain circumstances.81 In 
fact, these measures are exactly what MARPOL 73/78 demands and are thus ‘nothing 
novel in principle’.82 
 
Therefore, flag State jurisdiction over GHG emissions from international shipping under 
the MARPOL 73/78 regime is almost the same as that under the LOSC framework. Flag 
States are primarily responsible for the regulation and control of GHG emissions from 
                                                 
76 James Harrison, 'Recent Developments and Continuing Challenges in the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from International Shipping' (2012)  University of Edinburgh Research Paper Series  
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037038> accessed 6 June 2014, pp 20, 22-23. The rules incorporated in Articles 211(1) 
and 212(1) of the LOSC are so-called ‘rules of reference’, which require parties to the LOSC to comply with rules 
and standards as specified in other international instruments.  
77 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 8 ILM 679 (entered into force 27 
January 1980) art 31(1) (‘1969 Vienna Treaty Convention’). This article provides that, 
‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ 
78 Harrison, above n 76, 23.  
79 Ibid.  
80 LOSC art 217.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 413. Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell assert that Article 217 of the LOSC just 
‘fully accords with existing customary and conventional law’ and is thus ‘nothing novel’. But see Rothwell and 
Stephens, above n 59. Rothwell and Stephens assert that ‘the LOSC does not alter the capacity of flag States to take 
action to enforce pollution control standards’, but it ‘transforms the customary law capacity into a positive 




their ships. However, in practice some flag States may not exercise their entire 
jurisdiction in terms of GHG emissions from their own fleets, and empirical survey 
suggests that flag States impose lower fines than port States with regard to the average 
fines for violating MARPOL standards.83 There are many reasons why flag States lack 
incentives to exercise such jurisdiction. For instance, GHG emissions from international 
shipping are often outside the territory of the flag State and may only imperil the 
environment of others, so the incentives for a flag State to enforce may be low.84 
Further, such enforcement is often costly. The principal, or indeed sole, interest of many 
flag States is often to obtain economic benefits by means of registration fees or taxes 
from ships registered there due to the existence of ‘flags of convenience’(FOC),85 where 
registration is the ‘only substantial connection’ with the flag State.86  
 
2.2.3 Coastal State Jurisdiction  
 
Churchill and Lowe provide an apposite definition of coastal State, based on which a 
coastal State is ‘the State in one of whose maritime zones a particular vessel lies’.87 
Different from flag States, coastal States have incentives to impose severe restrictions 
upon ships navigating within their maritime zones. In general, the pollution caused by 
ships, including GHG emissions from international shipping, often makes the coastal 
States the victim of such damage. The damage frequently occurs either in the exclusive 
economic zone or in the territorial sea of the coastal State, although such damage is 
cumulative and global in nature in the context of GHG emissions from ships. However, 
the claims for stricter jurisdiction by coastal States are restricted by the LOSC in order 
to maintain navigational rights and an equitable balance between coastal States and 
                                                 
83 Ho-Sam Bang, 'Recommendations for Policies on Port State Control and Port State Jurisdiction' (2013) 44(1) 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commence 115, 127.  
84  Michael Faure and Ying Song (eds), China and International Environmental Liability: Legal Remedies for 
Transboundary Pollution (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008) 87.  
85 Ibid 85. To date there is no uniform definition of FOC. See, eg, Egiyan defines the FOC as ‘national flags of those 
States in which shipowners register their ships so as to avoid: (a) financial obligations; and (b) the nature and 
conditions of shipping were their vessels registered in their own countries’. G. S. Egiyan, '‘Flag of Convenience’ or 
‘Open Registration’ of Ships' (1990) 14(2) Marine Policy 106, 107; Griffin defines the FOC as ‘flags of certain 
countries whose laws make it easy and attractive for ships owned by foreign nationals or companies to fly these 
flags’. Andrew Griffin, 'MARPOL 73/78 and Vessel Pollution: A Glass Half Full or Half Empty?' (1994) 1(2) Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 489, 506. 
86 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 360.  




foreign flag States. Coastal States’ jurisdiction to regulate and enforce their laws against 
vessels depends on their sovereignty or sovereign rights over maritime zones contiguous 
to their coasts, and the LOSC provides the framework for dealing with this issue. Hence 
this part examines coastal State jurisdiction based on these maritime zones under the 
LOSC, and reviews the regulations from MARPOL 73/78 and other treaties.  
 
In internal waters, such as ports, coastal States enjoy full legislative and enforcement 
jurisdiction. Generally they are free to apply national laws and determine conditions of 
entry for foreign vessels when such ports are open, but appropriate publicity and 
communication with the IMO is necessary.88 On the one hand, internal waters form part 
of the territory of coastal States thus the coastal State has full territorial sovereignty 
over these waters. 89  On the other hand, this arrangement was also recognised by 
MARPOL 73/78 and utilised by the United States and other countries in passing 
stringent national legislation applicable to foreign shipping.90 As the first State to ban 
all single-hull oil tankers from entering its ports, the US did not wait for agreement in 
the IMO, and this approach was then adopted by the European Union in a similar ban 
following the sinking of the Prestige (oil spill incident) in 2002.91 Accordingly, in the 
context of GHG emissions from international shipping, coastal States may in principle 
legislate and enforce their own national requirements on emissions, and apply them to 
their internal waters and ports as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels. 
 
In contrast to internal waters, the legislative and enforcement jurisdiction of coastal 
States in the territorial sea is not unlimited. Concerning legislative jurisdiction, the 
coastal State enjoys sovereignty, and may apply its national laws on environmental 
protection to its territorial sea. Furthermore, international treaties on dumping or 
pollution from ships accord three rights to coastal States in the territorial sea, namely 
the designation of Emission Control Areas,92 the designation and control of navigation 
                                                 
88 LOSC art 211(3).  
89 See LOSC art 211(3). The only exception is for vessels in distress, which have a right to take refuge in the nearest 
port.  
90 MARPOL 73/78 art 5(3).  
91 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 414.  
92 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI regs 2.8, 13, 14. Regulation 2.8 reads that: 




routes for safety and environmental purposes, 93  and the prohibition of pollution 
discharges.94 However, such rights should not hamper the exercise of innocent passage 
of foreign ships,95 and such laws and regulations should not include matters related to 
the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships (CDEM standards) 
‘unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards’.96 
As for enforcement by coastal States in their territorial sea, the LOSC stipulates such 
measures as inspection, proceedings and detention of foreign vessels for coastal States 
under certain circumstances.97 These measures, however, are regarded as ‘rarely used’ 
for anti-pollution purposes due to their possible hampering of innocent passage of 
foreign ships.98 
 
Regarding the issue of GHG emissions from international shipping, the coastal State’s 
jurisdiction in its territorial sea may be more in the nature of prescriptive rather than 
enforcement jurisdiction. Coastal States may adopt their national standards on GHG 
emissions from ships, such as operational requirements in the territorial sea.99 They may 
also propose the establishment of GHG Emission Control Areas in their territorial sea to 
                                                                                                                                               
required to prevent, reduce and control air pollution from NOx or SOx and particulate matter or all three types of 
emissions and their attendant adverse impacts on human health and environment.’ 
Regulation 13 stipulates that an ‘Emission Control Area shall be any sea area, including any port area, designated by 
the Organization’. This means that an Emission Control Area could also be located in the exclusive economic zone or 
other maritime zones of a coastal State. 
93 LOSC art 22. 
94 MARPOL 73/78 art 4(2); LOSC art 21(1)(f); Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature 29 December 1972, 18 ILM 510 (entered into force 30 August 1975) 
art 4(3) (‘London Dumping Convention’). See also Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 414.  
95 LOSC art 24(1), 211(4).  
96 LOSC art 21(2).  
97 LOSC art 220(2). According to this article, where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navigating in 
the territorial sea of the coastal States has violated laws and regulations consistent with international standards, then 
the coastal State may undertake a physical inspection of the vessel relating to the violation and may institute 
proceedings, including the detention of the vessel.  
98 See LOSC art 19(2). According to this article, only pollution that is ‘wilful and serious’ and contrary to the LOSC 
will deprive a vessel in passage of its innocent character, which is rare. However, these anti-pollution measures pose 
serious danger to navigational freedom and will generally hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships. In view of 
this concern, often the preferable solution will be to rely on port States for anti-pollution enforcement purpose. See 
also Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 417; Faure and Song, above n 84, 93.  
99 An operational requirement/measure is one of the three methods considered so far within the IMO for regulating 
GHG emissions from ships (the other two are technical measures and market-based measures) and this method has 
been adopted by the IMO in the form of the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) in 2011 
amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. It includes the requirements during the course of getting on board, 
checking of certificate and documents and inspection of or on other pollution prevention measures or facilities. For 
example, the coastal State may regulate the speed limit of foreign vessels in its territorial sea so as to reduce the GHG 




the IMO, as provided in MARPOL Annex VI for the purpose of reducing NOx and SOx 
emissions from shipping.  
 
The establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is regarded by many 
commentators as the ‘most significant reform’ of the 1982 LOSC.100 The EEZ confers 
on coastal States sovereign rights over living and non-living resources, and jurisdiction 
relating to the protection and preservation of the marine environment. 101 Under the 
LOSC, coastal States may regulate pollution from seabed installations and dumping 
within the EEZ, but this prescriptive jurisdiction is limited to the application of 
international rules and standards, namely IMO rules and standards.102 In other words, 
this national legislation should neither be ‘less demanding’ nor ‘more stringent’ than 
IMO rules and standards.103 A State can only adopt stricter rules when such rules are 
regulating the IMO designated Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs) or ice-covered 
areas which are within a coastal State’s EEZ.104 Regarding enforcement jurisdiction, 
only when there are ‘clear grounds’ for believing that a vessel has committed a violation 
in the EEZ and such violation threatens substantial damage to the coastal State, may the 
coastal State ‘require the vessel to give information regarding its identity and port of 
registry’.105 The coastal State may exercise its power over EEZ pollution control only 
when the vessel is still navigating in its EEZ and this power is limited to a request for 
information.106 Therefore, this enforcement is not favoured by the coastal State in that it 
cannot effectively prevent, stop or penalise possible violation of relevant international 
regulations by the foreign vessel.107 Accordingly, in the context of GHG emissions from 
international shipping, what a coastal State may do is to incorporate IMO regulations, 
currently the energy efficiency requirements on ships under amendments to Annex VI 
                                                 
100 Rothwell and Stephens, above n 59, 356. As a new maritime zone introduced by the 1982 LOSC, the EEZ extends 
to 200 nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline which to a significant extent expands the sovereign rights of a 
coastal State.  
101 LOSC art 56.  
102 LOSC arts 208, 210, 211(5)(6).  
103 Rothwell and Stephens, above n 59, 356.  
104 Ibid 357.  
105 LOSC art 220(3)(5).  
106 LOSC art 220(3). 
107 Faure and Song, above n 84, 94. Under the circumstances, the only remedy for the coastal State is probably to 
inform the flag States or the next port State of the possible violation, so that these States may take actions to 




of MARPOL 73/78, into its domestic environmental protection regime so that these 
regulations can be applied in its EEZ.  
 
No State has territorial jurisdiction in the high seas.108 In these waters, the flag State has 
exclusive jurisdiction over its ships when they produce pollution including GHG 
emissions. The coastal State is not permitted to take measures unless it is threatened by 
the damage resulting from ‘pollution or threat of pollution following upon a maritime 
casualty or acts relating to such casualty’.109 Nevertheless, there is no evidence of such 
enforcement for GHG emissions.  
 
2.2.4 Port State Jurisdiction  
 
A port State refers to ‘the State in one of whose ports a particular vessel lies’.110 In 
contrast to the limited jurisdiction of coastal States, port States have substantial 
jurisdiction over pollution within their jurisdiction. This has been deemed as a 
‘corrective measure to remedy the inadequacy of flag State jurisdiction’.111 As a port is 
situated in a State’s internal waters, a port State may legislate for the prevention, 
reduction and control of marine pollution, including GHG emissions from international 
shipping, as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels into its ports or internal 
waters. 112 However, it is the port State’s enforcement jurisdiction that attracts more 
attention since it might prove to be an effective deterrent against ships polluting any 
part of the sea because they are likely to face investigation or the institution of 
proceedings in the port State. In a broad sense, the enforcement jurisdiction of the port 
State includes both enforcement or administrative jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction. 
Administrative jurisdiction is often called port State control and primarily involves the 
inspection and certification by a port, whereas judicial jurisdiction of the port State 
                                                 
108 LOSC art 89.  
109 LOSC art 221.  
110 Churchill and Lowe, above n 54, 344.  
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involves the prosecution of offences committed in its ports or coastal State maritime 
zones, or outside the internal waters, territorial sea or EEZ of the port State.113 
 
Under MARPOL 73/78 the inspection and certification rules serve as the basis for the 
enforcement jurisdiction of port States. Different certificates are designed and required 
by the IMO as various standards to measure corresponding aspects of pollution from 
ships.114 For example, the IEE Certificate is related to reducing GHG emissions from 
international shipping.115 According to MARPOL Annex VI, such certificates will only 
be issued to ships which meet the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP), 
and for new ships, the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) is also mandatory.116 
 
As for inspection, two points are notable. Firstly, inspection should be limited to 
verifying that there is a valid certificate on board. If there are clear grounds for 
believing that the condition of the ship, or its equipment, does not correspond 
substantially with the particulars of the certificate, or there is no valid certificate, the 
port State must ensure that the ship does not sail until it can proceed to sea without 
presenting an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment.117 If inspection 
detects violation of MARPOL 73/78 or its Annexes, the port State shall forward a report 
to the flag State so that the appropriate action may be taken.118 Secondly, port States 
must apply MARPOL 73/78 standards to all ships calling at their ports in that MARPOL 
adopts ‘no more favourable treatment’ with respect to the ships of non-Parties to the 
convention.119 Furthermore, a type of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) relating 
                                                 
113  LOSC art 218; See also Bang, above n 83, 119. The difference between port State control and port State 
jurisdiction, and regional Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) on port State control are examined in Chapter 6.  
114 But these certificates shall be issued or endorsed either by the Administration (the flag State) or any organization 
duly authorized by it. In every case, the Administration assumes full responsibility for the certificate. See, eg, 
MARPOL Annex VI reg 6(5).  
115 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) reg 6(4)(5).  
116 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) regs 6,7. See also International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
Mandatory Energy Efficiency Measures for International Shipping Adopted at IMO Environment Meeting (15 July 
2011) <http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/42-mepc-ghg.aspx> accessed 31 October 2011.  
117 MARPOL73/78 art 5(2).  
118 MARPOL73/78 art 6(5).  
119 MARPOL73/78 art 5(4). This article reads that,  
‘With respect to the ship of non-Parties to the Convention, Parties shall apply the requirements of the present 




to port State inspection has been developed to coordinate regional port State control.120 
Port State MOUs were designed to ensure that ships do not evade MARPOL 73/78 rules 
through calling at ports where the inspection regime is lax. To date there are nine 
MOUs on port State control which have covered most of the regions of the world.121 If 
we relate the issue of GHG emissions from international shipping to port State 
jurisdiction, the port State will inspect the vessel to verify whether the IEE Certificate is 
on board and whether there is any violation of MARPOL Annex VI even though the flag 
State of the ship is not a party to the convention. 
 
Article 218 of the LOSC gives port States a discretionary power to investigate and 
prosecute discharge violations wherever they have taken place.122 Regarding violations 
within the coastal zones of another State,123 the port State can only act by request from 
the State concerned.124 As to violations on the high seas, the port State may prosecute 
directly and independently in the public interest.125 In this sense, port State jurisdiction 
has been viewed as a kind of ‘universal jurisdiction’. 126  Therefore, if there is any 
violation of IMO regulations, including those relating to GHG emissions from 
international shipping (amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 or any other 
regulations), the investigation or prosecution by the port State could provide a kind of 
correction. However, in practice port States seldom exercise their judicial jurisdiction to 
prosecute on the ground that instituting legal proceedings can be costly.127 Some States, 
Netherlands and South Korea as examples, have not prosecuted any foreign ship but 
only utilise administrative penalties such as detention or charging inspection fees.128 
                                                 
120 Rothwell and Stephens, above n 59, 354.  
121 Ibid. These nine MOUs are Paris MOU, Latin American MOU, Tokyo MOU, Caribbean MOU, Mediterranean 
MOU, Indian Ocean MOU, West and Central African MOU, Black Sea MOU and Riyadh MOU. 
122 LOSC art 218(1).  
123 LOSC art 218(2). ‘Coastal zones’ refers to the internal waters, territorial sea or EEZ of another State.  
124 Ibid. ‘The States concerned’ may be that State (violation occurs in its coastal zones), the flag State, a State 
damaged or threatened by the discharge violation, or the violation has caused or is likely to cause pollution in the 
coastal zones of the State instituting the proceedings.  
125 Ibid. Although the port State’s jurisdiction under this article is independent and no request from the flag State is 
necessary, the flag State does enjoy a right of pre-emption, which enables it to insist on taking control of any 
prosecution. See LOSC art 228(1).  
126 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 422.  
127 Bang, above n 83, 126. Bang asserts that a very small number of MARPOL violations have been prosecuted by a 
few port States, but there is no evidence of such prosecution on illegal discharges. 





2.3 Environmental Liability for Transboundary Harm Caused by Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from International Shipping 
 
As observed by Sands, two opposite fundamental objectives guided the development of 
the rules of international environmental law, namely ‘that states have sovereign rights 
over their natural resources’ and ‘that states must not cause damage to the 
environment’.129 The latter objective involves environmental liability for transboundary 
harm since the ‘environment’ not only includes areas within national jurisdiction, but 
also transboundary contexts and areas beyond national jurisdiction.130 As one of the 
central tenets of international environmental law, the rules of liability on transboundary 
harm have been widely applied and developed.131 This part examines these rules and 
explores their application to the issue of GHG emissions from international shipping. 
 
2.3.1 An Overview of Transboundary Harm 
 
As a broader concept than transboundary pollution,132 ‘transboundary harm’ generally 
refers to ‘harm caused in the territory of or in other places under the jurisdiction or 
control of a State other than the State of origin, whether or not the States concerned 
                                                 
129 Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2003) 235. 
These objectives are set out in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which provides that: 
‘States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’ 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 11 ILM 1416 (16 June 1972) principle 21 (‘Stockholm 
Declaration’).  
130 Ibid.  
131 Cases involving the rules of transboundary harm include but are not limited to: Trail Smelter Case (United States 
of America v Canada) (Reports of International Arbitral Awards) (1938 & 1941) 3 UN RIAA 1905; Nuclear Tests 
Case (Australia v France) (Interim Protection) (1974) ICJ Reports 253 ; Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v Spain) 
(1957) 12 UN RIAA 285; Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v Albania) (1949) ICJ Rep. 4;The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v 
United Kingdom) (2001) 47 ILM 405; ITLOS, Order of 3 December 2001 on Provisional Measures; Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (2006) ICJ Reports.  
132 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 188. This difference can be seen clearly from Articles 1 and 2 of 1985 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 
opened for signature 22 March 1985, 26 ILM 1529 (entered into force 22 September 1988)(‘Vienna Ozone 
Convention’)) and 1992 UNFCCC on the definition of ‘adverse effects’, and Article 1 of the 1979 Convention on 
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for 





share a common border’.133 The areas damaged by transboundary harm may be either 
within a jurisdiction or beyond national jurisdiction. The general duty to prevent and to 
minimise the risk of transboundary harm is derived from the fundamental principle sic 
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas or ‘principle of good neighbourliness’. It has been 
underpinned by State practice, judicial decisions, multilateral environmental 
agreements, and the work of the International Law Commission (ILC).134 In particular, 
Principles 2, 18 and 19 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
(Rio Declaration) provide specific principles applicable to transboundary harm and 
environmental risks. 135  Two transboundary harm rules could be drawn from these 
principles. They are:  
 
‘(1) States have a duty to prevent, reduce, and control transboundary pollution and 
environmental harm resulting from activities within their jurisdiction or control; and  
(2) States also have a duty to cooperate in mitigating transboundary environmental 
risks and emergencies, through notification, consultation, negotiation, and in 
appropriate cases, environmental impact assessment.’136  
 
The two rules have been applied in many international judicial decisions.137 The two 
rules have the status of customary international law, but in certain respects these rules 
can also be treated as general principles of law.138 The rules on transboundary harm 
have been gradually formed and developed since the 1930s. This process, according to 
different elements reflected in the treaties or cases, can be summarised into three stages.  
 
The first stage can be traced back to the Trail Smelter arbitration—the origins of a rule 
on transboundary harm and also the first international environmental law decision in the 
                                                 
133 Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, ILC Report GAOR A/56/10 
(2001) art 2(c) (‘Draft Articles’). Regarding this definition, ‘State of origin’ means the State in the territory or 
otherwise under the jurisdiction or control of which the activities referred to in article 1 are planned or are carried out; 
‘States concerned’ means the State of origin and the State likely to be affected. 
134 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 137.  
135 Ibid.  
136 Ibid.  
137 For example, the first rule was applied in Trail Smelter Case and the Corfu Channel Case. Trail Smelter Case, 
below n 139; Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v Albania) (1949) ICJ Rep. 4. The second rule was applied in Lac Lanoux 
Arbitration case. Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v Spain) (1957) 12 UN RIAA 285.  
138 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 137. Customary international law and general principles of law are two 
sources of international law regulated by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Charter of the 
United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, signed 26 June 1945, 59 STAT 1031 (entered into 





world.139 The Trail Smelter dispute covered a period of 13 years from 1928 to 1941, and 
is usually the only case cited in which general principles of international law on State 
liability was applied to address issues involving transboundary damage.140 One of the 
main contributions from the Trail Smelter arbitration could be summarised as the well-
known ‘Trail Smelter principles’,141 which include: (1) each state has a duty to prevent 
transboundary harm; 142  and (2) the polluter-pays principle, which asserts that ‘the 
polluting State should pay compensation for the transboundary harm it has caused.’143 
These principles have been widely accepted as rules of customary international law and 
applied or cited by judges in some of the subsequent cases such as the Lac Lanoux 
Arbitration and the Nuclear Tests Case.144 
 
Furthermore, the rules on transboundary harm are reflected in some treaties. For 
instance, the 1951 International Plant Protection Convention recognised the need to 
prevent the introduction and spread of plant pests and diseases across national 
                                                 
139 Trail Smelter Case (United States of America v Canada) (Reports of International Arbitral Awards) (1938 & 1941) 
3 UN RIAA 1905 (‘Trail Smelter (1941)’). The Trail Smelter arbitration of 1938 and 1941 was a landmark decision 
about a dispute over environmental degradation between the United States and Canada. A tribunal was set up by 
Canada and the United States to resolve a dispute over damages to US citizens and property in the State of 
Washington caused by a smelter on the Canadian side of the border. The tribunal decided that Canada had to pay the 
United States for damages, and further that it was obliged to abate the pollution. The second Trail Smelter dispute in 
2003 on the contamination of the Upper Columbia River in Washington State of the United States by Trail Smelter in 
Canada, however, is not discussed in this chapter. 
140 Hanqin Xue, Transboundary Damage in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 269.  
141 Bratspies and Miller, above n 32, 3.  
142 Trail Smelter (1941), above n 139. This rule was reflected in the famous conclusion made by the tribunal that, 
‘Under the principles of international law…no state has the right to use or permit the use of territory in such a manner 
as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of 
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.’ 
143 Bratspies and Miller, above n 32. In this case the Tribunal’s decision holds that a state should be strictly liable for 
damages arising from activities by a private corporation operating within the state’s jurisdiction. See also ibid. 
The Trail Smelter case can be deemed as the application of the polluter-pays principle, which from the author’s point 
of view could be understood that the State (Canada) is actually also a ‘polluter’ in this case. According to a European 
Community Council recommendation of November 7, 1974, ‘polluter’ refers to ‘someone who directly or indirectly 
damages the environment or who creates conditions leading to such damage’. The smelter was within the jurisdiction 
of the Canadian government and managed and taxed by the latter, so the Canadian government had the due diligence 
obligation to make it not produce transboundary air pollution. In this case, however, the Canadian government 
‘create[d] conditions leading to such damage’.  
144 Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v Spain) (1957) 12 UN RIAA 285. This case involves the proposed diversion of 
an international river by France (the upstream state), and the arbitral tribunal finally affirmed that a state (France) has 
an obligation not to exercise its rights to the extent of ignoring the rights of another (Spain, the downstream state).  
Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) (Interim Protection) (1974) ICJ Reports 253 . This case involves Australia’s 
claims on the possible environmental damage from France’s atmospheric nuclear tests in the Pacific. Judge de Castro 
stated: ‘If it is admitted as a general rule that there is a right to demand prohibition of the emission by neighbouring 
properties of noxious fumes, the consequences must be drawn, by an obvious analogy, that the Applicant is entitled to 




boundaries.145 The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty prohibits nuclear tests if the explosion 
would cause radioactive debris ‘to be present outside the territory limits of the state 
under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.’146 The 1968 African 
Conservation Convention provides that the States Parties shall cooperate ‘whenever any 
national measure is likely to affect the natural resources of any other State.’ 147  In 
summary, one common feature that both cases and treaties share is that they only deal 
with transboundary harm to other states. 
 
The second stage commenced in 1972 when the Stockholm Declaration was adopted. 
The concept of transboundary harm during this period was expanded from mere 
relations between two States to relations which also include those between one State 
and global commons areas, namely the areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Examples of global commons areas are the high seas and the airspace above them, the 
deep sea-bed, outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies.148 These changes were 
reflected in Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration, Principle 2 of Rio Declaration, 
Article 3 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 149  Preamble of the 
UNFCCC, and other conventions and UN documents.150  
 
Among these international instruments, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration has 
two relevant implications. Firstly, States have a due diligence obligation to regulate all 
public and private activities within their jurisdiction and control so as to prevent and 
                                                 
145 International Plant Protection Convention, opened for signature 6 December 1951, 150 UNTS 67 (entered into 
force 3 April 1952) preamble.  
146 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, opened for signature 5 
August 1963, 480 UNTS 43 (entered into force 10 October 1963) art I(1)(b).  
147 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resource, opened for signature 15 September 
1968, 1001 UNTS 4 (entered into force 9 October 1969) art XVI(1)(b).  
148 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 145. Some relevant treaties include 1967 Outer Space Treaty (Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature 27 January 1967, 610 UNTS 205 (entered into force 10 October 1967)), 
1979 Moon Treaty (Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for 
signature 5 December 1979, 18 ILM 1434 (entered into force 11 July 1984)), 1972 London Dumping Convention 
(Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature 29 
December 1972, 18 ILM 510 (entered into force 30 August 1975)), and 1982 LOSC art 145, 209.  
149 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 31 ILM 818 (entered into force 29 
December 1993) (‘CBD’).  
150 For example, the United Nations General Assembly emphasised that State parties ‘must not produce significant 
harmful effects in zones situated outside their national jurisdiction’ during the course of the exploration, exploitation 
and development of their natural resources. See, Cooperation between States in the Field of the Environment, UNGA 




control the transboundary harm to other States or areas outside the limits of their 
jurisdiction.151 This affirmed and improved the ‘Trail Smelter principles’. Secondly, 
States should apply the same rules not only within their jurisdiction (for example, land 
territory, territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone) but also to 
activities and processes under their control, such as ‘ships, airplanes and spacecraft 
having the nationality of the State, missions to Antarctica, troops stationed in foreign 
territories, and any occupied or dependent territories’.152 The incorporation of ‘global 
commons areas’ into the protection regime against transboundary harm by Principle 21 
was a significant advancement which suggests that the State obligation to prevent, 
reduce and control environmental harm was ‘no longer solely bilateral in character’;153 
instead it benefits all humankind. 
 
The third stage began with the adoption of LOSC. However, some of the subsequent 
treaties or UN documents still fall into the category of the second stage. 154  The 
significance of LOSC concerning the prevention of transboundary harm mainly lies in 
the shift of emphasis from a negative obligation to prevent transboundary harm to a 
positive commitment to preserve and protect the environment. 155  To that end, two 
changes were made. Firstly, LOSC transforms the ‘responsibility’ into a ‘duty’ under 
Article 193 156  which probably indicates more moral commitment whereas the 
                                                 
151 Kiss and Shelton, above n 1, 189. See also Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 147-150. Birnie asserts that 
‘due diligence’ addresses two issues: one is that it ‘requires the introduction of policies, legislation, and 
administrative controls applicable to public and private conduct which are capable of preventing or minimizing the 
risk of transboundary harm to other States or the global environment’; the other is that it ‘entails an evolving standard 
of technology and regulation’ since internationally agreed ‘ecostandards’ can be easily detailed and precise, as in the 
annexes to MARPOL 73/78, and usually be easily updated, often using soft-law instruments or decisions of the 
parties. 
152 Kiss and Shelton, above n 1, 189-190.  
153 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 145.  
154 For instance, essentially the 1992 CBD and the Rio Declaration adhere to the features on the prevention of 
transboundary harm reflected in the Stockholm Declaration.  
155 Sands, above n 129, 244; Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 151.  
‘Negative obligation’ was reflected in previous treaties or regulatory documents where this state obligation was only 
mentioned and imposed by some limitations. For example, the second part of Rio Principle 2 only mentions the 
avoidance of the fact of harm, rather than the conduct of the state in bringing it about or failing to prevent it; and the 
first part of Rio Principle 2 probably indicates that economic activities outweigh the seriousness of the possible 
environmental harm.  
156 LOSC art 193. Article 193 reads that: 
‘States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environmental policies and in 
accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.’ 




‘responsibility’, which was used in previous treaties, is generally a condition of being 
responsible. Secondly, Article 194(2) utilises strong language to indicate such 
commitment. It provides that, 
 
‘States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or 
control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their 
environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or 
control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance 
with [the] Convention.’157 [emphasis added] 
 
Following the LOSC, the rules on the prevention of transboundary harm continued to 
develop through subsequent treaties and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rulings, 
such as the 1985 ASEAN Convention158 and the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.159 
 
The liability regime on transboundary harm also developed with the evolution of rules 
on transboundary harm. The International Law Commission (ILC) has been working on 
transboundary environmental harm since 1978 with the ‘improbable’ title of ‘Liability 
for Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law’.160 In 1996 the 
ILC released draft articles and commentary,161 which initially put forward the three-
element damage structure made up of prevention, cooperation and strict liability.162 
                                                 
157 LOSC art 194(2).  
158 Association of South Ease Asian Nations Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 
opened for signature 9 July 1985, 15 EPL 64 (not yet in force) art 20(1). Article 20(1) recognises the second element 
of Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of Rio Declaration as a ‘general accepted principle of 
international law’. It reads that,  
‘Contracting Parties have in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law the responsibility of 
ensuring that activities under their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment or the natural 
resources under the jurisdiction of other Contracting Parties or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’ 
159 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) (1996) ICJ Reports 241, para. 29. In this 
advisory opinion, the ICJ stated that: 
‘The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect 
the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law 
relating to the environment.’ 
This statement could be interpreted as a confirmation of the role of the prevention of transboundary harm as a rule of 
customary international law. 
160 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 146; See also II Yearbook International Law Commission (1980) Pt1, 160, 
138-139.  
161 Report of the Working Group on International Liability, in International Law Commission Report (1996) GAOR 
A/51/10, Annex 1, 235.  
162 Report of the Working Group on International Liability, annex I, C, Ch I, art 4 (Prevention), art 5 (Liability), and 




However, more important contributions from the ILC are the 2001 Draft Articles on the 
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (Draft Articles) and the 
2006 Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm 
Arising Out of Hazardous Activities (Draft Principles).163  
 
The 2001 Draft Articles apply to all activities within the jurisdiction or control of States 
which involve a risk of causing significant transboundary harm,164 and the ‘risk’ covers 
both unlikely but disastrous accidents and highly probable but smaller scale harm.165 
Since the harm or the risk of harm has to be ‘significant’, a thorough determination of 
‘significance’ is thus important. 
 
The 2006 Draft Principles are basically an international standard of liability involving 
both compensation for damage and the procedures and remedies. As the core principle, 
Principle 6(1) sets out the objective of prompt, adequate and effective compensation by 
means of competent judicial and administrative bodies of the State.166 Concerning the 
allocation of loss arrangement in the 2006 Draft Principles, three features are notable. 
Firstly, it adopts strict liability167 in treaties and in national law instead of proof of 
                                                                                                                                               
Article 4 reads that, ‘States shall take all appropriate measures to prevent or minimize the risk of significant 
transboundary harm and, if such harm has occurred, to minimize its effects.’ This article, together with article 6, 
provides the basic foundation for the articles on prevention. The obligation of States to take preventive or 
minimization measures is one of due diligence. 
Article 5 stipulates that, ‘In accordance with the present articles, liability arises from significant transboundary harm 
caused by an activity referred to in article 1 and shall give rise to compensation or other relief.’ This principle of 
liability and reparation is a necessary corollary and complement to article 4. That article obliges States to prevent or 
minimize the risk from activities that are not prohibited by international law. Article 5, on the other hand, establishes 
an obligation to provide compensation or other relief whenever significant transboundary harm occurs. 
Article 6 specifies that, ‘States concerned shall cooperate in good faith and as necessary seek the assistance of any 
international organization in preventing or minimizing the risk of significant transboundary harm and, if such harm 
has occurred, in minimizing its effects both in affected States and in States of origin.’ This kind of all-round 
cooperation is essential in designing and implementing effective policies to prevent or minimize the risk of causing 
significant transboundary harm.  
163  Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous 
Activities, Annex, UN Doc A/RES/61/36 (18 December 2006) (‘Draft Principles’).  
164 Draft Articles art 1.  
165 Draft Articles art 2(a).  
166 Draft Principles art 6(1). Art 6(1) reads that: 
‘States shall provide their domestic judicial and administrative bodies with the necessary jurisdiction and competence 
and ensure that these bodies have prompt, adequate and effective remedies available in the event of transboundary 
damage caused by hazardous activities located within their territory or otherwise under their jurisdiction or control.’  
167 ‘Strict liability’ means that a person is liable for any harm he causes even if he is not at fault or negligent. The 
rationale is that it is technically difficult to prove fault for the victims in the environmental context due to the 




fault.168 The ILC commentary indicates that this choice has taken the inherent risks of 
hazardous activities into consideration and that it would be unjust and inappropriate to 
apply proof of fault once accidents occur.169 Secondly, it imposes liability for damage 
on the operator and/or other person or entity,170 which is drawn from the existing civil 
liability and compensation schemes and seems more flexible.171 Thirdly, it offers more 
options for supplementary compensation from the industry and/or State in case the 
financial resources of the operator are insufficient to cover the damage suffered due to 
an incident.172 
 
In addition to MARPOL 73/78, the 1999 Basel Liability Protocol, the 2001 Bunker 
Convention, and above treaties, some other treaties on specific areas, such as oil 
pollution from ships, have been adopted to cope with possible damage from 
transboundary harm. Typical examples are the 1969/1971 regime (1969 CLC,173 and the 
1971 Fund Convention 174), the 1992 regime (the 1992 CLC, 175 and the 1992 Fund 
Convention176), and the 1996 HNS Convention,177 which will be further discussed in the 
polluter-pays principle section of this chapter. 
                                                                                                                                               
reduce potential harm. David Weisbach, 'Negligence, Strict Liability, and Responsibility for Climate Change' (2012) 
97(2) Iowa Law Review 521, 554-555.  
168 Draft Principles art 4(2). See also Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 320.  
169 International Law Commission Report (2004) Commentary to Principle 4, 15-17.  
170 Draft Principles art 4(2)(3).  
171 Take the 2001 Bunker Convention and the 1999 Basel Liability Protocol as examples: under the 2001 Bunker 
Convention, the shipowner, charterer, manager and operator are jointly and severally liable; while the 1999 Basel 
Liability Protocol makes the generators, exporters, importers and disposers all potentially liable at different stages of 
the wastes’ journey to its eventual destination. See IMO International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil 
Pollution Damage, opened for signature 27 March 2001, 40 ILM 1493 (entered into force 21 November 2008 ) 
(‘2001 Bunker Convention’) art 3,7; Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, opened for signature 10 December 1999, EMuT 
989:22/B (not yet in force)  art 4,5,9(‘1999 Basel Liability Protocol’). See also Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 
4, 320.  
172 Draft Principles art 7.  
173 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature 29 November 1969, 
973 UNTS 3 (entered into force 19 June 1975) (‘1969 CLC’).  
174 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, opened for signature 18 December 1971, 11 ILM 284 (entered into force 16 October 1978) (‘1971 Fund 
Convention’). 
175 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature 27 November 1992, 
IMO LEG/CONF.9.15 (entered into force 30 March 1996) (‘1992 CLC’). 
176 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, opened for signature 27 November 1992, 87 UKTSCm 3433 (entered into force 30 May 1996) (‘1992 Fund 
Convention’). 





2.3.2 The Application of Transboundary Harm Rules to the Issue of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from International Shipping 
 
As already noted, GHG emissions from international shipping can be regarded as a type 
of ‘conditional’ pollution. Given that harm is a broader term than pollution, are GHG 
emissions from international shipping a kind of transboundary harm? And if so, how 
can the rules on the prevention of transboundary harm apply to this GHG emissions 
issue? This section provides an analysis of these issues.  
 
First of all, can GHG emissions from international shipping produce transboundary 
harm? To address this question, we need to examine the terms ‘harm’ and 
‘transboundary’ respectively. 
 
‘Harm’ means adverse effects caused to persons, property or the environment.178 As 
illustrated in Chapter 1, GHG emissions from international shipping may result in many 
deleterious effects on atmospheric composition, marine ecosystems, human health and 
climate. These effects, however, may not be considered ‘serious’ or ‘substantial’ due to 
the cumulative nature of GHG emissions. Some serious consequences, such as the 
inundation of some islands as a result of sea level rise,179 or the extinction of some 
marine species due to ocean acidification, may be caused by many factors over quite a 
long term where GHG emissions from international shipping are only part of the cause 
and only add to the quantum of harm. On the other hand, the harm could be ‘more than 
detectable’ in a comparatively short period. For instance, excessive GHG emissions 
from international shipping may contribute to shifting ranges and distribution of species 
which will have direct impacts on fish stocks and can be easily noticed. Researchers 
have found that in harbour cities ship emissions, including GHG emissions and other 
                                                                                                                                               
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, opened for signature 3 May 1996, 25 ILM 1406 (not yet in force) (‘1996 
HNS Convention’). 
178 Draft Articles art 2(b).  
179 For example, in late 2005 an entire coastal village in the north of Tegua Island in Vanuatu was relocated to higher 
ground; in 2009 the Carteret Islanders of Papua New Guinea became the world’s first entire community to be 




emissions, are often a dominant source of urban pollution.180 Therefore, as discussed 
earlier, the harm resulting from GHG emissions from international shipping may be 
‘more than detectable’, but whether it is ‘serious’ or ‘substantial’ needs to be examined 
on a case-by-case basis. This element, based on the requirements from the 2001 Draft 
Articles and other international instruments, meets the threshold for ‘significant’ harm 
under certain circumstances.  
 
The harm caused by GHG emissions from international shipping may also be 
‘transboundary’. The definition of ‘transboundary harm’ in the 2001 Draft Articles 
indicates that the ‘boundary’ refers to territorial boundaries, jurisdictional boundaries or 
control boundaries of the State.181 In the case of international shipping, the ‘State of 
origin’ is generally the flag State of the ship,182 and the ‘State likely to be affected’ may 
be the coastal State, port State or a third State.183 Since ships always sail between ports 
of different countries in the context of international shipping,184 the harms caused by 
GHG emissions from international shipping to other areas may fall into four main 
scenarios.  
 
The first scenario is that GHG emissions from international shipping cause significant 
harm to the high seas and the deep seabed, or the international airspace which is the 
airspace above the high seas and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of a coastal State. In 
this case, the harms occur between the flag State of the ship and the global commons 
areas, or in other words, between one national jurisdiction and the areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction. The second scenario is that GHG emissions from 
                                                 
180 Veronika Eyring et al, 'Transport Impacts on Atmosphere and Climate: Shipping' (2010) 44(37) Atmospheric 
Environment 4735, 4753.  
181 Draft Articles art 2(c). This article stipulates that, 
‘Transboundary harm’ means harm caused in the territory of or in other places under the jurisdiction or control of a 
State other than the State of origin, whether or not the States concerned share a common border. 
This sentence is a summary for the above article, stressing that there are actually three types of ‘boundaries’.  
182 Draft Articles art 2(d). This article reads: 
‘State of origin’ means the State in the territory or otherwise under the jurisdiction or control of which the activities 
referred to in article 1 are planned or are carried out.  
183 Draft Articles art 2(e). This article provides that: 
‘State likely to be affected’ means the State or States in the territory of which there is the risk of significant 
transboundary harm or which have jurisdiction or control over any other place where there is such as risk. 




international shipping impose adverse effects on the EEZ, territorial sea (or archipelagic 
waters), continental shelf, the land territory, the atmosphere above the land and 
territorial sea (or archipelagic waters) of a State. In these circumstances, the harms are 
inflicted to the coastal States or the port States (or the archipelagic States) by the flag 
State of the ship, and this scenario involves harms between two national jurisdictions. 
The third scenario is that GHG emissions from international shipping result in 
substantial harm to a third State, such as its land territory or territorial sea or airspace 
under its sovereignty, via the territorial sea or land of another coastal State or port State 
(a second State). In this scenario, the coastal State or port State (the second State) has 
jurisdiction over GHG emissions from ships of the flag State although they are not 
under an obligation to assume such jurisdiction.185 In this case, the flag State will be 
responsible for the harm it causes to the third State directly. Clearly this scenario also 
involves harm between two national jurisdictions. In addition, there is another 
possibility, or the fourth scenario. GHG emissions from one ship produce harm to 
another ship or platform of another State (irrespective of whether they are on the high 
seas or anywhere on the sea) during their international voyages. This scenario involves 
harm between two national jurisdictions (two flag States). However, it rarely occurs in 
practice.  
 
It is clear that all four scenarios fall into the category of harm between two national 
jurisdictions (Scenario two, three and four) or from one national jurisdiction to the areas 
beyond national jurisdiction (Scenario one). This observation underpins the 
transboundary nature of GHG emissions from international shipping, which was 
discussed earlier in this section.  
 
The above discussion of the terms ‘harm’ and ‘transboundary’ in the context of GHG 
emissions from international shipping make possible the application of the rules on the 
prevention of transboundary harm to this specific issue. However, how can the rules on 
                                                 
185 LOSC art 211(4). This article stipulates that, 
‘Coastal States may, in the exercise of their sovereignty within their territory sea, adopt laws and regulations for the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from foreign vessels, including vessels exercising the right of 
innocent passage…’ 
Since GHG emissions from international shipping can be treated as a type of ‘conditional’ pollution as discussed at 




the prevention of transboundary harm apply to this GHG emissions issue? A brief 
examination of the four scenarios in relation to possible transboundary harm is now 
provided to justify the application of the two transboundary harm rules to GHG 
emissions from international shipping. 
 
In the first scenario, harm occurs between one national jurisdiction and the areas beyond 
national jurisdiction. As discussed earlier, the flag State of the ship has primary 
jurisdiction when GHG emissions from international shipping cause significant harm to 
the high seas or international airspace.186 Coastal States are not permitted to take action 
unless they are threatened by the damage (transboundary harm),187 which generally does 
not apply in this scenario. In this case, in accordance with the two rules on 
transboundary harm, it is mainly the flag State that has a duty to prevent, reduce and 
control the possible transboundary harm from the GHG emissions of its ship. To 
achieve this goal, the flag State is required to adopt national laws on the reduction of 
shipping GHG emissions, which should at least have the same effect as that of generally 
accepted international rules and standards established through the IMO,188 taking into 
account the amended Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 irrespective of whether they have 
ratified the amendments. 189  When a violation occurs, the flag State shall impose 
administrative penalties or institute proceedings in relation to such offences. Moreover, 
flag States shall conduct regular surveys, issue or empower other parties to issue the 
IEE Certificate to ships flying their flags. Another aspect is the duty of cooperation by 
States concerned. When informed of suspected violations of MARPOL 73/78 in areas 
                                                 
186  However, the 1982 LOSC also empowers the port State enforcement jurisdiction with respect to violations 
committed beyond its territorial sea (including the global commons areas) by a ship flying a foreign flag, where the 
flag State may be reluctant to do so, and/or where the coastal State is unable or incompetent to act. See LOSC art 218.  
187 LOSC art 221.  
188 LOSC art 211(2). Currently there are no specific generally-accepted IMO rules relating GHG emissions from 
international shipping.  
189 See LOSC art 212(1). This provision provides that, 
‘States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from or 
through the atmosphere, applicable to the air space under their sovereignty and to vessels flying their flag or vessels 
or aircraft of their registry, taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and 
procedures and the safety of air navigation.’ 
When applying this provision to the adoption of amended Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, it can be argued that this 
amendment is ‘internationally agreed’ rather than ‘generally accepted’ as indicated in Article 211(2) of the LOSC. 
This is because the amendment was adopted by a majority vote within the IMO in July 2011 when some large 
shipping nations, such as China, India, Brazil, Chile, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, voted against this adoption. This lack 
of consensus makes the amendment less likely to be a ‘generally accepted’ rule, but the broad participation of many 




beyond national jurisdiction, the flag State is obliged to cooperate with relevant parties, 
such as port States or sometimes coastal States, in detecting, inspecting or investigating 
such violations.  
 
The second scenario deals with the harm between the flag State and a coastal State or 
port State. In accordance with the two rules on transboundary harm, two requirements 
apply to both parties. First of all, the flag State has the prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction and responsibility to prevent, reduce and control transboundary harm 
resulting from GHG emissions from the ship entitled to fly its flag. This duty is exactly 
the same as that in the first scenario. Meanwhile, the coastal State may adopt national 
laws on the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping applicable to either 
its territorial sea or its EEZ. However, such legislation should not hamper the right of 
innocent passage of foreign vessels in its territorial sea and should be consistent with 
Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 in its EEZ if the State is a party to Annex VI. In their 
internal waters and ports, both the coastal State and the port State are free to make and 
enforce national laws dealing with such emissions. More significantly, port States may 
investigate and prosecute discharge violations wherever they have taken place.190 In the 
second place, once damage or risk of damage occurs, the States concerned, including 
the coastal State, port State, or other parties, shall notify the vessel or the flag State of 
the violation of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 or the LOSC if applicable, so that 
measures can be taken to reduce the possible loss.  
 
The third scenario involves harm between the flag State and a third State. The 
discussion for the second scenario applies if the third State is also a coastal State or a 
port State when the GHG emissions from international shipping are transferred to its 
territorial sea or other maritime zones via another coastal State or port State (the second 
State). However, if the third State is a land-locked State and the harm is caused to its 
land or the atmosphere above its land, the duties of the flag State are still the same as 
those in the first and second scenarios while the rights and obligations of the third State 
are very similar to those of the United States in the Trail Smelter case. 
 
                                                 




The fourth scenario involves harm between two flag States. When such harm occurs, it 
is mainly the two flag States that deal with the issue. The prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction and obligations of the flag State illustrated in the first scenario will then 
apply.  
 
Another relevant issue is the allocation of liabilities for the transboundary harm caused 
by GHG emissions from international shipping. Nowadays it is common that the vessel 
is registered in one State and managed by an operating company registered in another 
State, the crew is multinational and the beneficial owner is in another State. In these 
circumstances, when GHG emissions from international shipping cause transboundary 
harm, more jurisdictions will be involved besides the ‘State of origin’ and the ‘State 
likely to be affected’. This issue will be further discussed in the section on the polluter-
pays principle of this chapter.  
 
2.4 The Precautionary Principle and Its Application to the Issue of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions from International Shipping 
 
The precautionary principle has emerged in environmental law and policy in response to 
the need for an effective method to deal with risks and uncertainties associated with 
activities with the potential to affect the environment. It has been generally accepted as 
a ‘basic rule’ that governs activities especially those affecting the ocean environment.191 
This principle prescribes a general rule which has been translated into specific 
responsibilities for the proponents of certain maritime activities to meet before they are 
undertaken, so as to mitigate the adverse effects of these activities on the marine 
environment.192 This part first examines the concept of the precautionary principle from 
the perspectives of its evolution, legal status and implementation. Then, it explores the 
application of this principle to the issue of GHG emissions from international shipping. 
 
2.4.1 An Overview of the Precautionary Principle 
 
                                                 
191 J. M. Van Dyke, 'Applying the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments of Radioactive Materials' (1996) 27(4) 
Ocean Development and International Law 379, 379.  




The precautionary principle, also called the precautionary approach or precautionary 
measures, 193  is closely related to other international environmental law principles 
including the obligation to prevent transboundary harm, the preventive principle and the 
polluter-pays principle. Firstly, the duty to prevent transboundary harm requires that 
each State has a duty to prevent significant harm to other States or to common spaces. 
In other words, the State has the obligation of ‘diligent prevention and control of 
foreseeable risks’, which to some extent justifies the adoption of a precautionary 
approach.194 Secondly, the polluter-pays principle, which is analysed in the following 
section, is closely associated with the precautionary principle. 195  The precautionary 
principle imposes an environmental duty of care to prevent potential harm through 
seeking ‘collective environmental responsibility’.196 Similarly, under the polluter-pays 
principle, not only present polluters but also potential polluters are responsible for their 
actions. It appears that both principles adopt a ‘forward-looking approach’.197 Finally, 
the precautionary principle has been developed on the basis of the preventive principle. 
However, prevention aims to avoid an ‘identifiable threat’ which has been scientifically 
proven, whereas precaution underscores avoiding ‘uncertain outcomes which may, or 
may not, be harmful’.198 In general, the polluter-pays and preventive principles deal 
with known situations and risks while the precautionary principle addresses the 
scientific uncertainty of issues.199  
 
The precautionary principle emerged from the early concept of vorsorge (foresight, 
taking care) adopted by the former West Germany in its environmental management in 
the 1960s. It evolved into the vorsorgeprinzip (precautionary or foresight principle) to 
resolve the environmental issues faced by Germany and other European countries in the 
                                                 
193 The term ‘precautionary approach’ is preferred by the US and many global agreements adopt it or ‘precautionary 
measures’, while the ‘precautionary principle’ is favoured by European treaties and European Community law. 
However, these differences are often regarded as less significant. See Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 155.  
194 Ibid 153.  
195 Warwick Gullett, 'Environmental Protection and the Precautionary Principle: a Response to Scientific Uncertainty 
in Environmental Management' (1997) 14(1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 52, 55.  
196 Ibid 54.  
197 Minna Pyhålå, Anne Brusendorff and Hanna Paulomåki, 'The Precautionary Principle' in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, 
David M. Ong and Panos Merkouris (eds), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (2010) 203, 204.  
198 Warwick Gullett, 'The Precautionary Principle in Australia: Policy, Law and Potential Precautionary EIAs' (2000) 
11(2) Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 93, 98.  




1970s.200 The principle was first employed internationally in the 1984 Conference on 
Protection of the North Sea.201 It was later endorsed by the 1987 Montreal Protocol and 
the 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development.202 Since then, 
the precautionary principle has been incorporated into ‘almost all’ international 
agreements and declarations related to environmental protection.203 These include the 
1992 Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, 1992 UNFCCC, 1992 CBD, and 1996 Protocol to 
London Dumping Convention.204 Furthermore, many States, including both developed 
and developing States, have incorporated the precautionary principle in their domestic 
environmental policy and law.205 
 
                                                 
200 Elena McCarthy, 'Ocean Noise, Scientific Uncertainty, and the Paradox of the Precautionary Principle' (2007) 
10(3) Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 233, 233; Pyhålå, Brusendorff and Paulomåki, above n 197, 
205.  
201 McCarthy, above n 200, 233; Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 154. The adoption of the 1984 Bremen 
Ministerial Declaration and the 1987 London Declaration of the First and Second International Conferences on the 
Protection of the North Sea indicates the early utilisation of the precautionary principle. Specifically, article D3 of the 
1984 Bremen Ministerial Declaration says that, ‘Precautionary measures for air quality control by reduction of 
emissions at source should also be determined for the protection of the North Sea, based on the best available 
technology’. Article 7 of the 1987 London Declaration purports that, ‘in order to protect the North Sea from possibly 
damaging effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may require action 
to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific 
evidence ’.  
202Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 16 September 1987, 26 ILM 
1550 (entered into force 1 January 1989) preamble (‘Montreal Protocol’)  
It states that, ‘[parties to the Montreal Protocol] determined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary 
measures to control equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it, with the ultimate objective of their 
elimination on the basis of developments in scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic 
considerations’. 
Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, 20 EPL 200 (15 May 1990) principle 7. 
It advocates that, ‘in order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary principle. 
Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation’. 
Kiss and Shelton note that the 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development was ‘the first 
international instrument to treat the principle as one of general application and linked to sustainable development’. 
See Kiss and Shelton, above n 1, 269-207.  
203 Kiss and Shelton, above n 1, 207.  
204 Rio Declaration prin 15; Agenda 21 ch.17, para. 17.1; UNFCCC art 3.3; CBD preamble; 1996 Protocol to London 
Dumping Convention art 3(1).  
205 For example, in Australia the precautionary principle has been explicitly included in many fisheries laws and 
employed in a number of cases. Examples are the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth), Dixon v Australian 
Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) [2000], Arno Blank v AFMA [2000], and Latitude Fisheries Pty Ltd and 
Anor v AFMA [2000]. See Warwick Gullett, Chris Paterson and Elizabeth Fisher, 'Substantive Precautionary 
Decision-Making: the Australian Fisheries Management Authority's "Lawful Pursuit" of the Precautionary Principle' 
(2001) 7(2) The Australian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 95, 110-114. In India and Pakistan, the 
precautionary principle is treated as a principle of international law and invoked by their Supreme Courts. Birnie, 




There have been a number of discussions on the concept of precautionary principle and 
how it should be interpreted and implemented. 206 Arguably Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration is the most accepted formulation of the precautionary principle.207 Principle 
15 stipulates that: 
 
‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.’208 
 
This formulation provides constraints or guidance on the decision-making process 
relating to a proposed action, and can be regarded as an advance when compared to the 
traditional preventive principle.209 As such, Fisher treats the precautionary principle as 
‘a legal principle that is concerned with decision-making under scientific uncertainty in 
the context of risk regulation’.210 Fisher asserts that risk regulation consists of such 
three activities as standard setting, the application of those standards, and enforcement, 
while the precautionary principle mainly involves standard setting. 211  While Fisher 
                                                 
206  See, eg, Timothy O'Riordan and James Cameron, Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Earthscan 
Publications, 1994); Julian Morris, Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle (Butterworth-Heinemann, 2000); 
Poul Harremoës, The Precautionary Principle in the 20th Century: Late Lessons from Early Warnings (Earthscan 
Publications, 2002); Simon Marr, The Precautionary Principle in the Law of the Sea: Modern Decision Making in 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2003); Barney Dickson, Rosie Cooney and Ebscohost, Biodiversity and the 
Precautionary Principle: Risk Uncertainty and Practice in Conservation and Sustainable Use (Earthscan, 2005); 
Jacqueline Peel, The Precautionary Principle in Practice: Environmental Decision-making and Scientific Uncertainty 
(Federation Press, 2005).  
207 Gullett, above n 195.  
208 Rio Declaration pin 15.  
209 But this approach has also been criticised for its weakness, and is treated as ‘deliberation-guiding’ rather than 
‘action-guiding’. It is argued that the ‘deliberation-guiding’ approach as adopted in Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration is ‘less stringent’ than the ‘action-guiding’ approach as adopted by the 1989 report of the Nordic 
Council’s International Conference on the Pollution of the Seas. This report reads that, 
‘The need for an effective precautionary approach, with that important principle intended to safeguard the marine 
ecosystem by, amongst other things, eliminating and preventing pollution emissions where there is reason to believe 
that damage or harmful effects are likely to be caused, even where there is inadequate or inconclusive scientific 
evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and effects.’ 
Dickson classifies the formulations of the precautionary principle into two versions: one is ‘action-guiding’ version of 
the principle calling for action against the practice that may cause damage; the other is ‘deliberation-guiding’ version 
which stipulates that lack of evidence shall not be used as a reason for postponing action against potentially harmful 
activities. 
Barnabas Dickson, 'The Precautionary Principle in CITES: A Critical Assessment' (1999) 39(2) Natural Resources 
Journal 211, 213-214; Nordic Council's International Conference on Pollution of the Seas, Greenpeace 18, Annex 2 
(1990) 27.  
210  Elizabeth Fisher, 'Precaution, Precaution Everywhere: Developing a" Common Understanding" of the 
Precautionary Principle in the European Community' (2002) 9(1) Maastricht journal of European and comparative 
law 21, 9.  




underscores the standard setting stage of the decision-making process, Gullett pays 
more attention to the outcome of applying the precautionary principle. Gullett takes the 
view that this principle should ‘at minimum’ be interpreted as ‘requiring the adoption of 
sound environmental practices and the reduction of emissions of pollutants at source’.212 
The application of this principle ‘normally involves accepting a known risk of 
environmental harm to guard against an uncertain environmental outcome’.213 
 
The precautionary principle has received widespread support theoretically and 
practically although it has been subject to significant and sustained criticism for its 
subjective criteria or vague wording,214. It is arguable that the precautionary principle 
can be an important environmental law principle and a rule of customary international 
law.215 In practice, this principle has been invoked by many cases in the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ),216 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas (ITLOS),217 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO).218 However, these international bodies have 
not taken an explicit position as to whether the precautionary principle is a binding 
principle of customary international law although some judges have referred to it in 
individual judgments.219 For example, in the 1999 Southern Bluefin Tuna (Australia and 
                                                 
212 Gullett, above n 195, 58.  
213 Ibid.  
214 See, eg, Marr, above n 206, 21. Marr asserts that the precautionary principle relies heavily on subjective criteria to 
trigger environmental action; Morris, above n 206, 7-15. Morris claims that problems of this principle include the 
fallacy that the merest possibility of catastrophe should justify action, the precautionary principle is unnecessary, 
demands for a reversal of the burden of proof are disingenuous, the standard of proof is infinitely high, a duty to take 
action to prevent harm would be too broad, examining the full range of alternatives would be infinitely costly, and so 
on.  
215 See, eg, Sands, above n 129, 279; Pyhålå, Brusendorff and Paulomåki, above n 197, 210. Sands asserts that current 
State practice supports the view that the precautionary principle ‘reflects a principle of customary law’, and Pyhålå, 
Brusendorff and Paulomåki argue that this principle can be considered as a principle of customary international law 
‘at least from a regional perspective’. But Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell purport that it is ‘far from evident’ that the 
precautionary principle has the normative character of a rule of law. Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 161.  
216  Examples are the 1995 Nuclear Tests case and the 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case. See Request for an 
Examination of the Situation in Accodance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the 
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France) (1995) ICJ Reports 288; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case (Hungary v Slovakia) 
(1997) ICJ Reports 7.  
217 Examples are the 1999 Southern Bluefin Tuna case, and the 2001 MOX Plant Case. See Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Case (Australia & New Zealand v Japan) (1999) Case Nos.3 and 4 ITLOS; The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v United 
Kingdom) (2001) 47 ILM 405; ITLOS, Order of 3 December 2001 on Provisional Measures.  
218 Example is the 1988 Hormones case involving beef hormones and genetically modified organisms which has been 
settled by the WTO. 




New Zealand v. Japan) case,220 Judge Shearer commented that, ‘the measures ordered 
by the Tribunal are rightly based upon considerations deriving from a precautionary 
approach’.221 As noted earlier, this principle has also been incorporated in the statute 
law and case law of many countries.  
 
Regarding the structure of the precautionary principle, the following four basic elements 
are generally found in most formulations. 222 They are: a threat of harm, a lack of 
scientific certainty or evidence, no proved causation between cause and effect, and the 
existence of the duty to act.223 Then, in cases where there is reason to believe harm may 
occur but it cannot be proven scientifically, what precautionary responses or which 
precautionary measures should be taken by policy makers? Based on current research, 
the following three steps might be employed in applying the precautionary principle. 
 
The first step is to identify current options for precautionary measures, or tools for 
incorporating the precautionary principle. This principle calls for a response in the face 
of scientific uncertainty. However, the selection of appropriate precautionary measures 
should take into account the differing ecological, cultural, political and economic 
interests and conditions of different countries.224 Furthermore, preventative measures 
should be taken so as to fulfil the purpose of the precautionary principle. 225 These 
preventive measures and tools may include research, an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), alternative assessment,226 ecosystem management, and mitigating all 
reasonably foreseeable damage.227 Of these measures, EIA has been given a key role in 
that the precautionary principle can be integrated in the EIA process.228 
                                                 
220 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia & New Zealand v Japan) (1999) Case Nos.3 and 4 ITLOS.  
221 See Pyhålå, Brusendorff and Paulomåki, above n 197, 222.  
222 Peter L. deFur and Michelle Kaszuba, 'Implementing the Precautionary Principle' (2002) 288(1-2) The Science of 
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226 A definition of alternative assessment is provided in the next section. See below n 234.  
227 See, eg, Van Dyke, above n 191, 381-383; Anne Steinemann, 'Improving Alternatives for Environmental Impact 
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The second step is to locate appropriate precautionary responses or measures. One 
unifying feature of the precautionary principle is its reversal of the burden of proof. 
There can be a range of precautionary responses based on differing requirements for the 
burden of proof. Traditionally the opponents of an activity will be permitted to conduct 
the activity unless there is proof of likely and unacceptable harm, whereas the 
precautionary principle requires the opponents of an activity to prove that the proposed 
activity will not adversely affect the environment before they are permitted to 
proceed. 229  As such, Gullett put forward four operational approaches to implement 
precaution, which range from strongest precautionary strength to weakest precautionary 
strength as follows: 
 
• ‘Completely reverse the burden of proof to require the proponent to meet a high evidentiary 
standard pointing to harmlessness before the activity—or modified activity—may be 
permitted; 
• Approve the activity, contingent on a low “acceptability” level of uncertainty (determined in 
a manner similar to cost-benefit analyses or risk assessments); 
• Approve the activity but require the proponent to use best available technology (BAT) or 
best available technology not entailing excessive cost (BATNEEC) and conduct stringent 
post-decision monitoring;  
• Apply precautionary measures pursuant to the doctrine of “no regrets”.’230 
 
These four approaches may be utilised to provide appropriate precautionary measures 
for a proposed activity. It can be inferred that the requirements on how much is known 
about a possible outcome increase when the precautionary strength increases. In other 
words, the complete reversal of the burden of proof requires the least knowledge of the 
outcome of a proposed activity. A medium strength formulation of the principle can be 
found in the 2000 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. The parties agreed 
that, 
 
                                                                                                                                               
154; Gullett, above n 198, 116-123. Gullett asserts that the precautionary principle can be integrated in the EIA 
process through three steps, namely threshold for operation of EIA, content of EIA, and substantive influence on 
decision-making.  
229 Gullett, above n 195, 59; Sands, above n 129, 273.  
230 Gullett, above n 195, 60. The ‘no regrets’ doctrine permits regulatory action even when there are uncertain 
consequences of taking such action. This doctrine is applicable as long as there will be other benefits of taking such 
action. In contrast, the precautionary principle involves uncertain consequences of inaction. See also Ronnie Harding 




‘For new or exploratory fisheries, members of the Commission shall adopt as soon as 
possible cautious conservation and management measures, including, inter alia, catch 
limits and effort limits. Such measures shall remain in force until there are sufficient 
data to allow assessment of the impact of the fisheries on the long-term sustainability 
of the stocks, whereupon conservation and management measures based on that 
assessment shall be implemented. The latter measures shall, if appropriate, allow for 
the gradual development of the fisheries.’231 [emphasis added] 
 
The burden of proof is reversed and it becomes necessary for the proponent (the 
Commission) to conduct impact assessment with sufficient data prior to the termination 
of precautionary conservation and management measures. In this case the proposed 
fishing activity is approved due to its low ‘acceptability’ level of uncertainty. 
 
The last step is to optimise the selected precautionary responses or measures taking 
relevant factors into consideration. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration requires 
precautionary measures to be ‘cost-effective’. The economic feasibility of proposed 
activities can be ensured through conducting cost-benefit analysis.232 However, as noted 
earlier, environmental effectiveness should not be ignored while seeking cost-
effectiveness of any proposed activity. It is thus important to seek a balance between 
cost-effectiveness and environmental effectiveness of proposed precautionary measures. 
 
2.4.2 The Applicability of the Precautionary Principle to the Issue of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from International Shipping 
 
This section will address two questions: is the precautionary principle applicable to the 
issue of GHG emissions from international shipping? If so, how should it be 
implemented in the context of GHG emissions from international shipping? 
 
Two factors justify the application of the precautionary principle to GHG emissions 
from international shipping. First, the four elements constituting the formulation of the 
precautionary principle can also be found in this GHG emissions issue. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, five IPCC Assessment Reports have recognised the existence of harm or 
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potential harm brought by GHG emissions from various sources, including those from 
international shipping. These harms include observed sea level rise, global warming and 
extreme weather. However, these harms cannot be proven scientifically, or in other 
words, there are uncertainties as to the outcome of proposed activities (i.e., international 
shipping). These IPCC Assessment Reports still utilise the terms ‘likely’ (IPCC Third 
Assessment Report), ‘very likely’ (IPCC Fourth Assessment Report), or ‘extremely 
likely’ (IPCC Fifth Assessment Report) to explore the causation between GHG 
emissions and their adverse effects. As climate change is a global issue, theoretically 
each State has a duty to act in reducing GHG emissions from ships. It is thus reasonable 
for the precautionary principle to apply to this issue.  
 
Second, from an international law perspective, the precautionary principle should be 
applicable to GHG emissions from international shipping. Article 3 of the UNFCCC 
provides that ‘[t]he Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects’. In essence, this 
principle represents the fundamental consensus of the international community in 
tackling global climate change. Currently the UNFCCC and the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) are working on the regulation of GHG emissions from ships. While 
the IMO received its mandate to regulate the GHG issue from Article 2(2) of the Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC, it is reasonable that the precautionary principle embodied in 
the UNFCCC should also be applied to the regulation of GHG emissions from ships 
either under the IMO regime or through the UNFCCC process. 
 
The precautionary principle could be implemented in relation to GHG emissions from 
international shipping through three steps as examined in the previous section. The first 
step is to identify available precautionary responses or tools for incorporating the 
precautionary principle relating to GHG emissions from ships. Currently there are three 
routes the IMO has taken to regulate GHG emissions from ships, namely technical 
measures, operational measures, and market-based measures (MBMs). 233  These 
measures can be regarded as precautionary responses which could be utilised to curb the 
negative impacts resulting from the proposed activity (international shipping). 
                                                 




Technical and operational measures have been introduced in the form of amendments to 
Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78, so the remaining precautionary measures are either to 
enhance the current technical and operational measures, or to employ MBMs. 
 
Alternative assessment and EIA might be utilised as tools for incorporating the 
precautionary principle. Alternative assessment is also referred to as options analysis, 
facility planning, source reduction planning, and pollution prevention planning.234 It is a 
frequently used method to examine alternatives for achieving a specific purpose and 
selecting the one with the least potential impact on human health and environment.235 
Alternative assessment has been applied widely as a central aspect of the EIA 
process.236It indicates a shift from ‘problem-based’ environmental policy to ‘solution-
based’ policy.237 In the context of shipping GHG emissions, the EIA and alternative 
assessment may be used to identify the environmental impacts of international shipping, 
or possible alternatives to current practices in international shipping. Additionally, there 
could be other precautionary responses or duties for shipping States. For instance, they 
may have a duty to notify the possible risks to coastal States or port States before their 
ships arrive, they may have a duty to consult, to develop alternative techniques or other 
methods to mitigate all reasonably foreseeable damage. 238  The carbon tax package 
adopted by the Australian government in 2012 is an example of this type of measure.239 
 
The second step is to select appropriate precautionary measures to address shipping 
GHG emissions. As the main impacts of GHG emissions from international shipping 
have been generally recognised by IPCC Assessment Reports and IMO GHG Studies, it 
is reasonable to infer that there is substantial knowledge about the possible outcomes of 
the proposed activity—international shipping. GHG emissions from international 
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shipping lead to negative environmental impacts, but this is a cumulative process and 
international shipping serves as the most important means of transportation for 
international trade. 240  Therefore, based on the four-approach theory proposed by 
Gullett, less precaution will be needed to prevent negative impacts brought about by 
shipping GHG emissions. While the first approach, which reverses the burden of proof, 
would require shipowners or ship operators to prove the harmlessness of international 
shipping, the fourth approach does not provide any obligations on shipowners or ship 
operators. Therefore, the middle two approaches will be more suitable than the other 
two options. Regarding the acceptability level of uncertainty relating to impacts of 
shipping GHG emissions, this uncertainty is generally acceptable for most people. 
International shipping, as an important means of transportation, cannot be prohibited or 
replaced by other means of transportation due to the possible higher negative impacts 
from other alternatives. On this basis, the second approach that approves the activity 
based on a low acceptability level of uncertainty may not apply in the context of 
international shipping. It is thus arguable that the third approach should be adopted. 
That is, approve the activity (international shipping) but require the proponent 
(shipowners or ship operators) to use BAT or BATNEEC and conduct stringent post-
decision monitoring. Currently this technical measure has been adopted by the IMO. 
 
The last step is to achieve a balance between cost-effectiveness and environmental 
effectiveness of proposed precautionary measures. This issue has been raised by some 
countries during the discussions and negotiations of technical measures within the IMO. 
While it is difficult to achieve cost-effectiveness through upgrading the technical 
threshold for shipbuilding, it is feasible to achieve a balance between cost-effectiveness 
and environmental effectiveness.241 
 
2.5 ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibility’ and ‘No More Favourable 
Treatment’ 
 
                                                 
240 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 'Review of Maritime Transport 2012' (2012) 
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Whether the principles of ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibility’ (CBDR) or ‘No 
More Favourable Treatment’ (NMFT) should be applied to the GHG emissions issue 
has become a focal point in the debate since the IMO received its mandate to regulate 
GHG emissions from international shipping from Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol in 
1997. While developed States insist that the NMFT principle should apply as it typically 
does for all shipping conventions adopted under the auspices of the IMO, developing 
States argue that the CBDR principle should override it as IMO’s mandate for this 
regulatory issue comes from the Kyoto Protocol, which endorses the CBDR principle. 
This dispute has impeded the process of international regulation by the IMO and has 
imposed challenges on future implementation of the adopted energy efficiency measures 
within the IMO.242 This part first examines the principles of CBDR and NMFT, and 
then discusses whether both principles should be applied to the regulation of GHG 
emissions from international shipping, and explores the approaches for achieving this 
application. 
 
2.5.1 Common but Differentiated Responsibility 
 
As a nascent principle of international environmental law, the CBDR principle has 
received considerable attention from the international community. As far as its origins 
are concerned, there are generally four different opinions. Harris asserts that the CBDR 
principle originated from the principle of the ‘common heritage of mankind’,243 which 
has evolved into another relevant principle of ‘common concern of mankind’. This latter 
principle was first raised in the UN General Assembly Resolution 43/53 in 1988, where 
climate change is recognised as ‘a common concern of mankind since climate is an 
essential condition which sustains life on earth’.244 In order to resolve such ‘common 
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concern’ properly, States should be allocated responsibilities. As a response to the 
question of which States bear the greatest responsibility for climate change, the 
principle of CBDR came into being. 245 Sands purports that the principle of CBDR 
evolved from the application of equity in general international law based on which the 
special needs of developing countries should be taken into account.246 Cullet takes the 
view that the differentiated treatment, as the key part of the CBDR principle, could be 
traced back to the older principle of economic differentiation adopted in agreements on 
international trade and economic development.247 This view, however, reflects more the 
development of North-South relations, or the relations between developed States and 
developing States, which shaped the content of the principle of CBDR.248 Some other 
scholars treat the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment as the origin 
of the principle of CBDR.249 This view is based on the fact that during this conference 
the concept of sustainable development was first raised and the different development 
priorities of developed countries and developing countries were identified.250 Thus, the 
Stockholm conference represented ‘the first time that an international consensus had 
been reached, at least in theory, on applying CBDR and differentiated standards to 
international environmental problems’. 251  However, the current content and 
interpretation of the CBDR principle derives something from all these sources, and has 
been evolving as international relations and politics change. 
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The CBDR principle was implicit in the 1987 Montreal Protocol. 252  It was first 
explicitly formulated in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, which provides: 
 
‘States shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore 
the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions 
to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear 
in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their 
societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial 
resources they command.’253 [emphasis added] 
 
This elaboration, although criticised by both developed States and developing States,254 
has been widely accepted and endorsed in many conventions and treaties, including the 
1992 CBD,255 1992 UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol.256 Based on this formulation, the 
CBDR principle consists of two elements. One is the establishment of the common 
responsibility of States to protect the global environment. The other is the 
acknowledgement by all States that differentiated responsibilities should be allocated to 
different States due to their different contributions to a particular environmental 
problem and their differing capacities to take remedial measures.257 In other words, the 
CBDR principle requires both developed and developing States to contribute to 
addressing environmental problems, but developed States bear greater responsibility. 
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2.5.1.1 Common Responsibility 
 
As mentioned above, the notion of ‘common responsibility’ evolved from the principle 
of ‘common heritage of mankind’, or ‘common concern of humankind’. UN General 
Assembly Resolutions and many conventions, including the 1992 CBD and UNFCCC, 
have recognised biological diversity and climate change as ‘matters of common concern 
to humankind’.258 Addressing these environmental problems is ‘not solely a matter of 
domestic jurisdiction of each individual State’. Rather, all States, including developing 
States, are required to ‘participate actively in the formation and implementation of 
international law for sustainable development’.259 This notion, however, is rooted in the 
nature of the Earth and the spirit of solidarity.260 This is underpinned clearly by the 
preamble of the Rio Declaration, which provides  
 
‘With the goal of establishing a new and equitable global partnership through the 
creation of new levels of co-operation among States, key sectors of societies and 
people.’ 
‘Recognizing the integral and interdependent nature of the Earth, our home.’261 
 
To gain the above ‘equitable global partnership’ so as to protect ‘our home’, Agenda 21 
also put forward similar objectives, and urged States to  
 
‘promote and support the effective participation of all countries concerned, in 
particular developing countries, in the negotiation, implementation, review and 
governance of international agreements or instruments, including appropriate provision 
of technical and financial assistance and other available mechanisms for this purpose, 
as well as the use of differential obligations where appropriate.’ 262 [emphasis added] 
 
Certain means have been adopted by international institutions to facilitate the 
participation of developing States in jointly addressing international environmental 
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problems, such as the establishment of global environmental protection funds (examples 
are the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF)), 
technical and financial assistance, although the support is still ‘insufficient for the task’ 
and their effectiveness is to be improved.263 However, these measures also suggest that 
‘common responsibilities can never be separated from differentiated responsibilities’.264 
 
2.5.1.2 Differentiated Responsibility 
 
As the other element of the principle of CBDR, differentiated responsibility means the 
allocation of differentiated environmental standards to developed States and developing 
States based on a range of factors. These factors, according to Sands, may include 
‘special needs and circumstances, future economic development of developing 
countries, and historic contributions to causing an environmental problem’. 265  This 
approach was widely endorsed by many UN documents and treaties. Examples include 
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,266 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States, 267  1992 Rio Declaration, 268 1982 LOSC, 269 1987 Montreal Protocol, 270 1992 
CBD,271 1992 UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol.272  
 
In practice, differentiated responsibility leads to ‘different legal obligations’ so as to 
more effectively realise ‘substantive equality’.273 To achieve this goal, differentiated 
obligations are adopted by various international treaties and documents, and different 
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techniques are employed to implement them. 274  The first approach is to establish 
differentiated standards. This approach applies not only between developed States and 
developing States but also between developed States.275 Taking the 1992 UNFCCC and 
its Kyoto Protocol as an example, Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the UNFCCC stipulated that 
only Annex I States (mainly developed States) bear the responsibility of returning their 
GHG emission levels to 1990 levels by 2000. Article 11(2) of Kyoto Protocol puts 
forward the ‘appropriate burden sharing’ mechanism to guide the future negotiation of 
financial commitments between developed States while its Annex B lists the individual 
reduction commitment of different developed States. 276  The second approach is to 
regulate ‘grace’ period to delay implementation by certain developing States. In this 
regard the 1987 Montreal Protocol gave developing States 10 years’ grace period for 
implementing regulated control measures.277 The third approach is to have flexible and 
equitable requirements on different States as to the implementation of adopted 
measures, taking specific needs and special situations of developing States into 
consideration. Article 3 of the UNFCCC provides:  
 
‘In their actions to achieve the objective of the convention and to implement its 
provisions, the Parties shall be guided, inter alia, by the following: [1]…the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities…[2]The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country 
Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change…’278 [emphasis added] 
 
Apart from these approaches, the transfer of financial and technological resources to 
developing States is also frequently utilised as a method of differentiating 
responsibilities between developed States and developing States. This kind of transfer, 
however, may take various forms including official assistance channels, the setting of 
different funds, 279  private means, and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
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created by the Kyoto Protocol. These techniques are generally incorporated into 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) by means of ‘substantive provisions’. In 
other words, MEAs generally implement the differentiated responsibility, or the CBDR 
principle, by way of ‘substantive provisions’ instead of referring explicitly to such 
terms.280  
 
These different techniques employed to incorporate differentiated responsibility indicate 
that there are differing interpretations of the meaning of ‘differentiation’. Many 
developing countries tend to interpret the ‘differentiated responsibility’ as different 
central obligations where developing countries are excluded from binding obligations 
such as GHG emissions reductions. 281 However, there has been less room for such 
interpretation during the negotiations of the international climate change regime. In 
particular, the 2010 Cancun Agreements282 adopted at the 16th Conference of Parties 
(COP) to the UNFCCC reveals ‘a shift towards greater parallelism between developed 
and developing countries’ as to requirements relating to mitigation actions or targets 
and international Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV). 283  Given the 
growing divergence in the interpretation of differentiation, Rajamani put forward a 
broad interpretation of differentiated responsibility. Based on current international 
environmental agreements, she asserts that differentiated responsibility consists of three 
categories, namely: differentiated central obligations, differentiated implementation 
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arrangements, and the granting of assistance, including financial and technological 
assistance.284 
 
The basis for differentiated responsibility has been analysed and supported by many 
commentators.285 Two key justifications that have been invoked by international treaties 
and scholarly commentary are the historical responsibility of the North for current 
environmental degradation and their present capability to remedy such problems. The 
first justification is related to the differing contributions of States to environmental 
problems. From this perspective, the principle of CBDR can be deemed as the 
application of the polluter-pays principle.286 As the main GHG emitter contributing to 
current environmental problems, developed States are the main polluters and thus 
should be responsible for this issue. The second justification involves different 
capabilities of States. This can theoretically be underpinned by the principle of equity or 
the concept of environmental justice. It has been generally accepted that justice is ‘a 
compulsory part of international environmental law’.287 Due to imbalanced historical 
and present distribution of resources and power, it can be argued that a form of 
distributive justice should be realised.288 Therefore, differentiated responsibility can be 
viewed as a kind of ‘entitlement’ by developing States or obligation by developed States 
instead of on the basis of ‘need’ or ‘compassionate measures’.289  
 
Other justifications are based on the different priorities of developed and developing 
States, 290  ‘international cooperation’ or ‘solidarity’ being a feature of current 
international environmental law where developed States are obliged to bear more 
                                                 
284 Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
191.  
285 See, eg, Cullet, above n 247; French, above n 254; Rajamani, above n 284; Matsui, above n 259.  
286 See, eg, Matsui, above n 259, 155; Rajamani, above n 258, 122.  
287 Cullet, above n 273, 162.  
288 Ibid.  
289 S.R. Choudhary, 'Common but Differentiated Responsibility in International Environmental Law from Stockholm 
to Rio' in Konrad Ginther, Erik Denters and Paul J.I.M. de Waart (eds), Sustainable Development and Good 
Governance (1995) 322, 334. But Matsui treats this differentiated responsibility of developed States as the one with a 
moral or political nature. See Matsui, above n 259, 155.  
290 Generally protecting global environment or adapting to the consequences thereof has become one of the priorities 
of developed States whereas developing States pay more attention to their economies instead of environmental 




responsibilities, 291  and the utilisation of differentiated treatment as an incentive for 
developing States to participate in multilateral environmental agreements.292  
 
2.5.1.3 Legal Status and Application 
 
The inclusion of the CBDR principle in various treaties and UN documents has 
successfully increased the participation of developing States in international 
environmental regulation and management and achieved consensus in some areas 
especially within the climate regime. Its legal status, however, is still open to debate. 
Generally, it is regarded as a principle of international environmental law. 293 
Nevertheless, due to different understandings of the term ‘principle’, it has been 
accorded different degrees of status by scholars—some have classified it as ‘merely 
aspirational’ while others regard it as ‘legally binding’, 294  Currently its status in 
customary international law terms is not defined.295  
 
The preamble of the Kyoto Protocol emphasises that ‘in pursuit of the ultimate objective 
of the [UNFCCC] Convention as stated in its Article 2’, States’ actions should be 
‘guided by Article 3 of the [UNFCCC] Convention’. 296 Article 2 of the UNFCCC 
requires that the goal of GHG emission reduction should be conducted in a way to 
‘enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner’, which implies the 
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necessity of differentiated treatment if the requirement of ‘sustainable development’ and 
the context of this article is taken into account.297 Article 3 of the UNFCCC treats the 
CBDR as one of the principles of the convention, and the preamble of the UNFCCC 
also acknowledges this principle. Therefore, through the incorporation of the CBDR 
principle into various conventions, especially the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, the 
cornerstone role of this principle within the global climate change regime has been 
generally accepted. However, controversy remains regarding which aspects of the 
CBDR should be adopted for post-2012 climate negotiations.  
 
2.5.2 No More Favourable Treatment 
 
2.5.2.1 An Overview 
 
No more favourable treatment (NMFT), also called the equal treatment for all ships 
principle, or universal treatment principle, refers to ‘port States enforcing applicable 
standards in a uniform manner to all ships in their ports, regardless of flag’.298 Under 
the IMO Convention,299 Article 1(b) describes the ‘removal of discriminatory action’ as 
one of the purposes of the IMO, and Article 3 treats the ‘normal processes of 
international shipping business’ as a recommended way to deal with shipping-related 
matters. Indeed, these two Articles provide a legal basis for the NMFT principle. The 
term NMFT was included in MARPOL 73/78 and applies to all annexes to that 
Convention.  
 
Article 5(4) of MARPOL 73/78 stipulates that, 
 
                                                 
297  One element of sustainable development is to integrate environmental protection into economic and other 
development. This integration approach may also underpin the adoption of differentiated legal commitments based on 
the differentiated historical responsibility of States and their different capacity to respond to environmental 
requirements. Sands, above n 129, 263.  
298 Buhaug et al, above n 184, 20.  
299 Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, opened for signature 6 March 1948, 
289 UNTS 3 (entered into force 17 March 1958), amended and renamed as Convention on the International Maritime 





‘With respect to the ship of non-Parties to the Convention, Parties shall apply the 
requirements of the present Convention as may be necessary to ensure that no more 
favourable treatment is given to such ships.’300 [emphasis added] 
 
Article II of the 1978 Protocol to 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS) also has a similar provision, which reads: 
 
‘3. With respect to the ships of non-Parties to the Convention and the present Protocol, 
the Parties to the present Protocol shall apply the requirements of the Convention and 
the present Protocol as may be necessary to ensure that no more favourable treatment 
is given to such ships.’301 [emphasis added] 
 
Article X of the 1978 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) provides: 
 
‘This Article shall be applied as may be necessary to ensure that no more favourable 
treatment is given to ships entitled to fly the flag of a non-Party than is given to ships 
entitled to fly the flag of a Party.’302 [emphasis added] 
 
It appears that the NMFT principle only applies to Article X of this convention. 
However, the fact that this Article addresses the issue of ‘control’ indicates the 
application of this principle to the whole convention since the main purpose of this 
convention is to deal with the control of foreign ships while in the ports of a State.303 
To date this principle has been consistently applied without exception to all 53 IMO 
treaty instruments currently in existence.304 
 
2.5.2.2 Legal Status and Application 
 
                                                 
300 MARPOL 73/78 art 5(4).  
301 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, opened for signature 1 November 1974, 1184 UNTS 2 
(entered into force 25 May 1980) art II (‘SOLAS’).  
302 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, opened for 
signature 7 July 1978, 1361 UNTS 2(entered into force 28 April 1984), as amended by the 1995 Protocol, 1969 
UNTS (entered into force 1 February 1997) art X, para 5 (‘STCW’). 
303 G. P. Pamborides, International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 
107-108.  
304  International Maritime Organisation (IMO), Status of Conventions: List of IMO Conventions and Their 
Amendments (16 May 2013) <http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx> 




The NMFT principle has been widely applied to treaties adopted by the IMO. 
Nevertheless, it is only a customary rule applicable within the IMO regime. The 
application of this principle is one of the key features of IMO’s efforts in exercising 
uniform standards around the world, and it has assisted the IMO to fulfil the regulatory 
purposes of these treaties. First, the introduction of the NMFT principle has been proven 
to be an effective means and incentive for non-participating States to become 
contracting parties to an IMO treaty.305 Under this principle, port State control will 
impose the standards as indicated in an IMO treaty on all ships calling at a port of a 
contracting party. In this way, it becomes more difficult for a state to avoid compliance 
with a convention adopted under the auspices of the IMO. Second, the application of the 
NMFT principle may relieve concern over the existence of the ‘flag of convenience’ 
(FOC) phenomenon.306 Under the FOC, a ship may change its flag easily to have a non-
Annex I State nationality if differentiated responsibility applies and ships flying the 
flags of non-Annex I States would then enjoy less stringent treatment.307 If this were to 
be the case, the regulatory efforts by the IMO to address many maritime issues would 
be ineffective. Furthermore, 75 per cent of the world shipping tonnage, by deadweight, 
of all merchant ships on international voyages is registered in developing States.308 
Therefore, it would be ‘ineffective’ for the IMO to act by means of regulating only 25 
per cent of the world’s shipping tonnage if the NMFT principle were not in place.309  
 
It is worth noting that the IMO has limited the application of the NMFT principle to 
IMO regulated treaties. For instance, the preamble of amended Annex VI to MARPOL 
73/78 in 2011 provides: 
 
‘Recognizing also that adoption of the amendments to Annex VI in no way prejudges 
the negotiations held in other international fora, such as the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), nor affect the positions of the 
countries that participate in such negotiation,’ 310 [emphasis added] 
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306 Definitions of FOC is provided at footnote 85.  
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This statement reveals the IMO’s view on the application scope of its NMFT principle. 
That is, the IMO’s regulations on GHG emissions from ships, including the revised 
MARPOL Annex VI, are independent from those reached within the UNFCCC-Kyoto 
Protocol regime. The application of the NMFT principle to shipping GHG emissions 
issue should not be regarded as a precedent which may be applicable to the international 
climate change regime. Nevertheless, as an obligation under the Kyoto Protocol, the 
IMO still needs to report its progress on the GHG emissions issue to the UNFCCC’s 
SBSTA on a regular basis. 
 
2.5.3 Application of Both ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibility’ and ‘No More 
Favourable Treatment’ Principles to the Issue of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
International Shipping 
 
The CBDR principle and the NMFT principle are distinct in terms of their content and 
their scope of application. Generally the CBDR principle applies to the global climate 
change regime, whereas the NMFT principle applies to all IMO treaties. Regulating 
GHG emissions from international shipping involves both global climate change and the 
IMO. In this case, how the two principles should be applied to this GHG emissions 
issue is controversial. 
 
2.5.3.1 Applicability of Two Regulatory Principles 
 
Three divergent views exist as to the applicability of the CBDR and NMFT principles to 
the regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping. One view is that only the 
CBDR principle should be applied to this GHG emissions issue on the ground that the 
IMO received its mandate to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping from 
Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. This view has been supported by 
many developing countries311 and some scholars.312 This interpretation of the IMO’s 
                                                 
311 See, eg, China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and some other developing countries all hold that the IMO’s mandate 
comes from the Kyoto Protocol. Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 59th Session, 
Statement by the Delegation of China on GHG Issues, IMO Doc MEPC 59/24/Add.1 Annex 13 (2009) para 1; Report 
of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 24, 




mandate justifies the application of the CBDR principle, which runs through the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, to this issue. Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol 
provides, 
 
 ‘The parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine 
bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the 
International Maritime Organization, respectively.’313 [emphasis added] 
 
Marine bunker fuel, also called degraded residue heavy fuel oil, is the main fuel used by 
ships on international voyages.314 Therefore, it is arguable that the above article can be 
interpreted as meaning that the IMO has a mandate from the Kyoto Protocol to regulate 
GHG emissions from international shipping. Furthermore, this provision may also be 
interpreted as meaning that only Annex I States (developed States) are under the 
commitment to conduct the emissions reductions. 315  However, this view has been 
opposed by the Sub-Division for Legal Affairs of the IMO. It asserted that the IMO did 
not receive its GHG mandate from the Kyoto Protocol, and this provision should not be 
interpreted as meaning that non-Annex I States are exempt from any obligations. 
Rather, it should be interpreted that the reduction of such emissions is ‘a task which is 
properly within the purview of IMO’, and ‘only Annex I countries should be involved in 
the negotiations within IMO’.316 Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties 
stipulates that,  
 
‘1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose. 
                                                                                                                                               
312 See, eg, Wang, above n 307, 275; A. Miola, M. Marra and B. Ciuffo, 'Designing A Climate Change Policy for the 
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Responsibilities' (2012) <http://web.deu.edu.tr/hukuk/dergiler/dergimiz13-1/2-deryaaydinokur.pdf> accessed 1 
January 2014, p 28; Jodie Moffat, 'Arranging Deckchairs on the Titanic: Climate Change, Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
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314 Md. Saiful Karim and Shawkat Alam, 'Climate Change and Reduction of Emissions of Greenhouse Gases from 
Ships: An Appraisal' (2011) 1(1) Asian Journal of International Law 131, 131.  
315 See, eg, W. B. Fitzgerald, O. J. A. Howitt and I. J. Smith, 'Greenhouse Gas Emissions from the International 
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2. The context for purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes…’317 [emphasis added] 
 
In accordance with these rules, in particular based on the ordinary meaning of the terms 
and the context of negotiating the Kyoto Protocol, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol 
may be understood as meaning that only Annex I States are obliged to make reductions 
in international shipping, which is consistent with the rest of the Kyoto Protocol where 
the CBDR principle has been fully incorporated. However, this interpretation will only 
be logical if the IMO receives its GHG mandate from this provision. The IMO has 
denied this possibility and its documents indicate that no consensus was achieved as to 
the interpretation of this provision after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. 318 
Therefore, it seems that the first view would be more acceptable only when it is 
recognised that the IMO receives its GHG mandate from the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
The second view supports the sole application of the NMFT principle to this GHG 
emissions issue. This view is held by the Sub-Division for Legal Affairs of the IMO and 
some scholars.319 The IMO has been the main international institution working on the 
regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping since 1997. Therefore, there is 
little doubt that the NMFT principle is applicable to this issue. As noted earlier, this is 
because the NMFT principle has been consistently applied to all IMO treaties and has 
become a customary practice within the IMO regime. Furthermore, the reduction of 
GHG emissions from ships has been partially regulated in the form of amendments of 
Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 in 2011 and 2014 respectively. Since the NMFT principle 
is explicitly stipulated in Article 5(4) of MARPOL 73/78, it follows that the regime of 
GHG emission reductions from ships in Annex VI is subject to this article. In other 
words, the principle of NMFT applies to GHG emissions from international shipping in 
this context. In order to exclude the application of the CBDR principle, the proponents 
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of this view assert that the IMO derives its global mandate from the IMO Convention, 
the LOSC and IMO Regulation 8, but not from Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
The third view recognises the application of both the CBDR and the NMFT principles 
to this GHG emissions issue, but insists that this might only be achieved through 
market-based mechanisms.320 However, the proponents of this view have only explored 
the approaches of applying both principles to this issue, and some of them also assert 
that the IMO’s mandate to regulate shipping GHG emissions does not derive from 
Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol.321 
 
To date none of these three views have been generally accepted by most countries and 
the shipping industry. Theoretically speaking, it appears that identifying the origin of 
the IMO’s mandate to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping is a key to 
addressing this debate. Identifying the generally accepted origin of the IMO’s mandate 
could determine which principles may apply to the regulation of this issue. Generally if 
an international agreement gives the IMO a specific mandate, it would appear 
reasonable that the principles reflected in that agreement should also apply to the 
regulation of the GHG issue by the IMO. 
 
As discussed earlier, the proponents of the first view attribute the IMO’s mandate in 
regulating GHG emissions from ships solely to the Kyoto Protocol. Article 2(2) of the 
Kyoto Protocol requests the Annex I States of the UNFCCC to ‘work through the IMO’ 
to limit or reduce their GHG emissions from ships. Whether this provision gives the 
IMO the exclusive mandate to regulate this GHG issue is open to debate and dependent 
on various interpretations of the term ‘work through’. However, it ‘establishes a formal 
link to the IMO’ by authorising the IMO to regulate this GHG issue,322 and implies that 
the IMO should ‘take the lead’ on this issue.323 Furthermore, the acceptance of this 
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mandate by the IMO is consistent with the IMO Convention.324 Since then the IMO has 
reported its progress in regulating the GHG issue to the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body on 
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) on a regular basis, which could be 
regarded as one of its obligations in fulfilling this mandate.325 Therefore, it is argued 
that it is not reasonable to assert that the IMO’s mandate has nothing to do with the 
Kyoto Protocol.326  
 
The proponents of the second view assert that the IMO derives its global mandate from 
the IMO Convention, the LOSC and IMO Resolution 8, but not from Article 2(2) of the 
Kyoto Protocol. According to this view, Articles 1(a) and 64 of the IMO Convention 
provide the IMO with a global mandate and global competence ‘in the field of shipping 
and the effect of shipping on the marine environment’,327 in particular in relation to 
‘technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade’. 328 
Articles 211(1) and 212(3) of the LOSC request States Parties to ‘establish global rules, 
standards, and recommended practices and procedures’ to prevent, reduce and control 
atmospheric and vessel-source marine pollution. In particular, these actions shall be 
conducted through diplomatic conferences or a competent international organization 
(the IMO). Therefore, the LOSC defines flag, coastal and port State jurisdiction, while 
the IMO specifies how member State jurisdiction should be exercised to meet IMO 
safety and shipping anti-pollution regulations.329 Furthermore, Resolution 8 on ‘CO2 
emissions from ships’ was adopted by the MARPOL Conference of the Parties in 1997. 
This resolution requested the IMO to start its work on the reduction of GHG emissions 
from ships and has therefore been regarded as a key legal document underpinning 
subsequent regulatory efforts by the IMO. In addition, those who take the view that 
attributes the IMO’s mandate to these three sources exclude Article 2(2) of the Kyoto 
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Protocol as a source of the IMO’s mandate relating to the GHG issue. It is asserted that 
there has been no precedent for any IMO treaty instruments adopting a common but 
differentiated responsibility approach similar to that incorporated in the Kyoto 
Protocol.330 This argument, however, runs counter to the legal basis for the first view on 
the IMO’s mandate to regulate the GHG emissions issue. Generally an organisation 
which receives and accepts a mandate under an international agreement cannot question 
principles incorporated in that agreement simply based on its own previous practice 
which is incompatible with such principles.331 
 
From an international law perspective, the above two views on the origin of the IMO’s 
GHG mandate both have their legal bases. There is no clear hierarchy between the 
Kyoto Protocol and IMO Convention and the LOSC on the issue and it is open to debate 
which rules should prevail if there is a conflict between these treaties.332 For this reason, 
it might be appropriate to strike a compromise between the two views. It is clear that the 
IMO Convention and the LOSC provide the IMO with general competence to regulate 
GHG emissions from ships, while the Kyoto Protocol gives the IMO a specific mandate 
to regulate this matter. The two interpretations of the IMO’s mandate are thus consistent 
and the IMO can utilise both these competences to regulate GHG emissions from 
international shipping. An important implication of the this compromise interpretation is 
that principles incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol and the IMO Convention will also 
apply to the regulation of the GHG issue, namely, the CBDR and the NMFT principles. 
It therefore appears that the third view is more logical. However, the approaches that 
have so far been proposed for applying these two principles to this issue as expressed in 
the third view can be improved. This is examined in the next section. 
 
2.5.3.2 Approaches to Applying the Two Principles 
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It is a challenge to determine how to incorporate both the CBDR and NMFT principles 
into the IMO’s regulation of shipping GHG emissions. To address this issue, two 
assumptions can be made. One is that the CBDR principle is State-based whereas the 
NMFT principle is ship-based, so there is no irreconcilable conflict between them. The 
other is that common responsibility and differentiated responsibility are two core 
elements of the CBDR principle and common responsibility has been incorporated into 
this issue via the NMFT principle,333 so the key to applying the CBDR principle is 
effective incorporation of differentiated responsibility. There are different 
interpretations of the implications of the CBDR principle, in particular the meaning of 
‘differentiated responsibility’. Due to the complexity of the issue of GHG emissions 
from shipping, the adoption of a broad interpretation of differentiated treatment would 
be practical. As discussed earlier, Rajamani put forward a broad interpretation of 
differentiated responsibility which consists of three categories, namely differentiated 
central obligations, differentiated implementation arrangements, and the granting of 
assistance, including financial and technological assistance. 334  If this broad 
interpretation of differentiation is employed, the CBDR principle could be applied to the 
GHG issue in different ways depending on the nature of various measures for 
addressing this issue.  
 
There are three routes for regulating shipping GHG emissions that have been considered 
within the IMO: technical measures, operational measures, and MBMs. In terms of 
technical and operational measures adopted by the IMO in 2011, strengthening effective 
transfer of technologies and financial assistance from developed countries to developing 
countries in relation to these technical and operational measures would constitute an 
application of the CBDR principle to this issue as indicated in the third category of 
differentiated responsibility.335 As a requirement of the NMFT principle, port States 
exercise uniform control over all ships calling at their ports through participation in 
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various MOUs on Port State Control. 336  For this reason, it would be difficult to 
implement differentiated central obligations as indicated in the first category of 
differentiated responsibility with regard to the issue of GHG emissions from 
shipping. 337 Indeed this category of differentiated responsibility is often claimed by 
developing countries as the main form of the CBDR principle. 338  Meanwhile, the 
difficulty in applying the first category of differentiated responsibility to technical and 
operational GHG-reduction measures is also underpinned by the existence of Flag-of-
Convenience (FOC) States. It may be hypothesised that developing flag States are 
exempt from complying with IMO GHG-reduction regulations, as implied by the first 
category of the CBDR principle. In this circumstance, shipowners from developed 
countries would probably opt for flagging their ships under these FOC States to avoid 
the stringent regulations and increased cost in their own States flowing from compliance 
with these regulations. As of 1 January 2013, ships registered in developing countries 
(excluding transition economies) accounted for 75.49 per cent of the world fleet by 
deadweight tonnage (dwt), which if combined with the FOC would render these GHG-
reduction measures barely effective.339 Theoretically, it would be feasible to phase-in 
application of the CBDR principle to this GHG issue as indicated in the second category 
of differentiated responsibility.340 Indeed during the discussions within the IMO, some 
developing countries proposed this approach to postpone the application of regulations 
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to developing countries.341 However, due to the concern for the FOC and the urgency of 
addressing this issue against the backdrop of global climate change, this option was not 
adopted by the IMO. 
 
More options are available to incorporate the two principles with respect to MBMs. One 
possibility is to apply the CBDR principle to the issue by allocating differentiated 
central obligations to developed countries and developing countries so as to ensure ‘no 
net incidence on developing countries’, 342  as indicated in the first category of 
differentiated responsibility. Currently some proposed MBMs incorporating both 
principles have been submitted to the IMO for further discussion.343 This approach has 
also been supported by the UNFCCC Secretariat,344 as well as by other countries and 
international organisations. 345  Since these MBM proposals also apply the NMFT 
principle, the effectiveness of these measures is unlikely to be influenced by FOC 
States. A detailed assessment of current MBM proposals and the selection of MBMs for 
addressing GHG emissions from international shipping is provided in Chapters 4 and 7 
of this thesis. 
 
2.6 The Polluter-Pays Principle and Its Application to the Issue of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from International Shipping 
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Preventing and controlling pollution is a costly process where a significant financial 
investment in human and material resources and infrastructure or a large amount of 
compensation for victims may be required.346 But who is going to pay these bills? The 
polluter-pays principle provides some rules for addressing this problem. Despite the 
view from many States that it is only applicable at the domestic level rather than at the 
international level, 347  the polluter-pays principle has been evolving and is widely 
applied in various international instruments. This part first examines the polluter-pays 
principle as to its evolution, content and implementation, and then discusses how it can 
be applied to the issue of GHG emissions from international shipping.  
 
2.6.1 An Overview of the Polluter-Pays Principle 
 
The polluter-pays principle refers to the requirement that ‘the costs of pollution should 
be borne by the person responsible for causing the pollution’.348 Although its meaning 
and application are still open to debate, 349  the polluter-pays principle has been 
recognised worldwide and is referred to in both national legislation and international 
declarations and agreements.350 The origin of this principle can be traced back to 1972 
when the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) formally 
propounded it as a means of coping with environmental problems.351 The formulation of 
                                                 
346 See Kenneth A. MacInnis, 'The Polluter Pays Principle: Preventing Ship-Source Pollution in the Arctic' in Aldo E. 
Chircop et al (eds), The Regulation of International Shipping: International and Comparative Perspectives (2012) 
143, 143.  
347 Sands, above n 129, 281.  
348 Ibid 279.  
349 Ibid 280.  
350 James A. Tobey and Henri Smets, 'The Polluter-Pays Principle in the Context of Agriculture and the Environment' 
(1996) 19(1) WORLD ECONOMY 63, 63.  
351 Concerning the origin of the polluter-pays principle, there are some different views.  
Some scholars trace it back to the 1972 OECD Guiding Principles which recommend the adoption of the polluter-
pays principle to allocate costs of pollution prevention and control measures. Recommendation of the Council on 
Guiding Principles concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies (26 May 1972) OECD 
Recommendation C (72) 128 art 1 A. See, eg, Kiss and Shelton, above n 1, 213; Priscilla Schwartz, 'The Polluter-
Pays Principle' in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M. Ong and Panos Merkouris (eds), Research Handbook on 
International Environmental Law (2010) 243, 244. 
Other scholars, Sands for example, asserts that the polluter-pays principle in treaty law can be traced back to some of 
the first instruments setting minimum rules on civil liability for damage by hazardous activities, and the earliest one is 
the 1960 Paris Convention which provides that the operator of the nuclear installation, whether a private entity or the 
state, is strictly liable for injury to or loss of life of any person and damage to or loss of property. Sands, above n 129, 
281; See also OECD Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, opened for signature 29 




this principle was first contained in the 1972 OECD Guiding Principles, 352which 
provide: 
 
‘The principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and control 
measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and to avoid 
distortions in international trade and investment is the so-called “Polluter-Pays-
Principle”. This Principle means that the polluter should bear the expenses of carrying 
out the above mentioned measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the 
environment is in an acceptable state. In other words, the cost of these measures should 
be reflected in the cost of goods and services which cause pollution in production 
and/or consumption. Such measures should not be accompanied by subsidies that 
would create significant distortions in international trade and investment.’353 [emphasis 
added] 
 
This formulation of the polluter-pays principle specifies the costs and suggests the basic 
rules for the implementation of this principle. However, environmental damage is 
excluded from such costs.354 To make the principle better suit changing situations, the 
OECD adopted further recommendations in 1974, 1989 and 1991 respectively, 
supplementing the content of the Guidelines on the implementation of the principle and 
its exceptions as well.355 Similarly, the European Community (EC) also adopted the 
polluter-pays principle in its various recommendations and acts of EC secondary 
legislation.356  
 
The polluter-pays principle has not only been applied ‘in a geographic region subject to 
uniform environmental law’ such as the OECD and EC, 357 it has also been widely 
endorsed in a number of international instruments. Sands asserts that the polluter-pays 
principle in international treaty law originated from early treaties on civil liability for 
                                                 
352 Environment and Economics: Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental 
Policies, OECD Doc. No.C(72)128, 1972 WL 24710 (26 May 1972) .  
353 Ibid annex para 4.  
354 Sands, above n 129, 281.  
355 For instance, in 1974 a new OECD recommendation called on its member States to observe the polluter-pays 
principle uniformly, and defined ‘polluter’ as ‘someone who directly or indirectly damages the environment or who 
creates conditions leading to such damage’; in 1989 the OECD Recommendation on the Application of the Polluter-
Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution implied that the operator of a hazardous installation should bear relevant cost, 
provided guidance on ‘reasonable measures’, and listed certain exceptions to the principle; in 1991 a final 
recommendation urged OECD member States to treat ‘economic instruments’ as a means of implementing this 
principle. See ibid; Schwartz, above n 351, 244; Kiss and Shelton, above n 1, 215.  
356 Sands, above n 129, 283-284.  




damages from hazardous activities,358 such as the 1963 IAEA Liability Convention,359 
1969 CLC, 360 and 1971 Oil Fund Convention. 361 In these treaties, the ideas on the 
polluter-pays principle were reflected by providing that the damage resulting from 
hazardous activities should be borne by the shipping industry and oil cargo interests,362 
although the polluter-pays principle was not explicitly invoked. In 1992, Principle 16 of 
the Rio Declaration explicitly raised the polluter-pays principle to the global level, 
providing that: 
 
‘National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental 
costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the 
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public 
interest and without distorting international trade and investment.’363 [emphasis added] 
 
The formulations of the polluter-pays principle by the OECD and Principle 16 of the 
Rio Declaration indicate that the purpose of this principle is to internalise the economic 
costs of pollution control and prevent governments from subsidising these 
environmental costs. Due to the global participation and profound significance of the 
1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the polluter-pays 
principle was for the first time recognised globally as an environmental policy in 
1992.364 But essentially this principle was still not legally binding due to its not having 
achieved the status of ‘the normative character of a rule of law’.365 After UNCED it was 
endorsed by more international instruments.366 Examples include 1992 Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR 
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359 IAEA Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature 29 May 1963, 1063 UNTS 
265 (entered into force 12 November 1977).  
360 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature 29 November 1969, 
973 UNTS 3 (entered into force 19 June 1975).  
361 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, opened for signature 18 December 1971, 11 ILM 284 (entered into force 16 October 1978).  
362 Sands, above n 129, 281.  
363 Rio Declaration prin 16.  
364 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 4, 322.  
365 Ibid.  
366 Before the Rio Conference, the polluter-pays principle was endorsed by the 1990 OPRC in its preamble that the 
polluter-pays principle is ‘a general principle of international environmental law’. See International Convention on 
Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, opened for signature 30 November 1990 (entered into force 




Convention), 367  1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes (Watercourses Convention),368 1992 Convention 
on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents (Industrial Accidents 
Convention),369 and 1996 Protocol to the Contracting Parties to the Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (1996 
Protocol to London Dumping Convention).370 
 
The polluter-pays principle is treated as ‘a rule of economic, juridical and political good 
sense’.371 It seeks to address the issues of ‘cost allocation’ and ‘cost internalisation’.372 
‘Cost allocation’ of this principle resolves the question of ‘who pays’ for the pollution 
prevention and control, whereas its ‘cost internalisation’ answers the question of ‘how 
much should be paid’. 373  As noted earlier, cost internalisation is a concept from 
economics. With this concept, the polluter-pays principle aims to improve economic 
efficiency by ‘internalising external environmental costs of production and consumption 
into market prices’.374 Another relevant question is ‘how to pay’, which is sometimes 
interpreted as the implementation of the polluter-pays principle.  
 
                                                 
367 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, opened for signature 22 
September 1992, 32 ILM 1068 (entered into force 25 March 1998) art 2 (‘OSPAR Convention’). This article reads that 
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Since the meaning of the polluter-pays principle varies in different contexts,375 currently 
there are no indisputable answers to the above three questions. However, some of the 
interpretations or options under discussion are provided below in Table 2.1. Firstly, who 
pays for the pollution? Or, who is the polluter? In contrast to the rigid definition 
provided by the OECD, in practice the concept of the polluter varies depending on 
different categories in different contexts. According to Schwartz, at least three 
categories may apply based on different criteria.376 A list of these categories and types 
of persons is summarised in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Different Categories of Polluters377 
Category Criteria of Polluters Types of Persons as Polluters 





Nature and effects of conduct or activity 
Any activity that contributes to the deterioration of 
the environment, including natural resource use for 
economic or social purposes and attaching liability 
to direct or indirect environmental consequences. 
Examples: 
the handling or disposal of waste;  
the use and management of water resources;  




Scope of responsibility 
Subject: individual or collective, partial or total, 
actual or potential 
Measures: aid, technology transfer, or emission 
reduction programmes provided by developed 
States to developing States (application of the 
CBDR) 
 
These categories of polluters, however, may not always be responsible for the pollution 
they cause. As indicated in Table 2.1, sometimes the polluter may be only partially 
responsible. So in practice a case-by-case examination for determining the particular 
polluter’s responsibility for the pollution should always be undertaken.  
 
Secondly, what should the polluter pay for? Or in other words, what is the cost? 
Similarly to the first question, different regional or international instruments list various 
                                                 
375 Jonathan Remy Nash, 'Too Much Market? Conflict between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the "Polluter 
Pays" Principle' (2000) 24(2) Harward Environmental Law Review 465, 472-473.  
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types of cost to be borne or paid as a result of incorporating the polluter-pays principle. 




Table 2.2 Different Cost Bearing Arrangements by Regional or International 
Instruments378 
Regional or International 
Instruments 




OECD 1972, 1974 
(1)Cost related to measures needed to prevent, 
control and reduce pollution; 
(2)Cost of administrative measures by the 
authorities in response to pollution, including 
those implementing anti-pollution policies, 
developing anti-pollution technologies and grants 
for modernising out-of-date plants. 
 
Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration 
Agenda 21 
Cost of pollution and ‘environmental cost’, 
including: cost related to pollution regulation, 
environmental protection and management 
 
 
OECD 1974, 1989, 1991 
Environmental Liability Directive 2004 
Cost of achieving prescribed environmental 
quality, preventing or remedying environmental 
damage, preventing accidental pollution, and the 
clean-up or reinstatement of the environment after 
an accident, the ‘cost of exceptional measures’ 




Landfill Directive 1999 
Social cost, remaining external cost of investment 
on technology, the cost incurred when a ban is 
placed on polluting activity, indemnity cost, 
operational cost, including the cost of present and 
future expenditure and loss of profit, even if not 
accessible in monetary terms 
Antarctic Treaty Secretariat 2005 (1)Cost of abatement, compensation and 
reparation; 
(2) Cost of promoting best environmental practice, 
best available technology, and the cost of a prompt 
and effective response to environmental 
emergencies 
A General Summary (1) Costs of pollution control by governments; 
(2) Emergency response and clean-up costs; and 
(3) Compensation to victims of pollution. 
 
Through examining different cost-bearing arrangements in regional and international 
instruments, it may be inferred that based on the polluter-pays principle, a polluter often 
                                                 





needs to pay three types of cost. They are costs of pollution control by governments, 
emergency response and clean-up costs, and compensation to victims of pollution.379 
While in a particular case, there could be so many types of cost for the polluter to bear, 
generally the polluter is the first one to pay such cost. However, it will not invalidate the 
polluter-pays principle if the polluter passes on such costs to the consumer. 380 As 
argued by Kiss, ‘if the polluter holds a right to pollute, the victims must pay for 
cessation or reduction of the activity’.381 The mechanism of the polluter-pays principle 
is underpinned by both economic and social theories. 
 
Thirdly, how to pay? Or, how to implement the polluter-pays principle? To answer this 
question, the OECD provides seven options, namely direct controls, taxes, payments, 
subsidies, various incentives (tax benefits, accelerated amortisation, credit facilities), the 
auction of pollution rights and charges. 382  However, Schwartz puts forward four 
categories of implementation methods under the polluter-pays principle. The main 
content is listed in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3 Different Implementation Methods of the Polluter-Pays Principle383 





Command and control Fuel sulphur emission limits in 
MARPOL Annex VI 
Self-regulation Market-based instruments, eg, 
environmental fees, tradable 
permit, liability rules 
Voluntary initiatives Energy Efficiency Operational 







Internalisation Cost incorporated with the 
external effects 
Incentives ET, CDM, JI within the Kyoto 
Protocol; Carbon tax 
Initiatives Employ best available 
techniques 
Innovations Advocate investment by 
adopting new measures, 
technology designs or 
                                                 
379 MacInnis, above n 346, 148.  
380 OECD, above n 371, 27.  
381 Kiss and Shelton, above n 1, 214.  
382 OECD, above n 371, 28.  






Liability Regime Fault-based liability Deterrence, redress, 
reparation, and restitution of 
States 
Strict liability Operator non-fault liability 





Generally the above methods may be utilised in a particular case independently or 
jointly so as to improve performance in combating pollution. However, for the purpose 
of this thesis, the assessment of the regulatory regime is the focus. 
 
As the term ‘in principle’ used in Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration may imply, the 
polluter-pays principle allows certain exceptions from its strict application. Generally 
speaking, States should follow the polluter-pays principle ‘except when it would be 
socially, economically, or environmentally unreasonable to do so’. 384  This policy 
arrangement is consistent with the concept of ‘equitable internalisation’ in that they 
both take into account the different responsibilities or capacities among different States 
when such policies apply.385 This feature, however, also indicates its ‘soft’ law nature. 
 
2.6.2 The Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to the Issue of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from International Shipping 
 
Although endorsed by various regional and international instruments, the polluter-pays 
principle has not gained ‘the same degree of support or attention’ in recent years as the 
preventive and precautionary principles,386 or the CBDR. As asserted by Gaines, the 
polluter-pays principle cannot address all environmental problems. 387  Similarly the 
application of the polluter-pays principle to the issue of GHG emissions from 
international shipping is not straightforward.  
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As discussed in 2.3 of this chapter, transboundary harm caused by GHG emissions of 
ships to other areas may include four scenarios. In each scenario, the harm may lead to 
adverse effects to persons, property or the environment. According to the polluter-pays 
principle, generally the polluter should bear all the costs that such emissions may 
generate. The polluter may include the flag State,388 ship owners and operators,389 or in 
some cases, individuals who should be responsible for such damage. However, in 
practice ship owners and ship operators are generally regarded as the polluters of GHG 
emissions from ships due to their direct contribution to these emissions. The recently-
adopted technical and operational measures by the IMO clearly reflect this rule. 
Through implementing the EEDI and SEEMP, shipowners primarily pay for the higher 
shipbuilding cost whereas ship operators pay the cost relating to implementing stringent 
operational requirements. Flag States may also be responsible for transboundary harm 
resulting from such emissions under certain circumstances, which may include 
regulation and negotiation related costs as can be seen from the Trail Smelter case.  
 
Compared with the identification of the polluter of GHG emissions from international 
shipping, the cost bearing and implementation methods of the polluter-pays principle 
are more complicated. International shipping refers to ‘shipping between ports of 
different countries, as opposed to domestic shipping’.390 Such voyages may consist of 
domestic voyages (shipping within the maritime zones of a State, including the internal 
water, territory sea, and EEZ) and international voyages (shipping outside the maritime 
zones of a State) of the flag State. Regarding international voyages, in practice two 
approaches of dealing with transboundary harm from ships are in place based on the 
different injuries. When such injuries are ‘slight and infrequent’, the polluter may be 
more willing to ‘absorb them without increasing its level of control’.391 This offer is 
generally accepted by the victims in that such harm may not be easily recognised due to 
                                                 
388 In international shipping, the flag State may be responsible for the transboundary damage caused by the emissions 
from the ships flying its flag due to its role of exercising its jurisdiction.   
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its cumulative nature and the litigation or arbitration cost may be higher than the value 
of such a claim.392 However, when the possible compensation arising from the injuries 
is significant, the polluter may prefer to avoid or reduce such costs through legal 
means. 393  In this respect, the polluter-pays principle generally applies. These 
approaches are argued to be ‘appropriate’ if examined from the economic, 
environmental and social ethics perspective.394 When harm occurs during the domestic 
voyage of the flag State’s vessel, the polluter-pays principle may not be applicable. 
Instead, the traditional legal principle that ‘injuries incidental to lawful activities will 
not be compensated’ may apply.395 This is because of the fact that the affected party, as 
a member from the same State, probably benefits indirectly from the shipping activities. 
In this context, depending on different situations, the flag State may apply relevant 
domestic legislation to this issue, into which the polluter-pays principle may not be 
incorporated. It appears that a uniform cost-bearing mechanism in relation to GHG 
emissions from ships is necessary to be established globally so as to address this 
divergence in current shipping practice.  
 
The previous section concludes that the costs may include costs of pollution control by 
governments, emergency response and clean-up costs, and compensation to victims of 
pollution. Due to the cumulative nature of GHG emissions from ships, the cost relating 
to shipping GHG emissions may only include the first and third of these costs. While 
pollution costs can be calculated through identifying measures that have been taken by 
governments, the identification of victims is complicated. This is mainly due to the 
nature of this issue being a part of the global climate change regime. Often while the 
polluter is discharging GHG emissions from ships, they also suffer from its adverse 
effects either directly or indirectly.396 In this sense, polluters are often victims of such 
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pollution. Therefore, the application of the polluter-pays principle, or specifically the 
implementation of allocation of costs, to the issue has to be put in a global context 
through adopting globally uniform measures. If this assertion is related to the MBMs 
that are currently under discussion within the IMO, MBMs which involve the global 
emissions reduction of different sectors may better reflect the polluter-pays principle.397 
 
Among the four categories of the implementation methods mentioned above, the 
liability regime is less useful in this context due to the difficulty of identifying specific 
polluters and victims. The cooperative regime is necessary but could be integrated into 
other categories whenever it applies. Economic strategies are useful, which can be 
clearly seen from the three mechanisms established under the Kyoto Protocol.398 As 
good examples of economic strategies, emissions trading (ET), the clean development 
mechanism (CDM) and joint development (JI) have been achieving success. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the development of a regulatory regime for the issue under 
discussion is the focus and there is still ample room for further steps.  
 
Concerning the method of ‘command and control’, the 2011 amendments of Annex VI 
to MARPOL 73/78 regulate the mandatory EEDI for new ships and SEEMP for all 
ships. These measures will have profound influences on the reduction of GHG 
emissions from ships.399 As for voluntary initiatives, a wide range of discussions were 
held within the IMO and as a result, many measures, such as Energy Efficiency 
Operational Indicator (EEOI), have been suggested by the IMO as voluntary measures 
for all States. The third type of regulatory regime, self-regulation, often called a market-
based instrument (MBI) or MBMs, has aroused intense debate within the IMO. The 
adoption of MBMs complies with the polluter-pays principle. The environmental fees 
(contributions), being one type of MBMs, 400  can be taken as an example. An 
environmental fee is generally imposed on a unit of pollution thus providing the polluter 
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with an incentive to reduce the amount of pollution in order to avoid heavy fees.401 The 
setting of suitable fee rates, or in other words, the calculation of internalised cost, is 
crucial. If a fee is set too low compared with the cost needed for the reduction of one 
unit of pollution, the polluter may prefer to pay and continue polluting.402 One example 
of the environmental fee is a fund for GHG emissions from international shipping 
(GHG Fund). Basically the contributions to the GHG Fund are paid per tonne of bunker 
fuel by the polluter as the cost for preventive measures in this context, and are allocated 
to possible affected parties or victims whenever it applies. This approach complies with 
the polluter-pays principle in this regard. Lastly it is arguable that equitable 
consideration for the implementation of the polluter-pays principle cannot be ignored in 
the context of GHG emissions from international shipping. This is because equitable 
consideration not only imposes flexibility on the implementation of the polluter-pays 
principle, but also resonates with the CBDR principle. This approach may better 
encourage the participation of developing States in global emissions reduction from 




This chapter serves as the theoretical foundation for the thesis especially the gap 
analysis and gap-filling options relating to the current regulatory framework for the 
reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping to be raised in the following 
chapters. It was first argued that GHG emissions from international shipping, in 
particular CO2, are a type of ‘conditional’ pollution. Therefore, many marine pollution-
related treaties apply to this GHG emissions issue. This argument and the principles 
relating to flag State, coastal State and port State jurisdiction also underpin the 
application of international environmental law principles to GHG emissions from 
international shipping. 
 
It was further argued that GHG emissions from international shipping might lead to 
transboundary harm under four scenarios. On this basis, the duties associated with 
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transboundary harm would apply in the context of GHG emissions from international 
shipping. These include a flag State’s primary prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction 
and responsibility to prevent, reduce and control transboundary harm resulting from 
GHG emissions from the ships entitled to fly its flag. To achieve this goal, flag States 
need to adopt national legislation on the reduction of such emissions, taking into 
account the amended Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 irrespective of whether they have 
ratified this amendment. Flag States need to conduct regular surveys, issue or empower 
other parties to issue the IEE Certificate to ships flying their flags, as well as impose 
administrative penalties or institute proceedings in relation to offences. Furthermore, 
coastal States and port States also have a duty to cooperate in mitigating transboundary 
environmental risks arising from excessive GHG emissions from international shipping. 
 
GHG emissions from ships have been recognised as harmful, but there is not yet 
scientific proof that they have caused specific impacts. The application of the 
precautionary principle in this context would justify the action of States in taking 
proactive steps to tackle shipping GHG emissions. In contrast to the precautionary 
principle, the polluter-pays principle aims to address three relevant questions, namely: 
Who is the polluter? What should the polluter pay for? And, how to pay? It has been 
argued in this chapter that in the context of the GHG emissions issue, the polluter 
should include ship owners, ship operators and flag States under certain circumstances. 
The cost should be put in a global context through adopting uniform measures, whereas 
the means of payment could include various technical and operational measures and 
MBMs. In particular, MBMs which involve the global emissions reduction of different 
sectors may better reflect the polluter-pays principle. 
 
Whether the CBDR and NMFT principle should be applied to GHG emissions from 
international shipping is a controversial issue. This chapter argues that both the CBDR 
and the NMFT principles have solid ground for their application to this GHG emissions 
issue, and it is nearly impossible to exclude either of them in this regard. In this context 
it was argued that the IMO Convention and the LOSC provide the IMO with general 
competence to regulate GHG emissions from ships, while the Kyoto Protocol gives the 
IMO a specific mandate to regulate this matter. It is thus reasonable for both principles 




of regulatory measures, the CBDR and NMFT principles could be incorporated into the 
regulation of GHG emissions from ships in different ways. 
 
The application of these selected international law principles to the regulation of GHG 
emissions from international shipping has several implications. It reveals that the GHG 
emissions issue is reflective of, or subject to, the underlying principles of international 
environmental law. These principles should thus be taken into account in the developing 
regulatory regime of GHG emissions from ships. In addition, the development of this 
regime also has resulted in new implications for these principles, and impacts on their 
evolution. This interaction can be seen from the interpretation of the CBDR and NMFT 
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Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from international shipping contribute to global 
warming and climate change, while international regulation on shipping emissions is 
subject to the evolution of the international climate change regime.1 Climate change did 
not become an issue of global concern until it was brought to the attention of the UN. In 
1987 a report entitled Our Common Future was discussed in the UN General Assembly, 
attracting worldwide attention to the global issues of development and environment. In 
this report, ‘climate change’ was mentioned nine times as a fast-growing global threat.2 
It was also in this meeting that the scientific community formally brought the climate 
change issue to the political agenda under the auspices of the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
specialised agencies of the UN.3 One year later, the WMO and the UNEP established 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In 1992 the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)4 was adopted at the Rio United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), and its Kyoto 
Protocol was then adopted in 1997.5 The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, together 
with the agreements or declarations adopted in their Conferences of Parties (COPs) and 
the COPs serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (CMPs), constitute the 
core elements of the current climate change regime. They have significantly shaped the 
                                                 
1 The international climate change regime, often called the UNFCCC-Kyoto Protocol regime, mainly refers to a series 
of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), their related protocols and soft law in relation to climate change. 
See Patricia W. Birnie, Alan E. Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2009) 84. The international regulation on the reduction of GHG emissions from international 
shipping is primarily the mandate of the IMO as indicated in Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol. On this basis, the 
regulation by the IMO on this GHG emissions issue should be subject to the international climate change regime, or 
in other words, the UNFCCC-Kyoto Protocol regime. This issue is discussed at 3.3 of this chapter. 
2 The term ‘climate change’ was mentioned nine times in the text and twice in the footnotes of the report. Item 32, 
Chapter 1 of the report reads that, ‘it is true globally for such threats as climate change, ozone depletion, and species 
loss, [and the] risks increase faster than do our abilities to manage them.’ Item 11, chapter 7 of the report reads that, 
‘[t]he environmental risks and uncertainties of a high energy future are also disturbing and give rise to several 
reservations…the serious probability of climate change generated by the “greenhouse effect” of gases emitted to the 
atmosphere, the most important of which is carbon dioxide (CO2) produced from the combustion of fossil fuels.’ 
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, 
1987) 35, 146-147.  
3 Bert Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change: the Role of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 40.  
4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 31 ILM 848 (entered 
into force 21 March 1994) (‘UNFCCC’). 
5 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 16 March 




direction of international regulation on the reduction of GHG emissions from 
international shipping. 
 
This chapter examines the responses from the UN to the issue of GHG emissions from 
ships, aiming to identify the areas that need to be improved to facilitate and improve the 
global regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping. This chapter consists 
of two main parts. The first part introduces the UN’s institutional responses to the issue, 
in particular the responses from the IPCC, as well as the interaction among the IPCC, 
UNEP, and other UN agencies. The second part examines the international legal 
framework on climate change from two perspectives: analysis of two conventions on 
the prevention of atmospheric pollution prior to the 1992 UNFCCC and a critical review 
of the UNFCCC, its Kyoto Protocol and agreements produced in their COPs and CMPs.  
 
3.2 The UN Institutional Responses 
 
Climate change is an urgent environmental problem of a global nature, which makes it 
difficult for individual States to develop an effective national regulatory response. To 
cope with this issue, the UN, including its various agencies, has responded actively. 
This part reviews the work conducted by the IPCC in combating climate change, and 
the contributions from the UNEP, WMO, and other UN institutions. Due to their key 
roles in regulating GHG emissions from international shipping, the responses by the 
IMO, a UN specialised agency, are examined in Chapter 4. 
 
3.2.1 The UN and the IPCC 
 
The late 1970s and the 1980s witnessed a growing debate among scientists and policy 
makers on the risks associated with human-induced climate change. The need for 
independent, scientific and technical advice became apparent to inform decision-making 
on this important and complex issue. The first efforts were made by the United States 
(US) although this initiation was triggered by the energy crisis in the 1970s.6 The US 
                                                 
6 In 1978, the Carter administration of the US intended to use domestic coal to solve the energy crisis, which brought 
the issue of climate change into the political agenda for the first time. Nicolas Nierenberg, Walter R. Tschinkel and 
Victoria J. Tschinkel, 'Early Climate Change Consensus at the National Academy: The Origins and Making of 




government treated climate change as ‘a threat to humankind’, and its National 
Academy of Science (NAS) conducted an assessment on possible future human-induced 
changes of climate in 1977.7 The inclusion of this issue in the political arena of the US 
government in 1978 encouraged more research in relation to climate change.8 However, 
it was only in 1980 that the International Council of Science (ICSU), UNEP and WMO 
jointly developed a first international assessment on climate change, although this effort 
proved to be ‘not very successful’. 9  To cope with this challenge, in 1988 the 43rd 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution entitled 
‘Protection of the global climate for present and future generations of mankind’. The 
resolution endorsed the action by UNEP and WMO in jointly establishing the IPCC, 
and requested the IPCC to prepare a comprehensive review and recommendations on all 
aspects of climate change and its impacts, with a view to formulating realistic response 
strategies.10 Therefore, the IPCC was set up by the WMO and UNEP as an effort by the 
UN to provide the governments of the world with a reliable scientific view on climate 
change. As discussed earlier, the report named Our Common Future triggered this 
process within the UN. The IPCC is intended to serve as a link between the scientific 
community and political institutions, and thus promote the construction and 
improvement of the international climate change regime. 
 
Under the auspices of the UN, the IPCC’s structure and working mechanisms have been 
improving. Currently the IPCC has three Working Groups and a Task Force on National 
Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Working Group I deals with ‘the Physical Science Basis of 
Climate Change’, Working Group II with ‘Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability’ and Working Group III with ‘Mitigation of Climate Change’. The Task 
Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories aims to develop and refine a 
methodology for the calculation and reporting of national GHG emissions and 
removals. It meets in Plenary at the level of Representatives of Governments, and is 
                                                 
7 Bolin, above n 3, 33.  
8 Examples are the report by the JASON defense advisory panel chaired by Gordon MacDonald in 1979 and a report 
by an ad hoc National Academy of Sciences (NAS) with Jule G. Charney as the lead author in the same year. 
Nierenberg, Tschinkel and Tschinkel, above n 6.  
9 Bolin, above n 3, 35.  
10 Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, GA/Res 43/53, 43rd sess, 70th plen 




assisted by Technical Support Units (TSU) hosted and financially supported by the 
Government of the developed country co-chair of that Working Group/Task Force. 
Other departments within the IPCC include the IPCC Bureau, IPCC Secretariat and 
IPCC Executive Committee.11 This structure is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Structure of the IPCC12 
 
Due to its scientific and intergovernmental nature, the IPCC’s work is to be ‘policy-
relevant and yet policy-neutral, never policy-prescriptive’.13 Apart from that, scientific 
integrity, objectivity, openness and transparency are other principles that the IPCC 
should apply. 14 Generally the IPCC provides reports for the information of policy-
makers within governments. To ensure the incorporation of the principles mentioned 
                                                 
11  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Structure 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_structure.shtml> accessed 22 August 2012.  
12 Ibid.  
13  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Organization 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml> accessed 17 July 2012.  
14  World Meteorological Organization (WMO), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 




above into its reports, the IPCC has to follow strict procedures. In 2010, as a response to 
the request by the IPCC Chair and the Secretary-General of the UN, the InterAcademy 
Council (IAC) reviewed the IPCC’s processes and procedures and put forward some 
proposals for improvement which were partly adopted by the IPCC. Figure 3.2 
describes how the IPCC reports are currently produced. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 The Procedure of Drafting and Reviewing Reports by the IPCC15 
 
 
To date the IPCC has issued four Assessment Reports and part of the Fifth Assessment 
Report contributing to the combating of climate change around the world. The IPCC 
First Assessment Report of 1990 revealed the significance of climate change as a 
natural and political issue, and thus played a ‘decisive’ role in the adoption of the 
UNFCCC. The ‘Legal Measures’ paper submitted by the Response Strategies Working 
                                                 
15  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Principles and Procedures 




Group of the IPCC laid the foundation for the drafting and adoption of the UNFCCC.16 
Apart from that, the IPCC has remained the most important source of scientific, 
technical and socio-economic information for the UNFCCC, after the entry into force of 
the Convention, through its Special Reports, Technical Papers and Methodology 
Reports. Since 1991 the IPCC has supported the UNFCCC by preparing Methodology 
Reports for National GHG Inventories.17 Thus, the relationship between the UNFCCC 
and the IPCC is deemed as ‘a model for interaction between science and decision-
makers’. 18 The IPCC Second Assessment Report of 1995 provided key input to the 
further development of the UNFCCC, in particular the adoption of its Kyoto Protocol. 
The IPCC Third Assessment Report of 2001 and the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report of 
2007 further confirmed the contribution of GHG emissions to climate change and global 
warming. In September 2013 and early 2014, the IPCC released the reports of its three 
working groups, and a synthesis report will be finalised on 31 October 2014.19 These 
reports further strengthen the scientific evidence of anthropogenic climate change, and 
leave ‘fewer uncertainties about the serious consequences of inaction’.20 
 
It is clear that the UN helped to establish the IPCC and monitor its sound development. 
The IPCC, conversely, underpins the efforts of the UN in persuading countries around 
the world to recognise and combat climate change jointly. One of these achievements is 
the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, which determines the direction of global 
regulating GHG emissions from international shipping through giving the IMO a GHG 
mandate, setting the reduction targets for UNFCCC Annex I States, and discussing 
regulatory principles for GHG emissions from ships.  
 
3.2.2 Other Institutions and their Interaction 
 
                                                 
16 Jill Barrett, 'The Negotiation and Drafting of the Climate Change Convention' in Robin Churchill and David 
Freestone (eds), International Law and Global Climate Change (1991) 183, 184-187.  
17  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Understanding Climate Change: 22 Years of IPCC 
Assessment <http://www.ipcc.ch> accessed 17 July 2012.  
18 Ibid.  
19  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 'Fifth Assessment Report (AR5)' (2014) 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/> accessed 18 June 2014.  
20  Dahe Qin, Opening Remark at Working Group I - Twelfth Session (23 September 2013) 




In addition to the IPCC, some other UN subsidiary bodies or agencies also contribute to 
combating of climate change. As the ‘voice for the environment within the United 
Nations system’ established in 1972, 21  UNEP established a Climate Change sub-
program. In this program, UNEP works with countries, particularly developing 
countries, to raise public awareness of the Earth’s changing climate, strengthen 
countries’ ability to adapt to climate change, and integrate climate change responses 
into their national development processes.22 Essentially UNEP is assigned ‘a catalytic 
and coordinating role’ in the management of the climate change issue within the UN 
system. 23  The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) is regarded as the UN 
system’s ‘authoritative voice on the state and behaviour of the Earth’s atmosphere’.24 It 
exercises important functions such as weather and climate observation and monitoring, 
understanding of climate processes, the development of clear, precise and user-targeted 
information and other services for policy makers.25 The UN Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE) also contributed significantly to the adoption of the 1979 Convention 
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP).26 The above work makes a 
substantial contribution to international efforts in fighting climate change. However, 
this work essentially implements the outcomes within the UNFCCC-Kyoto Protocol 
regime rather than regulating climate change. The scope of these institutions seldom 
includes the GHG emissions from international shipping.  
 
Other institutions, the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) within the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) as an example,27 contribute little to the issue of climate 
change. Although the CTE deals with the relationship between Multilateral 
                                                 
21 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), About UNEP <http://www.unep.org> accessed 18 July 2012.  
22 Ibid.  
23 See Robin Churchill and David Freestone (eds), International Law and Global Climate Change (Graham & 
Trotman/M. Nijhoff, 1991) 167.  
24  World Meteorological Organization (WMO), WMO and Climate Change 
<http://www.wmo.int/pages/themes/WMO_climatechange_en.html> accessed 18 July 2012.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature 13 November 1979, 18 ILM 1442 
(entered into force 16 March 1983).  
27 The forerunner to the CTE was the Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade (GEMI) established 
in 1971 but it did not meet until 1992. In 1994 the CTE replaced the GEMI under the Marrakech Agreement while the 




Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and the international trading regime,28 as of 30 July 
2012, no conflict relating to an MEA, or a matter directly involving climate change, has 
been submitted to a dispute settlement panel within the WTO. 29  This is probably 
because of the limited authority of the CTE, which is confined to making 
recommendations rather than making decisions. Nevertheless, litigation seeking climate 
change mitigation or adaptation has been initiated in many countries such as Australia 
and the United States. 30  Examples are the Anvil Hill Project Watch Association v 
Minister for the Environment and Water Resources (2007) in Australia and the 
Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency (2007) in the USA.31 Thus, it might 
be inferred that global issues need international responses, but national responses might 
also be effective under certain circumstances.32 In the context of GHG emissions from 
international shipping, national or regional initiatives in tackling this issue might be of 
significance in advocating or pushing the international negotiation process. For 
instance, the European Union (EU) has taken unilateral measures to deal with GHG 
emissions from aviation and has planned to take similar measures to tackle GHG 
                                                 
28 The CTE has the mandate to ‘identify the relationship between trade measures and environmental measures’, and 
‘make recommendations on changes that might be necessary to the multilateral trading system both to enhance 
positive interaction between trade and environmental measures and avoid protectionist trade measures’. This mandate 
comes from the ‘Decision on Trade and Environment on 14 April 1994’. See Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, 
The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) 531-532.  
29  World Trade Organization (WTO), Chronological List of Disputes Cases 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm> accessed 22 August 2012.  
30 Jacqueline Peel, 'Issues in Climate Change Litigation' (2011) 5(1) Carbon & Climate Law Review 15, 15.  
31 Anvil Hill Project Watch Association Inc v Minister for the Environment and Water Resources (2007) FCA 1481. In 
this case Centennial Coal proposed to build a large open-cut coal mine in NSW and received State approval under 
Part 3A of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), while the Anvil Hill Project Watch 
Association, as a local community association, sued the Minister to review the government’s decision in that the 
proposed mine is to produce up to 10.5 million tons of coal per annum and operate for 12 years and thus have a 
significant environmental impact. However, the Minister argued that the estimated annual emissions from burning 
coal harvested from the mine would constitute only 0.04 per cent of global GHG emissions. Justice Stone dismissed 
the application for review on the grounds that the likelihood and extent of adverse impact on matters protected under 
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act) was not significant enough to 
trigger the application of the EPBC Act.  
Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency 549 U.S. 497 (2007), 127 S.Ct. 1438. This case was held in the 
US Supreme Court in which 12 states and several cities of the US brought suit against the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), aiming to push the federal agency to regulate carbon dioxide and other GHGs as pollutants. The Court 
held that the EPA has the authority to regulate GHG emissions as a response to petitions filed by environmental 
groups and the California Attorney General. The majority opinion of the justices commented that GHGs meet the 
definition of air pollutant regulated under the Clean Air Act.  
32 One of the motivations for a country to regulate a global issue like climate change is that climate change is a 
‘multiscalar’ environmental problem with both global impacts and local impacts. The climate change impact caused 
by an activity might be insignificant globally but could be ‘measurable and significant’ within the country. Peel, 




emissions from ships.33 These measures might impose some pressure on the IMO in 
regulating this issue in a timely manner,34 or provide the IMO with some approaches for 
reference. This issue is examined in more detail in Chapter 7.  
 
Within the UN system, these agencies interact with each other in jointly combating 
climate change, and thus promote the efficiency of such work. This interaction can take 
different forms. The establishment of the IPCC is an example where the UNEP and 
WMO collaborated closely in the 1980s. Moreover, the UNEP has cooperated with 
other UN agencies actively in addressing climate change internationally, such as the 
UNFCCC Secretariat, the IPCC Secretariat and the World Bank.35 Further, both the 
UNEP and WMO’s work is shaped by the negotiations process of the UNFCCC and its 
Kyoto Protocol. 36  Other types of UN institutions include the COPs and CMPs 
established under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. They have been pushing the 
negotiation process of the international climate change regime through organising 
rounds of conferences for their State Parties. In particular, the Subsidiary Body on 
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) under the UNFCCC had been working on 
GHG emissions from international bunker fuels before 2012. The Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) established in 2011 is 
                                                 
33 The EU has been working to include aviation and maritime carbon taxes in the EU Emission Trading System (EU 
ETS), and the aviation tax entered into force on 1 January 2012 (EU Directive 2008/10/101/EC) which applies to all 
airlines that fly in and out of the EU. In December 2012 the EU suspended this policy due to improved performance 
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), or perhaps because of strong opposition from many 
countries, including the US, Russia, China and India. In the same year, the EU published a consultation document 
seeking the views on how best to reduce GHG emissions from ships so as to finally include GHG emissions from 
international shipping in an EU ETS. See, eg, Elena Ares, EU ETS and Aviation (23 May 2012) 
<www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05533.pdf> accessed 24 August 2012; Aoife O'Leary, David Holyoake and 
Marta Ballesteros, 'Legal Implications of EU Action on GHG Emissions from the International Maritime Sector' 
(2011) 5-6; Will Nichols, EU Launches Attempt to Deliver Shipping Emissions Trading Scheme (24 January 2012) 
<http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2140997/eu-launches-attempt-deliver-shipping-emissions-trading-scheme> 
accessed 1 January 2014.  
34 Both the IMO and the ICAO received their GHG mandates from Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol in the same 
year, so any significant regulatory progress occurred in one institution would possibly encourage the other institution 
to take further steps. Furthermore, the possible inclusion of shipping GHG emissions into an EU ETS would impair 
the regulatory authority of the IMO in this regard. See Sebastian Oberthür, 'Institutional Interaction to Address 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto Protocol' (2003) 3(3) Climate 
Policy 191, 202.  
35 Yamin and Depledge, above n 28, 533-534, 539-540.  
36  United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Climate Change 
<http://www.unep.org/gc/gc26/factsheet/pdfs/Climate_change.pdf> accessed 24 August 2012, p 1; World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO), WMO at UNFCCC/COP Sessions 




currently working on negotiating a global climate change agreement that will be 
adopted by 2015 and will enter into force from 2020. It is anticipated that this 
agreement, if adopted, might influence the future regulation of GHG emissions from 
international shipping. 
 
The UNFCCC cooperates with the IMO through reciprocal exchange of information and 
reciprocal participation in relevant meetings.37 However, it is open to debate as to the 
regulatory roles of the UNFCCC and the IMO, in particular whether the IMO should be 
the exclusive international organisation responsible for the regulation of GHG 
emissions from international shipping. 38  Another form of institutional collaboration 
exists in the adoption of similar or common definitions through which the UN 
institutions might provide a common basis for regulation. One example of such 
collaboration lies in the adoption of a definition for ‘air pollution’. The definition of ‘air 
pollution’ in Article 1(a) of the CLRTAP was generally adopted by the subsequent UN 
Conventions as the definition of marine pollution under the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)39 and the definition of emission under Annex VI to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 
73/78).40  
 
Aside from the UN institutional collaboration, a certain degree of institutional conflict 
or ‘fragmentation’ also exists in international environmental governance,41 as well as 
the climate change regime. This fragmentation, however, is regarded as the main factor 
leading to slow development of the regulation by the IMO on GHG emissions from 
                                                 
37  Bernd Hackmann, 'Analysis of the Governance Architecture to Regulate GHG Emissions from International 
Shipping' (2012) 12(1) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 85, 95.  
38 There is no hierarchy between the two institutions (UNFCCC and the IMO) in regulating GHG emissions from 
international shipping, and both institutions have been involved in the regulation of this GHG emissions issue. 
Therefore, currently different interpretations exist. The IMO’s mandate has been discussed in Chapter 2 (2.5.3.1), and 
the IMO’s role in regulating GHG emissions from ships is examined in Chapters 4 (4.2) and 7 (7.4.3.2, 7.5.5).  
39 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 16 November 1994) art 1(4) (‘LOSC’). 
40  See CLTRAP art 1(a); LOSC art 1(4); International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL 73/78), signed 2 November 1973, 12 ILM 1319, as amended by the 1978 Protocol to the 1973 
Convention, 1341 UNTS 3, 17 ILM 546 (entered into force 2 October 1983) annex VI, art 2(7) (‘MARPOL 73/78’). 
See also ch 2, 2.1.1.  
41  Karen N Scott, 'International Environmental Governance: Managing Fragmentation through Institutional 




international shipping.42 The impact of institutional fragmentation on the reduction of 
shipping emissions, as well as possible options for its improvement, is examined in 
Chapter 7 of this thesis.  
 
The UN’s institutional responses to the GHG emissions issue, or in other words, climate 
change, have implications for the reduction of GHG emissions from international 
shipping. The establishment of the IPCC links the scientific community and political 
institutions. As a growing source of GHG emissions contributing to climate change, 
emissions from international shipping have also been recognised by the IPCC in its 
Assessment Reports. 43  Other institutions, such as the UNEP and WMO, raise the 
awareness of the Earth’s climate change, provide technical knowledge on combating 
climate change and implement the outcomes within the international climate change 
regime. Their work, although not specialised in the reduction of shipping emissions, is 
indispensable in uniting people from both developed countries and developing 
countries. As one of the main institutions coping with GHG emissions from ships, the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, as well as its COPs, CMPs, SBSTA, AWG-LCA and 
ADP, provide crucial platforms for different countries to discuss and negotiate the 
reduction of such emissions. Furthermore, given that international regulation of 
shipping GHG emissions within the UN institutions is a lengthy and complex process, 
any regulatory or enforcement initiative or unilateral action by individual States or the 
EU might facilitate or improve the global regulation of the GHG emissions issue under 
the auspices of these UN institutions.44 Therefore, any initiatives made by individual 
States or regional organisations to reduce shipping GHG emissions should be studied 
and promoted if applicable.  
 
                                                 
42 Hackmann, above n 37, 1. But, some scholars have asserted that this kind of fragmentation could be considered ‘a 
strength rather than a weakness’. See, eg, O. R. Young, The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, 
Interplay, and Scale (MA: MIT Press, 2002); Steinar Andresen, 'The Effectiveness of UN Environmental Institutions' 
(2007) 7(4) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 317;.T. Gehring and S. Oberthür, 
'Interplay: Exploring Institutional Interaction' in Oran R. Young, Leslie A. King and Heike Schroeder (eds), 
Institutions and Environmental Change: Principal Findings, Applications, and Research Frontiers (MA: MIT Press, 
2008) .  
43  See, eg, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 'Fourth Assessment Report' (2007) 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html> accessed 27 August 2012, p 36; 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 'Fifth Assessment Report: Working Group III Report' (2014) 
<http://report.mitigation2014.org/spm/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers_approved.pdf> accessed 18 June 
2014, p 8.  




3.3 International Legal Framework on Climate Change 
 
In a broad sense, the international legal framework on climate change covers various 
global and regional treaties and non-binding political agreements to combat climate 
change by States or through intergovernmental organisations. As a relatively narrow 
concept, the international climate change regime usually refers to the 1992 UNFCCC 
and its Kyoto Protocol, as well as its COPs and CMPs.45 As such, the climate change 
regime was formally established in 1992 when the UNFCCC was adopted; whereas the 
broader international legal framework on climate change also comprises the previous 
regional and international efforts in regulating atmospheric pollution. This part first 
reviews the UN’s efforts in tackling air pollution from the perspectives of the 1979 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP),46 and the 1985 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna Convention).47 Based on the 
analysis of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, this part then examines the key 
outcomes of the UNFCCC-Kyoto Protocol regime during its series of negotiations. The 
analysis of these outcomes indicates that international regulation on the reduction of 
GHG emissions from international shipping is subject to the evolution and direction of 
the UN climate change regime. 
 
3.2.1 The Prevention of Atmospheric Pollution 
 
The issue of atmospheric pollution is generally discussed in the academic literature 
separately from climate change.48 Thus atmospheric pollution was excluded from the 
climate change regime. However, it could be a part of the international legal framework 
on climate change and also one aspect of the international legal framework on the 
                                                 
45 This definition of the international climate change regime has been supported by many scholars. See, eg, Birnie, 
Boyle and Redgwell, above n 1, 356; Yamin and Depledge, above n 28, 24-29; Ronald D. Brunner, 'Science and the 
Climate Change Regime' (2001) 34(1) Policy Sciences 1, 1; Sebastian Oberthür, 'The Climate Change Regime: 
Interactions with ICAO, IMO, and the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement' in Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring 
(eds), Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance (The MIT Press, 2006) 53, 54.  
46 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature 13 November 1979, 18 ILM 1442 
(entered into force 16 March 1983) (‘CLRTAP’).  
47 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 22 March 1985, 26 ILM 1529 
(entered into force 22 September 1988) (‘Vienna Convention’).  
48 See, eg, Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2003) 
322-356; Alexandre Charles Kiss and Dinah Shelton, International Environmental Law (Transnational Publishers, 3rd 




reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. At least three factors lead to 
this conclusion. First, the international legal framework on climate change is a concept 
broader than the climate change regime. It encompasses not only current conventions 
regulating climate change, but also the formation of the key regulatory tool, the 
‘framework treaty’, which was initially adopted by two conventions on the prevention 
of atmospheric pollution: the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution (CLRTAP), and the 1985 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
(Vienna Convention). The two conventions were regarded as the first ‘framework 
treaties’ to address atmospheric pollution, and this approach was later followed by the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. Second, climate change and atmospheric pollution are 
‘interlinked’.49 Certain types of atmospheric pollution, transboundary air pollution as an 
example, and the depletion of the ozone layer, have been proven to contribute to global 
warming and climate change. 50 Effective international regulation on climate change 
could reduce atmospheric pollution. Third, as discussed in Chapter 1, GHGs can be a 
type of ‘conditional’ pollution, and the broad definition of GHGs includes those 
resulting in atmospheric pollution. 51  For example, the release of GHGs including 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, and other chlorine-based substances may lead to 
the destruction of the ozone layer.52 Thus, the issue of atmospheric pollution becomes 
an indispensable part of the international legal framework on climate change, as well as 
GHG emissions from international shipping.  
 
3.2.1.1 The 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
 
As early as the Trail Smelter case in 1941, transboundary air pollution has been a matter 
of international concern. The 1982 LOSC is considered to be ‘the first binding rules of a 
global nature’ on atmospheric pollution. 53  Its Articles 212 and 222 grant States 
legislative and enforcement responsibilities regarding air pollution. However, the role of 
the LOSC in combating climate change is generally less mentioned than the 1979 
                                                 
49 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 1, 336.  
50 See ibid 336.  
51 See ch 1, 1.1.  
52 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 1, 336.  




Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP). This is probably 
because the CLRTAP is a ‘framework treaty’ that relates it to climate change. As ‘the 
first international legally binding instrument’ dealing with regional air pollution,54 the 
1979 CLRTAP was adopted by the UNECE, signed by all European States, the US and 
Canada. It established a regional framework to combat transboundary air pollution. The 
main characteristics of the convention consist of two aspects. It provides for a ‘soft 
commitment’ by all parties that they should ‘endeavour to limit and, as far as possible, 
gradually reduce and prevent air pollution including long-range transboundary air 
pollution’.55 Thus it establishes a general obligation on parties to limit their emissions of 
air pollutants, although there was no specific target or timetable for such a limit.56 For 
example, it does not limit such pollution to a given level in certain years. The other 
important feature lies in its broad definition of ‘air pollution’, which leaves room for 
further regulation by means of protocols. Article 1(a) of the convention provides: 
 
‘air pollution’ means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy 
into the air resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm 
living resources and ecosystems and material property and impair or interfere with amenities 
and other legitimate uses of the environment, and ‘air pollutants’ shall be construed 
accordingly.57 
 
In this definition, ‘substances or energy’ directly or indirectly introduced by man is a 
broad expression and covers both GHG emissions and ozone depleting substances.58 It 
enables various types of air pollutants to be regulated by the protocols of the 1979 
CLRTAP. To date the CLRTAP has eight protocols which have set specific targets for 
reduction of air pollutants, ranging from sulphur emissions, 59  Nitrogen Oxides, 60 
                                                 
54  United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), The 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-rang 
Transboundary Air Pollution <http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/lrtap_h1.html> accessed 2 August 2012.  
55 CLRTAP art 2; Sands, above n 48, 325.  
56 Sands, above n 48, 325.  
57 CLRTAP art 1(a). This definition of air pollution was later generally adopted by the LOSC and MARPOL Annex VI, 
which may be regarded as a kind of collaboration within UN institutions. See ch 3, 3.2.2.  
58 Sands, above n 48, 325.  
59 The 1985 Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 per cent 
(entered into force 2 September 1987); the 1994 Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions (entered into 
force 5 August 1998).  





Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), 61  heavy metals, 62  and Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (POPs).63 For instance, its 1985 Protocol required its parties to reduce the 
sulphur emissions or their transboundary fluxes by 30 per cent by 1993, using 1980 
levels as the basis for calculation of reductions. 64  Additionally, the convention 
established a ‘Cooperative Programme for the Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-
range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe’ (EMEP), an Executive Body and 
Secretariat to monitor the air pollutants and develop relevant procedures. The 1979 
CLRTAP has its strengths and weaknesses. It is weak due to its nature of being a 
‘framework treaty’. It is strong in providing such framework for future cooperation and 
regime development of more effective measures against pollution.65 The approach of 
combining a framework treaty followed by protocols was adopted by subsequent 
environmental treaties to combat climate change and ozone depletion.66 
 
In the context of GHG emissions from international shipping, the framework treaty 
model reflected in the 1979 CLRTAP was adopted by both the 1992 UNFCCC and its 
Kyoto Protocol, and MARPOL 73/78. The CLRTAP broad definition of ‘air pollution’ 
also covers GHG emissions from international shipping. However, its definition of 
‘long-range transboundary air pollution’ specifies that the distance between the polluter 
and the victim should generally make it impossible ‘to distinguish the contribution of 
individual emission sources or groups of sources’.67 In reality, this article excludes the 
application of this treaty to the issue of GHG emissions from shipping. The distance 
between the ship which emits GHGs and the victims from such emissions should be 
long enough that the ship cannot be identified, so that the treaty may be applicable to 
                                                 
61 The 1991 Protocol concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or their Transboundary 
Fluxes (entered into force 29 September 1997).  
62 The 1998 Protocol on Heavy Metals (entered into force 29 December 2003).  
63 The 1998 Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) (entered into force 23 October 2003).  
64 The 1985 Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 per cent art 
2.  
65 See Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 1, 345; Kiss and Shelton, above n 48, 565-568.  
66 Examples are the 1992 UNFCCC and its protocols and the 1985 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
and its protocols. They are examined in the following sections.  
67 CLRTAP art 1(b). This article reads that,  
‘Long-range transboundary air pollution’ means air pollution whose physical origin is situated wholly or in part 
within the area under the national jurisdiction of one State and which has adverse effects in the area under the 
jurisdiction of another State at such a distance that it is not generally possible to distinguish the contribution of 




GHG emissions from ships.68 Yet, it would be meaningless whether the treaty could be 
applied in this context as such, since the ship might avoid liability against its emissions, 
which is also inconsistent with the polluter pays principle.69 Additionally, the definition 
of ‘air pollution’ by the treaty indicates that the pollution should be actual and has 
‘result[ed] in deleterious effects’.70 This expression did not include the risk of pollution 
or damage, which was based on the knowledge at that time. As time went on, the 
precautionary principle was incorporated into the Protocols of the CLRTAP.71  
 
3.2.1.2 The 1985 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
 
As a layer in the Earth’s atmosphere containing high concentrations of ozone (O3), the 
ozone layer is thought to prevent people from harmful exposure to ultraviolet radiation 
from the sun and adjust the temperature structure of the earth. Since the 1960s, losses in 
the ozone layer over the Antarctic, the Arctic, Australia and some other areas have been 
observed.72 As a response to this issue, an international ozone regime was established 
under the auspices of the UNEP. Currently the regime consists of the 1985 Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vienna Convention), the 1987 Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol), 73  and four 
amendments to the Protocol, adopted in London (1990), 74  Copenhagen (1992), 75 
Montreal (1997)76 and Beijing (1999).77  
 
                                                 
68 See Kiss and Shelton, above n 48, 564.  
69 See ch 2, 2.6.  
70 CLRTAP art 1(a).  
71 Henrik Selin and Noelle Eckley, 'Science, Politics, and Persistent Organic Pollutants: The Role of Scientific 
Assessments in International Environmental Co-operation' (2003) 3(1) International Environmental Agreements 17, 
27. See also ch 2, 2.4.  
72 Sands, above n 48, 343.  
73 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 16 September 1987, 26 ILM 
1550 (entered into force 1 January 1989) (‘Montreal Protocol’).  
74 The 1990 Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (London), opened for 
signature 29 June 1990, 30 ILM 537 (entered into force 10 August 1992) (‘The 1990 Amendment’).  
75 The 1992 Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Copenhagen), opened 
for signature 25 November 1992, 32 ILM 874 (entered into force 14 June 1994) (‘The 1992 Amendment’).  
76 The 1997 Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal), opened for 
signature 25 September 1997, UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12 (entered into force 10 November 1999) (‘The 1997 Amendment’).  
77 The 1999 Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Beijing), opened for 




Similar to the 1979 CLRTAP, the 1985 Vienna Convention is essentially a framework 
treaty. It does not set any targets or timetable for action, but requires its parties to ‘take 
appropriate measures’ to cooperate in four respects. Article 2(2) of the convention lists 
these obligations: 
 
‘To this end the Parties shall …: 
(a) Co-operate by means of systematic observations, research and information exchange in 
order to better understand and assess the effects of human activities on the ozone layer and the 
effects on human health and the environment from modification of the ozone layer; 
(b) Adopt appropriate legislative or administrative measures and co-operate in harmonizing 
appropriate policies to control, limit, reduce or prevent human activities under their jurisdiction 
or control should it be found that these activities have or are likely to have adverse effects 
resulting from modification or likely modification of the ozone layer; 
(c) Co-operate in the formulation of agreed measures, procedures and standards for the 
implementation of this Convention, with a view to the adoption of protocols and annexes; 
(d) Co-operate with competent international bodies to implement effectively this Convention 
and protocols to which they are party.’78 
 
These obligations are general, and are implemented by parties at their discretion based 
on relevant scientific and technical considerations, taking their capabilities into 
consideration. 79  The above Article 2(a)(b), however, incorporates the precautionary 
principle in that it requests its State Parties to take actions once ‘these activities have or 
are likely to have adverse effects’. Compared with the 1979 CLRTAP, the 1985 Vienna 
Convention was a major advance in this regard, and was thus regarded as ‘one of the 
first’ to recognise and adopt the precautionary approach. 80 This approach was also 
applied in its 1987 Montreal Protocol and its amendments81 and the IMO negotiation 
process on the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping.82 The spirit of 
cooperation indicated in the above article is another important feature of the convention, 
                                                 
78 Vienna Convention art 2(2).  
79 Vienna Convention art 2(2)(4).  
80 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 1, 351. 
The precautionary approach was also explicitly invoked in the Preamble of the Vienna Convention. The Preamble of 
the Vienna Convention notes that, ‘[m]indful also of the precautionary measures for the protection of the ozone layer 
which have already been taken by the national and international levels.’ See also ch 2, 2.4.  
81 The preamble of the Montreal Protocol notes that, ‘[d]etermined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary 
measures to control equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it.’ This expression goes beyond the 
limitation of the 1985 Vienna Convention to precautionary measures that already existed. The Montreal Protocol and 
its amendments stipulate specific legal obligations and timetables for such requirements with the absence of scientific 
evidence, which could be deemed as the application of the precautionary principle in this context.  




which was strengthened in its 1987 Montreal Protocol.83 The cooperation among States, 
in particular between developed States and developing States, is regarded as one of the 
important reasons for the success of the 1985 Vienna Convention and its Montreal 
Protocol,84 and arguably it was the absence of this cooperation that resulted in the slow 
progress of global climate change negotiations. The acquisition of alternative 
technology as stipulated in Article 4 was regarded as ‘most unsatisfactory’ on the 
ground that the parties only need to cooperate in accordance with their domestic laws 
and regulations. 85  However, the definition it provides on ‘adverse effects’ clearly 
indicates that ozone depletion might lead to climate change, 86  which relates the 
convention to the international climate change regime.  
 
The 1987 Montreal Protocol was regarded as a ‘landmark international environmental 
agreement’ due to the new regulatory techniques, institutional arrangements, and 
innovative financial mechanisms that it adopted.87 As a Protocol to the 1985 Vienna 
Convention, it sets specific targets for reducing and eliminating consumption and 
production of ozone depleting substances. These substances were listed and regulated 
by the Protocol and its four amendments.88 As these substances, including O3, are types 
of GHGs in a broad sense, the adoption of the Protocol paved the way for the 
negotiation and adoption of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. The adoption of the 
Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) principle 89  is another important 
                                                 
83 See, eg, Montreal Protocol arts 9, 10. 
84 Bryan A. Green, 'Lessons from the Montreal Protocol: Guidance for the Next International Climate Change 
Agreement' (2009) 39(1) Environmental Law 253, 259.  
85 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 1, 350. Article 4(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that, ‘[t]he parties 
shall cooperate, consistent with their national laws, regulations and practices and taking into account in particular the 
needs of the developing countries, in promoting, directly or through competent international bodies, the development 
and transfer of technology and knowledge.’ 
86 Article 1(2) of the Vienna Convention reads that,  
‘“Adverse effects” means changes in the physical environment or biota, including changes in climate, which have 
significant deleterious effects on human health or on the composition, resilience and productivity of natural and 
managed ecosystems, or on materials useful to mankind.’ 
87  Sands, above n 48, 345-346. UNEP, Key Achievements of the Montreal Protocol To Date 
<http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/MP_Key_Achievements-E.pdf> accessed 29 August 2012. According to the 
statistics by the UNEP, as of the end of 2009, the Parties to the Montreal Protocol had phased out the consumption of 
98 per cent of all the chemicals controlled by the Protocol. In this sense, the Montreal Protocol was successful in 
achieving its goals of phasing out the ODSs. See Green, above n 84, 259.  
88 Totally there are 5 Annexes ranging from Annex A, Annex B, Annex C, Annex D, and Annex E listing different 
groups of controlled substances under this regime.  




feature of the Protocol. Article 5(1) of the Protocol offers developing country parties a 
grace period of ten years beyond the dates set for phase-out of the controlled substances 
regulated under Article 2 of the Protocol. 90 Article 5(2) and 5(3) aims to facilitate 
access to ‘environmentally safe alternative substances and technology’ by developing 
countries, and promises to offer them ‘subsidies, aid, credits, guarantees or insurance 
programmes’. 91  These regulations attract participation from developing countries 
including India and China. Meanwhile, the Protocol’s institutional arrangements for the 
regular meetings of parties (MOPs), and the ‘Financial Mechanism’ including the 
establishment of a Multilateral Fund, have also gained wide support.92 These methods 
have been relied on extensively in the subsequent treaties on climate change.  
 
Three approaches adopted by the Montreal Protocol might be valuable to the issue of 
GHG emissions from international shipping. One is its flexible arrangement, which has 
helped both cooperation between various States and participation from developing 
States.93 For instance, parties are required to review and modify the provisions of the 
Protocol in the future as a new economic or environmental situation or technology 
appears. 94  Three categories of exemptions of certain Ozone Depleting Substances 
(ODSs) for certain uses were provided,95 which might alleviate concerns from relevant 
States due to their special situations.96 Additionally, rules on trade of ODSs are not 
rigid. The trade on production allowances among party States is allowed, which makes 
it possible for low-producing States to meet their domestic needs.97 In contrast to the 
above flexible agreement, the IMO explicitly sets the principle of No More Favourable 
                                                 
90 Article 5(1) of the Protocol provides, 
‘Any Party that is a developing country and whose annual calculated level of consumption of the controlled 
substances is less than 0.3 kilograms per capita on the date of the entry into force of the Protocol for it, or any time 
thereafter within ten years of the date of entry into force of the Protocol shall, in order to meet its basic domestic 
needs, be entitled to delay its compliance with the control measures set out in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 2 by ten 
years after that specified in those paragraphs.’  
91 Montreal Protocol art 5(2)(3).  
92 See, eg, Sands, above n 48, 354-357; Kiss and Shelton, above n 48, 575-579.  
93 Green, above n 84, 262-265.  
94 Montreal Protocol art 6.  
95 The three categories of exemptions include ‘the critical uses of methyl bromide, essential uses for all other [ODSs], 
and laboratory and analytical uses’. UNEP Ozone Secretariat, Exemption Information 
<http://ozone.unep.org/Exemption_Information/> accessed 28 August 2012.  
96 Green, above n 84, 263.  




Treatment (NMFT) in its MARPOL 73/78, 98  which makes it less attractive for 
developing States to participate in the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. When 
comparing the successful practice under the 1987 Montreal Protocol with the slow 
progress within the IMO in regulating the shipping GHG emissions issue, it might be 
inferred that certain kinds of flexibility are necessary to facilitate reaching consensus in 
the IMO on future action to regulate shipping GHG emissions. Indeed, the IMO had 
demonstrated flexibility in its newly-adopted Energy Efficiency measures for reducing 
shipping emissions in that it gave new ships a six and a half year delay in applying new 
shipbuilding standards, although this benefit applies to ships registered in both 
developing and developed States.99 It is arguable that more flexibility is needed for 
adopting market-based measures (MBMs) to further reduce GHG emissions from 
international shipping.100  
 
Another innovative approach adopted by the Montreal Protocol lies in its well-designed 
application of the CBDR principle. First, it links the obligations by developing State 
parties with the effective implementation of financial cooperation and the transfer of 
technology from developed State parties.101 Article 5(5) of the amended Protocol in 
1990 provides: 
 
‘Developing the capacity to fulfil the obligations of the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of 
this Article to comply with the control measures set out in Articles 2A to 2E and Article 2I, 
and any control measures in Articles 2F to 2H that are decided pursuant to paragraph 1 bis of 
this Article, and their implementation by those same Parties will depend upon the effective 
implementation of the financial co-operation as provided by Article 10 and the transfer of 
technology as provided by Article 10A.’102 [emphasis added] 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the financial cooperation and transfer of technology included 
in the above article is a kind of ‘differentiated treatment’, and constitutes a form of the 
CBDR principle. The Protocol is innovative in setting the implementation of financial 
                                                 
98 MARPOL 73/78 art 5(4); see also ch 2, 2.5.  
99  John Vidal, Maritime Countries Agree First Ever Shipping Emissions Regulation 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/18/maritime-countries-shipping-emissions-regulation> accessed 
29 August 2012; see also ch 4, 4.3.  
100  See ch 4, 4.3.3.2, ch 7, 7.5.4. There are three routes within the IMO in regulating GHG emissions from 
international shipping, namely technical measures, operational measures, and MBMs. Currently technical and 
operational measures have been adopted by the IMO, while the MBMs are still under discussion.  
101 Sands, above n 48, 354.  




cooperation and technology transfer as the conditions for the developing States to fulfil 
their obligations under the Protocol. This approach was later adopted by the 
UNFCCC.103 Second, the provisions of the Multilateral Fund required that the financial 
assistance would only cover the incremental costs undertaken by developing States in 
fulfilling their obligations under the Protocol. 104  As such, both developing and 
developed States found this an appropriate measure to relieve their concerns: 
developing States received the assistance that they were lacking while developed States 
were guaranteed that their assistance would be utilised for the purpose of reducing 
ODSs.  
 
Currently the mechanisms on financial cooperation and technology transfer are in place 
under the UNFCCC,105 as well as various funds. It is important to maintain and improve 
these mechanisms to incorporate the successful practice of the Montreal Protocol into 
the reduction of GHG emissions from shipping. In particular, it might be necessary to 
apply both the CBDR and the NMFT principles in a creative manner. Due to the 
growing status of developing States in the international economy and politics, it is 
important to take into account the interests from this group of nations in the 
development of global regulation of shipping GHG emissions. To that end, the adoption 
of the CBDR principle might take different forms, such as certain kinds of MBMs, so as 
to be more flexible and attractive for most States. It is arguable that the obligation or 
commitment to reduce GHG emissions by developing countries should only be 
activated once the financial assistance and technology transfer as agreed by both parties 
are effectively implemented by developed countries. This approach, however, is 
stronger than those indicated within the Montreal Protocol and the 1992 UNFCCC.106 
Similar restrictions on the utilisation of the funds by the Protocol might also be applied 
through a GHG Fund. The key to attracting the participation from developing States lies 
in a sound arrangement on the utilisation and allocation of these benefits as can be seen 
from the Montreal Protocol. These issues are further discussed in Chapters 4 and 7.  
 
                                                 
103 UNFCCC art 4(7). 
104 Green, above n 84, 266.  
105 UNFCCC art 4(7).  




The third successful approach adopted by the Montreal Protocol lies in its dealing with 
non-parties by means of trade sanctions which effectively attracted the involvement and 
cooperation from the industry. Article 4 of the Protocol as revised in 1990 and 1997 
requires each party to ban the import and export of controlled substances or products 
containing such substances from and to non-parties. Due to their consistency with 
Article 20(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO,107 
these trade measures could be used as ‘sticks’ while financial assistance serves as a 
‘carrot’. 108  More importantly, the Protocol encouraged the utilisation of 
‘environmentally safe alternative substances’.109 In this way it successfully ensured the 
industry that a worldwide reduction of ODSs would eventually eliminate the market for 
ODSs, and it would be secure and profitable from a long term perspective to invest in 
the research and development of alternatives to ODSs.110 Thus the industry actively 
participated in the exploration of new alternatives, as well as the transfer of ozone safe 
technology, as these technologies were mostly owned by the private sector rather than 
the governments of developed States.  
 
While ozone depletion and climate change are both issues of a global nature, these trade 
measures, or methods of dealing with non-parties, particularly in the way they attracted 
participation from industry, may also have a significant role to play in accelerating the 
reduction of shipping emissions. To avoid the non-parties’ competitive advantage 
gained from possible future regulations by the IMO, the functions of the port State need 
to be strengthened since any ship’s entry into a port State is subject to the jurisdiction of 
that State. In this case, the port State might strengthen its legislation and enforcement of 
vessel entry into its port, and this arrangement could be made through improving 
current Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) in the port State control regime. 111 
However, trade-related measures might not be applied directly in this context. 
                                                 
107 There are a lot of discussions on the possible conflicts or necessary coordination between trade measures and 
environmental concerns, but some scholars assert that trade measures are justified and legitimate in this regard. See, 
eg, Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 1, 353; Scott N. Carlson, 'The Montreal Protocol's Environmental Subsidies 
and GATT: A Needed Reconciliation' (1994) 29(2) Texas International Law Journal 211, 229; Zhongxiang Zhang, 
'Multilateral Trade Measures in a Post-2012 Climate Change Regime? What Can Be Taken from the Montreal 
Protocol and the WTO?' (2009) 37(12) Energy Policy 5105, 5105.  
108 Zhang, above n 107.  
109 Montreal Protocol art 5(2), 9(1).  
110 Green, above n 84, 267.  




Furthermore, in view of the fact that most ships around the world are owned by private 
shipping companies, it is important to examine their needs and get them involved in the 
reduction of shipping emissions. Chapter 5 discusses this issue in more detail.  
 
3.2.2 The UNFCCC-Kyoto Protocol Regime 
 
It is generally accepted that the international climate change regime, also referred to as 
the UNFCCC-Kyoto Protocol regime,112 was established in 1992 when the UNFCCC 
was adopted, culminated in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol was signed, and is currently 
under development. 113 There are different views on the development stages of this 
regime. Some scholars classify the regime into five periods,114 while others divide it 
into four periods.115 Based on the recent development of the regime, the evolution of the 
UNFCCC-Kyoto Protocol regime is divided into three stages as illustrated in Table 3.1. 
While the early international responses to the issue of climate change have been 
discussed in the first part of this chapter, this section mainly examines the establishment 
of the regime and the post-Kyoto efforts by the international community with a focus on 







                                                 
112 D. M. Ong, 'International Legal Efforts to Address Human-induced Global Climate Change' in M. Fitzmaurice, D. 
M. Ong and Panos Merkouris (eds), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2010) 450, 451.  
113 See, eg, Yamin and Depledge, above n 28, 22-29; Kevin A. Baumert, 'Participation of Developing Countries in the 
International Climate Change Regime: Lessons for the Future' (2006) 38(2) The George Washington International 
Law Review 365; Daniel Bodansky, 'The History of the Global Climate Change Regime' in Urs Luterbacher and 
Detlef F. Sprinz (eds), International relations and global climate change (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001) 23; 
Lavanya Rajamani, 'The Cancun Climate Agreements: Reading the Text, Subtext and Tea Leaves' (2011) 60(2) The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 499, 499.  
114 See, eg, Bodansky, above n 113, 23-24. Bodansky divided the period till 1997 into five periods, namely the 
foundational period, the agenda-setting phrase from 1985 to 1988, a pre-negotiation period from 1988 to 1990, the 
formal intergovernmental negotiations phase of the UNFCCC, Post-Rio Developments and the Negotiation of the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
115 See, eg, Yamin and Depledge, above n 28, 22-29. Yamin and Depledge classify the regime into three stages, 
namely the emergence of the climate change regime, entry into force of the UNFCCC and the Berlin Mandate, the 





































1.Climate change as a ‘common concern of 
mankind’; 
2.Endorsed the action in establishing the IPCC 
and requested it to prepare a review & 









Global mean temperature likely to increase by 
about 0.3。C per decade, under business-as-















1.Countries need to stabilise GHG emissions, 
developed States should establish emissions 
targets and/or national programs or strategies; 
2. Called for negotiations on a framework 




21 Dec 1990 UN 1.Establishment of INC; 




























1.Defined an ultimate objective and 
principles; 
2.Divided countries into Annex I, Annex II 
and non-Annex I, and specified general 
commitments to different Parties respectively; 
3. Included general obligations by all 
parties to promote and cooperate in the 
reduction of GHG emissions from the 
















1. Assessed specific commitments for Annex I 
Parties under the UNFCCC as ‘not adequate’;  
2. Launched negotiations on ‘a protocol or 
another legal instrument’ to be concluded by 
COP 3; 
3. Requested its SBSTA and the SBI to 
address the allocation and control of 













1. Endorsed the 1995 IPCC Second 
Assessment Report; called for accelerating 
negotiations on a legally binding Protocol or 
another legal instrument; 
2. SBSTA negotiated allocation and control 
of international bunker fuels. 
                                                 
116  This table is compiled by the author based on the following sources: UNFCCC, Meetings 
<http://unfccc.int/meetings/items/6240.php> accessed 19 June 2014; UNFCCC, A Brief Overview of Decisions 
<http://unfccc.int/documentation/decisions/items/2964.php> accessed 19 June 2014; Yamin and Depledge, above n 

































1. Provided all parties with general 
commitments, and Annex I parties with 
individual emission targets; set flexibility 
mechanisms: CDM, JI, ET; Reporting and 
Review, Compliance system; 
2. Delegated IMO the mandate to regulate 
GHG emissions from international shipping 
(Art 2(2)); 
3. Urged SBSTA to elaborate further on the 
inclusion of international bunker emissions 























Included 7 decisions focusing on 
strengthening the financial mechanism, 
technology transfer, adverse effects of climate 
change/implementation of response measures, 
activities implemented jointly, flexibility 
mechanisms, and preparation for COP/CMP. 
Many of these decisions or actions are to be 








Implementation of the BAPA; adoption of the 
guidelines for the preparation of national 
communications by Annex I States; capacity 
building, transfer of technology, and flexible 
mechanisms (no major conclusions). 
 13-24 Nov 
2000 










1.Adopted the IPCC Third Assessment Report 
of 2001; 
2. Provided core elements for the 
implementation of the BAPA; established new 
Special Climate Change Fund, the Kyoto 









Based on the Bonn Agreement, set out 
detailed rules, procedures, technical guidelines 
and work programmes, which actually 
completed the work of BAPA; brought to an 
end the post-Kyoto cycle of policy-making 









Reiterated the need to build on the outcomes 






The Milan conference adopted decisions on 
the institutions and procedures of the Kyoto 






The Buenos Aires conference completed 
















2004 Accords, reassessed the building blocks of the 










Discussed capacity building, transfer of 
technologies, adverse efforts of climate 
change, etc.; launched negotiations on the 
next phase of the KP with the establishment 
of AWG-KP.  


































1.Endorsed the IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report of 2007; 
2.Bali Road Map is made up of a set of 
decisions that represent the work to be done 
under various negotiating ‘tracks’; 
3. As a part of the Bali Road Map, the Bali 
Action Plan pointed out a process to enable 
the full, effective and sustained 
implementation of the Convention through 
long-term cooperative action up to and beyond 
2012. It includes five categories: shared 
vision, mitigation, adaptation, technology and 
financing; 
4. AWG-LCA was established to conduct 
this process, and is responsible for 
addressing shipping emissions’ reduction 
under the sub-item 1b(iv) addressing 
cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-
specific actions.  




The Poznan conference launched the 












/ CMP 5 
1.Raised climate change policy to ‘the highest 
political level’;  
2.Committed developed States to USD30 
billion fast-starting financing for adaptation 
and mitigation in developing States for the 
period 2010-2012; 3.Decided to establish the 
















/ CMP 6 
Integrated many of the elements of the 
Copenhagen Accord:  
1.Took note of the mitigation targets and 
actions communicated by States, provided for 
transparency in their implementation; 
established new mechanisms for the 
measurement, reporting and verification 
(MRV) of mitigation efforts and support for 
















2. Established an Adaptation Framework, a 
Technology Mechanism and a Green Climate 
Fund; 
3. Created a framework for addressing 


















/ CMP 7 
1.Established a second commitment period 
under the KP; 
2. Agreed on long-term cooperative action 
under the UNFCCC; 
3. Operationalised the Technology Mechanism 
in 2012; 
4. Launched the Green Climate Fund, the 
Adaptation Committee; and a new subsidiary 
body under the Convention (ADP); 
5. Amended the KP and its Annexes, added 




















1. Adopted the Doha Amendment to the KP, 
which includes new commitments for annex I 
parties to the KP who agreed to take on 
commitments in a second commitment period 
(01/01/2013-31/12/2020),  amended GHG list, 
and other amended articles of the KP. 
2. Terminated the AWG-LCA and AWG-
KP; 
3. Transferred some issues to be considered by 
the SBSTA and SBI, eg, MRV, REDD+, 







1. Established the Warsaw international 
mechanism for loss and damage associated 
with climate change impacts;  
2. Established the Warsaw REDD+ 
framework. 




A draft global climate change agreement is 

















3.2.2.1 The UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol 
 
In contrast to the international regulation of transboundary air pollution and ozone 
depletion, climate change regulation is a much broader and more complex issue which 
involves all aspects of people’s daily lives,117 and has greater differentiated economic 
and political implications for both developed and developing countries. The success of 
the framework approach adopted by the 1979 CLRTAP and 1985 Vienna Convention led 
to a consensus in support of a similar approach to climate change. This consensus was 
formally confirmed by the 44th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1989.118 
As stated by the UNGA Resolution 44/207, ‘a framework convention on climate was 
urgently required’ and ‘specific protocols with commitments could develop within this 
framework’.119  
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the establishment of the IPCC served as a bridge 
between the scientific community and the political agenda. To incorporate the 
international consensus achieved into the drafting of a climate convention, 120  the 
Response Strategies Working Group of the IPCC drew up a ‘Legal Measures’ paper in 
1989, which listed the possible elements for the drafting of a framework convention on 
climate change.121 The document was endorsed by the Ministerial Declaration of the 
Second World Climate Conference in 1990.122 In the same year, the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee (INC) was established by the UN to host the negotiation and 
drafting of a framework convention on climate change, and was also required to take the 
work of the IPCC into consideration during this process.123  
 
                                                 
117 See Milke Hulme, 'The Idea of Climate Change' (2010) 19(3) GAIA: Ecological Perspectives for Science & 
Society 171, 171.  
118  Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, UNGA. A/RES/44/207 (22 
December 1989).  
119 Ibid.  
120 The ‘consensus’ here includes both the fact that scientific evidence proves the existence of global warming and 
climate change, and the broad agreement that a Convention should follow the format of the 1979 CLRTAP and the 
1985 Vienna Convention, namely the framework treaty model.  
121 Barrett, above n 16, 184.  
122 Ibid 184.  
123  Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, UNGA. A/RES/45/212 (21 




The UNFCCC was adopted in 1992 through the joint efforts of the international 
community. As the ‘Constitution’ for the international climate change regime,124 to date 
the UNFCCC has 196 parties including 195 States and the European Union. 125 
However, the bodies under the UNFCCC have been changing due to the termination of 
some temporary bodies mandated by the convention for certain periods. Figure 3.3 
provides the current structure of the UNFCCC bodies. Except for the SBSTA and the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) which are permanent subsidiary bodies 
under the UNFCCC, most of the other subsidiary bodies exist temporarily.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Structure of the UNFCCC Bodies126 
 
                                                 
124 D. M. Bodansky, 'The Emerging Climate Change Regime' (1995) 20(1) ANNUAL REVIEW OF ENERGY AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT 425, 426.  
125 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Status of Ratification of the Convention 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php> accessed 31 July 2014.  




The main contributions from the UNFCCC are shown in Table 3.1. First, the ultimate 
objective of the Convention and any related legal instruments is to stabilise GHG 
concentrations ‘at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system’ rather than reverse GHG emissions. 127  Stabilisation should be 
achieved within a time frame that allows ecosystems to adapt naturally, ensures that 
food production is not threatened and enables sustainable economic development.128 It 
is difficult to infer from this Article what concentration levels and rates of change are 
‘safe’.129 However, in assessing whether it is necessary to reduce GHG emissions from 
international shipping, for instance, the contributions of shipping GHG emissions to 
global anthropogenic GHG emissions could be an important criterion. The discussions 
in Chapter 1 indicate that this was 2.7 per cent in 2007 and is projected to be 5.7 per 
cent by 2050 if such growth remains unchecked.130 This percentage is high enough to be 
regulated. Second, the Convention raises several guiding principles for the parties to 
achieve the above objective. These principles include the principle of equity, 131 the 
precautionary principle, 132  the CBDR principle, 133  the sustainable development 
principle 134 and promoting a supportive and open international economic system.135 
Most of these principles reflect more general principles of international environmental 
law and apply to the issue of GHG emissions from international shipping.136 Among 
them, the CBDR was explicitly mentioned for the first time although it was actually 
applied in the Montreal Protocol. This principle, together with the right to sustainable 
development, addressed the concern from developing countries that their economic 
development would not be impeded due to their engagement in fighting climate 
change. 137  Nevertheless, the use of words ‘guided’ at the beginning and ‘should’ 
                                                 
127 UNFCCC art 2.  
128 UNFCCC art 2.  
129 Bodansky, above n 124, 433.  
130 ø. Buhaug et al, 'Second IMO GHG Study 2009' (International Maritime Organization (IMO), 2009) 1; see also ch 
1, 1.1.1.2.  
131 Or called ‘intra- and intergenerational equity’. See UNFCCC art 3(1).  
132 UNFCCC art 3(3).  
133 UNFCCC art 3(1)(2).  
134 UNFCCC art 3(4). 
135 UNFCCC art 3(5).  
136 See ch 2.  




throughout Article 3 also indicate that these principles are ‘not necessarily binding 
rules’, although they are useful for the interpretation and implementation of the 
Convention.138 Thus, it might be inferred that the application of the CBDR principle to 
the issue of GHG emissions from ships could be flexible.139  
 
In accordance with the CBDR principle, the UNFCCC divides countries into three 
categories, namely, Annex I (OECD countries and economies in transition), Annex II 
(OECD countries only) and non-Annex I (mostly developing countries).140 All parties 
have general commitments, including developing national inventories of anthropogenic 
emissions, promoting sustainable management, and reporting obligations. 141  The 
specific aim of returning emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 is imposed on Annex I 
parties, 142 while Annex II Parties must provide financial assistance and promote 
technology transfer to developing countries. 143  These commitments, however, have 
been criticised as ‘neither strong nor clear’. 144 This was mainly because under the 
Convention Annex I Parties are free to choose their different starting points, resources, 
economies and other individual circumstances without a uniform requirement,145 and a 
certain degree of flexibility in implementing their commitments is allowed for 
economies in transition.146 Furthermore, the obligations by all parties to promote and 
cooperate in the reduction of GHG emissions in the transport sector were included in 
the UNFCCC,147 although they only served as general commitments. In this sense, the 
                                                 
138 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 1, 359. Based on article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, article 3 of the UNFCCC could be regarded as ‘the context’ for interpreting the UNFCCC or its related legal 
instruments including its Kyoto Protocol.  
139 See ch 2, 2.5.  
140 However, some countries which became OECD members after the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992 are non-
Annex I countries (such as the Republic of Korea and Israel), and the Annex I list has not been updated. See also ch 
5, 5.4.2.  
141 UNFCCC art 4(1).  
142 UNFCCC art 4(2). 
143 UNFCCC art 4(3)(4)(5).  
144 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 1, 360.  
145 UNFCCC art 4(2).  
146 UNFCCC art 4(6).  
147 UNFCCC art 4(1)(c). The article provides: 
All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and 
regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, shall: 




UNFCCC could also be deemed as the ‘Constitution’ of the GHG reduction regime 
from international shipping. 
 
These commitments were identified by the First Conference of the Parties of the 
UNFCCC (COP 1) in 1995 as ‘not adequate’ in its strong mandate (commonly known as 
the Berlin Mandate) and negotiations on a protocol or another legal instrument were 
launched.148 More importantly, it was in this conference that the SBSTA and the SBI 
were requested to address the allocation and control of GHG emissions from 
international shipping for the first time. Decision 4/CP.1 (methodological issues) of the 
UNFCCC COP 1 Report in 1995 decided:  
 
‘1. (f) That the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation, taking fully into account ongoing work in 
Governments and international organizations, including the International Maritime 
Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization, address the issue of the 
allocation and control of emissions from international bunker fuels, and report this 
work to the Conference of the Parties at its second session.’149 [emphasis added] 
 
Bunker fuel is degraded residue heavy fuel oil, which has been widely used by 
international shipping due to its low cost.150 In accordance with the above decision, the 
SBSTA and SBI were requested to work out how to allocate GHG emissions from 
international shipping to individual States so as to regulate this GHG emissions issue 
through the scheduled Kyoto Protocol. This is because the UNFCCC and its scheduled 
Kyoto Protocol are State-based agreements whereas ships engaged in international 
shipping are emitting during the whole voyage. However, it is technically difficult and 
politically sensitive to allocate shipping GHG emissions to individual States due to the 
transboundary nature of GHG emissions and the close linkage of international shipping 
with international trade. Due to the significance of this work on the allocation of 
emissions, it is arguable that the UNFCCC started its work on addressing GHG 
                                                                                                                                               
practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by 
the Montreal Protocol in all relevant sectors, including the energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste 
management sectors.  
148 The Berlin Mandate, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (28 
March - 7 April 1995) preamble.  
149  Methodological Issues, Decision 4/CP.1, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, 
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (28 March - 7 April 1995) art 1(f).  
150 Md. Saiful Karim and Shawkat Alam, 'Climate Change and Reduction of Emissions of Greenhouse Gases from 




emissions from international shipping at COP 1 in 1995. To address this difficult 
problem, at the SBSTA 4th meeting (SBSTA 4) in 1996 the UNFCCC Secretariat 
prepared a paper that included eight allocation options for consideration by the 
SBSTA.151 Then, SBSTA identified five options from these eight choices as the basis for 
future work on the allocation of GHG emissions from international shipping. These five 
options are: 
 
‘Option 1: no allocation; 
Option 2: allocation to the country where the bunker fuel is sold; 
Option 3: allocation to the country of the transporting company, the country of 
registration of the aircraft/vessel, or the country of the operator; 
Option 4: allocation to the country of departure or destination of the aircraft/vessel 
(including some kind of sharing of emissions between them); and 
Option 5: allocation to the country of departure or destination of the passenger/cargo 
(including some kind of sharing of emissions between them).’152 
 
However, States failed to reach a consensus on selecting the most-favoured option for 
the allocation and control of GHG emissions from international shipping. This is 
probably because countries that would have been allocated substantial amounts of 
emissions from bunker fuels would be in a disadvantageous situation in international 
trade, and these options are not feasible for domestic implementation.153 Due to the 
deadlock on the allocation issue, the UNFCCC delegated responsibility to the IMO to 
regulate the issue for shipping under Article 2(2) of its Kyoto Protocol. The mandate 
                                                 
151 These eight options are: 
‘(1) No allocation, as in the current situation. 
(2) Allocation of global bunker sales and associated emissions to Parties in proportion to their national emissions. 
(3) Allocation to Parties according to the country where the bunker fuel is sold. 
(4) Allocation to Parties according to the nationality of the transporting company, or to the country where a ship or 
aircraft is registered, or to the country of the operator. 
(5) Allocation to Parties according to the country of departure or destination of an aircraft or vessel. Alternatively, the 
emissions related to the journey of an aircraft or vessel could be shared by the country of departure and the country of 
arrival. 
(6) Allocation to Parties according to the country of departure or destination of passenger or cargo. Alternatively, the 
emissions related to the journey of passengers or cargo could be shared by the country of departure and the country of 
arrival. 
(7) Allocation to Parties according to the country of origin of passengers or owner of cargo. 
(8) Allocation to the Party of all emissions generated in its national space.’ 
Communications from Parties Included in Annex I to the Convention: Guidelines, Schedule and Process for 
Consideration, SBSTA Fourth Session, Agenda Item 5(a), Doc FCCC/SBSTA/1996/9/Add.1 (24 October 1996) p 11.  
152 Ibid 11-13; Oberthür, above n 34, 193.  




that the IMO has from Article 2(2) of the protocol not only gives the IMO such 
authority or responsibility, it also underpins the application of principles from both the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol to this GHG emissions issue.154 Meanwhile, GHG 
emissions from international shipping are neither part of national emissions nor the 
subject of the emission targets agreed in the Kyoto Protocol.155 Since then, the SBSTA 
has not discussed substantial issues with regard to the regulation of GHG emissions 
from international shipping. However, cooperation between the Secretariats of the 
UNFCCC and the IMO has been ongoing since 1998, and these two organisations 
regularly exchange information regarding the regulation of GHG emissions from 
ships.156 
 
The Geneva Ministerial Declaration adopted by the UNFCCC COP 2 in 1996 endorsed 
the newly published IPCC Second Assessment Report of 1995, and called for 
accelerating negotiations on a ‘legally-binding protocol or another legal instrument’.157 
These efforts eventually led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The Kyoto 
Protocol is the only protocol of the UNFCCC; however, its entry into force experienced 
a lengthy and painful process until 2005. Despite this, through placing quantitative 
restrictions on emissions from industrialised economies, the Kyoto Protocol has been 
regarded as the culmination of international efforts to date to address the climate change 
problem.158 Due to the contributions from the Montreal Protocol, only six types of 
unregulated GHGs were listed in the Protocol at that time. 159 Comparable with the 
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol divides its parties into two groups: Annex I and non-
Annex I, or generally developed and developing States.160 The Protocol sets legally 
                                                 
154 See ch 2, 2.5.  
155 Oberthür, above n 34, 193.  
156 Report of the Marine Environmental Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Fifth Session, MEPC 55th Session, Agenda 
Item 23, IMO Doc MEPC 55/23 (16 October 2006) para 4.28.  
157  The Geneva Ministerial Declaration, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Second Session, 
FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 (8 - 19 July 1996), item 8.   
158 D.I. Hodgkinson and R. Garner, Global Climate Change: Australian Law and Policy (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
2008) 34-64.  
159 But a seventh GHG was added to the list by the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol in 2012. See Doha 
Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, adopted 8 December 2012, Decision 1/CMP.8, C.N.718.2012.TREATIES-
XXVII.7.c (not yet in force).  
160 To date 192 parties, including Australia, China (but excluding the USA), and the European Union have either 
ratified, acceded to, approved or accepted the Protocol. See 




binding targets on the reduction of anthropogenic GHG emissions from Annex I States 
for the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012. 161  To reflect differentiated 
circumstances between the main industrial actors,162 a system of differentiated targets 
within the rolling time scale was also agreed as Annex B to the Protocol.163 Given the 
different historical and current contributions to global GHG emissions from both 
developed and developing States, these targets incorporate the CBDR principle and are 
thus acceptable for most States. 
 
The most innovative aspect of the Kyoto Protocol is its so-called ‘flexibility 
mechanisms’, which were created for Parties to achieve their targets. These market-
based mechanisms include Joint Implementation (JI), 164  the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)165 and Emissions Trading (ET).166 JI allows Annex I States to trade 
emission reduction units (ERUs) among themselves. ERUs can be obtained either by 
implementing cooperative projects to reduce GHG emissions or through establishing 
GHG sinks.167 As the only flexibility mechanism available to developing States, CDM 
enables Annex I Parties to provide for actual GHG emission reduction projects in non-
Annex I Parties, and thus receive the generated Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), 
either through financial sponsoring, or by technology transfer. In this way Annex I 
Parties can meet their emissions targets while the non-Annex I Parties will benefit from 
such projects. 168 ET generally allows Annex I Parties to purchase emissions credits 
from other Annex I Parties so as to fulfil their commitments provided that such trading 
is supplemental to their domestic actions.169 In contrast to traditional ‘command and 
control’ type regulations, the above three mechanisms are more market-based. This 
                                                 
161 Kyoto Protocol art 3(1).  
162 UNFCCC art 4(2)(a). ‘The differentiated circumstances’ here refer to the ‘differences in these Parties’ starting 
points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic 
growth, available technologies and other individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate 
contributions by each of these Parties to the global effort regarding that objective.’ 
163 See Ong, above n 112, 456.  
164 Kyoto Protocol art 6.  
165 Kyoto Protocol art 12.  
166 Kyoto Protocol art 7.  
167 Ong, above n 112, 456.  
168 Ibid 457.  




change was interpreted as a response to the shift of the US position in dealing with the 
Kyoto Protocol.170 However, from the perspective of international environmental law, 
this shift may reflect the trend of international environmental regulation. For example, 
to cope with GHG emissions from ships more effectively, extensive discussions on 
MBMs have been under way within the IMO.171 
 
3.2.2.2 Post-Kyoto Efforts and Possibilities 
 
3.2.2.2.1 International Bunker Fuels Negotiation under the AWG-LCA 
 
As noted earlier, the UNFCCC’s SBSTA was responsible for the issue of allocation and 
control of GHG emissions from international shipping before the adoption of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997. However, after the Kyoto Protocol authorised the IMO to regulate 
shipping GHG emissions, the UNFCCC did not completely rely on the IMO’s work in 
this regard. Rather, the AWG-LCA of the UNFCCC also discussed the issue of 
international bunker fuels in the context of paragraph 1b(iv) of the Bali Action Plan,172 
cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions. As seen from Table 3.1, the 
AWG-LCA was established as a subsidiary body under the Convention at COP 13 and 
CMP 3 of the UNFCCC process in 2007, working for long-term cooperative action 
under the UNFCCC. As such its work in relation to international bunker fuels, or GHG 
emissions from international shipping, did not conflict with the IMO’s work. The IMO’s 
work primarily focuses on specific technical and operational measures, whereas the 
AWG-LCA’s work essentially involves regulatory principles, the setting of reduction 
targets, climate financing, preventing competitive distortions and carbon leakage, and 
the regulatory competence of the IMO. Theoretically, the work of the AWG-LCA could 
complement the IMO’s work and possibly address some controversial issues that the 
IMO is facing, such as the regulatory principles and the IMO’s regulatory competence. 
Nevertheless, no substantial outcomes relating to GHG emissions from international 
shipping had been achieved before the AWG-LCA terminated its five-year work at the 
                                                 
170 Ong, above n 112, 456.  
171 See, eg, Ensuring No Net Incidence on Developing Countries from a Global Maritime Market-Based Mechanism, 
submmited by World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), IMO Doc. MEPC 63/5/6 (22 December 2011).  
172 Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, Doc 




Doha Climate Change Conference in 2012. 
 
The AWG-LCA organised 15 sessions from March 2008 to December 2012. 173 
Although no consensus was achieved, some of the proposals and options discussed 
under the AWG-LCA may contribute to the current discussions and negotiations within 
the IMO. Firstly, it was proposed that both the CBDR and NMFT principles could be 
applied to this GHG emissions issue but may not be treated equally. For instance, one 
option suggests that ‘[the regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping 
should be] in accordance with the principles and customary practices of the IMO, taking 
into account [the CBDR principle]’. 174 This means that the NMFT principle should 
apply, but the CBDR principle could be applied in different forms since it is only 
‘[taken] into account’ in this context. Similarly, some options suggest global levies on 
maritime bunker fuels, and propose that traffic on routes to and from Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) should be 
exempt.175 Although it is arguable that ships may change their routes to avoid more 
stringent rules, this option provides a base for similar discussions on MBM proposals 
within the IMO.176  
 
Secondly, it was suggested that the global emissions targets relating to international 
shipping be set by the UNFCCC, and this target could be 20 per cent below 2005 levels 
in 2020 on a scale consistent with the agreed two degrees objective, and this target may 
be achieved by means of MBMs.177 This proposal involves both the reduction target and 
MBMs. Since MBMs often involve emissions reduction from different sectors,178 it is 
reasonable for the UNFCCC to set this target due to the IMO’s limited capacity in other 
                                                 
173 UNFCCC, International Bunker Fuels under the AWG-LCA 
<http://unfccc.int/methods/emissions_from_intl_transport/items/6141.php> accessed 20 June 2014.  
174 Cooperative Sectoral Approaches and Sector-Specific Actions in order to Enhance the Implementation of Article 
4, Paragraph 1(c), of the Convention, AWG-LCA 14th Session (Third Part), Panama City (1-7 October 2011) Option 
2, p 5.  
175 Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention on Its Seventh 
Session, Held in Bangkok from 28 September to 9 October 2009, and Barcelona from 2 to 6 November 2009, Doc 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/14 (20 November 2009) Option 7(para 26), p 102.  
176 See ch 4, 4.3.3.2.  
177 Cooperative Sectoral Approaches and Sector-Specific Actions in order to Enhance the Implementation of Article 
4, Paragraph 1(c), of the Convention, AWG-LCA 14th Session (Third Part), Panama City (1-7 October 2011) Options 
2, 3, p 5.  






Thirdly, it was suggested that the IMO’s regulatory competence, in particular relating to 
MBMs, should be clarified by the UNFCCC. One option provides that, ‘all Parties in 
Annex I to the Convention shall pursue limitation or reduction of [GHG emissions from 
international shipping], working exclusively through the [IMO]’.179 In this case, the 
proponents attempt to exclude other competent international bodies from regulating the 
shipping GHG emissions issue by any means, including MBMs. Theoretically, it is 
controversial whether the IMO has competence in regulating MBMs, so it might be 
necessary for the UNFCCC to clarify its view on this debate.180 It may be inferred that 
these options discussed under the AWG-LCA were not adopted due to their lack of 
support from the main stakeholders. The responses from the main stakeholders of this 
issue are thus provided in the following chapters. 
 
3.2.2.2.2 Other Post-Kyoto Achievements and Their Implications on Shipping GHG 
Emissions 
 
Although the negotiation of GHG emissions from international shipping under the 
AWG-LCA was unsuccessful, the COPs and CMPs of the UNFCCC process have 
achieved outstanding outcomes and some of them may have significant implications for 
the regulation of shipping GHG emissions. After the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 
1997, as of July 2014, 19 COPs and 9 CMPs have been held. A broad range of matters 
have been discussed and various decisions made during these conferences. Table 3.1 
lists the major outcomes and contributions achieved in these conferences. Based on 
distinct missions and achievements, the development of the climate change regime 
under the post-Kyoto era can be divided into two stages. The first stage includes the 
periods from COP 4 to COP 10, during which various unresolved issues within the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol were first raised by the Buenos Aires Plan of Action 
(BAPA) and then discussed and supplemented in the subsequent COPs. The second 
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stage commenced in 2005 when the Kyoto Protocol entered into force and the ‘twin 
track’ Convention and Protocol negotiations were launched. One of the focuses of the 
work in this stage has been to establish a second commitment period by means of a new 
Protocol, an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, or a new climate change agreement after 
the first commitment period indicated in the Kyoto Protocol expired on 31 December 
2012.  
 
In the first stage, seven important issues were put forward in the Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action (BAPA) and most of them were required to be finished before COP 6 in 2000.181 
To address these matters, the Bonn Agreements adopted in COP 6 enacted the ‘core 
elements for the implementation of the BAPA’, providing specific approaches and 
requirements for such implementation.182 Nevertheless, due to the diverse interests from 
developed and developing States, the tasks set in the BAPA were not finished until COP 
10 in 2004. During this process, the Marrakesh Accords adopted in COP 7 made vital 
contributions in successfully drafting detailed rules, procedures, technical guidelines 
and work programs.183 Thus, the post-Kyoto cycle of policy-making launched by the 
BAPA was basically fulfilled with only minor matters supplemented by the subsequent 
three COPs. 184  During this stage, GHG emissions from ships were not specifically 
discussed and no outcomes achieved on this issue. 
 
In the second stage, most of the COPs and CMPs have been working along with four 
subsidiary bodies: the AWG-LCA which was launched in Bali (COP 13) in 2007 and 
terminated in Doha (COP 18) in 2012, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further 
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) which was 
established in Montreal (CMP 1) in 2005 and terminated in Doha (CMP 8) in 2012, and 
the SBSTA and SBI (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.3). As the two mechanisms worked in 
                                                 
181 The Buenos Aires Plan of Action, Decision 1/CP.4, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fourth Session, 
FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1 (25 January 1999) (‘BAPA’). These seven issues include financial mechanisms, technology 
transfer, adverse effects of climate change and implementation of response measures, activities implemented jointly, 
flexibility mechanisms, and the preparation for future COPs/CMPs. 
182 The Bonn Agreements on the Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, Decision 5/CP.6, Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on the Second Part of its Sixth Session, FCCC/CP/2001/5 (25 September 2001).  
183 See The Marrakesh Accords, Decisions 2-14/CP.7, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (21 January 2002).  




parallel, the AWG-KP worked for a second commitment for Annex B Parties of the 
Kyoto Protocol beyond the end of the first commitment period in 2012,185 while the 
AWG-LCA primarily worked for long-term cooperative action under the UNFCCC.186 
As discussed above, the SBSTA and SBI (mainly SBSTA) organised the negotiation on 
the allocation and control of GHG emissions from international shipping from 1995 to 
1996, and since 1998 the SBSTA has mainly exchanged information with the IMO on 
the regulation of shipping GHG emissions.  
 
It was not until the Bali Climate Change Conference in 2007 that the development of a 
post-2012 climate change legal framework began, although the establishment of the 
AWG-KP at the CMP 1 in 2005 launched the negotiations for the next phase of the 
Kyoto Protocol. This was not only because of the establishment of the twin-track 
negotiation process,187 but also due to the substantial contributions from the Bali Road 
Map. The Bali Road Map constitutes a set of decisions that represent the work to be 
done under various negotiating ‘tracks’. In particular, the AWG-LCA’s work on 
international bunker fuels, as discussed above, was guided by paragraph 1b(iv) of the 
Bali Action Plan, which is a part of the Bali Road Map. 
 
As seen from Table 3.1, a number of outcomes have been achieved in the climate 
change conferences following the Bali conference in 2007. Examples are the 
Copenhagen Accord,188 the Cancun Agreements,189 the Durban Package,190 the Doha 
Climate Gateway,191 and the Warsaw Outcomes.192 The outcomes listed in Table 3.1 
                                                 
185 Consideration of Commitments for Subsequent Periods for Parties Included in Annex I to the Convention under 
Article 3, Para 9 of the Kyoto Protocol, Decision 1/CMP.1, Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (2006) art 1.  
186 Bali Action Plan art 1.  
187 The twin-track negotiation process refers to the simultaneous negotiations under the COPs and CMPs of the 
UNFCCC.  
188  Copenhagen Accord, Decision 2/CP.15, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session, 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010) (‘Copenhagen Accord’).  
189 The Cancun Agreements, Decisions 1-2/CMP.6, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its Sixth Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.1 (15 March 2011); Decision 
1/CP.16, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (15 March 2011) 
(‘Cancun Agreements’).  
190 See Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventeenth Session, Held in Durban from 28 November to 11 
December 2011, Doc FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (15 March 2012); Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as 
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on Its Seventh Session, Held in Durban from 28 November to 11 
December 2011, Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add. 1 (15 March 2012).  




reflect decreased political support for the CBDR principle during global climate change 
negotiations. The Copenhagen Accord explicitly provides that combating climate 
change should be conducted in accordance with the CBDR principle,193 and asserts that 
mitigation actions will be ‘voluntary and on the basis of support’ for least developed 
countries and small island developing States.194 The Cancun Agreements require both 
developed and developing countries to exercise the communications obligation on 
measurement, reporting and verification (MRV). In particular, it even imposes greater 
burdens on developing countries than developed countries.195 The Durban Package has 
been regarded as an advance to the climate regime on the grounds that: it ended the 
uncertainty of the future of the Kyoto Protocol by extending it for a second commitment 
period, established a roadmap for adopting a post-2020 climate regime applicable to all 
and fulfilled the promise of the Cancun Agreements.196 However, the Durban Package 
decisions do not contain a reference to the CBDR principle or even ‘equity’.197 It is thus 
argued that the weakened role of the CBDR principle, in particular the interpretation of 
‘differentiation’, in the above decisions or statements represents ‘a shift towards greater 
parallelism between developed and developing countries’. 198  Or in other words, 
‘differentiated responsibility’ might be replaced by ‘symmetry’ as a guide for a future 
climate regime.199  
 
                                                                                                                                               
December 2012, Doc FCCC/CP/2012/8 (28 February 2013); Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protol on Its Eighth Session, Held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 
2012, Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13 (28 February 2013).  
192 See Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Nineteenth Session, Held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 
2013, Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10 (31 January 2014); Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on Its Ninth Session, Held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013, Doc 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2013/9 (31 January 2014).  
193 Copenhagen Accord art 1.  
194 Copenhagen Accord art 5.  
195 Rajamani, above n 113, 509, 513. In accordance with the Cancun Agreements, UNFCCC non-Annex I States are 
required to submit their national communications every four to five years, whereas Annex I States only need to do 
this every four years. Stathis Palassis, 'Climate Change and Shipping' in Robin Warner and Clive Schofield (eds), 
Climate Change and the Oceans: Gauging the Legal and Policy Currents in the Asia Pacific and Beyond (Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012) 200, 206. However, Palassis argues that the Cancun Agreements affirmed the role of 
the IMO as the appropriate international organisation regulating GHG emissions from international shipping.  
196 Lavanya Rajamani, 'The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action and the Future of the Climate Regime' (2012) 
61(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 501, 515.  
197 Ibid 507.  
198 Lavanya Rajamani, 'The Climate Regime in Evolution: The Disagreements that Survive the Cancun Agreements' 
(2011) 5(2) Carbon & Climate Law Review 136, 144.  




From an international law perspective, most of the above decisions and statements are 
soft law in nature and the CBDR principle is currently applicable to the issue of climate 
change based on the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, most developed 
countries support a broader interpretation of ‘differentiation’ rather than to simply 
abandon the CBDR principle. For example, at the Durban climate change conference in 
2011, developed countries insisted that any reference to the CBDR principle must be 
qualified with a statement that ‘this principle must be interpreted in the light of 
contemporary economic realities’. 200  This might be interpreted as meaning that the 
current Annex I countries list should be updated to suit changed economic situations. 
Based on the current Annex I countries list, some OECD countries (such as the 
Republic of Korea and Israel) and well-developed countries (Singapore as an example) 
are treated as developing countries.201 Additionally, non-Annex I States may also need 
to be sub-categorised into SIDS, LDCs, large developing countries and other developing 
countries to reflect their differing economic situations and regulatory interests.202 
 
3.2.2.2.3 The Prospect of the 2015 Global Climate Change Agreement 
 
As seen from Figure 3.3, a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol 
commenced on 1 January 2013, and a draft of a universal climate agreement is 
scheduled to be discussed in December 2014, to be adopted in the Paris climate change 
conference in December 2015, and to be implemented from 2020. 203  The new 
agreement may take the form of a protocol, ‘another legal instrument’ or ‘an agreed 
outcome with legal force’ under the UNFCCC applicable to all Parties.204 Although 
there are different views and interpretations on these forms of agreement, 205  the 
                                                 
200 Ibid 508.  
201 See ch 7, 7.4.3.1.  
202 See Rajamani, above n 196, 517-518. Due to differing situations of developing countries, Rajamani asserts that the 
differentiation between developing countries should be based on ‘self-perception’ by individual developing countries.  
203  UNFCCC, The Doha Climate Gateway (2012) 
<http://unfccc.int/key_steps/doha_climate_gateway/items/7389.php> accessed 21 June 2014.  
204 Establishment of An Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, UNFCCC Decision 
1/CP.17, Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (2011) para 2.  
205 See, eg, ‘another legal instrument’ could be an amendment under Article 15, a new or an amended annex under 
Article 16, an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, or an implementation agreement similar to a protocol; ‘an agreed 
outcome with legal force’ could be unilateral declarations by Parties, or COP decisions. Xolisa Ngwadla, Achala C. 
Abeysinghe and Adéyêmi Freitas, The 2015 Climate Agreement: Lessons from the Bali Road Map (2012) 




agreement will still be a part of the UNFCCC regime and be subject to the regulatory 
principles of the UNFCCC. For this reason, it is less likely that the IMO’s mandate and 
competence in regulating the GHG issue, including the regulatory principles and 
scope,206 would be substantially changed, although it is possible that this mandate could 
be explicitly identified or even slightly modified.207  
 
Another possibility is that no agreement under the UNFCCC will be achieved before 
2015. In this case, a number of scenarios, including the adoption of an agreement 
outside the UNFCCC, could occur. Accordingly, the IMO’s mandate to regulate the 
GHG issue, as discussed in Chapter 2, may also be significantly influenced by these 
developments. Indeed, there are many uncertainties as to the adoption of this agreement. 
For example, GHG emissions generated by China and the US account for 40 per cent of 
the world’s total GHGs.208 It is thus important for the two countries to support the 
adoption of this agreement. Nevertheless, China has declared that it will not participate 
in a legally binding climate agreement before 2020, but will agree to participate in such 
an agreement after 2020 under certain conditions.209 Accordingly, the US asserted that it 
would not participate in any climate change agreement to which other major economies, 
in particular China, were not parties.210 Additionally, some developed countries, such as 
Japan and Russia, have explicitly rejected a second commitment period under the Kyoto 
                                                 
206 See ch 2, 2.5; ch 4, 4.2. But it is possible that some of the regulatory principles embodied in the UNFCCC and its 
Kyoto Protocol, such as the CBDR principle, may be maintained but provided with new implications. On 12 February 
2014, the US released its views on a 2015 climate agreement suggesting that the CBDR principle should be 
interpreted differently during the period of post-2020 and beyond. It asserted that national efforts will be 
differentiated based on a range of factors, including ‘circumstances, level of development, mitigation opportunities, 
capabilities’, and so on, but it would not support ‘a bifurcated approach to the new agreement, particularly one based 
on groupings that may have made sense in 1992 but that are clearly not rational or workable in the post-2020 era’. 
The United States of America, U.S. Submission on Elements of the 2015 Agreement (12 February 2014) 
<https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/u.s._submission_on_elements_
of_the_2105_agreement.pdf> accessed 1 July 2014.  
207 Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol has been regarded as a bit vague in that it does not recognise the explicit 
competence of the IMO, or define the precise measures that the IMO might adopt to address the GHG emissions 
issue. Thus some shipping associations have requested the UNFCCC to address this problem. See ch 4, 4.2.  
208 Richard Balme, 'China's Climate Change Policy: Governing at the Core of Globalization' (2011) 5(1) Carbon & 
Climate Law Review 44, 50.  
209 China's Xinhua News Agency, China Sets Conditions on Binding Climate Change Commitment after 2020 (6 
December 2011) <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7667257.html> accessed 21 June 2014. During the 
Durban climate change conference in 2011, China asserted that these conditions include ‘new carbon-cutting pledges 
by rich nations in the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, a fast launch of the Green Climate Fund 
agreed on in Cancun under a supervisory regime, implementing the consensus of adaptation, technology transfer, 
transparency, capability building and other points agreed upon in the former conferences as well as appraising 
developed countries’ commitment during the first period of the Kyoto Protocol’. 





Protocol while the European Union (EU), Australia, New Zealand, Norway and 
Switzerland have expressed their willingness to take on a second commitment period.211 
As of 12 June 2014, only 11 countries, including China and Norway, have ratified the 
Doha Amendments to the Kyoto Protocol which regulates the second commitment 
period from 2013 to 2020. 212  Since non-Annex I States are still exempt from 
compulsory emissions reductions under the Doha Amendments to the Kyoto Protocol, it 
is anticipated that significant efforts and changes on the current Annex I list will be 




This chapter has examined the responses from the UN to the issue of GHG emissions 
from international shipping. Faced with the aggravating situations of climate change 
around the world, the UN made timely institutional and legal responses and these 
responses have significant implications for shipping emissions. To cope with climate 
change, the UN established a number of institutions. Among them, the IPCC underpins 
the combating of GHG emissions from shipping by means of its Assessment Reports; 
the UNEP and WMO raise awareness of the need to tackle the issue and implement 
outcomes within the international climate change regime; the UNFCCC and its COPs 
and CMPs, especially its subsidiary SBSTA and AWG-LCA, provide crucial platforms 
for different countries to negotiate on the issue of international bunker fuels. 
Furthermore, unilateral actions by individual States or the EU to reduce shipping 
emissions should be considered.  
 
The UN came to establish an international legal framework on climate change with the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol as its core element. During this process, the 1979 
CLRTAP and 1985 Vienna Convention provided a ‘framework treaty’ model for future 
international environmental agreements. The precautionary principle and the spirit of 
cooperation revealed from the Vienna Convention paved the way for future conventions. 
Additionally, three innovative approaches adopted by the 1987 Montreal Protocol 
                                                 
211 Ibid 512; Rajamani, above n 113, 504.  
212  UNFCCC, Doha Amendment (12 June 2014) 




might be particularly valuable to the issue of shipping emissions, namely, a more 
flexible arrangement, a well-designed application of the CBDR principle and gaining 
participation and investment from industry.  
 
An international climate change regime has been established and continues its 
development. In particular, the SBSTA worked on the allocation and control of GHG 
emissions from international shipping from 1995 to 1996, but failed to reach consensus 
in adopting an option on the allocation of GHG emissions. Since 1998 the SBSTA has 
exchanged information with the IMO as to the regulation of GHG emissions from ships. 
The subsequent AWG-LCA started to work on international bunker fuels under the Bali 
Action Plan in 2008. It worked on regulatory principles, the setting of reduction targets 
and the IMO’s competence. However, no substantial outcome had been achieved before 
the AWG-LCA terminated its work at the Doha Climate Change Conference in 2012. 
Currently, regulatory measures to reduce shipping GHG emissions mainly rely on the 
work of the IMO. Nevertheless, it is possible that the scheduled 2015 universal climate 
agreement, if adopted, might influence the regulation of GHG emissions from 
international shipping. In particular, the way that the CBDR principle will be 
incorporated into this agreement will have an effect on the further regulation of the 
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The previous chapters revealed that the problem of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
from international shipping is an issue with international dimensions. While a number 
of emerging principles on international environmental liability might apply to the issue, 
the UN has also made active institutional and legal responses. The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1  and its Kyoto Protocol, 2 
together with its Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), Conferences 
of Parties (COPs) and the COPs serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol 
(CMPs), have contributed to the international tackling of the issue, although the 
effectiveness of their efforts has been questioned.3  
 
As a specialised agency of the UN, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has 
recognised the problem and has acted on it based on Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol 
as well as the IMO Convention and the LOSC.4 In contrast to the efforts made within the 
international climate change regime, the IMO’s work is worthy of higher expectation 
due to the IMO’s mandate and strength in regulating GHG emission-related technical 
matters. In particular, the newly-adopted amendments of Annex VI to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) 5  and 
                                                 
1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 31 ILM 848 (entered 
into force 21 March 1994) (‘UNFCCC’).  
2 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 16 March 
1998, 37 ILM 22 (entered into force 16 February 2005) (‘Kyoto Protocol’).  
3 See, eg, Sebastian Oberthür, 'Institutional Interaction to Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International 
Transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto Protocol' (2003) 3(3) Climate Policy 191, 193. Oberthür asserts that Parties to 
the UNFCCC had wide discussions on the GHG emissions from international transport, and its SBSTA selected five 
options as the basis for further work on the allocation of emissions from aviation and marine bunker fuels in 1996, 
which failed later in reaching consensus among different States. Due to the political deadlock on the allocation issue, 
the UNFCCC had to turn to the IMO for the future regulation of the issue. But see Bernd Hackmann, 'Analysis of the 
Governance Architecture to Regulate GHG Emissions from International Shipping' (2012) 12(1) International 
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 85, 90. Hackmann purports that the work by the UNFCCC 
on the issue is still proceeding, and regulating shipping GHG emissions should fall under the scope of the Bali Action 
Plan.  
4 See ch 2, 2.5.3.  
5 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), signed 2 November 1973, 12 
ILM 1319, as amended by the 1978 Protocol to the 1973 Convention, 1341 UNTS 3, 17 ILM 546 (entered into force 
2 October 1983). To date, MARPOL 73/78 has adopted six annexes and their revisions, namely, Annex I on Oil 
(entered into force 2 October 1983); Annex II on Noxious Liquid Substances Carried in Bulk (entered into force 6 
April 1987); Annex III on Harmful Substances Carried in Packaged Form (entered into force 1 July 1992); Annex IV 
on Sewage (entered into force 27 September 2003); Annex V on Garbage (entered into force 31 December 1988); and 




guidelines by the IMO have assured the international community of progress regarding 
the adoption of energy efficiency measures. 
 
The first part of this chapter looks briefly at the establishment of the IMO, and its 
mandate and competence to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping. 
Having established the central role of the IMO in providing a solution to the problem, 
the chapter then examines and assesses the IMO GHG regime from four perspectives, 
namely, the evolution of the regime, MARPOL Annex VI and its amendments, the 
adopted technical and operational measures within the IMO and market-based measures 
(MBMs) currently under discussion.  
 
4.2 The IMO’s Mandate and Competence to Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from International Shipping 
 
To cope with the increasingly serious issues of safety at sea and marine pollution,6 the 
United Nations (UN) held a Maritime Conference in Geneva on 6 March 1948. This 
conference adopted a convention that formally established the Inter-Governmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), which subsequently changed its name to 
the IMO in May 1982.7 Article 1 of the IMO Convention outlines five purposes of the 
organisation,8 which can be broadly summarised into its jurisdiction on technical and 
                                                                                                                                               
are compulsory, whereas the other 3 annexes were adopted as voluntary annexes to MARPOL 73/78 which means 
they are only binding on those States which ratify them.  
6 G. P. Pamborides, International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 79-
80.  
7 Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, opened for signature 6 March 1948, 
289 UNTS 3 (entered into force 17 March 1958), amended and renamed as Convention on the International Maritime 
Organization, opened for signature 14 November 1975, 9 UTS 61 (entered into force 22 May 1982) (‘IMO 
Convention’). 
8 Article 1 of the IMO Convention provides that, 
‘The purposes of the Organization are: 
(a) To provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of governmental regulation and practices 
relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage and facilitate 
the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning the maritime safety, efficiency of 
navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships; and to deal with administrative and legal 
matters related to the purposes set out in this Article; 
(b) To encourage the removal of discriminatory action and unnecessary restrictions by Governments affecting 
shipping engaged in international trade so as to … 
(c) To provide for the consideration by the Organization of matters concerning unfair restrictive practices by shipping 




commercial matters relating to shipping. It appears that paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 
1 give the IMO competence to regulate commercial aspects of shipping aiming at 
removing discriminatory and ‘unfair restrictive practices’. However, due to the potential 
threat to the practice of free enterprise through the IMO’s regulation of the commercial 
aspects of shipping, many States have united to limit the purposes of the IMO to 
technical aspects.9 To date the IMO has never been allowed to exercise its full economic 
mandate. 10  Therefore, the main purpose of the IMO is ‘to encourage the general 
adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, 
efficiency of navigation and the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships’ 
primarily through technical means.11 
 
The IMO currently has 170 member States, three associate members, and 77 
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) under consultative status.12 The 
IMO’s structure has developed, reflecting its evolving mandate. 13 Initially, the IMO 
only comprised the Assembly, the Council and the Maritime Safety Committee 
(MSC). 14  Currently, the IMO consists of an Assembly, a Council and five main 
Committees: the MSC, the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), the 
Legal Committee, the Technical Co-operation Committee and the Facilitation 
Committee. Among these, the MEPC, which comprises all member States, is 
responsible for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. In 
addition, the inter-sessional meeting of the IMO’s Working Group on GHG Emissions 
from Ships (GHG-WG) was established between two MEPC sessions. These changes 
                                                                                                                                               
(d) To provide for the consideration by the Organization of any matters concerning shipping and the effect of 
shipping on the marine environment that may be referred to it by any organ or specialized agency of the United 
Nations; 
(e) To provide for the exchange of information among Governments on matters under consideration by the 
Organization.’  
9 Pamborides, above n 6, 83.  
10 Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution: the Law and Politics of International Regulation (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 75.  
11 IMO Convention art 1(a). Although the Facilitation Committee of the IMO has regulated some matters involving 
elements of trade, the purposes of these regulations are generally to be achieved by technical means. 
12  International Maritime Organization (IMO), Member States, IGOs and NGOs 
<http://www.imo.org/About/Membership/Pages/Default.aspx> accessed 24 June 2014.  
13 Tan, above n 10, 76.  
14 Lawrence Juda, 'IMCO and the Regulation of Ocean Pollution from Ships' (1977) 26(3) The International and 




indicate the growing significance of marine environmental protection and co-operation 
among various institutions.15 To accomplish its mission, the IMO makes full use of 
different instruments, namely resolutions, codes, guidelines and conventions.  
 
It was argued in Chapter 2 that the IMO’s mandate to regulate GHG emissions from 
international shipping comes from the IMO Convention, the LOSC and the Kyoto 
Protocol. While the IMO Convention and LOSC provide the IMO with general 
competence to regulate GHG emissions from ships, the Kyoto Protocol gives the IMO a 
specific mandate to regulate this matter. It was thus inferred that this interpretation 
justifies the application of both the Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) 
and No More Favourable Treatment (NMFT) principles to the regulation of GHG 
emissions from international shipping.16 Indeed another implication that can be drawn 
from this interpretation is that the IMO may not be the sole competent international 
organisation in regulating GHG emissions from ships. Currently there are three routes in 
regulating GHG emissions from international shipping within the IMO: technical 
measures, operational measures and MBMs. As discussed above, regulating technical 
and operational measures falls under the competence of the IMO based on the IMO 
Convention, and currently no other international body possesses the IMO’s technical 
expertise. In practice, the global shipping industry, including national shipping 
industries from the UNFCCC’s non-Annex I States, takes the view that the IMO is the 
only competent organisation to regulate the issue from a technical and operational 
perspective.17 Against this backdrop, technical and operational measures were regulated 
                                                 
15 For instance, the establishment of the Facilitation Committee was to harmonise shipping procedures and eliminate 
unnecessary formalities and ‘red tape’ in international shipping. Tan, above n 10, 76.  
16 See ch 2, 2.5.3. The CBDR principle requires both developed and developing States to contribute to addressing 
environmental problems, but imposes the primary responsibility on developed States due to their different historical 
contribution to the problems and the differentiated capability of developed and developing States. The NMFT 
principle refers to ‘port States enforcing applicable standards in a uniform manner to all ships in their ports, 
regardless of flag’. ø. Buhaug et al, 'Second IMO GHG Study 2009' (International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
2009) 20; see also MARPOL 73/78 art 5(4).  
17 For instance, the four Round Table members, namely the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the Baltic and 
International Maritime Council (BIMCO), the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners 
(INTERTANKO) and the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), asserted that both 
technical and operational measures and MBMs should be governed by the IMO. Future IMO Regulation regarding 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping, submitted by Denmark, Marshall Islands, BIMCO, ICS, 
INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and OCIMF, MEPC 57th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 57/4/2 (21 
December 2008) para 10; Round Table of International Shipping Associations, Round Table Associations Position 
Paper on GHG+MBMs (22 February 2012) 
<https://www.bimco.org/About/Press/Press_Releases/2012/2012_02_22_Round_Table_MBM.aspx> accessed 1 June 
2014. China’s shipping industry generally supports the IMO’s role in regulating technical and operational measures to 




by the IMO in the form of energy efficiency measures under the revised Annex VI of 
MARPOL 73/78 in July 2011. Therefore, given that the Kyoto Protocol has delegated to 
the IMO the competence to regulate this GHG issue, there is little doubt that the IMO is 
the sole competent international organisation to regulate technical and operational 
measures to reduce shipping GHG emissions.  
 
In accordance with the origin of the IMO’s mandate, it is arguable that the MBMs 
currently being discussed within the IMO could be considered as being beyond the 
competence that the IMO has received from the IMO Convention and the LOSC. This is 
because some of these measures involve global emissions reduction from different 
sectors, 18  and also go beyond the scope of technical matters relating to shipping. 
Theoretically, the mandate that the IMO has from the Kyoto Protocol also gives it the 
competence for such work. However, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol is vague in that 
it does not recognise the explicit competence of the IMO, or define the precise measures 
that the IMO might adopt to address the GHG issue. Therefore, in 2011 the 
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) called on the participants in the Durban 
Climate Change Conference to give the IMO a clear mandate to reduce emissions 
through MBMs. 19  Nevertheless, this request was not addressed by the Durban 
Conference. Consequently, it is possible that in the future in order to regulate MBMs 
involving out-of-sector emissions reduction and international trade, the IMO will 
collaborate with other international organisations, such as the UNFCCC or the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), due to their broader competence or expertise in 
international trade.20  
                                                                                                                                               
[Agreement Achieved through Reduction Negotiations and China Is to Start Its Reduction in 2019]', 21st Century 
Business Herald (Beijing), 26 July 2011 <http://stock.sohu.com/20110726/n314586469.shtml> accessed 22 June 
2014. See ch 5, 5.2, 5.4.1.  
18 The third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships grouped the MBMs 
proposals into two categories, namely ‘focus on in-sector’ and ‘in-sector and out-of-sector’. Based on this grouping, 
current MBM proposals involving out-of-sector emission reductions are the International GHG Fund, the Emissions 
Trading Scheme, the Port State Levy and the Rebate Mechanism. Report of the Third Intersessional Meeting of the 
Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 
62/5/1 (8 April 2011) annex 3.  
19 Kevin Cooper, Reducing Shipping Emissions: An Overview of Recent International Initiatives (25 September 2012) 
<http://www.safety4sea.com/analysis/89/134/reducing-shipping-emissions-> accessed 24 June 2014.  
20 In practice, some UNFCCC non-Annex I States, such as China, India, and Malaysia, doubt the competence of the 
IMO in regulating MBMs and assert that MBMs should be determined by the UNFCCC. Report of the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 22, IMO Doc MEPC 





4.3 The IMO Greenhouse Gas Emissions Regime 
 
The IMO has partially regulated GHG emissions from international shipping by means 
of negotiations and discussions within its MEPC. The conventions, codes, resolutions, 
guidelines and discussions achieved or conducted during this process constitute the 
IMO regime on the reduction of shipping GHG emissions or, in other words, the IMO 
GHG Emissions regime. This part firstly reviews the development of this regime and 
then examines Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 and its amendments—the major 
achievement of this regime to date. Then this part continues to summarise and assess the 
adopted technical and operational measures within the MEPC. Finally the theoretical 
foundation, the necessity, and the feasibility and impact assessment of MBMs are 
analysed.  
 
4.3.1 Evolution of the IMO Greenhouse Gas Emissions Regime 
 
Although discussions on GHG emissions from ships within the IMO started in the late 
1980s, it is generally accepted that the IMO’s work on this issue formally commenced 
in 1997.21 During that year, the MARPOL Conference not only adopted a protocol on 
Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 but also adopted Resolution 8 on ‘CO2 emissions from 
ships’, which requested the IMO to undertake a study on GHG emissions from ships 
and consider feasible CO2  reduction strategies. 22  Following joint efforts by several 
internationally renowned research institutes,23 a Study of GHG Emissions from Ships 
was published in 2000. 24 This study not only answered the question of why GHG 
emissions from shipping should be reduced, but it also explored how to deal with the 
issue. It canvassed the reduction potential of different technical, operational and market-
                                                 
21  International Maritime Organisation (IMO), 'Main Events in IMO's Work on Limitation and Reduction of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping' (2011) 
<http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/resources/Pages/Greenhouse%20gas%20emissions.aspx> accessed 16 September 
2012, p 3.  
22 Ibid.  
23 These institutes were from Norway and the USA, namely MARINTEK (Norway), Det Norske Veritas (Norway), 
ECON, Center for Economic Analysis (Norway), and Carnegie Mellon University (United States). Kjell Skjølsvik et 
al, 'Study of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships' (International Maritime Organization (IMO), 2000) 7.  
24 These institutes were from Norway and the United States, namely MARINTEK, Norway, Det Norske Veritas, 




based approaches, which to some extent provide a ‘road map’ for future policies within 
the IMO. In 2003, a resolution was adopted by the IMO Assembly on ‘IMO policies and 
practices related to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from ships’, urging the 
MEPC to ‘identify and develop the mechanism or mechanisms needed to achieve the 
limitation or reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping’.25 Since then, the 
MEPC has been working on this issue by means of negotiations and discussions within 
its series of session meetings, as well as in its GHG-WGs. The main events during this 
process are listed in Table 4.1. 
 
The evolution of the IMO GHG Emissions regime has been lengthy and intermittent. 
During a 14-year period from September 1997 to July 2011, no binding agreements 
regarding GHG emissions from international shipping were reached within the IMO, 
and producers of emissions were exempt from liabilities under this regime. Intensive 
discussions on this issue have only occurred since 2008. GHG emissions from 
international shipping were partially regulated by technical and operational measures in 
July 2011 for the first time, and the regulatory scope was further extended in April 
2014. Table 4.1 indicates that the IMO reiterated at least three times its role as the most 
competent international body in regulating GHG emissions from ships. This claim 
might have resulted from competitive institutional pressure from other international 
organisations such as the UNFCCC and the possibility of unilateral measures being 
adopted by individual States and the European Union (EU).26  
 
The debate on the incorporation of either the CBDR principle or the NMFT principle 
into the reduction of GHG emissions from ships has run through all of the negotiations 
and discussions within the IMO. The conflict of the two principles has delayed the 
advancement of the negotiations within the MEPC. 27  To expedite the negotiation 
process within the MEPC, the 52nd MEPC meeting adopted a two-step strategy, 
according to which the MEPC was to deal with all technical matters related to GHG 
limitations or reductions first and then resolve the politically related issues including the 
                                                 
25 IMO Policies and Practices Related to the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, IMO Assembly 
23rd Session, Agenda Item 19, IMO Doc Res A.963(23) (5 December 2003).  
26 See Oberthür, above n 3, 202-203.  




application of the CBDR or NMFT principles. 28  However, it has been difficult to 
separate the two steps. In 2008, the 57th MEPC meeting adopted nine fundamental 
principles as a basis for future regulations, although they were opposed by many 
developing countries. Principle 2 provides that the future IMO framework should be 
‘binding and equally applicable to all flag States in order to avoid evasion’,29 which 
incorporates the NMFT principle. The 58th MEPC meeting in 2008 discussed a 
proposed change to Principle 2, which was amended to read that it was, ‘binding and 
equally applicable to all ships, without this requiring States to accept similar 
regulations/standards in other fora.’30 In this case, the responsible entity shifts from flag 
States to all ships and the application of this principle is limited to either the MEPC or 
the IMO. However, the NMFT principle remained in this version and, consequently, no 
consensus was achieved. As to the proposed MBMs, the application of the CBDR or the 
NMFT principle has been the main focus of debate, which can be seen from the 
succeeding rounds of negotiations. It is concluded that the evolution of the IMO GHG 
Emissions regime is a process where various technical and operational measures and 
MBMs have been discussed and negotiated in an attempt to reach agreement between 
developed and developing countries. To date this regime is still under development. 
However, some outcomes, including the amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 






                                                 
28 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Second Session, MEPC 52nd Session, Agenda 
Item 24, IMO Doc MEPC 52/24 (18 October 2004) para 4.35.  
29 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Seventh Session, MEPC 57th Session, Agenda 
Item 21, IMO Doc MEPC 57/21 (7 April 2008) para 4.73.  
30 Identifying Consensus on IMO Principles on Addressing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping, 
submitted by Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Marshall Islands, Norway, Panama and the United States, 




Table 4.1 Main Events of IMO’s Work on GHG Emissions from International 
Shipping31 
Meetings Meeting  
Date 




Sep 1997 Resolution 8 on ‘CO2 emissions from ships’ requested the IMO to 
undertake a study on GHG emissions from ships and consider 












Urged the MEPC to develop mechanisms to tackle the GHG 
emissions issue; 
Gave priorities to establish a GHG baseline, develop a 
methodology and guidelines, and evaluate technical, operational 
and market-based solutions; called for the MEPC’s draft of a 




MEPC 52 Oct 2004 Agreed on a two-step strategy: firstly deal with technical matters, 
then politically related issues. 
MEPC 52.24 
MEPC 53 Jul 2005 Approved IMO’s ‘Interim Guidelines for Voluntary Ship CO2 
Emission Indexing for Use in Trials’, aiming to provide a 







Confirmed the leading role of the IMO in the work of the issue; 





MEPC 57 Apr 2008 Adopted nine fundamental principles as a basis for future 
regulations, incorporating the NMFT principle.  
MEPC 57/21 









Adopted revised MARPOL Annex VI (designated Emission 
Control Area for SOX and NOX);  
Made progress in developing technical and operational measures, 
including the formula, mandatory or voluntary, either the CBDR 
or NMFT principle, etc; Discussed MBMs; Agreed on the role of 
the IMO as the most competent international body in regulating 







GHG-WG 2 Mar 
2009 
Further refinement of the EEDI; Considered how to improve the 








Agreed to disseminate a package of interim and voluntary 
technical and operational measures; 
Agreed a work plan of proposed MBMs for further 
consideration—in-depth debate held; 
Presented Second IMO GHG Study 2009; Reaffirmed the role of 






  Discussed the relations between attained EEDI and required MEPC 60/22 
                                                 
31 This table is compiled by the author based on the following sources: International Maritime Organisation (IMO), 




Meetings Meeting  
Date 
Major Outcomes Base 
Documents 
MEPC 60 Mar 
2010 
EEDI; Agreed to establish an Expert Group (EG) to undertake a 








Debated on proposed amendments to MARPOL Annex VI; 
Debated on MBMs, GHG-EG submitted a study report; Agreed to 








Concluded that regarding the MBMs for international shipping, 
no incompatibility existed between IMO and other customary 










Adopted amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 for 
inclusion of energy efficiency measures; 
Adopted a work plan to include further guidelines to EEDI and 
SEEMP, remaining EEDI and SEEMP related guidelines, an 
EEDI framework for ship types, sizes and propulsion systems not 











Adopted four guidelines to assist the implementation of the 
mandatory regulations on Energy Efficiency for Ships in Annex 





MEPC 64 Oct 2012 Implementation of energy efficiency; MBMs: updated emission 









Further discussions on EEDI, particularly on US’s proposal on 
enhancing energy efficiency of ships; discussion on MBMs 
suspended; adopted Resolution on Promotion of Technical 










(1)Adopted amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 
extending the application scope of the EEDI to include an 
extra five types of ships, adding a Chapter 5 to make the IMO 
Audit Scheme mandatory; (2) Established the Working 
Group on further technical and operational measures for 
















4.3.2 Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 and its Amendments 
 
As a means of reducing shipping GHG emissions, technical and operational measures 
were examined in the report entitled Study of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships in 
2000 (the First IMO GHG Study). Based on both short-term and long-term perspectives, 
the report classified CO2 reduction potential by technical measures into two categories: 
measures for new ships and measures for existing ships.32 It identified various technical 
and operational measures and asserted that these measures have limited potential for 
reducing shipping emissions. It concluded that it might be ‘more feasible’ for the 
shipping industry to implement these measures primarily through new ship 
construction.33 The Second IMO GHG Study in 2009 emphasised the role of new ship 
construction in increasing efficiency and reducing emissions. It proposed a mandatory 
energy efficiency design index (EEDI) for new ships as an incentive to improve the 
design efficiency of these ships.34 Based on this work and on intensive discussions and 
negotiations on various technical, operational and MBMs within the IMO, the 62nd 
MEPC meeting adopted the revised Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 on 15 July 2011. This 
amendment represents ‘the first ever mandatory global [and legally binding] GHG 
reduction regime for an international industry sector.’35 Since that time, GHG emissions 
from shipping have been partially regulated. However, this amendment to Annex VI 
only regulates a package of mandatory technical and operational measures to reduce 
GHG emissions from international shipping. By adding a new Chapter 4 to Annex VI 
on the regulation of energy efficiency for ships, the amendment makes mandatory the 
EEDI for new ships and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) for all 
ships.  
 
A breakthrough on other measures including MBMs has not yet been achieved due to 
the deadlock in the negotiation of the CBDR and NMFT principles and the divergent 
                                                 
32 Skjølsvik et al, above n 23, 14.  
33 Ibid 8–9.  
34 Buhaug et al, above n 16, 1. The report concludes that if technical and operational measures are implemented 
together, ‘these measures could increase efficiency and reduce the emissions rate by 25% to 75% below the current 
levels.’  
35 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Mandatory Energy Efficiency Measures for International Shipping 
Adopted at IMO Environment Meeting (15 July 2011) <http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/42-




views on the necessity of MBMs within the IMO. The successful outcome on the 
technical and operational regulation can be attributed to the following two factors. First, 
the energy efficiency measures were included in the revised Annex VI rather than 
creating a new Annex VII to MARPOL 73/78. For this amendment to Annex VI, the 
‘tacit acceptance’ procedure applied. According to this procedure, amendments of the 
MARPOL 73/78 annexes or appendices to such annexes enter into force on a specified 
date unless a specific number of State parties object by an agreed date.36 Due to the 
technical nature of these annexes and appendices, it might be inferred that the ‘tacit 
acceptance’ procedure basically applies to technical amendments. In this case, the 
‘silence’ of a member State represents its approval and makes a formal acceptance 
unnecessary.37 This procedure, however, does not apply to either the articles of the 
convention or to the introduction of a new annex. 38 The main benefit of the ‘tacit 
acceptance’ procedure lies in the expedited entry into force of the amendments. This 
procedure partially explains why these revisions entered into force on 1 January 2013 
shortly after their adoption, despite the opposition of many developing States.39 Second, 
the voting mechanism within the MEPC accelerates the adoption of these measures. 
Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedures of the MEPC provides that decisions of the 
committee and of its subsidiary bodies are made by a majority of the members present 
and voting rather than by a consensus.40 This policy ensures that a resolution can be 
adopted by the MEPC even if some States with large owned fleets oppose it. To change 
this situation, at the 64th MEPC meeting many developing States proposed that all 
decisions of the MEPC on GHG emissions from ships should be adopted by consensus. 
However, the debate on this issue has been postponed.41  
 
                                                 
36 MARPOL 73/78 art 16.  
37 Pamborides, above n 6, 101.  
38 MARPOL 73/78 arts 16(2)(f), 16(5).  
39 See, eg, Comments on the Proposed Mandatory Energy Efficiency Regulations, submitted by China, Saudi Arabia 
and South Africa, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/10 (5 May 2011). The co-sponsors of 
this proposal, namely China, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa, opposed the adoption of the amendment because of its 
exclusion of the CBDR principle, technical uncertainty and other factors. They also opposed the inclusion of energy 
efficiency measures in MARPOL Annex VI due to the different nature of GHGs and other air pollutants. 
40 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Basic Documents Volume I (International Maritime Organization, 
2010) 113.  
41 Further Work on GHG Emissions from Ships, submitted by Brazil, China, India, Peru, Saudi Arabia and South 




The energy efficiency measures apply to all ships of 400 gross tonnage and above.42 
Due to the global financial crisis since 2009, this new regulation has imposed 
significant pressure on global shipping industries, in particular, those from developing 




1. This chapter shall apply to all ships of 400 gross tonnage and above … 
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this regulation, the Administration 
may waive the requirement for a ship of 400 gross tonnage and above from complying 
with regulation 20 and regulation 21. 
5. The provision of paragraph 4 of this regulation shall not apply to ships of 400 gross 
tonnage and above: 
(1) for which the building contract is placed on or after 1 January 2017; or 
(2) in the absence of a building contract, the keel of which is laid or which is at a 
similar stage of construction on or after 1 July 2017; or 
(3) the delivery of which is on or after 1 July 2019; or 
(4) in cases of a major conversion of a new or existing ship, as defined in regulation 
2.24, on or after 1 January 2017, and in which regulation 5.4.2 and regulation 5.4.3 of 
chapter 2 apply. [emphasis added] 
 
Regulation 19.4 and 19.5 indicate that for some States the actual commencement date of 
the EEDI might be postponed for six and a half years from 1 January 2013.43 Since the 
administration is generally the flag State of a ship,44 this regulation gives the ships from 
developing States a long lead time for their preparation and adjustment. This treatment 
is still non-differentiated between developed and developing States and thus does not 
apply the CBDR principle.45 In practice, this waiver might be used primarily by ships 
flying the flags of developing States due to the much more stringent requirements of 
developed States. Nevertheless, prior to the adoption of this amendment, Vanuatu 
submitted a proposal on possible exemptions from the EEDI requirements for ships 
trading to the least developed States and small island developing States, but it was not 
                                                 
42 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) reg 19.1. 
43 Or such ships will be exempt from complying with EEDI until 1 January 2017 based on contract date. MARPOL 
73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) reg 19.5.2.  
44 MARPOL 73/78 art 2(5).  
45 This regulation was misinterpreted by some media and scholars as solely applying to the developing countries. See, 
eg, John Vidal, Maritime Countries Agree First Ever Shipping Emissions Regulation 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/18/maritime-countries-shipping-emissions-regulation> accessed 1 
January 2012; Laura Boone, 'Reducing Air Pollution from Marine Vessels to Mitigate Arctic Warming: Is it Time to 
Target Black Carbon?' (2012) (1) Carbon & Climate Law Review 13, 18. Vidal commented that ‘China, Brazil, Saudi 




accepted at the 61st MEPC meeting.46 In this sense, this waiver clause could be deemed 
to be a compromise between developed States and developing States.  
 
According to an assessment by Lloyd’s Register and Det Norske Veritas, the impact of 
the waiver clause (Regulation 19.5) is estimated to be low on the total emission 
reduction potential. 47  This is because low compliance costs and the commercial 
disadvantages associated with non-compliance make it unattractive for flag States or 
shipowners to opt for an EEDI waiver.48 Given the situations of the States supporting 
this waiver clause, notably Brazil, China, and Saudi Arabia, the most likely level of 
waiver is only 5 per cent. 49  To assist with the implementation of the mandatory 
regulations on energy efficiency for ships in the 2011 Annex VI, the 63rd MEPC 
meeting in March 2012 adopted four important guidelines, 50  and the 65th MEPC 
meeting in May 2013 adopted a Resolution on Promotion of Technical Co-operation 
and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of 
Ships. 51  In April 2014, Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 was amended to extend the 
application scope of the EEDI to include an extra five types of ships and add a Chapter 
                                                 
46 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda 
Item 24, IMO Doc MEPC 61/24 (6 October 2010) ss 5.32–5.33. Before the meeting, Vanuatu proposed to include a 
provision in the draft regulation on an exemption for these vessels trading to least developed countries and small 
island developing states (SIDS). However, the committee did not agree with the proposal on the grounds that the 
adoption of this provision could mean that ‘the least efficient ships would serve these trades/routes indefinitely’ and 
would prejudice the benefits of developing countries due to higher transportation costs resulted as such. See also ch 6, 
6.3.2.3.  
47  Zabi Bazari and Tore Longva, 'Assessment of IMO Mandated Energy Efficiency Measures for International 
Shipping' ( IMO Doc MEPC 63/INF.2, Annex, 31 October 2011) 6–7, Appendix 1, 3.  
48 Ibid Appendix 1, 1–3. Appendix 1 of the report analyses that technology cost of compliance to EEDI will be low 
due to such factors as EEDI reference lines, ship hydrodynamic optimization, and preparation for future more 
stringent Phases 2 and 3; and an EEDI non-compliance ship is projected to suffer from certain commercial costs 
including higher ship fuel cost, cost of re-verification, second hand value, opportunity costs, and charter-ability.  
49 Ibid. According to the report, these three countries supported the waiver clause at the 62nd MEPC meeting. If the 
waiver will be taken up by these countries, as of October 2011, the current tonnage and number of ships for these 
three flags totally cover 4.6 percent of the global fleet. 
50 These four guidelines are: 2012 Guidelines on the Method of Calculation of the Attained Energy Efficiency Design 
Index (EEDI) for New Ships, Resolution MEPC.212(63), IMO Doc MEPC 63/23 Annex 8 (2 March 2012) annex 8 
(‘EEDI Calculation Guidelines’); 2012 Guidelines for the Development of a Ship Energy Efficiency Management 
Plan (SEEMP), Resolution MEPC.213(63), IMO Doc MEPC 63/23 Annex 9 (2 March 2012) annex 9 (‘SEEMP 
Guidelines’); 2012 Guidelines on Survey and Certification of the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), Resolution 
MEPC.214(63), IMO Doc MEPC 63/23/Add.1 Annex 10 (2 March 2012) annex 10 (‘EEDI Survey and Certification 
Guidelines’); Guidelines for Calculation of Reference Lines for Use with the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), 
Resolution MEPC.215(63), IMO Doc MEPC 63/23/Add.1 Annex 11 (2 March 2012) annex 11 (‘EEDI Reference 
Lines Guidelines’).  
51 Promotion of Technical Co-operation and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency 




5 to make the IMO Audit Scheme mandatory. 52  These amendments, together with 
various technical, operational measures and MBMs, are discussed in the following 
sections. 
 
4.3.3 Outcomes within the Marine Environment Protection Committee 
 
Technical, operational measures and MBMs have been widely discussed and negotiated 
within the MEPC since the adoption of Resolution 8 on ‘CO2 emissions from ships’ in 
1997. Currently, technical and operational measures are included in Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78 in the forms of the EEDI and the SEEMP requirements respectively, 
whereas MBMs are still unregulated. This section introduces the newly adopted 
technical and operational measures, followed by an assessment of their benefits and 
deficiencies.  
 
4.3.3.1 Technical Measures 
 
The EEDI is the main technical measure regulated by the revised Annex VI to MARPOL 
73/78 in 2011. The EEDI provides a specific figure representing a minimum energy 
efficiency level for certain ship types and size segments, expressed in grams of CO2 per 
ship’s capacity-mile (for example, gross tonne nautical mile). The lower EEDI indicates 
better energy efficiency of ship design. Regulations 20 and 21 divide it into attained 
EEDI and required EEDI,53 and both of them are calculated by a formula based on the 
technical design parameters for a given ship.54 Based on the formula, the attained EEDI 
should be less than or equal to the required EEDI. 55  As a ‘non-prescriptive’ and 
‘performance-based’ mechanism, the EEDI only requires a minimum energy efficiency 
                                                 
52 Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI and the NOx Technical Code 2008, IMO Doc Res MEPC.251(66) (4 April 
2014) (‘MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2014 amendments)’).  
53 Attained EEDI refers to the EEDI value achieved by an individual ship in accordance with Regulation 20 of 
Chapter 4, MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI; while required EEDI is the maximum value of attained EEDI that is allowed 
by Regulation 21 of Chapter 4 for the specific ship type and size. MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) regs 
2.36-37.  
54 The formula of required EEDI is indicated by Regulation 21 of MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI, while the formula of 
Attained EEDI is provided by its guidelines. 2012 Guidelines on the Method of Calculation of the Attained Energy 
Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for New Ships, Resolution MEPC.212(63), IMO Doc MEPC 63/23 Annex 8 (2 March 
2012) art 2.  




level.56 Provided the EEDI requirement is achieved, ship designers and shipbuilders are 
free to choose the most cost-efficient solutions for the ship to meet the regulations. The 
EEDI could provide a strong incentive for the shipping industry to improve ship fuel 
consumption with updated technical development. This approach, similar to those 
adopted in the 1987 Montreal Protocol and its amendments,57 would encourage the 
adoption of the most cost-efficient technologies by industry. Consequently, non-
compliant ships would suffer from significant opportunity costs and become less 
competitive in the international shipping market.58 Meanwhile, the EEDI is essentially a 
‘hard rule’ rather than a commercial incentive scheme. Based on the mandatory EEDI 
requirements, substandard ships might be detained, fined by port States, or even 
forbidden to trade, although the way to achieve the emissions reduction is left to the 
shipping industry.59 
 
Aside from the EEDI waiver clause under Regulation 19 of Annex VI, the EEDI does 
not apply to all ship types or to all types of propulsion systems. Under the 2011 
amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, Regulation 21 (Required EEDI) only lists 
seven types of ships, namely bulk carriers, gas carriers, tankers, container ships, general 
cargo ships, refrigerated cargo ships and combination carriers. 60  Ships with diesel-
electric propulsion, turbine propulsion and hybrid propulsion are excluded from the 
EEDI requirement.61 The exemptions for these types of ships can be mainly attributed to 
the technical difficulty of incorporating them into the EEDI formulae due to the 
complexity of their shipping emissions. Nevertheless, as the first step in reducing the 
majority of shipping emissions sources, the EEDI coverage as regulated in the 2011 
amendments to Annex VI accounts for 70 per cent of emissions from new ships.62 The 
regulated seven types of ships are essentially those designed to transport cargos, 
                                                 
56 IMO, above n 21, 12.  
57 See ch 3, 3.2.1.2.  
58  Opportunity cost is an economics term, which in this context might include the loss of future EEDI-based 
incentives. For instance, EEDI might be used for chartering, port discounts, flag registration discounts by ports, flag 
States, charters and Port States, where these non-EEDI ships are excluded from application. Bazari and Longva, 
above n 47, Appendix 1, p 3.  
59 王尔德[Wang Erde], above n 17.  
60 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) reg 21, table 1, 2.  
61 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) reg 19.3.  




representing ‘the largest and most energy intensive segments of the world merchant 
fleet’.63 Under the 2014 amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, the application 
scope of the EEDI has been extended to cover an extra five types of ships. They are 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carrier, roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) cargo ship (vehicle carrier), 
ro-ro cargo ship, ro-ro passenger ship, and cruise passenger ship having non-
conventional propulsion. 64  However, the amended Regulation 19 of Annex VI still 
exempts ships not propelled by mechanical means, platforms including Floating 
Production Storage and Offloading Facilities (FPSOs) and Floating Storage Units 
(FSUs) and drilling rigs, regardless of their forms of propulsion.65 Cargo ships having 
ice-breaking capability and most ships which have non-conventional propulsion are also 
exempted from the EEDI.66 Passenger ships other than cruise passenger ships will also 
remain unregulated by the EEDI. 
 
This step-by-step approach was utilised by the IMO to relieve strong opposition from 
developing countries and expedite the regulation progress within the MEPC. However, 
the 2011 amendments were not reached by consensus within the MEPC, which indicates 
a challenge for their future implementation.67 As a global mandatory instrument, the 
amended Annex VI requests port States to verify whether there is a valid International 
Energy Efficiency Certificate (IEE Certificate) on ships calling at their ports so as to 
monitor the compliance of ships. 68 Nevertheless, some flag States may not join the 
instrument, and the ships flying their flags may seek suitable routes to avoid the 
regulation. To facilitate the enforcement of EEDI requirements, the amendments and 
                                                 
63 Ibid 12.  
64 Res MEPC.251(66) reg 21 (‘MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2014 amendments)’).  
65 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2014 amendments) reg 19(2).  
66 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2014 amendments) reg 19(3). Regulation 19(3) of Annex VI provides that ‘[the EEDI] 
shall not apply to ships which have non-conventional propulsion, except that regulations 20 and 21 shall apply to 
cruise passenger ships having non-conventional propulsion and LNG carriers having conventional or non-
conventional propulsion, delivered on or after 1 September 2019, as defined in paragraph 43 of regulation 2. [The 
EEDI] shall not apply to cargo ships having ice-breaking capability’.  
67 Md. Saiful Karim, 'IMO Mandatory Energy Efficiency Measures for International Shipping: The First Mandatory 
Global Greenhouse Gas Reduction Instrument for an International Industry' (2011) 7(1) Macquarie Journal of 
International and Comparative Environmental Law 111, 113. See also James Harrison, 'Recent Developments and 
Continuing Challenges in the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping' (2012)  
University of Edinburgh Research Paper Series  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037038> accessed 1 June 2013, p 19.  




subsequent guidelines have provided a phased approach and an IMO commissioned 
report offers technological options. 
 
First, Regulation 21 provides four phases for the implementation of the EEDI. Phase 0 
(1 January 2013–31 December 2014) provides a two-year grace period for all ships 
regardless of their flags to be exempt from EEDI requirements. This regulation gives 
the shipping industry lead time to make necessary preparations such as technology 
research and development and staff training. This measure was initially proposed by 
China as a five-year Phase 0 and was supported by other developing States.69 Thus, it is 
actually a compromise achieved between developed States and developing States. In 
Phase 1 (1 January 2015–31 December 2019), a CO2 reduction level of 10 per cent is 
mandated, and this percentage will become higher every five years to be consistent with 
updated technological developments in efficiency and reduction measures. In Phase 3 (1 
January 2025 onwards), a 30 per cent reduction is set for most ship types calculated 
from a reference line for ships built between 2000 and 2010. 70  This schedule for 
implementation follows a step-by-step approach and provides differentiated 
requirements for different ship sizes. Generally, the EEDI requirements on ship size 
below certain capacities are lower. This arrangement meets the special demand by 
various States for trade considerations, physical port limitations and cargo logistic 
issues since not all States need large-size ships. Although, according to the economics 
theory of ‘economies of scale,’ at a given speed, the larger the ship the lower the fuel 
consumption per unit of cargo.71  
 
Second, the selection of technologies is vital for ship designers and shipbuilders to meet 
the EEDI requirements for new ships. An assessment report commissioned by the IMO 
                                                 
69 Report of the Outcome of the Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Energy Efficiency Measures for 
Ships, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/3 (7 July 2010) para 2.19.2. In Doc EE-WG 1/2, 
China argued that the reduction rate X should not be implemented immediately once the mandatory EEDI takes effect 
and that is X=0 for the first phase for five years.  
70 A reference line refers to ‘a curve representing an average index value fitted on a set of individual index values for 
a defined group of ships,’ so it represents the average efficiency for ships. The reference line was also called baseline 
but was later abandoned by the MEPC as the reference line can better reflect its purpose and function. EEDI Survey 
and Certification Guidelines art 4; IMO, above n 21, 12.  




provides 15 types of technologies for reducing the EEDI of ships in the future as shown 
in Table 4.2.72 These technologies can be classified into five groups, namely: 
 
• ship capacity enhancement; 
• hull and propeller;  
• engines, waste heat recovery and propulsion system;  
• alternative fuels; and  
• alternative sources of energy.73  
 
Compared with the seven types of technologies available for new ships as indicated in 
the First IMO GHG Study, there are currently more choices available for the shipping 
industry.74 It is projected that during Phases 0 and 1 (1 January 2013 – 31 December 
2019), hull, propeller and main engine optimisation will contribute more to EEDI 
compliance, while during Phases 2 and 3 (1 January 2020 onwards), new technologies 
and design speed reduction will be utilised more to meet the EEDI requirements.75 The 
order of these technologies does not imply any prioritisation. However, it is of ‘critical 
importance’ to ensure safe navigation under adverse conditions, while energy efficiency 
of international shipping is promoted.76 Based on this understanding, the need for a 
minimum speed is incorporated into the EEDI formula and into Regulation 21.5 of 
Annex VI, although reducing speed is generally regarded as the easiest way to improve 





                                                 
72 Bazari and Longva, above n 47, 14-15.  
73 Ibid.  
74 Skjølsvik et al, above n 23, 14.  
75 Bazari and Longva, above n 47, 15.  
76 IMO, above n 21, 34.  
77 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) regs 21.1, 21.5. Regulation 21.5 provides: 
‘For each ship to which this regulation applies, the installed propulsion power shall not be less than the propulsion 
power needed to maintain the manoeuvrability of the ship under adverse conditions as defined in the guidelines to be 




Table 4.2 Technologies for EEDI Reduction78 
No. EEDI Reduction Measures Remark 
1 Optimised hull dimensions and 
form 
Ship design for efficiency via choice of main dimensions 
(port and canal restrictions) and hull forms. 
2 Lightweight construction New lightweight ship construction material. 
3 Hull coating Use of advanced hull coatings/paints. 
4 Hull air lubrication system Air cavity via injection of air under/around the hull to 
reduce wet surface and thereby ship resistance. 
5 Optimisation of propeller-hull 
interface and flow devices 
Propeller-hull-rudder design optimisation plus relevant 
changes to ship’s aft body. 
6 Contra-rotating propeller Two propellers in series; rotating at different direction. 
7 Engine efficiency improvement De-rating, long-stroke, electronic injection, variable 
geometry turbocharging, etc. 
8 Waster heat recovery Main and auxiliary engines’ exhaust gas waste heat 
recovery and conversion to electric power. 
9 Gas fuelled (LNG) Natural gas fuel and dual fuel engines 
10 Hybrid electric power and 
propulsion concepts 
For some ships, the use of electric or hybrid would be 
more efficient. 
11 Reducing on-board power demand 
(auxiliary system and hotel loads) 
Maximum heat recovery and minimising required 
electrical loads flexible power solutions and power 
management 
12 Variable speed drive for pumps, 
fans, etc. 
Use of variable speed electric motors for control of 
rotating flow machinery leads to significant reduction in 
their energy use. 
13 Wind power (sail, wind engine, 
etc.) 
Sails, flettner rotor, kites, etc. These are considered as 
emerging technologies.  
14 Solar power Solar photovoltaic cells.  
15 Design speed reduction (new 
builds) 
Reducing design speed via choice of lower power or de-
rated engines.  
 
Thirdly, Annex VI and EEDI Survey and Certification Guidelines regulate a two-stage 
survey and verification process to ensure the smooth and uniform implementation of the 
EEDI. Based on regulations 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of MARPOL Annex VI and EEDI 
Calculation Guidelines, EEDI Survey and Certification Guidelines divide the process 
into two stages: preliminary verification at the design stage, and final verification at the 
sea trial. Their working mechanism is illustrated in Figure 4.1. At the first stage, a 
report of pre-verification will be provided by the verifier to the submitter once the 
verification is complete. At the second stage, a certificate will be issued if a ship has 
passed the certification. Through this process, verifiers of the EEDI of ships ensure that 
the ships under survey and certification comply with the EEDI requirements.79  
 
                                                 
78 Bazari and Longva, above n 47, 14-15.  
79  Verifier means ‘an Administration or organization duly authorized by it’, or in other words, flag State or 





Figure 4.1 Survey and Certification Process80 
 
4.3.3.2 Operational Measures 
 
The SEEMP is the operational measure regulated by Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. It 
constitutes the other component of the energy efficiency measures besides the EEDI. 
This plan provides a flexible mechanism for shipowners and ship operators to monitor 
ship and fleet efficiency performance over time in a cost-effective manner. The main 
objective of the plan is to minimise shipping GHG emissions by means of reducing fuel 
consumption, 81  while the Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI) is often 
utilised as a monitoring tool and to establish benchmarks related to energy efficiency of 
ships.82 Regulation 22 of Annex VI briefly regulates the SEEMP, which provides that,  
 
                                                 
80 EEDI Survey and Certification Guidelines art 4.1.1, Figure 1.  
81 Bazari and Longva, above n 47, Appendix 4, p 12.  
82 The energy efficiency operational indicator (EEOI) can be applied to almost all new and existing ships and is 
generally used to measure ships energy efficiency at each voyage or over a certain period of time. It enables ship 
operators to measure the fuel efficiency of a ship in operation and to gauge the effect of any changes in operation. 




‘Each ship shall keep on board a ship specific Ship Energy Efficiency Management 
Plan (SEEMP). This may form part of the ship’s Safety Management System (SMS).’83 
 
Based on Regulations 19.1 and 22.1 of Annex VI, the SEEMP applies to all existing and 
new ships of 400 gross tonnage and above on a mandatory basis. As a ‘ship specific’ 
plan, the SEEMP adopts a four-step approach to improve a ship’s energy efficiency, 
namely planning, implementation, monitoring, and self-evaluation and improvement. 
The SEEMP Guidelines introduce procedures and measures at each stage. In the 
planning stage, the Guidelines recognise that the specific measures for a ship to improve 
energy efficiency should be identified first, and then company-specific measures, 
human resource development and goal setting issues are to be addressed. 84  In the 
implementation stage, it is essential to establish an implementation system of the above 
identified and selected measures by drafting procedures for energy efficiency and 
defining and allocating tasks, and record-keeping should be done simultaneously.85 In 
the monitoring stage, a monitoring tool, as well as the establishment of a monitoring 
system, is to be selected.86 In particular, it recommends that the EEOI be utilised in this 
context as an internationally recognised primary monitoring tool.87 The final stage deals 
with self-evaluation and improvement, which aims to produce meaningful feedback for 
the next improvement cycle.88 Furthermore, the SEEMP incorporates best practices for 
the fuel-efficient operation of ships. 89 Similar to the EEDI Guidelines, the SEEMP 
Guidelines also highlight the importance of safe navigation.90 By introducing specific 
procedures, measures and best practices along with the four stages of the plan, the 
SEEMP urges shipowners and ship operators at each stage to consider new technologies 
and practices when seeking to optimise the energy efficiency performance of a ship. 
Additionally, the guidelines provide a reference for the classification societies and 
shipping companies to make their own SEEMPs. 
 
                                                 
83 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) reg 22.1.  
84 SEEMP Guidelines art 4.1.  
85 SEEMP Guidelines art 4.2.  
86 SEEMP Guidelines art 4.3.  
87 SEEMP Guidelines art 4.3.1.  
88 SEEMP Guidelines art 4.4.  
89 SEEMP Guidelines art 5.  




It is important for a ship to adopt specific operational measures for each voyage to meet 
the SEEMP requirements. The main SEEMP-related measures are listed in Table 4.3. 
These operational measures aim at reducing fuel consumption and CO2 emissions, and 
they can be classified into three categories.91 The first category is enhanced technical 
and operational management. This category includes measures related to enhanced 
weather routing, hull and propeller cleaning, better main and auxiliary engine 
maintenance and turning, and efficient operation of larger electrical consumers. The 
second category is enhanced logistics and fleet planning. For instance, combining 
cargoes to achieve a higher utilisation rate, optimisation of logistic chains, larger cargo 
batches, adjustments for optimised arrival times and slower steaming and changed 
contract formats between charter and shipowner. The third category is port-related 
measures. Examples include larger port capacity, quicker loading and discharging, 
flexible design of cargo handling equipment, more efficient port clearance and slot time 
allocation and fewer restrictions on ship draft, beam or length. 
 
A well-implemented SEEMP might lead to enhanced technical and operational 
management as illustrated earlier in the first category. 92  The second and third 
categories, however, are less influenced by the SEEMP since they involve many 
stakeholders, which makes their implementation rely heavily on the co-operation of 
many people and groups.  
 
                                                 
91 The information on this classification comes from the IMO Assessment Report on Energy Efficiency Measures for 
International Shipping, reprinted in Bazari and Longva, above n 47, Annex, p 15.  




Table 4.3 SEEMP Related Measures93 
 
 
4.3.3.3 Assessment of Current Technical and Operational Measures 
 
The EEDI and the SEEMP are the main technical and operational measures adopted by 
amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 in July 2011 as the first mandatory and 
legally binding energy efficiency standards.94 The adoption of these measures was a 
breakthrough in the lengthy deadlock of the political negotiations on shipping GHG 
emissions within the IMO and also confirmed the leading role of the IMO in regulating 
the issue.95 According to an IMO assessment report, the combined EEDI and SEEMP 
will lead to significant emission reductions. 96 This reduction, if valued in terms of 
annual fuel cost savings, will reach about US $50 billion in 2020 and increase to US 
$200 billion by 2030.97 Meanwhile, the cost of EEDI compliance for an ‘average ship’ 
will not be significant, although this cost will be higher in Phase 2 and 3 than in Phase 0 
and 1 due to possible investment in design-speed reduction.98 Therefore, the overall 
CO2 reduction resulting from the implementation of current technical and operational 
                                                 
93 Ibid 16.  
94 IMO, above n 35.  
95 For example, Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General said in acknowledgment of the decision of the parties to Annex 
VI of MARPOL 73/78 to adopt mandatory energy efficiency measures during the 62nd MEPC meeting, that: ‘I would 
like to congratulate you on this significant outcome reached at IMO’s MEPC 62. This underscores the fact that the 
IMO is best positioned to play a leadership role in addressing GHG emissions from international shipping. This is 
indeed very welcome progress.’ IMO, above n 21, para 99. 
96 Bazari and Longva, above n 47, 8, executive summary.  
97 Ibid.  




measures will be not only ‘positive’ but also economically sound for the shipping 
industry.  
 
Both the EEDI and the SEEMP highlight the importance of safe navigation of ships 
while also improving the energy efficiency of shipping. 99  The EEDI and SEEMP 
requirements are linked to other IMO treaties on maritime safety and security, such as 
the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREG). 100  To meet the safety requirements, a technological threshold is to be 
achieved by shipowners and ship operators. Additionally, both the EEDI and the 
SEEMP provide a strong incentive for the shipping industry to choose and update cost-
efficient technologies to meet the criteria set under the EEDI and the SEEMP. The 
shipping industry can freely choose the technologies provided that they meet the 
requirements. This ‘freedom from prescription’ approach is vital for the success of this 
mechanism on the ground that it was strongly supported by the global shipping industry 
before it was adopted by the IMO.101 Since it is almost impossible to implement these 
IMO instruments, including the technical and operational measures, without compliance 
by the shipping industry, their active participation is essential.  
 
Another example of these efforts is the negotiation on the possible approval of the 
SEEMP by flag State administrations. During the 60th and 61st MEPC meetings, many 
State delegations supported the proposal that the contents of the SEEMP should as a 
rule be examined by the administration or organisation recognised by the 
administration, 102  while other State delegations and many industry representatives 
stressed that the SEEMP should not be approved by the administration but may be 
                                                 
99 See, eg, MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) regs 21.5, 22.1; SEEMP Guidelines art 3.7.  
100 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, opened for signature 20 October 
1972, UKTS 77 (entered into force 15 July 1977) (‘COLREG’).  
101 See, eg, at the 57th MEPC meeting, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) proposed five principles for 
guiding the amendment of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, and one of them is that the ship operators should have the 
freedom to choose their compliance mechanism so as to protect the shipping industry from monopolistic situations. It 
treated the ‘freedom from prescription’ as the most effective means for stimulating future innovation. The Revision of 
MARPOL Annex VI, submitted by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), MEPC 57th Session, Agenda Item 4, 
IMO Doc MEPC 57/4/28 (13 February 2008) para 5.3. The shipping industry is the main stakeholder of regulating 
GHG emissions from international shipping, and its response to this GHG issue is examined in Chapter 5.  
102 Generally, the ‘Administration’ refers to a flag State and the ‘organisation recognised by the Administration’ refers 




audited as a part of the ship’s safety management systems.103 Eventually, it was agreed 
that approval of the SEEMP by flag State administrations would not be required. This 
result was achieved by many international shipping associations and could be deemed a 
victory for the shipping industry over the flag States. Where the SEEMP of a ship needs 
to be approved by its flag State, it will be often less efficient and more costly for the 
shipowners, whereas it may be beneficial for flag States to better manage their ships. 
Moreover, in view of the current ‘Flag of Convenience’ (FOC) problem,104 to rely on 
the examination of a ship’s SEEMP in the audit of a ship’s safety management system 
rather than on the approval of a flag State’s administration is also beneficial for the 
reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. This is because many open 
registry States often do not have enough motive and expertise to organise this 
examination of the SEEMP. 
 
Despite the benefits of these technical and operational measures, some deficiencies 
remain and impose challenges on the future implementation of these measures. 
Regarding the EEDI, it only applies to certain types of new ships; existing ships are not 
covered by the EEDI. This situation, if combined with the lenient timetable as 
introduced in the Regulation and the projected growth in international trade,105 may 
significantly reduce the effectiveness of the EEDI. Additionally, future regulation for 
the remaining types of new ships may adopt different energy efficiency standards, 
which would increase the difficulty of enforcement. With respect to MARPOL 73/78, 
implementation mainly relies on flag States and port States. The IMO sets energy 
efficiency standards itself through Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. However, the authority 
it gives to port States is limited. The added paragraph 5 of regulation 10 of Annex VI 
provides that, 
 
                                                 
103 Report of the Outcome of the Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Energy Efficiency Measures for 
Ships, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/3 (7 July 2010) para 2.24.  
104 A ‘flag of convenience’ refers to ‘the flag of any country allowing the registration of foreign-owned and foreign-
controlled vessels under conditions which for whatever the reasons, are convenient and opportune for the persons 
who are registering the vessels.’ B.A. Boczek, Flags of Convenience: An International Legal Study (Oxford 
University Press, 1962) 117.  




‘In relation to chapter 4, any port State inspection shall be limited to verifying, when 
appropriate, that there is a valid International Energy Efficiency Certificate on board, 
in accordance with article 5 of the Convention.’106 
 
This regulation is a standard phrase for port State control, but it excludes unilateral 
actions by port States in dealing with shipping GHG emissions. Nevertheless, it will be 
beneficial for the global reduction of GHG emissions from ships if some States take 
further steps in this regard. It is also believed that potential regulatory competition 
between different institutions will provide a significant motivation for the IMO to 
facilitate its work.107 An example of unilateral action is the inclusion of the emissions 
from the international aviation industry into the emission trading scheme of the EU. 
Although this initiative has been suspended due to opposition from various developed 
and developing countries, 108  it has motivated the efforts of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) in accelerating its work under the Kyoto Protocol.109  
 
The SEEMP is introduced as representing a reduction measure for existing and new 
ships. Essentially, it is a management scheme that entails no reduction requirements. 
The lack of reduction target setting and monitoring reduces the effectiveness of the 
SEEMP.110 This deficiency needs to be rectified by means of other incentives.111 An 
IMO assessment report also recommends that the EEOI should be encouraged or 
mandated as a performance indicator for the SEEMP rather than remain as a voluntary 
provision.112  
 
                                                 
106 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) reg 10.5.  
107 Sebastian Oberthür, 'The Climate Change Regime: Interactions with ICAO, IMO, and the EU Burden-Sharing 
Agreement' in Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring (eds), Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental 
Governance (The MIT Press, 2006) 53, 202.  
108 The European Union (EU) has included the emissions from the international aviation sector into its emissions 
trading scheme since 1 January 2012, which charges carbon tax to all airlines that fly in and out of the EU. This 
policy was suspended in December 2012 due to strong opposition from many countries including the United States, 
Russia, China, and India. See Elena Ares, EU ETS and Aviation (23 May 2012) <www.parliament.uk/briefing-
papers/SN05533.pdf> accessed 1 June 2013.  
109 Kyoto Protocol art 2(2).  
110 Bazari and Longva, above n 47, 7, executive summary.  
111 Ibid Annex 15. The report lists some of the drivers for more effective use of the SEEMP, including high fuel and 
carbon prices, more vigorous awareness building, and cultural change on board ships, more collaboration between 
industry stakeholders and a solution to the issue of split incentives, and effective monitoring of SEEMP 
implementation via rigorous audits and reviews.  




Another challenge comes from the future enforcement of these measures by developing 
countries that opposed the adoption of the measures. Regulation 23 of Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78 underscores the promotion of technical co-operation and transfer of 
technology, aiming to strengthen the capacity-building of developing countries. This 
mechanism, if well designed, could be regarded as a type of differentiated treatment. 
Since common responsibility and differentiated responsibility are two core elements of 
the CBDR principle, and common responsibility has been incorporated in this context 
via the NMFT principle,113 the design and implementation of the technical co-operation 
and transfer of technology elements of this mechanism might constitute the application 
of the CBDR principle. However, Regulation 23 lacks ‘concrete obligations’ on any 
State 114  and stipulates that this technical co-operation is subject to national laws, 
regulations, and policies.115 It is likely that the transfer of technology from developed 
countries to developing countries will not be straightforward due to various domestic 
regulations on intellectual property protection in developed countries.116 In developed 
countries, most energy-efficient technologies are owned by private shipping companies, 
so how to achieve the successful transfer of technologies in a cost-effective manner 
remains a difficult question.117 
 
Triggered by a proposal submitted by South Africa,118 the 65th MEPC meeting in May 
2013 adopted a MEPC Resolution on Promotion of Technical Co-operation and 
Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of Ships to 
address the criticism from developing countries. This Resolution explicitly recognises 
                                                 
113 MARPOL 73/78 art 5(4).  
114 Harrison, above n 67, 16.  
115 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) reg 23.2.  
116 Harrison, above n 67, 17.  
117 This question does not occur in the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast 
Water and Sediments (BWM Convention) adopted by the IMO in 2004, where there are similar technological 
standards. This is because the IMO was not mandated by the Kyoto Protocol to adopt the BWM Convention and 
accordingly only the NMFT principle applies to this matter instead of the CBDR principle. Therefore, Article 13 of 
the BWM Convention only stipulates technical assistance and co-operation generally rather than facilitating the 
transfer of technology from developed countries to developing countries with the recognition of the CBDR principle. 
International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments, opened for 
signature 13 February 2004, IMO Doc. BWM/CONF/36 (not yet in force).  
118 See, eg, Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, MEPC 61st Session, 
Agenda Item 24, IMO Doc MEPC 61/24 (6 October 2010) Annex 5, p 1; Amendment to Draft Compromise MEPC 
Resolution on Promotion of Technical Co-operation and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of 
Energy Efficiency of Ships, submitted by South Africa, MEPC 65th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 




both the NMFT principle and the CBDR principle,119 and requests the IMO to provide 
technical assistance and funding for developing countries. 120  According to this 
Resolution, an expert working group will be established to facilitate the transfer of 
technology for ships. 121  However, this Resolution still does not impose concrete 
obligations on any State to transfer such technology, but rather underscores respect for 
intellectual property rights.122 The protection of intellectual property rights has often 
been regarded as a formidable obstacle to the transfer of technologies, 123 which, if 
combined with the non-binding nature of a Resolution, would make the implementation 
of this Resolution by developed countries difficult. Therefore it appears that a market-
based approach to technology acquisition might be a better option for developing 
countries.124 
 
At the 66th MEPC meeting in April 2014, the IMO adopted amendments to Annex VI of 
MARPOL 73/78 which makes the IMO Audit Scheme mandatory through adding a 
Chapter 5 entitled ‘verification of compliance with the provisions of this annex’. Under 
these amendments, the IMO shall conduct periodic audits in accordance with the audit 
standard as specified in IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code)125 to verify 
compliance with and implementation of this Annex by flag States, coastal States and 
port States which have ratified the amendments. 126 The amendments would impose 
pressure on States, in particular FOC States, to exercise their obligations and 
responsibilities contained in this Annex. However, as only States which have ratified 
these amendments would be legally bound, it appears vital to encourage more States to 
ratify the amended Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78.127  
                                                 
119 Resolution MEPC.229(65) preamble paras 3-4.  
120 Resolution MEPC.229(65) art 1.  
121 Resolution MEPC.229(65) art 3.  
122 Resolution MEPC.229(65) art 4.  
123 Nitya Nanda and Nidhi Srivastava, 'Clean Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights' (2009) 9(3) 
Sustainable Development Law & Policy 42-69, at 46.  
124 This issue is further examined and a proposal is provided in Chapter 7, 7.5.1.  
125 IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code), IMO Doc Res A.1070(28) (4 December 2013).  
126 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2014 amendments) reg 25(1).  
127  IMO, Status of Conventions (25 June 2014) 
<http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx> accessed 28 June 2014. As of 25 





Figure 1 is one scenario devised by a recent IMO Assessment Study on Energy 
Efficiency Measures.128 The figure shows that based on the 2010 CO2 emissions level, 
it is almost impossible to achieve absolute emission reduction from 2010 to 2050 using 
the EEDI and SEEMP alone. This is because new emissions produced by increased 
world trade outweigh the emissions reductions achieved by these two measures. For all 
scenarios, this conclusion is the same. Therefore, in addition to technical and 
operational measures already adopted in Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, the international 
community has turned to MBMs to explore their utility in the possible reduction of 
GHG emissions from international shipping.  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Annual Emission Reduction by 2050 and New Emissions Levels 





                                                 
128 Bazari and Longva, above n 47, 8, executive summary.  




4.3.4 Market-based Measures 
 
MBMs, which are also referred to as market-based instruments or market-based 
mechanisms, are generally regarded as an important supplement to the technical and 
operational measures already in place in reducing GHG emissions from international 
shipping. In accordance with the polluter-pays principle, MBMs aim to provide the 
polluters (shipowners and ship operators) with an economic incentive to reduce their 
GHG emissions.130 As a comparatively new concept in the shipping context, MBMs 
have been controversial since they were formally put forward in the First IMO GHG 
Study in 2000. The IMO has endeavoured to promote the awareness of stakeholders in 
applying MBMs. The Scientific Study on International Shipping and Market-Based 
Instruments (Scientific Study) was published in December 2009 as a follow up to the 
2000 GHG study commissioned by the IMO. 131  In August 2010, another IMO-
commissioned report undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact 
Assessment of Possible Market-based Measures (Expert Group) was released, the Full 
Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact 
Assessment of Possible Market-based Measures (Feasibility Study and Impact 
Assessment Report). 132  Currently a report commissioned by the IMO on possible 
impacts on consumers and industries in developing countries is under way. Through this 
work, most countries have come to accept MBMs. Seven main types of proposals have 
been submitted to the IMO for discussion, although some countries still oppose the 
adoption of any MBM. 133 The following sections explore the necessity of adopting 
MBMs and then provide a feasibility and impact assessment of current MBM options.  
 
4.3.4.1 The Necessity of Market-based Measures in Reducing Shipping GHG Emissions 
 
                                                 
130 Harilaos N. Psaraftis, 'Market-Based Measures for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships: A Review' (2012) 11(2) 
WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 211, 213.  
131 Scientific Study on International Shipping and Market-based Instruments, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 4, 
IMO Doc MEPC 60/INF.21 (15 January 2010).  
132 Full Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment of Possible 
Market-based Measures, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/INF.2 (13 August 2010).  
133 See, eg, Uncertainties and Problems in Market-based Measures, submitted by China and India, MEPC 61st 
Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/24 (5 August 2010); Market-based Measures--Inequitable Burden on 





The emergence of MBMs has been interpreted in economics as an approach to 
overcome the problem of environmental externalities.134 MBMs are one of the main 
types of environmental policies,135 and they have been employed by many countries to 
regulate adverse environmental impacts resulting from anthropogenic activities. As 
defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
 
‘[MBMs] seek to address the market failure of ‘environmental externalities’ either by 
incorporating the external cost of production or consumption activities through taxes or 
charges on processes or products, or by creating property rights and facilitating the 
establishment of a proxy market for the use of environmental services.’136 
 
MBMs can be classified into three groups, namely, environmental fees (contribution), 
tradable permit (allowance) schemes and liability rules.137 There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
MBM. In practice, different MBMs provide solutions for different problems, and some 
issues might need a mix of two or three types of MBMs.  
 
MBMs can be designed to internalise the external cost of GHG emissions from 
international shipping by means of a GHG fund or different emission trading schemes. 
However, the first step is to decide whether MBMs are needed for the reduction of 
GHG emissions from international shipping. It is a difficult question. Many developing 
countries, in particular China, India, and Brazil, oppose the adoption of any MBMs. 
Their argument has mainly been underpinned by three reasons. Firstly, they assert that 
there are uncertainties associated with MBMs. Examples are the uncertainties of the 
carbon market, the calculation of the emissions from international shipping, the impact 
of a carbon tax on ships on the export industry and the future development of the 
shipping industry and world trade.138 Secondly, there are fundamental inadequacies both 
                                                 
134 Environmental externalities ‘refer to the economic concept of uncompensated environmental effects of production 
and consumption that affect consumer utility and enterprise cost outside the market mechanism.’ OECD, 
Environmental Externalities (4 March 2003) <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=824> accessed 1 June 
2013.  
135  Environmental policies are often classified as command and control, market-based, education, provision of 
information, and voluntary measures. Thomas Dietz and Paul C. Stern, 'Exploring New Tools for Environmental 
Protection' in Thomas Dietz and Paul C. Stern (eds), New Tools for Environmental Protection: Education, 
Information, and Voluntary Measures (National Academies Press, 2002) 4.  
136 OECD, Market-based Instruments (23 July 2007) <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7214> accessed 1 
July 2014.  
137 Scientific Study on International Shipping and Market-based Instruments, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 4, 
IMO Doc MEPC 60/INF.21 (15 January 2010) annex, 14.  




in theory and in principle relating to MBMs. Developing States argue that the 
implementation of current MBM proposals requires several prerequisites so as to avert 
the distortion of competition, such as the same or similar level of economic and 
technological development realised among all participating countries, some 
convergence of political power and the deployment of a common central institution.139  
 
Thirdly, they also assert that the NMFT principle incorporated in the majority of current 
MBM proposals ignores historical responsibility and is a disadvantage for developing 
countries.140 Moreover, some of the proposed MBMs are regarded by some developing 
countries as being likely to violate WTO rules.141 For instance, the MBM on Port State 
Levy proposed by Jamaica envisages levying a globally uniform emissions charge on all 
vessels calling at their respective ports, based on the amount of pollution produced by 
the vessel during the voyage (see Table 4.4). This proposal measures the amount of 
pollution by the amount of fuel consumed, which may not be accurate due to different 
ship types and operational methods. In this case, it actually leads to differentiated 
treatment of different ships, which might contravene the general most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) treatment as incorporated in Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade.142  
 
In contrast to developing countries, most developed countries and NGOs are in favour 
of certain types of MBMs, although they disagree on what type of MBM is best. The 
reason is simple: the current EEDI and SEEMP are not sufficient for effective reduction 
of GHG emissions from international shipping due to the projected growth of 
                                                                                                                                               
Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/24 (5 August 2010) p 2.  
139 Ibid 3.  
140 Ibid; Market-based Measures--Inequitable Burden on Developing Countries, submitted by India, MEPC 61st 
Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/19 (2 August 2010) p 3. 
141 See, eg, Possible Incompatibility between the WTO Rules and Market-based Measures for International Shipping, 
submitted by India and Saudi Arabia, MEPC 64th Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 64/5/3 (29 June 2012).  
142 Ibid para 25. General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, opened for signature 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 194 (in 
force provisionally since 1 January 1948 under the 1947 Protocol of Application, 55 UNTS 308) (‘GATT’). According 
to Article I of the GATT, the general most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment requires WTO Members to accord the 
most favourable tariff and regulatory treatment that is granted to the product of any Member at the time of import or 
export of ‘like’ products to all other WTO Members immediately and unconditionally. The MFN treatment is a part of 
the non-discrimination principle. See World Trade Organization's Views on Document MEPC 64/5/4 Submitted by 
India and Saudi Arabia, note by the Secretary-General, MEPC 65th Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 




international seaborne trade. Thus, specific types of MBMs are needed to supplement 
the energy-efficiency measures. 
 
As intensive discussions on MBMs have been held within the IMO, it is anticipated that 
a form of MBM will be adopted in the near future by the IMO or other international 
institutions to reduce emissions from ships.143 First, as discussed earlier, in practice it is 
not possible to achieve absolute emissions reduction using EEDI and SEEMP alone, 
which has been proven by a number of scenario modellings, revealed in many 
assessment reports.144 Moreover, the EEDI and SEEMP regulations only entered into 
force on 1 January 2013, so in practice compliance with these regulations by various 
States and their emissions reduction potential cannot be identified in the short term. The 
shipping industry has recognised the deficiencies of these measures and work on their 
improvement has been conducted within the IMO. However, given the intricacies of 
ship types and shipping features, a technical breakthrough is hardly likely to be 
achieved soon. Currently, global emissions are ‘considerably higher’ than the level 
consistent with the two degree Celsius target in 2020, and this trend continues.145 In 
these circumstances, it is necessary for the international shipping industry to explore the 
possibility of adopting MBMs for more GHG reduction rather than waiting for the 
effects of applying energy-efficiency measures to be identified.  
 
Second, it is technically possible to incorporate the CBDR principle into a future MBM, 
and proposals applying the principle have been submitted to the IMO by different 
countries and NGOs.146 As shown in the comments by some developing countries, the 
core debate within the MEPC lies in the ignorance of the CBDR principle reflected in 
                                                 
143 Other international institutions may include the UNFCCC, the EU or the WTO. See ch 4, 4.2; ch 7, 7.5.5.  
144 Bazari and Longva, above n 47, 8, executive summary. 
145 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 'The Emissions Gap Report 2012: A UNEP Synthesis Report' 
(November 2012) <http://www.unep.org/pdf/2012gapreport.pdf> accessed 1 June 2013, p 1, executive summary.  
146 For example, the WWF suggested that a MBM that is both global and differentiated was possible to develop 
incorporating both the CBDR and the NMFT principles simultaneously, and it also put forward a specific revenue 
allocation scheme for different countries. Benefits and Possible Adverse Impacts of Market-based Instruments, 
submitted by World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), MEPC 58th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4/39 (15 
August 2008). This approach was also adopted by the Scientific Study on International Shipping and Market-based 
Instruments, a study led by the University of Cambridge in partnership with Cambridge Econometrics, MARINTEK, 
Manchester Metropolitan University, and Deutsches Zentrum fΰr Luft-und Raumfahrt e.V. Scientific Study on 
International Shipping and Market-based Instruments, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 




many MBM proposals. Once this problem is resolved, it may be possible to adopt 
MBMs that are accepted by most countries. It seems that any MBM proposal that 
ignores the CBDR principle would not be feasible on the ground that the CBDR 
principle in the shipping context has been supported by ‘the majority of delegations’ 
within the MEPC.147 In recent years, some international shipping organisations, as well 
as the shipowners’ associations in States listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC, have also 
come to accept the incorporation of the CBDR principle into a proposed MBM.148  
 
The possible adoption of MBMs could reduce shipping GHG emissions in two respects: 
in-sector reduction and out-of-sector reduction.149 In the first case, a MBM may provide 
an economic incentive (for example, a charge on fuel, a refund to ‘good performance 
ships’150) for the shipping industry to reduce its fuel consumption. The industry might 
invest in more fuel efficient ships or technologies or operate ships in a more energy-
efficient manner. In the second case, the money collected from a MBM could be utilised 
to reduce GHG emissions outside the marine sector. In this way, growing shipping 
emissions could be offset by emission reduction in other sectors. 
 
4.3.4.2 The Feasibility and Impact Assessment of Market-based Measure Options 
 
                                                 
147 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (16 October 
2008) para 4.45.  
148 See, eg, at the 59th MEPC meeting, the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) proposed three principles 
for tackling GHG emissions from ships, namely the NMFT principle, the principle of high quality, multiple benefit 
carbon mitigation investment, and the CBDR principle. It further explained that a framework established by the IMO 
on combating climate change should respect both the NMFT principle and the CBDR principle. Consideration of 
Adoption of Three Principles for Market-based Instruments, submitted by Cruise Lines International Association 
(CLIA), MEPC 59th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/32 (8 May 2009) para 1. Another example is 
from Australian Shipowners Association (ASA). In a proposal drafted by the ASA and some of other shipowners 
association, the ASA supported a ‘cap-and-trade’ emission-trading scheme for shipping and recognized that the 
CBDR principle ‘may also need to be reflected’ in this scheme. Australian Shipowners Association et al, A Global 
Cap-and-Trade System to Reduce Carbon Emissions from International Shipping (2009) <http://www.asa.com.au/wp-
content/uploads/Joint-Industry-ETS-Discussion-PapervFINAL1.pdf> accessed 1 June 2013.  
149  International Maritime Organisation (IMO), Market-based Measures 
<http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Market-Based-Measures.aspx> 
accessed 1 June 2013.  
150 ‘Good performance ships’ refer to ships that operate in a fuel-efficient manner. Good performance ships are 
rewarded in different ways under different MBM proposals. For example, the leveraged incentive scheme proposed 
by Japan in 2010 required all ships to pay contributions based on the marine bunker that they purchase, but a part of 
the GHG contributions is refunded to ships labelled as ‘good performance ships’ in order to produce incentives for 
efficiency improvement. The 2012 SEEMP Guidelines provides guidance on best practices for fuel-efficient operation 
of ships. See Consideration of A Market-Based Mechanism: Leveraged Incentive Scheme to Improve the Energy 
Efficiency of Ships Based on the International GHG Fund, submitted by Japan, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 4, 




In order to adopt MBMs for the reduction of GHG emissions from international 
shipping, it is important to know what choices exist and the impacts that they may have 
on the shipping industry and different countries, in particular, developing countries. 
Based on these analyses, the selection and adoption of a suitable MBM is possible. 
Currently, there are seven types of MBM proposals being discussed and debated within 
the IMO. A brief introduction of these proposals is provided in Table 4.4. At the third 
GHG-WG meeting in 2011, intensive debate on the grouping of these proposals was 
held to simplify future assessments and facilitate the decision-making process of the 
MEPC. It was concluded that MBM proposals should be grouped into two categories, 
the first focused on in-sector reduction and the second focused on in-sector and out-of-
sector reduction, as indicated in Table 4.4.151 This grouping is based on the areas in 
which the reduction of GHG emissions from ships will mainly take place and has 
received many comments on their strengths and weaknesses from different 
delegations.152 This section divides these MBM options into three groups. They are 
environmental fee-related MBM proposals, tradable permit scheme-related MBM 











                                                 
151 Report of the Third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, 
MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/1 (8 April 2011) para 3.39. 
152 Ibid para 3.40-3.46; see also Grouping and Evaluation of Proposed MBMs, submitted by Greece, Intersessional 
Meeting of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd Session, Agenda Item 3, IMO Doc GHG-WG 3/3 
(24 February 2011); The Evaluation on the Relative Strengths and Weaknesses of the Reduction Mechanisms 
Employed by the MBM Proposals, submitted by the Republic of Korea, Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group 






























Establishes a global reduction target for 
international shipping, set by either the 
UNFCCC or the IMO. Emissions above the 
target line would be offset largely by 
purchasing approved emission reduction 
credits. The offsetting activities would be 
financed by a contribution paid by ships on 
every tonne of bunker fuel purchased 














Establishes a speed-related GHG or 
compensation fund to include regulated slow 
steaming in the design and impact assessment 
of any MBM proposals. It set average target 
speeds for different types and sizes of ships 
in order to meet the agreed emissions 
reduction target set by the IMO for an MBM. 
Additional speed levy or contribution would 
be payable for ships having higher average 
speeds. Revenues could be used to purchase 
offsets. 



















Levies a uniform emissions charge on all 
vessels calling at their respective ports based 
on the amount of fuel consumed by the 
respective vessel on its voyage to that port. 
The CBDR principle could be achieved 
through a self-administered fund and/or some 
international mechanism (Grouping: ‘Focus 




















All new ships, except for those that meet pre-
set EEDI thresholds and existing ships, are 
required to make payment contributions 
based on the amount of the bunker fuel 
consumed/purchased and the degree to which 
the ship’s efficiency falls short of a specific 
standard. Funds collected go to an 
International GHG Fund for further 















Subjects all ships to mandatory energy-
efficiency standards. As one means of 
complying with the standard, an efficiency 
credit trading program would be established. 
These standards would become more 






                                                 
153 This table was compiled by the author based on the following sources: IMO, above n 21; Report of the Third 
Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, MEPC 62nd Session, 
Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/1 (8 April 2011) annex 2. The IMO suspended its discussion on MBM 

























(later added as co-
sponsor, Germany) 
Sets a sector-wide cap on net emissions from 
international shipping. A number of 
allowances (ship emission units) 
corresponding to the cap would be released 
into the market each year via a global 
















Differs from the Norwegian ETS proposal in 
two respects: the method of allocating 
emissions allowances (national instead of 
global auctioning) and the approach for 
setting the emissions cap (set with a long-
term declining trajectory). 
 
France 
Sets out additional details on auction design 
under a shipping ETS. In all other respects, 
the proposal is similar to the Norwegian ETS 
proposal. 










The imposition of any costs should be 
proportionate to the contribution by 
international shipping to global carbon 
dioxide emissions. The reduction will apply 
to individual ships and not member states, 
and developing states will not be faced with a 
penalty upon trade and development 




















Compensate developing countries for the 
financial impact of an MBM. It could be 
either applied to any maritime MBM that 
generates revenue (add-on option) or 
integrated with the International Maritime 
Emission Reduction Scheme (integrated 
option) (Grouping: ‘Focus on In-Sector’ and 
‘In-Sector & Out-of-Sector’ (add-on); In-








4.3.4.2.1 Environmental Fee-Related Market-Based Measure Proposals 
 
The GHG Fund, Port State Levy and Penalty on Trade and Development are types of 
environmental fee-related MBM proposals. They provide the polluter with an incentive 
to reduce GHG emissions in order to pay lower fees. Among the three proposals, the 
GHG Fund has received the most attention. The Scientific Study on International 
Shipping and Market-Based Instruments asserts that all emissions covered by the GHG 
Fund will raise revenue for a central governing body, and the amount depends on the 
carbon price per tonne of CO2 and on the amount of emissions.154 The higher carbon 
                                                 
154 Scientific Study on International Shipping and Market-based Instruments, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 4, 




price generally indicates more reduction of CO2 emissions.155 In this case, the carbon 
price, or the ‘contribution,’ is actually a levy on fuels since it needs to be imposed on 
ships if these MBMs apply. 156 In this way, the shipping GHG emissions could be 
reduced, and the revenues raised could be utilised to either compensate developing 
countries or reduce out-of-sector emissions through purchasing ‘offsets.’ Nevertheless, 
the utilisation of revenues for reducing out-of-sector GHG emissions does not indicate 
that in-sector emission reduction is less significant. Rather, the in-sector reduction can 
be achieved through the collection of a contribution or levy.157 This proposal seems 
feasible and easy to implement since shipowners generally respond to prices quickly.158 
The main concern about this proposal lies in its dealing with revenue and how the 
special conditions of developing countries are taken into account. There might be 
another concern about the increased cost, including the extra administrative burden, 
associated with the GHG Fund proposal. The Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment 
Report, undertaken by the Expert Group and commissioned by the IMO, provides a 
comprehensive assessment of proposed MBMs. This report reveals that the increased 
cost for the GHG Fund is the second lowest among the current MBM proposals.159  
 
The Port State Levy proposed by Jamaica levies a uniform emissions charge on all 
vessels calling at ports, based on the amount of fuel consumed by the vessels on their 
voyage to that port. This option can be easily implemented and is consistent with the 
polluter-pays principle due to its inclusion of all emissions produced by the ship during 
that journey. However, as mentioned earlier, this option might neither be accurate nor 
fair for all ships since it measures the ship’s actual emissions solely by the fuels that 
have been consumed. This measurement ignores other pertinent parameters such as 
different types of ships and the location of ships (at ports or in other maritime zones) 
and, thus, is not conducted in a ‘cost-effective’ manner.160 Meanwhile, since port States 
                                                 
155 Ibid.  
156 Psaraftis, above n 130, 223.  
157 Ibid.  
158 Ibid 225.  
159 Full Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment of Possible 
Market-based Measures, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/INF.2 (13 August 2010) pp14–16. 
Based on this report, the MBM on Penalty on Trade and Development proposed by the Bahamas has the lowest 
increased cost. 




play a crucial role in the enforcement of this MBM, it is important to ensure that all port 
States collaborate in implementing it, including those that choose not to participate in 
the system and those that lack proper monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 161 
Otherwise, some ships may opt for routes through ports that lack monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms to avoid the levy. This may lead to competitive distortion, 
distortion in trade flows and a ‘non-level playing field’ among shipping companies and 
ports. Additionally, under this scheme, the increased cost option is estimated to be the 
highest among the seven types of MBM proposals.162 At the 64th MEPC meeting in 
2012, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) announced that its preferred MBM 
is a levy or compensation fund-based scheme which relates to the actual fuel 
consumption of individual ships in service.163 This preference has also been followed by 
the shipping industries in some countries such as Greece and Korea.164  
 
The Penalty on Trade and Development proposed by the Bahamas aims to reduce 
shipping GHG emissions through the imposition of a penalty (cost) and insists that such 
costs should be proportionate to the GHG emissions from international shipping. It 
seeks to collect emission statistics from either the EEOI or ship funnels using a suitable 
sensor. According to the proposal, the ship is required to submit data to its flag State or 
recognised organisation for annual verification. No extra cost would be generated under 
this scheme. However, the EEOI is not available for all types of ships, and, currently, 
EEOI baselines are also impossible to establish.165 The application of this proposal to 
the GHG issue will not be feasible if this problem cannot be resolved.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd Session, Agenda Item 3, IMO Doc GHG-WG 3/3 (24 February 2011) para 44.  
161 Psaraftis, above n 130, 222.  
162 Full Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment of Possible 
Market-based Measures, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/INF.2 (13 August 2010) p 14.  
163 Operational Energy Efficiency of New and Existing Ships, submitted by the International Chamber of Shipping 
(ICS), MEPC 64th Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 64/5/11 (27 July 2012) para 11.  
164 Union of Greek Shipowners, Prevention of Environmental Pollution by Ships: Regulation and Compensation 
Regimes and Industry Standards (2011) <http://www.nee.gr/default.asp?t=anakoinoseisDetails&id=13> accessed 1 
June 2013, p 29; George A. Gratsos, Green and More Profitable Shipping (13 November 2012) 
<http://www.nee.gr/downloads/183NEWSFRONT%20NAFTILIAKI%2013-11-12.pdf> accessed 1 June 2013; Sang-
Yoon Lee and Young-Tae Chang, 'Shipping Companies' Awareness and Preparedness for Greenhouse Gas 
Regulations: A Korean Case' in Theo Notteboom (ed), Current Issues in Shipping, Ports and Logistics (2011) 25, 44.  




4.3.4.2.2 Tradable Permit Scheme-Related Market-Based Measure Proposals 
 
The three types of global emissions trading systems (ETS) for international shipping 
submitted by Norway, the United Kingdom and France are tradable permit scheme-
related MBM proposals. The ETS mechanism was first regulated by the Kyoto Protocol 
and is utilised in the EU. The EU ETS scheme has applied since 1 January 2005 as the 
world’s largest company-level ‘cap-and-trade’ system. As of 14 November 2012, all 27 
EU member states and three other European countries have participated in the 
scheme. 166  There are only minor differences between the three ETS proposals for 
international shipping. Compared with the Norwegian ETS, the proposal by the United 
Kingdom has a different method of allocating emissions allowances and a different 
approach to setting the emissions cap, while the French proposal provides details on 
auction design. The main strength in relation to these ETSs lies in their higher certainty 
of CO2 reduction. Although no international ETS has been implemented, a regional EU 
ETS might provide a ‘prototype’ from which international shipping can learn.167  
 
There are significant challenges in implementing these ETS proposals. First, significant 
carbon leakage and distortion of competition risks exist under the proposals. Carbon 
leakage generally refers to differentiated carbon policies and their subsequent impacts 
on GHG emissions.168 Since carbon leakage might hinder the success of a global GHG 
emissions reduction and thus distort global competition, it is important for the ETS to be 
applied to the international transportation sector, including international aviation, rather 
than solely to the shipping industry or even part of the shipping industry. 169  The 
Norwegian ETS provides two exemptions from applying the scheme, namely ships 
below certain sizes and ships on international voyages to Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS). 170  The design of the voyage exemption was to meet the needs of 
                                                 
166 These three states are Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. European Commission, Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS) <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm> accessed 1 June 2013.  
167 Psaraftis, above n 130, 223.  
168 Larry Parker and John Blodgett, '"Carbon Leakage" and Trade: Issues and Approaches' (19 December 2008) 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40100.pdf> accessed 1 June 2013.  
169 Jodie Moffat, 'Arranging Deckchairs on the Titanic: Climate Change, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and International 
Shipping' (2010) 24(2) Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal 104, 121.  
170 A Further Outline of A Global Emission Trading System (ETS) for International Shipping, submitted by Norway, 




developing countries, even though it is a common practice within the IMO regime to set 
a threshold for ship size. However, this proposal may also make it possible for some 
shipowners or ship operators to opt for certain ship sizes or certain shipping routes 
through the SIDS in order to obtain emission exemptions. In this case, competition will 
be distorted, and the reduction goal may also be difficult to achieve. Second, compared 
with the GHG Fund proposal, an ETS incurs much higher administrative costs to track, 
monitor and enforce as well as to avoid evasion and fraud. Third, the current 
development of the EU ETS provides more uncertainty for the future development of an 
ETS for international shipping. As discussed earlier, the inclusion of the emissions from 
the international aviation industry into the EU ETS was suspended in December 2012, 
which, to some extent, makes the ETS less attractive for the shipping industry. 
International shipping organisations are generally opposed to an ETS, whereas the 
shipping associations in some of the Annex I States to the UNFCCC support it.171  
 
4.3.4.2.3 Hybrid Market-Based Measure Proposals 
 
The Efficiency Incentive Scheme, Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading and Rebate 
Mechanism belong to the category of hybrid MBM proposals. The Efficiency Incentive 
Scheme and Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading can be regarded as hybrid MBMs with 
the EEDI as a benchmark, whereas the Rebate Mechanism is a hybrid MBM that can be 
built into any other MBM. One common feature between the Efficiency Incentive 
Scheme and Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading is that they both reward good 
performance ships, and the EEDI is used for measurement. However, it is the EEDI that 
makes the two hybrid MBM proposals less attractive. Two factors contribute to this 
argument. First, low EEDI indicates high energy efficiency, whereas a ship with a low 
EEDI does not necessarily mean that it has the lowest GHG emissions.172 Its emissions 
might be more than those from a ship with a larger engine (high EEDI), which the 
smaller ship needs to maintain certain speed to ensure safety in bad weather.173 In this 
                                                 
171 See, eg, the Round Table of International Shipping Associations, which opposed any emission trading system 
(ETS) in that it would be ‘unworkable’ for the shipping industry. Round Table of International Shipping Associations, 
above n 17. The national shipowners associations in Australia, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
released a discussion paper in 2009 supporting a global cap-and-trade ETS to reduce GHG emissions from 
international shipping. Australian Shipowners Association et al, above n 148. See ch 5, 5.2-5.3.  
172 Psaraftis, above n 130, 222.  




case, the EEDI measurement does not work well. Second, the two hybrid MBM 
proposals, if adopted, will apply to both new ships and existing ships, whereas the EEDI 
adopted by Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 applies only to new ships.174 There has been 
no research indicating the possible application of the EEDI to existing ships. After 
testing and verification, the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners 
(INTERCARGO) asserts that the EEDI ‘does not apply to, and hence it cannot and 
should not be used for, existing ships.’175 Therefore, the adoption of these hybrid MBM 
proposals is not straightforward.  
 
The Rebate Mechanism consists of two options: an add-on option by integrating with 
any revenue-raising MBM and an integrated option incorporated with the International 
Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme, which is a levy-on-fuel scheme. The main 
feature of this hybrid MBM is its compatibility with the CBDR principle. Under the 
add-on option, all ships pay for their emissions. However, a developing country obtains 
an annual rebate based on its share of global seaborne imports first, and then the 
remaining revenue from developed countries will be disbursed through the UNFCCC. 
In this way, the ‘no net incidence’ on developing countries can be ensured.176 In other 
words, developing countries will not suffer any loss, but they will benefit from 
participating in the Rebate Mechanism. The first draft of the legal text for the Rebate 
Mechanism was submitted to the 64th MEPC meeting by the World Wide Fund for 
Nature in October 2012. It stipulates that ‘[e]ach Party not included in annex II of the 
UNFCCC, or any successor annex, shall be eligible to an apportioned rebate [from a 
potential MBM Convention].’177 It further provides that this rebate could be foregone as 
its contribution to international co-operation.178 This proposed regulation would expand 
the scope of the beneficiaries of this scheme from SIDS and least developed countries as 
proposed by some countries to all non-Annex II States to the UNFCCC. It is expected 
                                                 
174 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) regs 20–21.  
175 Application of the EEDI to Existing Ships, submitted by INTERCARGO, MEPC 63rd Session, Agenda Item 5, 
IMO Doc MEPC 63/5/12 (6 January 2012) summary.  
176  Ensuring No Net Incidence on Developing Countries from A Global Maritime Market-Based Mechanism, 
submitted by World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), MEPC 63rd Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 63/5/6 (22 
December 2011). 
177 Draft Legal Text on Uses of Financing Generated from A Maritime MBM, submitted by the World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF), MEPC 64th Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 64/5/10 (27 July 2012) Annex, art 4(1). 




that this mechanism will be attractive for developing countries due to its incorporation 
of the CBDR principle. Compared with other proposals, this proposal better reflects the 
interests of both developing countries and developed countries. Nevertheless, if the add-
on option is built into any other MBM proposal, such as a GHG Fund or ETS, the 
administrative costs will probably be higher due to the possible increased number of 
administrative bodies. Therefore, it will be challenging to control these costs. 
Furthermore, there is another concern about whether the available data are accurate and 




The purpose of this chapter is to identify the IMO’s response to the issue of GHG 
emissions from international shipping. As a specialised agency of the UN, the IMO 
received its mandate for regulating shipping GHG emissions from the Kyoto Protocol. 
Meanwhile, the IMO Convention and the LOSC also provided the IMO with 
competence in this area. These competences make it possible for the IMO to apply both 
the CBDR and NMFT principles in addressing GHG emissions from ships. It is also 
arguable that the IMO has an exclusive role in regulating technical and operational 
measures and a non-exclusive role in regulating MBMs.  
 
To accomplish its mandate for regulating GHG emissions from international shipping, 
the IMO has been working on this issue since the adoption of Resolution 8 and Annex 
VI to MARPOL 73/78 in 1997. The main achievements by the IMO in this regard 
include amendments to Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78 adopted in 2011 and 2014, as well 
as various guidelines, codes and resolutions. The amendments to Annex VI make the 
EEDI mandatory for new ships, and the SEEMP for all ships. The EEDI is the most 
important technical measure that aims at promoting the use of energy-efficient 
equipment and engines, whereas the SEEMP is an operational measure with the purpose 
of improving the energy efficiency of ship operations. The energy efficiency measures, 
including the EEDI and SEEMP, serve as the first legally binding standards tackling 
shipping GHG emissions. They maintain a balance between safe navigation and energy 
efficiency. Furthermore, these regulations ensure significant emissions reduction and 




technologies. However, the limited EEDI coverage and the lack of an SEEMP reduction 
target need to be addressed. In particular, the lack of full incorporation of the CBDR 
principle makes the future enforcement of these regulations questionable particularly for 
developing country fleets. 
 
In furtherance of reducing GHG emissions from ships, the IMO has organised various 
discussions and negotiations on potential MBMs. Of the current seven types of MBMs 
proposed to the IMO, each of them has its advantages and disadvantages. Generally, the 
GHG Fund has low administrative costs and has been welcomed by most of the 
shipping industry, whereas the Rebate Mechanism serves as the only MBM that 
effectively incorporates the CBDR principle. An ETS, as a widely discussed option, is 
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The regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping is a complex process in 
which different State and non-State actors advance their own interests either politically 
or commercially. This can be seen from the debate within the IMO on the issue. The 
response from the shipping industry is critical in incorporating its sectoral interest into 
the IMO’s regulation. The representatives from the shipping industry, in particular the 
shipping industry associations that have consultative status with the IMO as Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs), have influenced the direction of policy-making by 
contributing to the debate in the IMO. Voluntary or even mandatory instruments by the 
IMO can never be implemented effectively without compliance by the shipping 
industry. 1  Thus, in order to find an effective solution for the reduction of GHG 
emissions from ships, an analysis of the views from the shipping industry is 
indispensable.  
 
The shipping industry may be grouped into different subcategories based on differing 
criteria. According to the purpose of shipping, it consists of a cruise sector and a cargo 
sector.2 The cruise sector provides passenger and ferry services while the cargo sector 
transports cargo through designated sea routes. The shipping industry can also be 
categorised into bulk shipping and liner shipping based on the goods that are 
transported.3 The bulk sector, which includes wet/liquid bulk and dry bulk, transports 
raw materials such as crude oil and other petroleum products or iron ore and coal. 
Whereas the liner sector mainly engages in small shipments of general commercial 
freight and it transits regular routes on fixed schedules. Regulation 21 of Annex VI to 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) 
lists 12 types of ships to be regulated by the EEDI.4 These categories cover the majority 
of the international shipping industry, although the implementation of these ships is 
                                                 
1 Costas Giziakis and Anastasia Christodoulou, 'Environmental Awareness and Practice concerning Maritime Air 
Emissions: the Case of the Greek Shipping Industry' (2012) 39(3) Maritime Policy & Management 353, 354.  
2  Costas T. Grammenos and Chong Ju Choi, 'The Greek Shipping Industry: Regulatory Change and Evolving 
Organizational Forms' (1999) 29(1) International Studies of Management & Organization 34, 38.  
3 H.E. Haralambides, 'Structure and Operations in the Liner Shipping Industry' in David A. Hensher and Kenneth J. 
Button (eds), Handbook of Transport Modelling (Elsevier Ltd, 2007) 607, 607.  
4 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), signed 2 November 1973, 12 
ILM 1319, as amended by the 1978 Protocol to the 1973 Convention, 1341 UNTS 3, 17 ILM 546 (entered into force 




phased depending on specific ship types.5 In accordance with different stakeholders of 
shipping, the shipping industry constitutes six sectors: ship design, shipbuilding, ship 
insurance, cargo owner, bunker supplier and classification societies. The response from 
these sectors is analysed in this chapter. 
 
The origin of the modern shipping industry can be traced back to the year 1787 when 
steamships emerged. With the development of information and communications 
technologies (ICT) and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the shipping industry 
grew exponentially to facilitate faster trade between Europe and Asia. To address the 
‘unsustainable predatory competition’ associated with this process, 6 cartels or ‘liner 
conferences’ and various shipping associations were established. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping is primarily 
regulated by the IMO. The main approach adopted by the global shipping industry to 
participating in the regulatory process is to submit their written proposals to the IMO 
and attend its discussions. This work can mainly be achieved by shipping NGOs. 
 
This chapter has three major parts. The first part examines the response from 
international and regional shipping organisations by summarising and analysing the 
documents submitted by them to the IMO as well as their reports obtained from other 
sources. The organisations examined include those representing ship designers, 
shipbuilders, shipowners and ship operators, cargo owners, ship insurers, the 
classification societies and the bunker suppliers. The second part assesses the response 
from the shipping industry in UNFCCC Annex I States with Australia, Greece and the 
United Kingdom as examples. The third part explores the response from the shipping 
industry in UNFCCC non-Annex I States with China, Republic of Korea and India as 
examples. It is generally less feasible for the shipping industry in individual States, in 
particular those from non-Annex I States, to submit proposals directly to the IMO. 
Therefore, the methodology adopted in the second and third parts combines the report 
assessment and the surveys of shipping companies that have been prepared by other 
institutions or individuals.  
                                                 
5 Ibid Table 1.  





5.2 Response from International and Regional Shipping Organisations 
 
This part examines the views and actions of the global shipping NGOs on the issue of 
GHG emissions from international shipping. It analyses six types of stakeholders: ship 
designers and shipbuilders, shipowners and ship operators, cargo owners, ship insurers, 
classification societies, and bunker suppliers. The issues that these international or 
regional shipping organisations have responded to include: 
 
• whether the reduction of GHG emissions from ships is necessary; 
• views and practice on proposed technical and operational measures; 
• views and practice on proposed market-based measures (MBMs); and 
• views and practice on other issues in relation to the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. 
 
5.2.1Ship Designers and Shipbuilders 
 
Ship design and shipbuilding play an important role in the maritime sector because they 
influence the supply of various types of ships. The price of shipbuilding is an important 
factor based on which the shipowner makes investment decisions and shipyards win 
orders.7 Meanwhile, the cost of shipbuilding is determined by many factors, including 
ship design options, market demand and shipyard capacity. 8 The reduction of GHG 
emissions from ships will generally increase the cost of shipbuilding in that the Energy 
Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) requires the adoption of new technologies. 9 
Theoretically speaking, ship designers and shipbuilders do not need to be concerned 
about the cost of ship designing and shipbuilding since the shipowners bear the cost. 
However, the increased cost might challenge the market competitiveness of their 
products and thus influence the number of orders that they receive. Another concern 
will be whether their technological capability can meet the GHG emissions reduction 
requirements. 
 
                                                 
7 Liping Jiang and Jørgen T. Lauridsen, 'Price Formation of Dry Bulk Carriers in the Chinese Shipbuilding Industry' 
(2012) 39(3) Maritime Policy & Management 339, 339. Generally a high freight rate spurs shipowners to order new 
ships. A positive market expectation boosts the price of shipbuilding, and vice versa.  
8 Ibid 340.  




The International Paint and Printing Ink Council (IPPIC) is the only NGO focusing on 
ship design. It has achieved consultative status within the IMO and has submitted a 
proposal to the IMO. The Community of European Shipyards’ Associations (CESA) is 
the main regional shipping NGO representing the interests of shipbuilders within the 
IMO. The Tripartite Working Group of shipyard operators, shipowners and 
classification societies (Tripartite Working Group) was formed in 2007 to pool 
resources, share knowledge and make joint proposals for achieving reductions for new 
ship building.10 Since CESA is also a member of the Tripartite Working Group, the 
views from this Group also reflect those from the shipbuilding sector. As an influential 
shipbuilders’ association, the Japan, Europe, China, Korea and USA Shipbuilders’ 
Association (JECKU), in particular its Committee for Expertise of Shipbuilding 
Specifics (CESS), also participates in discussion on GHG emissions from ships. 
However, it has not obtained consultative status within the IMO and has not submitted 
any proposal to the organisation. 
 
Ship designers and shipbuilders generally welcome the reduction of GHG emissions 
from ships. At the 57th Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) meeting in 
2008, the Tripartite Working Group was formed and a consensus was reached that the 
shipping industry should contribute to the reduction of shipping GHG emissions. To 
achieve this goal the Group noted that, ‘a broad, inclusive and goal-based approach’ 
should be adopted to facilitate this process.11 At the 58th MEPC meeting, the CESA, on 
behalf of European shipbuilders and ship repairers, welcomed the efforts made by the 
IMO and asserted that ‘a convincing and effective approach towards reduction of the 
specific CO2 emissions from international maritime transport is urgently needed’.12 In 
2010 the IPPIC commented that it is important to control GHG emissions from ships 
since the shipping industry must ensure that ‘its operations are as efficient as 
                                                 
10 A Cross-industry Goal-based Approach to Reduction of GHG Emissions from New Ships, submitted by the ICS, 
BIMCO, CESA, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and OCIMF, MEPC 57th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 
57/4/8 (23 January 2008) para 3. The members of the Tripartite Working Group include the CESA, International 
Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), International Association of 
Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) 
and Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF).  
11 Ibid para 4.  
12  Development of a CO2 Design Index for New Ships, submitted by the Community of European Shipyards' 




possible’. 13  At the 18th JECKU Top Executive Meeting in 2009, the chairman 
welcomed the efforts of the IMO in reducing GHG emissions from ships and asserted 
that this ‘can only be secured’ through the shipbuilding industry around the world.14 It 
is clear that ship designers and shipbuilders recognise the importance of reducing GHG 
emissions from ships and are ready to contribute to this work. 
 
The CESA actively participated in the debate and trial application of the draft EEDI 
regarding the adoption of proposed technical and operational measures by the IMO. The 
development of its views can be divided into three stages. The period from the 57th 
MEPC meeting to the 58th MEPC meeting (March-October 2008) belongs to the first 
stage. During this period, the CESA acknowledged that technical innovation would be 
useful for the reduction of GHG emissions from ships, but stressed that ‘operational 
measures have an even higher reduction potential compared to the available options at 
new building stage’.15 It insisted that ‘effective measures should focus on existing ships 
firstly and the experience gained should be used for the development of measures for 
new ships that will come into operation in the future’.16 As for the proposed new ship 
design CO2 index, the CESA considered it ‘inappropriate and premature’ to be utilised 
‘in a prescriptive way’. 17 It can be deduced that in this stage the CESA was more 
interested in operational measures (Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan 
(SEEMP)) than technical measures (EEDI), and preferred voluntary measures to 
mandatory measures. This preference is consistent with its own interests. The SEEMP 
relates to the operational measures which are mainly utilised by ship operators, while 
the EEDI relates to the technical measures on new ships which require shipbuilders to 
invest more on research and development (R&D), in particular, the upgrading of 
technology so as to meet the EEDI requirements. The cost of shipbuilding might not 
                                                 
13 The Importance of Using Effective Anti-fouling Coatings in relation to Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Shipping, 
submitted by the International Paint and Printing Ink Council (IPPIC), MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc 
MEPC 60/4/21 (15 January 2010) para 7.  
14  JECKU, Chairman's Note (18th JECKU Top Executive Meeting October 29, 2009, Berlin) 
<http://www.sajn.or.jp/e/press/Press_Berlin_TEM.pdf> accessed 8 April 2013.  
15  Development of a CO2 Design Index for New Ships, submitted by the Community of European Shipyards' 
Association (CESA), MEPC 58th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4/12 (1 August 2008) para 1.  
16 Ibid para 2.  




increase at least in the short term if the IMO relies more on operational measures rather 
than technical measures or considers proposed EEDI requirements to be voluntary.  
 
The period from the second GHG-WG meeting to the 59th MEPC meeting (March-July 
2009) constitutes the second stage. During this stage the CESA came to accept the 
concept of EEDI but asserted that this concept was not technically mature. It undertook 
a trial application of the draft EEDI and found shortcomings with the proposed baseline. 
New vessels, especially in short sea shipping, may have to reduce their speed under a 
mandatory EEDI regime incorporated with the proposed baseline. Nevertheless, older 
vessels may be in service much longer than they should be since they are not subject to 
the speed limitation.18 To address this problem, the CESA put forward a three-stage 
phase-in approach to implementing the EEDI at the 59th MEPC meeting.19 That is to 
start with standard ship types, such as large carriers, tankers and container vessels of 
more than 20,000 mt dwt. Then develop the indexes for vessels smaller than 20,000 mt 
dwt. Finally it will develop indexes for the more complex ship types. These proposals 
by CESA pointed out the deficiencies that existed in the proposed draft EEDI. Its 
proposals were later adopted by the IMO. The period after MEPC 59 (2009-2014) 
belongs to the third stage. In this stage the CESA has worked on a new reference line to 
include other types of ships, such as the ro-ro cargo and ro-ro passenger ship types into 
the EEDI framework, and facilitated the implementation of the adopted Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78. In particular, at the 62nd MEPC meeting in 2011, the CESA lodged a 
statement to the MEPC to highlight the significance of protecting intellectual property 
rights during the course of the transfer of technology. It asserted that advanced 
emissions reduction technology is the key to environmental protection and 
competitiveness of the shipbuilding industry, which demands a high level of intellectual 
property right protection.20 In other words, the EEDI technology in shipbuilding has to 
be legally protected from any possible free utilisation. This view reveals the complexity 
                                                 
18 CO2 Reduction Requires Efficient Instruments Based on Sound Technical Solutions, submitted by the Community 
of European Shipyards' Association (CESA), Intersessional Meeting of the Greenhouse Gas Working Group 2nd 
Session, Agenda Item 2, IMO Doc GHG-WG 2/2/22 (6 February 2009) Annex 1, para 25-26.  
19 Phase-in Implementation of the Energy Efficiency Design Index for Standard and Complex Ship Types, submitted 
by the Community of European Shipyards' Associations (CESA), MEPC 59th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc 
MEPC 59/4/38 (20 May 2009) para 10.  
20 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Second Session, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda 




of the transfer of technology as regulated under Regulation 23(2) of Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78. It appears that the regulation on technology transfer needs to be more 
specific and improved to build sufficient capacity for developing countries to comply 
with the EEDI.21  
 
The IPPIC asserted that it is economically and technologically impractical to apply 
these technologies to the existing fleet. It proposed the use of anti-fouling 
coatings/paints to prevent additional GHG emissions from shipping on the ground that 
this is an economically and environmentally better method.22 The application of anti-
fouling paints to immersed areas of ships can prevent the colonisation and growth of 
marine organisms such as algae, tubeworms and barnacles. It has been proved that a 
ship not applying an anti-fouling system to its hull may require up to 70 per cent extra 
propulsion power when compared to those which apply this paint. 23 This approach, 
however, has not aroused much attention within the IMO since anti-fouling paints 
themselves may not be an independent measure. It can be regarded as a type of EEDI 
technology.24  
 
The Committee for Expertise of Shipbuilding Specifics (CESS) is a JECKU committee. 
It supports the adoption of the EEDI and promises that the shipbuilding industry will 
work closely with shipowners and classification societies to ensure the smooth 
implementation of the scheme. 25  Meanwhile, it also underscores the importance of 
intellectual property protection as an essential element of technology development in 
this regard.26 This view is consistent with that of the CESA as discussed above. 
 
                                                 
21 A proposed solution to address this transfer of technology problem is provided in Chapter 7. See ch 7, 7.5.1. 
22 The Importance of Using Effective Anti-fouling Coatings in relation to Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Shipping, 
submitted by the International Paint and Printing Ink Council (IPPIC), MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc 
MEPC 60/4/21 (15 January 2010) paras 7, 13.  
23 Ibid para 11.  
24 See ch 4, 4.3.3.1, Table 4.2.  
25  JECKU, CESS 2012 Press Release (23 August 2012) <http://www.sajn.or.jp/e/press/CESS_AM2012_en,pdf> 
accessed 8 April 2013.  
26  JECKU, CESS Annual Meeting 2009 Press Release (2 September 2009) 




The CESA believes that the EEDI cannot achieve any short-term reduction of GHG 
emissions because it only applies to new ships. Instead, the CESA regards  MBMs as a 
‘more effective solution’ to address the GHG emissions issue,27 and ‘strongly proposes’ 
the implementation of MBMs for ships engaging in voyages in the short sea shipping 
sector.28 Due to its specialisation in shipbuilding, however, the CESA has not provided 
its comments on specific MBMs. 
 
It is concluded that at the international and regional level ship designers and 
shipbuilders support the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. They 
believe that the SEEMP will be more effective than the EEDI. However, they have 
come to accept the concept of EEDI. They assert that the deficiencies in the current 
EEDI should be addressed and they have conducted research and trial application to 
improve the EEDI. Although the European shipbuilders’ association has highlighted the 
importance of MBMs in tackling the GHG issue, a wider Japan, Europe, China, Korea 
and USA Shipbuilders’ Association, in which some UNFCCC non-Annex I States are 
members, has stressed the function of technical and operational measures and has 
ignored the MBMs in this regard. The above response from ship designers and 
shipbuilders generally supports the IMO’s regulatory initiatives. However, the fact that 
these organisations are dominated by UNFCCC Annex I States makes the above 
conclusions less reliable. Figure 5.1 demonstrates the change in the shipbuilding 
sector’s global share of shipbuilding between the Far East and the rest of the world from 
1964 to 2008. Since the Far East surpassed Western Europe in 1966, the percentage of 
the Far East in the world’s shipbuilding deliveries has been growing. Currently the Far 
East accounts for more than 90 per cent of the global market in shipbuilding. 29 
However, no international or regional shipping NGOs from the Far East have achieved 
                                                 
27 Phase-in Implementation of the Energy Efficiency Design Index for Standard and Complex Ship Types, submitted 
by the Community of European Shipyards' Associations (CESA), MEPC 59th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc 
MEPC 59/4/38 (20 May 2009) para 3.  
28  Comments related to Trial Calculations of the EEDI for Subgroups of Ro-ro Cargo Ships, submitted by 
INTERFERRY and CESA, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/48 (29 January 2010) para 22.  
29  Lloyd's Register, World Shipbuilding Deliveries (11 October 2010) 
<http://shipbuildinghistory.com/today/statistics/world.htm> accessed 21 January 2013. However, European countries 
and the US still largely dominate other important sectors of the shipping industry, such as ship brokering, ship 
financing, maritime arbitration, insurance and claims, as well as global shipping pricing. See, eg, Suranjana Roy 
Bhattacharya, 'Chinese Shipping Industry Is Big but Not Powful', Gulf News 19 July 2010 
<http://gulfnews.com/business/opinion/chinese-shipping-industry-is-big-but-not-powerful-1.656076> accessed 1 




consultative or observer status at the IMO.30 Consequently, their views have not been 
expressed in international fora. This situation does not match the contribution made by 
this region to the global shipping industry. To compensate for the lack of the voice from 
the region on the issue, the response from the shipbuilding industry in China and the 
Republic of Korea, two main countries of the Far East, is examined in the third part of 
this chapter.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 World Shipbuilding Deliveries 
(Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping’s “World Fleet Statistics”)31 
Note: Far East countries and regions mainly include Japan, Republic of Korea, China and Chinese Taipei. 
 
5.2.2 Shipowners and Ship Operators 
 
Shipowners refer to ‘individuals, companies and state-owned enterprises which own, 
manage and operate the commercial shipping fleets of the world’.32 This means that a 
shipowner may also be a ship operator, which constitutes one of the reasons why they 
are both discussed in this section. The shipowner is the ship’s registered legal owner 
                                                 
30 Article A(IV) of the IMO Guidelines for the Granting of Consultative Status provides that consultative status shall 
only be granted to NGOs which are truly international. In practice the CESA, as a regional shipping organisation, has 
been granted a consultative status at the IMO. International Maritime Organization (IMO), Basic Documents Volume I 
(International Maritime Organization, 2010) 165.  
31 Lloyd's Register, above n 29.  
32 Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution: the Law and Politics of International Regulation (Cambridge 




which appears in the registry of one country. 33 However, the real shipowner is not 
always the same as the one that appears in the registry. This is because some of the true 
beneficial owners want to conceal their identity to avoid their exposure to liability. The 
secrecy surrounding ship ownership should not influence the burden of responsibility 
for the possible transboundary harm resulting from the GHG emissions from ships. Ship 
operators usually include ship managers and charterers, and they are often regarded as 
polluters who should be held responsible for employing the services of substandard 
vessels.34 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the polluter-pays principle applies to the reduction of GHG 
emissions from international shipping. The polluter may include the flag State, ship 
owners and operators, or in some cases, individuals. Among them, shipowners and ship 
operators, in particular the shipowners, are treated as the primary polluters in the 
shipping sector.35 The flag States, however, tend to transfer the costs of environmental 
compliance to the shipping industry. 36  Against this backdrop, shipowners and ship 
operators are key stakeholders in the reduction of GHG emissions from ships, so their 
responses warrant examination.  
 
Currently the interests of shipowners are mainly represented by the Round Table of 
International Shipping Associations (Round Table) within the MEPC. The four member 
organisations of the Round Table are the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)/the 
International Shipping Federation (ISF),37 the Baltic and International Maritime Council 
(BIMCO), the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners 
(INTERTANKO), and the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners 
(INTERCARGO). The ICS is the principal international trade association for the 
shipping industry, representing all sectors and trades. Its membership constitutes 47 
national shipowners’ associations from more than 30 countries, whose member shipping 
                                                 
33 Ibid.  
34 G. P. Pamborides, International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 
145.  
35 Tan, above n 32, 36.  
36 Ibid.  





companies operate two thirds of the world’s merchant tonnage. Although the ICS is 
dominated by members from developed countries, 38  developing countries, such as 
China, India and Cyprus, also have influence within the organisation. As the largest 
private shipping organisation in the world, BIMCO controls around 65 per cent of the 
world’s shipping tonnage, and has members in more than 120 countries, including 
shipowners, operators, managers, brokers, agents, the Protection and Indemnity (P&I) 
Clubs and other commercial actors. 39  INTERTANKO represents the interests of 
independent tanker owners and operators of oil and chemical tankers, namely non-oil 
companies and non-State controlled tanker owners. It controls 80 per cent of the world’s 
tanker fleet and the vast majority of tanker owners are members. 40 INTERCARGO 
mainly advocates the interests of the bulk carrier owners in the international dry bulk 
trades, such as coal, grain, iron ore and other commodities.41 
 
In addition to BIMCO and INTERTANKO that include ship operators as their 
members, there are a number of global associations of ship operators which have 
consultative status at IMO. Examples are Cruise Lines International Association 
(CLIA), INTERFERRY, the World Shipping Council (WSC), the Society of 
International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO) and the International 
Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA). These ship operator associations, together with 
global shipowner associations, have taken an active part in the discussions and debate 
within the IMO on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. This section also 
canvasses the views of other regional shipowners associations which do not have 
consultative status at the IMO, such as the Asian Shipowners Forum (ASF).42  
 
At the 57th MEPC meeting in 2008, the four Round Table members (ICS, BIMCO, 
INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO), co-sponsored by other countries and 
                                                 
38 Tan, above n 32, 37.  
39 BIMCO, About BIMCO <https://www.bimco.org/About/About_BIMCO.aspx> accessed 22 January 2013.  
40 INTERTANKO, About Us <http://www.intertanko.com/About-Us/> accessed 22 January 2013.  
41 INTERCARGO, About INTERCARGO <http://www.intercargo.org/about/78-about-intercargo.html> accessed 22 
January 2013.  
42 The ASF was founded in April 1992 and consists of eight members from the shipowners’ associations of Asia 
Pacific nations, namely Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Chinese Taipei and the Federation of 
ASEAN Shipowners’ Associations (FASA), consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 




organisations, submitted a proposal to the IMO to support the reduction of GHG 
emissions from international shipping and encourage the IMO to take earlier action. 
Additionally, they put forward nine fundamental principles as a base for future 
discussions on reducing GHG emissions.43 Meanwhile, ICS proclaimed that it would be 
‘fully committed to the adopting of stringent and effective regulations’ for the reduction 
of shipping emissions. 44  In the next year, INTERTANKO asserted that it would 
‘strongly support’ the IMO’s efforts in regulating GHG emissions from ships.45 The 
IPTA also expressed its support for the EEDI concept.46 A ship operator or shipowner 
generally can save money by using substandard ships.47 So, at first sight the natural 
inclination of shipowners and ship operators would be to oppose the reduction of GHG 
emissions from ships. However, this cutting of costs gained from the utilisation of 
substandard ships can only be maintained on a short-term basis since the introduction of 
more stringent regulations will be enforced by either flag States or port States, which 
eventually will narrow their profit margin.48 In this sense, the reduction of shipping 
GHG emissions will be to the benefit of the shipping industry as a whole from a long-
term perspective, and thus ‘provide a common basis for fair competition in a free 
                                                 
43 Future IMO Regulation regarding Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping, submitted by Denmark, 
Marshall Islands, BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and OCIMF, MEPC 57th Session, Agenda Item 4, 
IMO Doc MEPC 57/4/2 (21 December 2008) para 11. The nine principles are: 
‘(1) effective in contributing to the reduction of total global greenhouse gas emissions; 
(2) binding and equally applicable to all flag States in order to avoid evasion; 
(3) cost-effective; 
(4) able to limit – or at least – effectively minimize competitive distortion; 
(5) based on sustainable environmental development without penalizing global trade and growth; 
(6) based on a global-based approach and not prescribe specific methods; 
(7) supportive of promoting and facilitating technical innovation and R&D in the entire shipping sector; 
(8) accommodating to leading technologies in the field of energy efficiency; and 
(9) practical, transparent, fraud free and easy to administer.’ 
44 The Revision of MARPOL Annex VI, submitted by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), MEPC 57th 
Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 57/4/28 (13 February 2008) para 3.  
45 Comments on MEPC 59/4/8 and MEPC 59/4/9 relating to the Energy Efficiency Design Index, the Ship Energy 
Management Plan and Possible Market-based Instruments, submitted by INTERTANKO, MEPC 59th Session, 
Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/43 (22 May 2009) para 2.  
46 Introduction of A Cubic Capacity Correction Factor into the EEDI Formula, submitted by the International Parcel 
Tankers Association (IPTA), MEPC 62th Session, Agenda Item 6, IMO Doc MEPC 62/6/13 (5 May 2011) para 12.  
47 Pamborides, above n 34, 139-140.  




market’.49 Therefore, it is not surprising that shipowners and ship operators welcome 
the IMO’s regulatory efforts in reducing GHG emissions from international shipping.  
 
Various global shipowners and ship operators associations made prompt responses to 
the technical and operational measures before and after the adoption of the EEDI and 
SEEMP by the IMO in July 2011. The response from these organisations mainly 
focused on regulatory principles, methodologies, application scope and other technical 
aspects of the proposed measures. They are examined in the following paragraphs.  
 
At the 57th MEPC meeting, the ICS proposed five principles to guide the amendment of 
Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. One of them is that ship operators should have freedom 
to choose their compliance mechanism, namely they should be allowed to adopt 
appropriate technologies they select, so as to protect the shipping industry from 
monopolistic situations. 50  It regarded this ‘freedom from prescription’ as the most 
effective means for stimulating future innovation but also asserted that there is a need to 
specify performance criteria for exhaust gas monitoring and measuring equipment to be 
carried by ships. 51  This principle is generally positive for the development of the 
shipping industry since it provides significant encouragement for technological 
innovation by the shipowners and ship operators. However, performance criteria should 
be in place not only for exhaust gas monitoring and measuring equipment, but also for 
all other equipment involving the efficient operation of ships. As noted in Chapter 1, 
exhaust gas is the main but not sole source of GHG emissions from ships. Other 
substances and equipment, such as refrigerants and fire-fighting equipment, may also 
emit GHGs.52 The ‘freedom of prescription’ principle, however, does not mean that 
shipping companies may adopt any technology they choose. Instead, the technological 
criteria should be regulated in a prescriptive way so as to underpin the enforcement of 
these measures. The amended Annex VI in 2011 prescribed that the criteria should also 
                                                 
49 Ibid.  
50 The Revision of MARPOL Annex VI, submitted by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), MEPC 57th 
Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 57/4/28 (13 February 2008) para 5.3.  
51 Ibid.  




be reviewed and updated regularly with the availability of better technologies.53 In this 
way, marine reduction of GHG emissions could be achieved as technology advances.  
 
The ICS suggested that stringent regulations shall be adopted ‘without delay’.54 This 
view probably reflects the desire of shipowners and ship operators from developed 
countries to expand their global market share through technological upgrading in the 
international shipping market. Furthermore, the ICS opposed the proposal which 
permits port States to set different limits by informing the IMO in advance. 55 This 
opinion is consistent with the 2011 amendments to Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78.56  
 
Shipowners’ and ship operators’ associations also extensively debated the methodology 
relating to GHG emissions from ships. At the 57th MEPC meeting, BIMCO, ICS, 
INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO, together with other co-sponsors, proposed that 
any CO2  indexing method for new ships should be based on a ‘generally accepted 
methodology’.57 But at the 58th MEPC meeting, BIMCO and INTERTANKO asserted 
that ‘different methodologies will be required by different owners to match the very 
different efficiency assessment needs of different ships engaged in different trades’.58 
This difference of opinion reflects the complex situations of various ship types. 
Sometimes even for sister ships, or two fleets of the same type, ‘vastly differing and 
varying results’ may appear. 59 This discussion on methodology also led to another 
controversy on the application scope of the proposed EEDI and SEEMP.  
 
It is generally accepted by the shipping industry that the SEEMP could be applied to all 
ships. At the 58th MEPC meeting, Round Table members submitted to the IMO their 
                                                 
53 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) reg 21.6.  
54 The Revision of MARPOL Annex VI, submitted by the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), MEPC 57th 
Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 57/4/28 (13 February 2008) para 5.  
55 Ibid 9.  
56 See MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2011 amendments) art 10.21(5); see also ch 4, 4.3, ch 6, 6.6.  
57  A Mandatory CO2 Design Index for New Ships, submitted by Denmark, Marshall Islands, BIMCO, ICS, 
INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and OCIMF, MEPC 57th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 57/4/3 (21 
December 2007) para 12.  
58 Guidelines for the Implementation of the Ship Operational Index--Ship Efficiency Management Tool, submitted by 
INTERTANKO, OCIMF and BIMCO, MEPC 58th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4/13 (1 August 
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draft Ship Efficiency Management Plan (SEMP), an earlier vision of the SEEMP. The 
draft provides guidance on best practices for the efficient operation of ships. Many 
options are listed, such as fuel-efficient operations, optimised ship handling, more 
efficient propulsion systems, improved fleet management, improved cargo handling, 
energy management and fuel type. However, it also mentions that these measures are 
often ‘area and trade dependent and are likely to require the agreement and support of a 
number of different stakeholders if they are to be utilized most effectively’. 60 This 
expression, however, reveals that these measures may not be compatible. Or in other 
words, these shipping organisations believe that operational measures may apply to all 
ship types, but should not be applied to all areas [or countries] due to their unique 
trading routes or geographical characteristics. This is consistent with the view by 
BIMCO and INTERTANKO that the Operational Index, a former expression of the 
SEEMP, will prove to be a useful tool for ship operators, but is ‘not suited for 
mandatory application’. 61  This opinion was reflected in the revised Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78 by explicitly regulating the mandatory SEEMP but not mentioning the 
operational index as the mandatory benchmark tool. In a joint statement made after the 
adoption of the SEEMP, the Round Table reiterated its full support for the SEEMP in 
that it ‘provide[s] the framework allowing shipowners a degree of flexibility in how best 
to adapt it to individual ships’.62  
 
In contrast to the discussion on the application of the proposed SEEMP, more 
international shipowners’ and ship operators’ associations have been engaged in 
research and testing of the application of the proposed EEDI. Since 2009, the 
application scope of the proposed EEDI has been discussed at all MEPC and GHG-WG 
meetings of the IMO. The ICS, the CLIA and INTERFERRY asserted that the proposed 
EEDI is ‘not applicable to all ships, especially to those with complex and sophisticated 
                                                 
60 Ship Efficiency Management Plan, submitted by ICS, BIMCO, Intercargo, Intertanko and OCIMF, MEPC 58th 
Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 58/INF.7 (28 July 2008) annex, para 3.35 
61 Guidelines for the Implementation of the Ship Operational Index--Ship Efficiency Management Tool, submitted by 
INTERTANKO, OCIMF and BIMCO, MEPC 58th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4/13 (1 August 
2008) para 2.  
62 Round Table of International Shipping Associations, Round Table Associations Position Paper on GHG+MBMs 
(22 February 2012) 
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machinery installations that are not “conventional” in nature’.63 The CLIA commented 
that the draft EEDI should not be applied directly to passenger ships and electrically 
propelled ships. It proposed a revision to the EEDI calculation.64 The ICS recognised 
the difficulty in applying EEDI to ro-ro vessels, high speed craft, smaller vessels (less 
than 20,000 dwt), passenger vessels, general cargo ships and steam turbine ships.65 It 
proposed the phased approach, and suggested that each phase of application be 
reviewed before it is completed. 66  At the 59th MEPC meeting, INTERTANKO 
considered that the EEDI formula had ‘matured enough’ for ship operators to test after it 
was tested by its members,67 and at the 60th MEPC meeting, it asserted that ‘the EEDI 
formula would not be appropriate for a certain category of tankers, such as the diesel-
electrically powered tankers and dual-engine shuttle tanker designs’. 68 The SIGTTO 
proposed that ships carrying liquefied gases in bulk should be divided into liquefied 
natural gases (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for the purposes of 
implementing the EEDI,69 and found after assessment that the draft EEDI works well 
for LPG ships but not for the LNG ships.70 Due to the technical contributions by these 
shipping organisations, the current application scope of the EEDI has covered 12 types 
of new ships and will be implemented in four phases. In terms of safety aspects of the 
EEDI, INTERFERRY proposed a modification to the circulated EEDI with regard to 
                                                 
63 Application of EEDI to Ships other than Those Operating with Conventional Machinery and Power Distribution 
Arrangements, submitted by ICS, CLIA, INTERFERRY and the Marshall Islands, Intersessional Meeting of the 
Greenhouse Gas Working Group 2nd Session, Agenda Item 2, IMO Doc GHG-WG 2/2/19 (6 February 2009) para 14.  
64 Refinements to the "Draft Guidelines on the Method of Calculation of the Energy Efficiency Design Index for New 
Ships" for Conventional Passenger Ships, submitted by Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), MEPC 59th 
Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/12 (9 April 2009).  
65 The Need for Refinement of the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), submitted by the International Chamber of 
Shipping (ICS), MEPC 59th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/13 (9 April 2009) para 4.  
66 Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI--Inclusion of Regulations on Energy Efficiency for Ships, submitted by the 
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 6, IMO Doc MEPC 62/6/24 (20 May 
2011) para 4.  
67 Comments on MEPC 59/4/8 and MEPC 59/4/9 relating to the Energy Efficiency Design Index, the Ship Energy 
Management Plan and Possible Market-based Instruments, submitted by INTERTANKO, MEPC 59th Session, 
Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/43 (22 May 2009) para 4.  
68 Energy Efficiency Design Index for Tankers, submitted by INTERTANKO, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 4, 
IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/3 (18 December 2009) para 6; Energy Efficiency Design Index for Propulsion Redundancy, 
submitted by INTERTANKO, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/4 (18 December 2009) para 
3.  
69  Considerations of the Application of the EEDI Reference Lines to LNG Vessels, submitted by Society of 
International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO), MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 6, IMO Doc MEPC 
62/6/20 (20 May 2011) para 21.  
70 Results of Data Gathering Exercise for the Assessment of the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for Ships 
Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk, submitted by the Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators 




redundant propulsion systems. 71  This view was later incorporated in the 2011 
amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78.  
 
The response from the shipowners and ship operators associations also includes their 
joint project/research and individual trials aiming to address the GHG issue. For 
example, INTERTANKO established a Virtual Arrival Project aiming to reduce actual 
GHG emissions and fuel usage from ships by optimising the vessel speed,72 together 
with representatives from other sectors such as the Oil Companies International Marine 
Forum (OCIMF), a cargo owner. After the adoption of the technical and operational 
measures, these organisations have continued to contribute to the improvement of the 
EEDI, in particular, they have proposed various methods to include the remaining ship 
types into the EEDI regime. Among these efforts, it is worth noting that after testing and 
verification, INTERCARGO asserted that the application of the EEDI should be limited 
to new ships, and insisted that the EEDI ‘does not apply to, and hence it cannot and 
should not be used for, existing ships’.73 If this proves to be the case, the hybrid MBMs 
will not work due to their setting of the EEDI as their benchmark.74 At the 66th MEPC 
meeting in 2014, the ICS proposed to establish a mandatory global system for 
monitoring and reporting fuel consumption in response to the US’s proposal of 
enhancing technical and operational measures raised at the 65th MEPC meeting in 
2013. 75  Based on this proposal, the ICS agreed to further reduce shipping GHG 
                                                 
71 Application of Power Correction Factor Fj for Enhanced Safety, submitted by INTERFERRY, MEPC 60th Session, 
Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/20 (15 January 2010) para 8. This view of INTERFERRY can also be seen 
from an interview with Johan Roos, INTERFERRY’s executive director of EU and IMO affairs. He says that,  
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efficiency gains and a consequent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. But we also had to ensure that new ships 
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INTERFERRY, Interferry Welcomes EEDI Decision (12 October 2012) <http://www.marinelink.com/news/interferry-
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72 Comments on the Outcomes of the United Nations Climate Change Conference Held in Copenhagen, Denmark, 
submitted by OCIMF and INTERTANKO, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/46 (28 January 
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73 Application of the EEDI to Existing Ships, submitted by INTERCARGO, MEPC 63rd Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO 
Doc MEPC 63/5/12 (6 January 2012) para 19.  
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emissions by enhancing the energy efficiency of ships while temporarily suspending the 
discussion on MBMs.  
 
The views of shipowners’ and ship operators’ associations on MBMs mainly focus on 
their necessity, principles, advantages and disadvantages of different schemes. As 
mentioned earlier in this section, shipowners’ and ship operators’ associations generally 
support the efforts of the IMO in reducing GHG emissions from ships.76 However, in 
terms of the timing of regulating MBMs, the ICS asserted that an MBM for shipping is 
currently not appropriate due to ‘the state of the global economy and the impact on 
shipping markets’.77 BIMCO is of the view that MBMs ‘do not appear warranted at this 
particular time’. 78 In February 2012, the Round Table asserted that MBMs ‘are not 
justified at this particular time’, but it also admitted that MBMs might eventually be 
introduced for shipping.79 These views reveal the concerns of the shipping industry on 
the possible negative influence of proposed MBMs on the international shipping 
market. It is therefore necessary to conduct research on the possible impacts of these 
measures on the industry, the global supply chain and developing countries.  
 
CLIA, INTERTANKO and the ICS submitted their proposals to the IMO on the 
principles for choosing and implementing MBMs to reduce GHG emissions from 
international shipping. At the 59th MEPC meeting, CLIA proposed three principles on 
this issue, namely the IMO principle of no more favourable treatment of ships (NMFT), 
the principle of high quality, multiple benefit carbon mitigation investments, and the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities 
(CBDR). It explained that a framework established by the IMO for tackling climate 
change should respect both the NMFT and the CBDR principles. This could be 
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delegates ‘fully agreed that realistic and effective measures to reduce GHG emissions should be dealt with in the 
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accomplished by ‘not unduly penaliz[ing] vessels based upon their trading routes or 
flag’ and ‘ensuring a portion of the redistributed funds are applied to those areas where 
a net benefit is achieved by non-Annex I parties through a market-based instrument’ 
(MBI).80 INTERTANKO treated the nine IMO principles agreed by the 57th MEPC 
meeting as the criteria for selecting the MBMs, and asserted that a MBI should be: 
 
‘1. governed by the IMO and be specific for the shipping industry; 
2. effective in contributing to the reduction of total GHG emissions; 
3. environmentally sustainable without negative impact on global trade and growth; 
and 
4. efficient and credible enforcement & monitoring.’81 
 
Under point 4, it reiterated that a MBI ‘should be binding and equally applicable to all 
ships’. The ICS also embraced the nine IMO principles and highlighted the status of the 
IMO as the only competent body to regulate MBMs, although other international 
administration bodies may operate on behalf of the IMO.82 However, while insisting on 
the NMFT principle, it also made a compromise. It stated that, 
 
‘If there is a need to find a means to accommodate the UNFCCC principle of “common 
but differentiated responsibility” then this must be achieved at a level above that of the 
individual shipping company.’83 
 
It also set two priorities for the disbursement of funds generated from a MBI: a 
mitigation and adaption scheme, and research and development.84  
 
Although the CLIA, INTERTANKO and the ICS all represent the interests of 
shipowners or/and ship operators, the principles put forward by them have different 
emphases. They all respect the role of the IMO as the regulator of any MBM, and 
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respect the NMFT principle. However, INTERTANKO did not explicitly raise the 
CBDR principle because it was not included in the nine IMO principles at the 57th 
MEPC meeting. The CLIA underscored both the NMFT principle and the CBDR 
principle, and identified the means for achieving these principles. Whereas the ICS still 
stressed the NMFT principle, and seemed reluctant to accept the CBDR principle which 
can be seen from the expression ‘if there is a need’ as cited above. Also the two 
priorities identified by the ICS did not specifically mention the interests of developing 
countries. This view, however, is slightly different from that of the Round Table, 
although the ICS is a member of the latter. In a joint official statement, the Round Table 
asserted that the CBDR principle ‘cannot be practically applied to ships in light of the 
very nature of international shipping operations’. 85  Instead, it preferred the NMFT 
principle to maintain a level playing field for international shipping. It can be deduced 
that within the shipowners’ and ship operators’ sector there has been no consensus 
reached on whether the CBDR principle should be applied to the reduction of GHG 
emissions from ships, although currently it seems opponents of this principle dominate 
in this sector. As discussed in Chapter 2, the principles raised by CLIA are more 
feasible if a compromise is to be achieved between developed countries and developing 
countries.  
 
Some shipowners and ship operators associations have analysed MBM proposals. At the 
first GHG-WG meeting in 2008, INTERFERRY proposed a maritime carbon reduction 
scheme. This scheme was a type of MBM based on the cap and trade principle, and it 
was actually the application of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) to the context of international shipping. Since the proposed scheme was 
essentially an idea without specific designs, the proposal did not attract much attention 
from the international community. At the 60th MEPC meeting in 2010, the WSC 
proposed a Vessel Efficiency System (VES), which was later merged with the 
Leveraged Incentive Scheme proposed by Japan into a new Efficiency Incentive 
Scheme (EIS) in 2011. As discussed in Chapter 4, the EIS works through an 
International GHG Fund. Substandard ships pay contributions based on the amount of 
the bunker fuel consumed or purchased. However, as a hybrid MBM, the EIS treats the 
                                                 




EEDI as the benchmark for all ships, which is arguably to be infeasible.86 At the 62nd 
MEPC meeting in 2011, IPTA commented on the proposed MBM on the International 
GHG Fund. It asserted that, as a scheme based on a set target line, the International 
GHG Fund does not cap shipping activities.87 The Fund can embrace both the NMFT 
and the CBDR principles by ‘reserving most of the revenues to climate change purposes 
in developing countries’.88 Meanwhile, under this scheme, it is the ship rather than the 
flag State that needs to pay the GHG contribution. It also commented that this MBM is 
compatible with WTO’s non-discrimination principle. According to the proposed GHG 
Fund scheme, an international convention will be established to provide requirements 
for the payment of a uniform GHG contribution where no discrimination is foreseen. 
Nevertheless, a conflict between Parties that include an element of discrimination is an 
indispensable element for any incompatibility with WTO rules.89 At the 64th MEPC 
meeting in 2012, the ICS announced that its preferred MBM would either be based on a 
levy or a compensation fund and should relate to the actual fuel consumption of 
individual ships in service. ICS asserted that such a scheme would ensure that: 
 
‘1. a level playing field is maintained; 
2. serious market distortion is avoided; 
3. management of the system will be easier; and 
4. the desired transparency will be provided.’90 
 
Compared with the views from ICS, the Round Table opposed any ETS because it 
would be ‘unworkable’ for the shipping industry.91 Similarly, the Asian Shipowners 
Forum (ASF) has also opposed an ETS on the grounds that it is practically less 
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applicable, unreasonably costly92 and might become a major source for funding non-
shipping sectors.93 However, it overestimates the functions of technical and operational 
measures.94 It asserts that MBMs, such as the proposed global bunker levy and ETS, are 
premature so further study is needed.95 The ASF has not expressed any of its preferred 
MBMs and it seems that MBMs have still not been accepted by the Asian shipping 
industry. 
 
It can be deduced that the international shipowners’ and ship operators’ associations are 
more interested in levy or compensation fund-based MBMs than an Emission Trading 
Scheme (ETS) and other MBM proposals. Two factors might contribute to this 
preference. First, being profit-oriented, the shipping industry is more concerned about 
the sound development of the global shipping market than the reduction of GHG 
emissions from ships. A levy or a compensation fund – based MBM can achieve this 
goal more easily than a global ETS. This is because the ETS sets a sector-wide cap on 
net emissions from international shipping, which may limit the development of 
international shipping and lead to carbon leakage.96 Second, the regulation of a levy or a 
compensation fund – based MBM may result in the reduction of the shipping sector (in-
sector reduction). This is consistent with the competence of the IMO. On the other hand, 
a global, cross-sectoral emissions trading market is needed in order to regulate an ETS 
and avoid carbon leakage. This is beyond the competence of the IMO.97 For this reason 
and to maintain the status of the IMO as the only regulator of a MBM, the global 
shipowners’ and ship operators’ associations prefer a levy or a compensation fund – 
based MBM. Surprisingly, while international shipowners’ and ship operators’ 
associations oppose an ETS, some national ship owners’ associations in Europe, such as 
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Germany and Norway, support an ETS being applied to the shipping industry.98 This 
disparity of views reveals the complexity of this issue, and indicates that further study is 
needed to enhance understanding of the issues so as to find a solution.  
 
In summary, the international shipowners and ship operators generally welcome the 
IMO’s efforts in reducing GHG emissions from international shipping. Regarding the 
proposed technical and operational measures, they contributed a great deal to the 
improvement of the EEDI and SEEMP through their proposals to the IMO. They take 
the view that they should have the freedom to choose their compliance mechanisms, and 
that specific technical requirements, including the Operational Index, should not be 
regulated in a prescriptive way. They suggested that the EEDI only cover new ships of 
certain types and be implemented in four phases. Currently they are working to include 
the unregulated types of ships into the EEDI regime and provide options for enhancing 
energy efficiency measures. As to the proposed MBMs, international shipowners and 
ship operators insist on the NMFT principle and assert that the MBM should be 
governed by the IMO. However, some of them also accept the application of the CBDR 
principle to the regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping, although the 
Round Table opposes its application. Of the current MBM options, most of the 
shipowners’ and ship operators’ organisations prefer a levy or a compensation fund – 
based MBM and oppose an ETS.  
 
5.2.3 Cargo Owners 
 
Cargo owners are exempt from any compensation liability to pollution victims that 
results from incidents involving their cargos. This responsibility is generally attributed 
to the shipowners or ship operators due to their direct operational role.99 It is believed 
that this liability arrangement originates from the strong influence of the cargo owners, 
particularly oil companies. In the 1960s and 1970s, pollution-related regulations in 
various States, including preventive and remedial measures and damage compensation, 
were generally imposed upon tanker owners.100 At present, although some of the cargo 
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owners have their own ships, most of them use ‘spot’ charters and tend to employ 
substandard operators so as to avoid the fluctuating freight rates and minimise 
transportation costs.101 In the context of international shipping, as discussed in Chapter 
1, cargo emissions and emissions from cargo ships constitute important sources of GHG 
emissions from ships.102 For this reason, cargo owners are an important stakeholder in 
the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. It is debated whether cargo owners should 
share the regulatory costs, including preventive and remedial measures and damage 
compensation for pollution victims, with shipowners and ship operators, due to their 
choice of employing substandard ships. 103 However, because of the contribution of 
cargo ships to GHG emissions, it is necessary to examine the response of the cargo 
owners to the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping.  
 
The Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) is the main NGO which 
represents the interests of cargo owners within the IMO, particularly those from 93 oil 
companies worldwide. 104  Similar to international shipowners and ship operators 
associations, OCIMF welcomes the efforts of the IMO in reducing GHG emissions from 
ships. It insists that the IMO is the sole competent international organisation to regulate 
GHG emissions from ships. To justify the exclusion of the CBDR’s application to this 
issue, it supports the legal advice from the IMO’s Sub-Division for Legal Affairs in 
document MEPC 58/4/20 that IMO’s mandate in regulating shipping GHG emissions 
comes from the IMO Convention itself to regulate all aspects of international shipping 
rather than the UNFCCC.105  
 
The OCIMF prepared most of its proposals on EEDI and SEEMP in collaboration with 
international shipowners and ship operators associations due to its lack of expertise in 
the technical and operational measures. For instance, it asserted that different 
methodologies for shipping efficiency assessment should be required by different 
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owners to suit the needs of different trades, thus the operational index should not be 
mandatory.106 It believed that SEEMP measures should be area and trade dependent.107 
At the 59th MEPC meeting in 2009, the OCIMF asserted that ‘operational and technical 
improvements will be gradual rather than revolutionary’ due to the long-lived shipping 
fleet.108 This indicates that it prefers a step-by-step approach to proposed technical and 
operational measures. Moreover, the OCIMF has supported the trial of the proposed 
EEDI and SEEMP measures. It applied a SEEMP to improve the energy efficiency of a 
fleet of Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) and claimed that compared with 2010, 
emissions of CO2 from that fleet reduced by 10 per cent.109  
 
The OCIMF has expressed its views on the assessment principles of the proposed 
MBMs and commented on the options. It believes that the nine principles for shipping 
GHG legislation agreed by the 57th MEPC meeting should form the basis for any GHG 
reduction measures.110 Any selected MBMs should have the direct effect of reducing 
GHG emissions from the shipping industry without restricting world trade and leading 
to carbon leakage.111 In particular, it asserts that ‘a substantial proportion of the revenue 
generated [50%], from any [MBM]’ should be utilised to ‘promote and facilitate marine 
R&D aimed at reducing shipping GHG emissions’. 112  These views emphasise the 
potential reduction of GHG emissions from ships but ignore the CBDR principle 
insisted on by the shipping industries from developing countries. The shipping 
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industries in many developing countries are more concerned about their market share 
than the reduction of GHG emissions and they generally lack energy efficient 
technologies. Therefore, it is difficult for developing countries to accept these views. 
 
The OCIMF has not explicitly expressed its preference among current MBM proposals. 
Instead, it examines the advantages and disadvantages of MBMs such as the ETS, GHG 
Compensation Fund, Leveraged Incentive Scheme and Efficiency Standards Index. At 
the 59th MEPC meeting in 2009, it commented that both the ETS and the GHG Fund 
have challenges in their design and will inevitably lead to an increase in cost to 
consumers. It also commented that the Compensation Fund proposal lacks a linkage to 
the market price of Carbon, while the Marine ETS will impose a heavy administrative 
burden on shipowners. 113 At the 60th MEPC meeting in 2010, it compared the four 
MBM proposals and concluded that these proposals require further development and it 
would be premature to judge whether they meet the nine IMO fundamental 
principles.114 
 
It is concluded that international cargo owners, the OCIMF being the principal 
representative body, generally support the work of the IMO in reducing GHG emissions 
from international shipping. They believe that IMO is the only competent international 
organisation to regulate this GHG emissions issue, but favour exclusion of the CBDR 
principle. This obviation of the interests of developing countries probably results from 
the dominance of developed countries within the organisation.115 In their opinion, the 
nine IMO fundamental principles are the only criteria for assessing any GHG reduction 
measures. They welcome the proposed technical and operational measures and have 
contributed to their improvement together with international shipowners and ship 
operators associations. To date they have not expressed their preference for any MBM, 
but they have asserted that further development of the MBM proposals is required.  
 
5.2.4 Ship Insurers 
                                                 
113 Ibid para 15.  
114 Updated Technical Evaluation of Proposed GHG Reduction Measures, submitted by Oil Companies International 
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The ship insurers are probably the only parties among stakeholders of the shipping 
industry who do not welcome any upgrading of ship standards on the ground that it 
might increase the number of claims.116 Generally there are two types of risks against 
which shipowners or ship operators insure their operations, namely hull and machinery 
(H&M) and third party liability risks.117 H&M coverage deals with the damage to the 
shipowner’s ship through possible collisions, groundings and other accidents, whereas 
third party liability coverage is to compensate the shipowner against claims by third 
parties for damage incurred to their interests due to the operation of the ship.118  
 
The shipping insurance industry is represented at the IMO mainly by the International 
Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI) and the International Group of P&I Associations 
(P&I Clubs).119 As a member of BIMCO, P&I Clubs might have expressed its views on 
the reduction of shipping GHG emissions through BIMCO. However, as independent 
NGOs, the IUMI and P&I Clubs have not submitted any proposal to the IMO on the 
issues under discussion. This is probably because it would not be viable for the ship 
insurers to be involved in the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping, 
including the EEDI, SEEMP and proposed MBMs. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
transboundary harm resulting from GHG emissions from ships is a cumulative process, 
which in any case would not lead to actual damage either to the shipowner’s ship or to 
any third party in the short term. In this case, it would only be possible for ship insurers 
to be involved in the reduction of GHG emissions from ships when an innovation or 
significant change in marine insurance policy occurs. This is currently a remote 
possibility.  
 
5.2.5 Classification Societies 
 
                                                 
116 Pamborides, above n 34, 141.  
117 Tan, above n 32, 40.  
118 Ibid.  
119 Currently IUMI has 55 national associations of hull and cargo insurers from all over the world, while P&I Clubs 
mainly deal with third party liability insurance and other types of insurance, and members of the Group cover about 
90 per cent of world shipping tonnage. International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI), Membership 




The classification society is a significant sector of the shipping industry. It plays an 
important role by providing various classification and statutory services and assistance, 
which cover almost all technical aspects of shipping.120 The role of classification and 
classification societies has been recognised by a number of international conventions. 
Article 94 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) 
requires a flag State to ‘effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, 
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag’ and take ‘such measures for ships 
flying its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea’. 121  These requirements are 
generally referred to as ‘statutory requirements’, which range from the ship’s design and 
its structural integrity to pollution control, accident prevention and emergency 
handling.122 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),123 the 
1988 Protocol to the International Convention on Load Lines, 124  and some other 
international conventions permit the flag State to delegate the verification of ships to a 
Recognised Organisation (RO) to verify whether the ship has met these requirements. 
These conventions also recognise the classification society as a competent RO which 
can be nominated by flag States. 
 
The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) was established by 
seven major societies in 1968. Currently the IACS, and two of its 13 members, Lloyd’s 
Register and the Royal Institution of Naval Architects (RINA), are the main 
classification societies involved in the IMO’s work of reducing GHG emissions from 
ships. However, due to their expertise in technical aspects of shipping, the work of 
classification societies mainly contributes to the verification, safety and interpretation of 
the proposed EEDI. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and 
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122  IACS, Classification Societies: What, Why and How? (March 2011) 
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national standards of the Administration which provide an equivalent level of safety.’  
124 International Convention on Load Lines, opened for signature 5 April 1966, 640 UNTS 133 (entered into force 21 




International Towing Tank Conference (ITTC), a type of RO in this context,125 also 
participated in some of this work. 
 
The IACS treats the IMO’s work in addressing GHG emissions from ships as its highest 
priority and has been contributing to the advancement of this work within the 
IMO. 126 Regarding the verification of the proposed EEDI, the IACS provided a 
methodology for a CO2  design index for new ships at the 58th MEPC meeting, and 
suggested that the verification process of the EEDI be performed in two phases: data 
examination and sea trials verification at the 59th MEPC meeting. The ITTC strongly 
supported the EEDI, but asserted that ‘it is not a substitute for taking action in reducing 
emissions from the existing fleet’. 127  The ITTC also proposed a verification and 
approval process for the proposed EEDI. Meanwhile, RINA, a member of IACS, also 
proposed a modification to the EEDI to improve its application scope and monitoring 
methodology at the second GHG-WG meeting in 2009. To ensure the safety of 
navigation in adverse conditions, at the 61st MEPC meeting in 2010 the IACS proposed 
adding a paragraph to Regulation 4 of the draft legal text for the required EEDI, 
stressing the need to maintain a minimum speed requirement. This proposal was later 
adopted by IMO without any further modification. Furthermore, after the adoption of 
EEDI by Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, the IACS provided a unified interpretation of 
the terms ‘new ships’ and ‘major conversion’ and clarified the relationship between the 
International Energy Efficiency Certificate (IEE Certificate) and the International Air 
Pollution Prevention Certificate (IAPP) as requested by the 63rd MEPC meeting in 
2011. The next year the IACS agreed to strengthen the implementation of the EEDI by 
using the industry developed guidelines as a Procedural Requirement for its members. 
At the 65th and 66th MEPC meetings, the IACS proposed to establish an ‘EEDI 
database’ so as to facilitate reviews of the EEDI as regulated under Regulation 21.6 of 
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the 2011 amendments to Annex VI.128 In this way, the IACS has been significantly 
contributing to the development, interpretation and implementation of the EEDI. 
 
The Lloyd’s Register is a member of the IACS. It drafted an assessment framework for 
the Institute of Marine Engineering Science and Technology (IMarEst) aiming to 
provide a mechanism to analyse various MBM proposals. However, classification 
societies have not been involved in MBM-related work.  
 
5.2.6 Bunker Suppliers 
 
Bunker suppliers generally are not a main member of the shipping industry. 
Nevertheless, through providing lower emitting fuels to ships and participating in the 
discussion of MBMs, bunker suppliers have become one of the stakeholders in the work 
on reducing GHG emissions from ships. At the IMO the main representatives for this 
sector are the International Bunker Industry Association (IBIA) and the International 
Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPITCA). Among the 
proposals that they have submitted to the IMO, the one that IBIA submitted in 2008 is 
relevant to the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. 
 
At the 58th MEPC meeting in 2008, the IBIA predicted that with the projected growth in 
the shipping sector there would be an absolute increase in CO2 emitted by the industry 
between 2008 and 2020 and thus supported the reduction effort by the international 
community.129 It believed that proposed design indexes could guide shipbuilders and 
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ship buyers to reduce GHG emissions. 130  The IBIA also explicitly expressed its 
preference for the CO2 Cap and Trade scheme to the shipping industry and put forward 
principles for the proposed mechanisms, including setting a shipping sector CO2 cap (a 
cap on total CO2 emissions), allocating sector emissions entitlement under the cap, and 
establishing a global registry. Indeed, this scheme is a type of ETS, and the IBTA 
suggested that the global registry should be operated by the bunker industry and 
shipping sector so as to ‘retain control of [their] investments and of the scheme integrity 




In addition to the above discussions from six organisational perspectives, other 
international and regional shipping organisations have also expressed their views on the 
regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping. For instance, the Clean 
Shipping Coalition (CSC) argues that ‘speed reduction should be pursued by the IMO as 
a regulatory option in its own right and not just as a possible consequence of MBIs or 
the EEDI.’132 This proposal has not attracted much attention at the IMO because speed 
reduction is often treated as one of the operational measures or a part of the SEEMP. 
Some industry groups have also been established to cope with the challenges that they 
are facing in reducing shipping GHG emissions. For example, the Tripartite Working 
Group was established in 2008 and the Joint Industry Working Group (JWG) on the 
EEDI was organised in 2010. The JWG drafted industry guidelines on calculation and 
verification of the EEDI based on IMO resolutions and submitted it to the IMO for 
further discussion. The Tripartite Working Group also conducted joint research and 
expressed the views of its members as a whole. 
 
It is concluded that generally international and regional shipping organisations welcome 
the IMO’s efforts in reducing GHG emissions from international shipping, and assert 
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132 Speed Reduction - the Key to the Fast and Efficient Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, submitted 
by the Clean Shipping Coalition (CSC), MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/10 (23 July 2010) 




that the IMO is the only competent organisation to regulate the issue. However, the 
various stakeholders in the global shipping industry have not achieved consensus on 
how to reduce GHG emissions from ships. Based on current discussions within the 
IMO, their views mainly reflect the following four perspectives. Firstly, stakeholders of 
the global shipping industry have different preferences for the proposed technical and 
operational measures and MBMs. Generally ship designers and shipbuilders, the CESA 
as an example, prefer operational measures (SEEMP) to technical measures (EEDI) 
because they believe that the SEEMP will be more effective than the EEDI. They also 
highlight the importance of MBMs. Other stakeholders, such as shipowners, ship 
operators and cargo owners, welcome proposed technical and operational measures and 
MBMs and have contributed to the improvement of these measures through their 
proposals to the IMO. Secondly, most stakeholders, in particular shipowners and ship 
operators, support the freedom to choose their compliance mechanisms in relation to the 
EEDI and SEEMP, and suggest that the issues not be regulated in a prescriptive way. 
Thirdly, most stakeholders insist on the application of the NMFT principle to the issues 
and exclude the application of the CBDR principle. Nevertheless, as an international 
shipowners’ association, the ICS accepts the application of the CBDR principle to the 
GHG emissions issue provided that this principle does not apply directly to individual 
shipping companies. This compromise, however, has much to do with the presence of 
shipowners’ associations from developing countries in the ICS. Fourthly, stakeholders 
of the global shipping industry have different preferences for the proposed MBMs. 
Shipowners and ship operators prefer a levy or compensation fund-based MBM and 
oppose any ETS, whereas the bunker suppliers support the application of an ETS to the 
shipping sector. 
 
5.3 Response from the Shipping Industry in the UNFCCC Annex I States 
 
The development of the shipping industries in different countries, particularly between 
developed and developing countries, has been imbalanced due to historical, economic 
and geographic factors. Many of the shipping organisations from developing countries 
are not members of international and regional shipping organisations. Accordingly, the 
response from global shipping organisations analysed in the previous sections of this 




countries. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the response from the individual 
shipping sectors in some of the developed and developing countries to the issue of GHG 
emissions from international shipping.  
 
There are no uniform definitions or lists of what constitutes developed countries and 
developing countries. A number of lists are used by various organisations for different 
purposes. The World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
World Factbook produced by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the American 
Mathematical Society (AMS), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) all have their own definitions or lists of developed countries and 
developing countries. Thus in the context of climate change, based on different criteria, 
UNFCCC Annex I States are not all developed States and UNFCCC non-Annex I States 
may not be widely-recognised developing States. For example, Turkey is a UNFCCC 
Annex I State, but it is identified as a developing State by the World Bank, AMS and 
OECD.133 Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Cyprus are all non-Annex I States, but 
they are identified by the World Bank as developed States. 134  However, since the 
classification of Annex I States and non-Annex I States has been adopted by the 
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol (including its eight-year second commitment period 
which commenced on 1 January 2013), it can be deduced that the international 
community has generally recognised these categories of country groups for the purpose 
of bearing different responsibilities in tackling global climate change. For the purpose 
of this thesis, this classification of different countries is utilised to examine the response 
from the shipping industries in individual States. The States examined as examples of 
Annex I States are Australia, Greece and the United Kingdom, while China, the 
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Australia is a UNFCCC Annex I State surrounded by sea and all of its large cities are 
coastal. International shipping plays a significant role in Australia’s economy because 
most of Australia’s imports and exports are moved by ships.135 Australia is the world’s 
fifth largest shipping nation in terms of tonnes of cargo shipped and kilometres 
travelled.136 In 2011-2012, 973.2 million tonnes of goods valued at $236.2 billion were 
exported by international shipping to other countries, while 94.9 million tonnes of 
goods valued at $182.2 billion were imported to Australia by sea.137 During this period 
the value of Australia’s exports and imports by sea increased by 6.1 per cent and 13.3 
per cent respectively on 2010-2011, whereas the weight of its exports and imports by 
sea increased by 10.4 per cent and 3.0 per cent respectively.138  
 
The Australian trading fleet is relatively small in contrast to the vital role of 
international shipping in Australia’s economy. In 2011-2012, the Australian trading 
fleet was comprised of 104 ships with a total 3.5 million deadweight tonnage (dwt).139 
Meanwhile, the average age of ships in the trading fleet was 16.7 years during this 
period.140 By comparison, in January 2013, globally 47,122 seagoing vessels were in 
service with 1,613 million dwt, and the global average age per ship was 20.3 years.141 
The size of Australia’s shipping industry is small but the industry has been growing. 
However, more than 99 per cent of Australia’s international trade is carried by foreign-
flagged vessels, 142  which some analysts have assessed as being harmful to the 
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development of Australia’s shipping industry.143 For these reasons, in September 2011, 
the Australian Department of Infrastructure and Transport announced a ‘Stronger 
Shipping for a Stronger Economy’ shipping reform package which commenced on 1 
July 2012. Consequently, an Australian International Shipping Register (AISR) was 
established to increase Australia’s involvement in the international shipping trade by 
offering Australian registration which is believed to be globally competitive and highly 
regarded.144 In addition to the Australian government’s efforts in promoting its shipping 
industry, in recent years Australia has also made rapid progress in tackling climate 
change. Examples include its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2007 and the 
adoption of a carbon pricing scheme (commonly referred to as a ‘Carbon Tax’) in July 
2012.145 The shipping industry in Australia contributed to these achievements by means 
of participation in the discussion and debate.  
 
The Australian Federal Government is responsible for regulating ships engaged in 
international trade.146 However, it has not responded quickly to the issue of regulating 
GHG emissions from international shipping. The Australian shipping industry, 
represented by various shipping organisations, has expressed its views on this GHG 
emissions issue. The main shipping associations in Australia are the Australian 
Shipowners Association (ASA), Shipping Australia Limited (SAL),147 Maritime Union 
of Australia (MUA) and the Australian Peak Shippers Association Inc. (APSAI). These 
organisations generally support the efforts of the IMO in regulating GHG emissions 
from ships. In a document submitted by the ASA to the Australian Federal Government, 
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the ASA has agreed to the nine principles for the development of regulating GHG 
emissions from ships agreed at the 57th MEPC meeting of the IMO. It agreed that these 
measures should be ‘binding and include all flag States’, and should be ‘goal-based and 
not prescribe particular methods’. 148  Regarding the mandatory energy efficiency 
measures adopted by the IMO in 2011, many members of SAL have incorporated the 
EEDI into their new building designs and adopted the SEEMP prior to its 
implementation which commenced on 1 January 2013. 149  SAL believes that these 
measures will achieve a 20 per cent CO2 emissions reduction from ships by 2020 and 
this number will increase to 50 per cent by 2030.150  
 
The ASA has actively responded to the proposed MBMs. Firstly, it agrees that a MBM 
will be beneficial for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping, but it 
also asserts that it will be difficult to adopt appropriate MBMs.151 Secondly, it purports 
that any MBM to be adopted must be ‘flag neutral’ so as to avoid market distortions and 
maximise its effectiveness in reducing emissions. 152  Thirdly, it suggests that the 
engagement of the shipping industry in discussions on the proposed MBMs is vital to 
ensure that any MBM to be adopted is workable and effective. 153  Fourthly, it 
categorises the proposed MBMs into two types, namely, ‘cap and trade’ Emission 
Trading Schemes (ETS) and a carbon levy or tax system which is linkable to a Fund to 
help emissions reductions.154 Furthermore, it expresses its preference for an ETS to be 
applied to the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. In a discussion paper submitted 
by the ASA, co-sponsored by the national associations of Belgium, Norway, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom, the ASA explains why a global ETS will be effective in 
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reducing shipping GHG emissions, and how such a mechanism can work in practice at 
the shipowner/operator level.155 It lists five key advantages of an ETS. Namely an ETS: 
 
• ‘provides for certainty of environmental outcome; 
• allows the market to set the price of carbon; 
• allows the shipping company to find the most cost-effective solutions; 
• resonates with other legislative developments around the world; and 
• fits well with other existing carbon reduction infrastructure, such as Clean 
Development Mechanisms and Joint Implementation processes under the Kyoto 
Protocol.’156 
 
In illustrating the working mechanism of the cap-and-trade scheme, the ASA put 
forward a two-step strategy for the implementation of an ETS. The first step is to agree 
on the baseline, which represents the total emissions from international shipping at a 
given point in time. Then, the IMO, possibly in conjunction with the UNFCCC, sets the 
cap by reference to the baseline.157 The second step is the allocation of allowances, or in 
other words, the obtaining of carbon credits. During this process, monitoring, reporting 
and verification (MRV) are vital.158 In this way, an absolute emission reduction could 
be achieved via the cap by means of the trading of carbon credits. In this document, the 
ASA realises that the setting of a global cap requires the collaboration of the IMO and 
the UNFCCC, which would be a pragmatic way of dealing with this issue. This is 
probably because coordinating different global sectors might be beyond the mandate 
and competence of the IMO 159 that is generally responsible for regulating maritime 
issues within the shipping sector. The ASA does not exclude the application of the 
CBDR principle to the issue. Instead, it recognises that the CBDR principle may need to 
be reflected in an ETS for shipping, and in this case ‘there are more sophisticated ways 
of meeting this principle than by simply excluding ships of a given flag’.160  
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Similarly to the ASA, the MUA also favours an ETS for the reduction of GHG 
emissions from ships. In particular, the MUA proposes the inclusion of transport fuels 
in the ETS scheme, which imposes reduction obligations on upstream fuel suppliers.161 
Additionally, MUA suggests that an ETS for the international shipping industry not be 
regulated under the Kyoto Protocol or its amendments.162 This view is consistent with 
those of international and regional shipping associations, and reveals their support for 
the leading role of the IMO in regulating GHG emissions from international shipping. 
 
It is concluded that the shipping industry in Australia welcomes the mandatory technical 
and operational measures adopted by Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. Many shipping 
companies had incorporated them into their building designs and operational plans prior 
to the commencement of these measures on 1 January 2013. This response coheres with 
the recently-launched shipping revival reform by the Australian government, indicating 
that both the shipping industry and Australian government are paying attention to the 
development of their engagement in international shipping. As for the proposed MBMs 
to tackle GHG emissions from ships, the Australian shipping industry prefers a cap-and-
trade ETS and has explored how such a system could work at the shipowner or ship 
operator level. In order to achieve absolute GHG emissions reduction from ships, the 
shipping industry in Australia insists on the application of the NMFT principle to the 
regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping. Nevertheless, it does not 
exclude the possible application of the CBDR principle. Compared with the rigid 
positions of some other shipping organisations, the flexibility of views reflected in 
Australia’s shipping industry might lead to more fruitful negotiations with developing 
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Greece is a country with a long and distinguished maritime tradition.163 It has been 
prominent in the world maritime industry for decades. Greek shipowners have 
established the largest merchant fleet in the world. As of 1 January 2013, Greek 
interests controlled 3,695 vessels of various categories, comprising 245 million total 
deadweight tonnage (dwt).164 This accounts for about 7.84 per cent of the world’s total 
number of vessels in service and 15.17 per cent of the world fleet dwt, making Greece 
the country which owns the largest fleets in the world.165 Meanwhile, Greece is also the 
sixth flag State with the largest registered fleets.166 The data indicate that Greece plays 
an important role in international shipping. The response from its shipping industry is 
significant for the efforts of the international community in reducing GHG emissions 
from ships. 
 
The main shipping associations in Greece are the Union of Greek Shipowners (UGS), 
the Hellenic Chamber of Shipping (HCS), the Greek Shipowners Association for 
Passenger Ships (GSAPS), and the Hellenic Shortsea Shipowners Association (HSSA). 
Among them, the UGS and the HCS have expressed their views on the reduction of 
GHG emissions from international shipping. In 2009, a survey was carried out by 
Costas Giziakis and Anastasia Christodoulou to examine the response of various 
shipping companies in Greece on the issue.167 Part of the results of that survey were also 
utilised in this section. 
 
The shipping industry in Greece generally welcomes the regulatory efforts of the 
international community in reducing GHG emissions from ships. The 2009 survey in 
Greece reveals that 73 per cent of the shipping companies surveyed know very well the 
efforts of the international community in regulating GHG emissions from ships, and 23 
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per cent of these companies know that there have been efforts made on this issue.168 
Regarding the institutional arrangements for regulating the GHG issue, the support for 
the IMO, EU and UNFCCC roles covers 93 per cent, 23 per cent and 13 per cent of all 
involved shipping companies respectively. 169  It can be deduced that the shipping 
companies in Greece have been actively engaged in the work of reducing GHG 
emissions from ships, and, compared with the EU and the UNFCCC, the IMO has been 
regarded by them as the most suitable institution to regulate GHG emissions from 
international shipping.  
 
The Greek shipping industry has actively participated in the discussion of the technical 
and operational measures before and after their adoption in July 2011. From the 
perspective of Greek shipping companies, the EEDI for new ships is an environmentally 
effective measure. It can promote Research & Development in the maritime sector, and 
can be easily implemented. 170 However, the President of the HCS asserted that the 
current EEDI formulation indicates that the same ship will have a different EEDI at 
different speeds.171 If this is the case, in order to make the EEDI an effective tool for 
reducing GHG emissions from ships, it might be necessary to improve or interpret the 
EEDI formula so that it can compare ship design energy efficiency at a fixed speed. 
Otherwise, under current Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, a ship which complies with the 
EEDI requirement may actually reduce its GHG emissions more if it speeds up. This 
scenario is quite possible since generally a ship will automatically decelerate in times of 
poor markets or high bunker prices and accelerate in times of good markets or low 
bunker prices.172 As to the SEEMP applicable for all ships, 52 per cent of the participant 
shipping companies in Greece believe that an Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator 
(EEOI) is ‘probably necessary’ for better implementation of the SEEMP.173 Although 
currently the SEEMP is mandatory, it is only a management scheme which entails no 
reduction requirement (eg, reduction target or monitoring requirement). A SEEMP 
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requires that what is done to manage the operational efficiency of a ship should be 
documented. Nevertheless, an EEOI could be utilised as a tool to monitor a ship’s 
performance, which combined with the SEEMP could achieve better efficiency.174  
 
The MBMs have aroused more attention from the Greek shipping industry than the 
technical and operational measures. First, both national shipping organisations and 
individual shipping companies generally oppose an ETS to be adopted to reduce GHG 
emissions from ships. Whether an ETS is cost-effective and operationally feasible has 
been widely discussed. The UGS asserted that an ETS system ignores the ‘structural, 
operational and contractual complexities of bulk shipping’ and this will create a heavy 
and unwarranted administrative burden on the bulk shipping sector.175 The adoption of 
an ETS needs to address many issues, such as the criteria of emissions allocation, 
thresholds, global cap setting, ship types and evasion possibilities via transhipment.176 It 
will be challenging and time-consuming to address these issues due to the nature and 
pattern of the bulk/tramp shipping. It is also argued that the party paying for the fuel, 
such as charterers or cargo receivers, should also be responsible for GHG emissions 
from ships.177 This argument is based on the fact that the charterer decides the voyage, 
the ship’s speed and itinerary while the cargo receiver decides the cargo’s origin and 
volume, the date of its shipping and delivery.178 The opposition to an ETS by shipping 
organisations is consistent with the results of the survey of Greek shipping companies in 
2009. According to the survey, 47 per cent of the participant companies believe that an 
ETS is not a good solution for addressing the GHG issue, while 27 per cent regard it as 
totally ineffective.179  
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The UGS favours the International Fund for GHG Emissions from Ships (GHG Fund) 
as its preferred MBM,180 whereas the HCS prefers a Global Levy Scheme on Marine 
Bunkers (Bunker Levy). 181 Under the GHG Fund, contributions would be collected 
through bunker fuel suppliers or via direct payment from shipowners. In this way, the 
GHG Fund could be applicable to all ships worldwide based on their fuel consumption, 
which makes the cost predictable to shipowners and is consistent with the money raised 
‘going directly for the benefit of the environment’.182 Comparable with the UGS, the 
HCS strongly supports the Bunker Levy, which is believed to trigger ‘an automatic 
profitable speed balancing mechanism’ through directly applying to the cost of fuel for 
any trip.183 That is, if a levy on bunker is collected, the ship operator may automatically 
adjust the speed based on the new bunker price so as to reduce GHG emissions from 
ships. This mechanism, however, attributes emissions reduction to the adjusting of 
ship’s speed while ignoring the speed requirement from the cargo receiver, which in 
practice may make it difficult to achieve any emissions reduction from ships. 
Essentially, the above two proposals are the same type of MBM except for the different 
names utilised by different organisations. In the 2009 survey of Greek shipping 
companies, 53 per cent considered that a Bulk Levy is not a good solution for shipping, 
and only 10 per cent regarded it as an effective measure for tackling shipping GHG 
emissions.184 This disparity reveals that a consensus on a suitable MBM for reducing 
global shipping emissions has not been achieved in the Greek shipping industry. 
 
In summary, the Greek shipping industry has taken an active part in the regulation of 
GHG emissions from ships. It welcomes the efforts of the international community and 
insists that this process should be governed by the IMO. It has contributed to the 
development and improvement of the EEDI and SEEMP, and has suggested that EEOI 
should be made mandatory for better implementation of the SEEMP. Generally the 
Greek shipping industry is against an ETS, and prefers a bunker levy or GHG Fund 
related MBM, through which GHG emissions from ships could be reduced by adjusting 
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driving speeds through increased bunker prices. Consensus on this mechanism, 
however, has not been achieved within the Greek shipping sector.  
 
5.3.3 The United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) is a traditional maritime power surrounded by the sea. It has 
been active in developing its shipping industry and participating in international and 
regional debate on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. As at 1 January 2013, 
there were 1237 vessels in the UK trading fleet, with a total dwt of 50 million tonnes 
which accounted for 3.12 per cent of the world fleet.185 Although the percentage of UK 
vessels in the world fleet is not high, the UK controlled the eighth largest owned fleet in 
the world, and the UK shipping industry has contributed to many aspects of the UK’s 
economy. In 2011, the UK shipping industry directly employed some 145,500 people, 
which covered about 0.5 per cent of total employment in the country.186 In the same 
year, the shipping sector made a £5.6 billion value-added contribution to the GDP of the 
UK, constituting 0.4 per cent of the UK economy.187 In addition, 95 per cent of the 
UK’s international trade is transported by ships.188  
 
The shipping industry in the UK, including the Shipbuilders and Ship Repairers 
Association (SSA) and the UK Chamber of Shipping (UCS), has actively responded to 
global discussion on the reduction of GHG emissions from shipping.  
 
Many UK shipping companies had adopted the voluntary energy efficiency measures 
before the adoption of the mandatory EEDI and SEEMP in July 2011. As reported by 
the SSA, customers (shipowners) have been increasingly valuing sustainable 
performance, and thus requiring more energy efficient ships.189 For instance, the Maersk 
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Line, a Danish shipping company, after adopting energy efficiency measures, met its 25 
per cent CO2 emissions reduction target in 2013 which it had set for itself eight years 
earlier.190 In 2011, the UCS expressed its full support for the adoption of the EEDI and 
SEEMP by the IMO. However, it also commented that technical and operational 
measures alone will not be sufficient to achieve the absolute reduction of GHG 
emissions from shipping, and that the introduction of a MBM will be indispensable.191 
 
The UCS released a discussion paper in 2009 entitled ‘A global cap-and-trade system to 
reduce carbon emissions from international shipping’, in collaboration with the national 
shipowners associations from Australia, Belgium, Norway and Sweden. In this paper, 
the UCS proposed a global ETS as its preferred MBM because it would create greater 
incentives for shipowners to cut emissions in the long term. This proposal did not obtain 
much support due to its lack of a long-term target and vague descriptions of its 
mechanisms. In 2011, the UCS published two papers to facilitate further debate by 
providing more information on the structure and establishment of a possible ETS, and 
an International GHG Contribution Fund.192 Although both MBMs would apply the 
IMO NMFT principle to all ships over 400 GT, they also leave room for the 
incorporation of the CBDR principle. Specifically, under an ETS, ship operators need to 
buy and then surrender offset credits from a UNFCCC certified project in proportion to 
their bunker fuel purchases. 193 Since the UNFCCC certified project lies in an open 
market, the funds raised can also lead to out-of-sector reduction and satisfy the CBDR 
principle via their utilisation.194 Similarly, under an international GHG Contribution 
Fund, UNFCCC non-Annex I States can receive the benefits of projects funded through 
carbon offset purchases, a ‘net profit’ from the system, although they also need to pay 
the contributions first. 195 In this way, the differentiated responsibility of developing 
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countries can be reflected in both the ETS and the GHG Fund options. This discussion 
paper and its proposals indicate that the incorporation of the CBDR principle into a 
MBM is not only feasible but is also becoming more accepted by the shipping industry 
in UNFCCC Annex I States. 
 
GHG emissions from international shipping currently are not regulated under the UK 
Climate Change Act 2008. The question of how to regulate this issue, and in particular 
whether an ETS should be adopted, has been debated in the UK. In 2011, the UCS 
expressed its view that an EU ETS is not suitable for shipping on the ground that a 
global solution is the only way to address this problem due to the nature of shipping.196 
The Energy and Climate Change Committee, a body appointed by the UK House of 
Commons, released a report in January 2012, asserting that UK shipping emissions 
should be included in an EU ETS. It commented that it is a ‘delaying tactic’ by the UK 
shipping industry to call for a global ETS.197 Furthermore, this report underscores the 
environmental benefits of unilateral action at the EU level and encourages other 
countries to adopt their own measures to tackle GHG emissions.198 The view of the 
shipping industry, however, has been endorsed by the Committee on Climate Change, 
an independent statutory body established under the UK Climate Change Act 2008.199 
 
In summary, the UK shipping industry supports the work of the IMO in reducing GHG 
emissions from international shipping. Many shipping companies had already adopted 
the energy efficiency measures before they were regulated as amendments of Annex VI 
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to MARPOL 73/78. The industry also argues that technical and operational measures 
alone will be insufficient to achieve the absolute reduction of GHG emissions from 
ships and advocates the introduction of MBMs. Of the current MBM proposals, they 
prefer a global ETS, which they believe will provide more incentives for shipowners to 




The three States reviewed in this section are all UNFCCC Annex I States, and the 
shipping industries in these States all support the effort of the IMO in reducing GHG 
emissions from international shipping. They value highly the EEDI and SEEMP 
measures adopted by the IMO, and many of their shipping companies had already 
incorporated them into the building and operation of their ships prior to the regulation 
of these measures. However, their attitudes vary towards the proposed MBMs. The 
shipping sectors in Australia and the UK prefer an ETS and accept the incorporation of 
the CBDR principle into a MBM, whereas the shipping sector in Greece opposes an 
ETS and supports a bunker levy or GHG Fund – related MBM. The view of the Greek 
shipping industry on the CBDR principle is unclear. Nevertheless, the fact that two EU 
member States have totally different preferences for MBMs indicates the complexity of 
adopting MBMs. It seems it will not be straightforward to reach consensus on adopting 
MBMs not only globally but also at the regional level. 
 
5.4 Response from the Shipping Industry in the UNFCCC Non-Annex I States 
 
The regulatory measures that have been adopted by the IMO, such as the EEDI and 
SEEMP, or MBMs possibly to be adopted in the future, will increase transportation 
costs for the shipping industry, and may also have an impact on international trade.200 
These impacts will be greater for UNFCCC non-Annex I States (developing countries) 
than UNFCCC Annex I States (developed countries).201 Therefore, whether the shipping 
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industry in a country can absorb these higher costs will influence the degree to which 
they comply with these measures. The development of the shipping industries in 
UNFCCC non-Annex I States generally commenced later and has lagged behind in 
many respects when compared with the development of these industries in UNFCCC 
Annex I States. The shipping industries in these non-Annex I States are facing barriers 
resulting from historical, financial and technological gaps. This section takes China, the 
Republic of Korea and India as examples to examine the responses from the shipping 




China has a lengthy continental coastline of approximately 18,000 kilometres. 202 A 
number of excellent natural ports are located around the coast; in 2003 the coastal areas 
contributed 50 per cent of China’s GDP and constituted 80 per cent of the country’s 
international trade value.203 Until 2010, over 90 per cent of China’s imports and exports 
were moved by international shipping. 204  These advantageous natural resources, 
together with preferential policies by central and local governments, have made possible 
the rapid development of China’s shipping industry. As at 1 January 2013, China 
controlled the third-largest owned fleet (in dwt) in the world with 2665 vessels 
registered in China and 2648 registered in other flag States.205 The dwt controlled by 
China in that year covered 11.78 per cent of the world total.206 Established in 1961, the 
China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO) is the first Chinese international 
shipping company. However, China’s international shipping sector started its rapid 
development only after 1978 when China adopted its reforms and opening-up 
policies. 207  In 2010 China’s shipbuilding sector ranked first in the world in three 
categories, namely its accomplished shipbuilding output, volume of new ship orders and 
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holding orders, which accounted for 43 per cent, 54 per cent and 41 per cent of the 
world market, respectively. 208  According to research jointly undertaken by Lloyd’s 
Register, QinetiQ and the University of Strathclyde, by 2030, the Chinese-owned fleet 
will probably reach 19-24 per cent of the world fleet, rivalling Greece and other 
European countries. 209  As a UNFCCC non-Annex I State, China has promoted its 
shipping industry to a high level in terms of its shipbuilding capability and shipping 
fleet. 
 
The shipping associations in China mainly include the China Classification Society 
(CCS), the China Association of the National Shipbuilding Industry (CANSI), and the 
China Shipowners Association (CSA). Due to China’s unique political structure, work 
on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships is dominated or guided by the 
government, mainly implemented by shipping companies, supported by the shipping 
industry and participated in by the public.210 Most shipping companies, in particular 
large-scale companies, are state-owned. This means that the response of the shipping 
industry in China is often consistent with the positions of the Chinese Government. 
 
In 2009, the Chinese Government announced its GHG emissions control target, before 
the 2009 Copenhagen climate change conference. It stated that it would cut its CO2 
emissions per unit of GDP by 40 per cent to 45 per cent by 2020 from the 2005 level. 
Against this backdrop, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China 
released a ‘Development Plan for the Ship Industry during the 12th Five-Year Plan 
(2011-2015)’ in 2012. This plan seeks a greater role for China’s shipping industry 
around the world by making it ‘powerful’ rather than simply ‘big’. It also puts forward 
some requirements to reach this goal. For example, the current structure of the shipping 
sector needs to be optimised and upgraded, its technological innovation and overall 
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quality should be improved, and the energy efficiency requirement in ship design and 
ship building should be strengthened.211  
 
As a follow-up to this Development Plan, China’s shipping industry was allocated its 
sector reduction target by the Ministry of Transport. The target requires the shipping 
companies to reduce their energy consumption and CO2 emissions per unit turnover by 
15 per cent and 16 per cent respectively from the 2005 level by the end of 2015.212 
China’s shipping industry still considers the IMO’s regulatory initiatives in reducing 
shipping emissions, although GHG emissions from international shipping are excluded 
from this target. This is because the shipbuilding sector, as a key sector of China’s 
shipping industry participating in international business, needs to comply with the IMO 
rules to meet the requirements of its current and potential customers. Another benefit is 
that while complying with international rules the industry can also meet the domestic 
reduction target. 
 
China’s shipping industry has different views towards the proposed technical, 
operational and MBMs under discussion within the IMO. As far as the technical and 
operational measures are concerned, the shipping industry welcomes the efforts of the 
IMO and agrees that the IMO is the most competent institution to regulate this issue. 
Representatives from shipping companies actively participated in the discussions on the 
proposed EEDI and SEEMP, and submitted their proposed modification of the EEDI 
formula to the IMO through the Chinese government. After the adoption of the energy 
efficiency rules by the IMO in July 2011, CCS released its Rules for Green Ships on 10 
July 2012, the first rules of this kind in the world,213 as well as the Attained EEDI 
Calculation Guide and EEDI Verification Guide. These rules serve as the industry’s 
compliance with IMO regulations through the incorporation of the EEDI and SEEMP 
requirements into China’s domestic ship classification. They provide information that 
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China’s shipbuilding industry will abide by international shipbuilding standards in 
building its ships for international buyers.  
 
Regulation 19 of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 allows all flag States, including the 
Chinese Government, to postpone its implementation of the EEDI regulation until 
2019.214 However, it appears that China’s shipbuilding industry will not utilise this right 
due to the fierce competition in the international shipbuilding market. Even before the 
adoption of Rules for Green Ships by the CCS, the French classification society had 
issued an EEDI Certificate, the first such certificate in Asia, to a bulk carrier with 
63,500 dwt built by the SinoPacific Shipbuilding Group. 215  In practice, however, 
Chinese shipping companies often reduce their GHG emissions by employing large 
vessels and slowing their speed, a strategy which is said to be commonly utilised by 
other large shipping companies, such as the Maersk Line.216 
 
Although China’s shipbuilding industry has responded positively to the newly-adopted 
EEDI and SEEMP regulation by the IMO, it also recognises that these new rules, in 
particular the EEDI, have imposed great challenges on it. First, as stated by the Chinese 
delegation at the IMO, the CBDR principle that it asserted during the IMO negotiations 
was not reflected ‘in a full and objective manner’ within the amended Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78 in 2011. 217  The consequence of this is that the CBDR principle, 
confirmed as a basic principle in the global climate change regime by the UNFCCC and 
its Kyoto Protocol, has been further weakened in the shipping arena from the technical 
perspective. Although technically it is more feasible to apply the NMFT principle in this 
regard, ignoring the historical contribution of GHG emissions by developed countries 
will lead to an unfair extra burden for the shipping industry in developing countries, 
including China.  
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Second, it will be more costly for China’s shipping industry to achieve the regularly-
upgraded EEDI standards. The new Chapter 4 of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 provides 
a four-phased reduction schedule. During the period 2013 to 2025, the EEDI reference 
line parameters for relevant ship types and reduction rates, as well as the time periods, 
will be reviewed and amended regularly to reflect the latest status of technological 
development.218 However, it is often recognised that China’s shipping industry is ‘big 
but not powerful’ and China ‘does not have sufficient say in global shipping pricing’.219 
A report by CANSI reveals that, in comparison with European countries, the US, Japan 
and the Republic of Korea, the Chinese shipbuilding sector aims at building middle and 
low-level vessels and lacks core technologies and capability in its Research and 
Development (R&D). This objectively makes its profit rate quite low.220  
 
A three-party conference, participated in by Chinese ship owners/operators, 
shipbuilders, and classification societies, was held in Beijing in November 2011. This 
conference aimed at meeting the EEDI requirements and reducing shipping cost. It also 
discussed how to research, design and build green ships jointly in order to maintain and 
promote the competitiveness of China’s shipping industry. Aside from the increased 
cost in relation to R&D, China’s shipbuilding companies may need to purchase energy-
efficient technologies from other countries. In practice, it is difficult for them to obtain 
technologies through the transfer of technology arrangement as indicated in Regulation 
23 of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, due to the so-called title ‘newly industrialised 
[developing] country’ imposed on China by some economists.221  
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Third, the Chinese shipping industry is concerned about whether the EEDI benchmark, 
a technological standard, will become a type of trade barrier for developing countries.222 
This is a valid concern. On the one hand, currently the core energy efficient 
technologies on shipbuilding are primarily controlled by a few developed countries or 
regional blocs like the EU, and China does not have sufficient say in the drafting of the 
EEDI formula and reference line.223 On the other hand, the setting of this floatable and 
upgrading EEDI standard actually raises the trading threshold for ships from most 
developing countries. Based on the mandatory EEDI requirements, substandard ships 
might be detained, fined by port States or even not allowed to trade.224  
 
In contrast to the EEDI and SEEMP, MBMs are regarded as an even ‘bigger challenge’ 
by the Chinese shipping industry.225 First, the Chinese shipping industry believes that it 
is premature to adopt any MBMs because many uncertainties and problems still relate to 
them, 226  and China’s shipping sector also needs more time to conduct research to 
enhance its understanding of this issue. Meanwhile, China’s shipping industry holds that 
a policy arrangement on financial, technological and capacity-building support from 
developed countries for the implementation of the EEDI and SEEMP by developing 
countries should be in place before a MBM is adopted.227 It is expected that the benefits 
of the shipping industry in developing countries can be secured under this arrangement. 
In view of these factors, to date the Chinese shipping industry has not expressed its 
preference for any of the currently proposed MBMs.  
 
Second, consistent with the position of the Chinese government, China’s shipping 
industry supports the leading role of the IMO in regulating technically related issues, 
but doubts the competency of the IMO to regulate MBMs. From its point of view, the 
IMO Convention gives the IMO the competence to regulate technical issues but not 
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trade-related issues. MBMs are trade-related measures and thus should be decided by 
the UNFCCC.228 Additionally, China took the view that the CBDR principle needs to be 
incorporated if an MBM needs to be adopted in the future.229  
 
Third, China’s shipping industry opposes unilateral actions, in particular the proposed 
inclusion of the shipping GHG emissions into a EU ETS. If this happens and the EU 
ETS which includes GHG emissions from international shipping comes into force 
before July 2019, the lead period that China’s shipping industry may get to phase in 
changes from Regulation 19 of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 will become meaningless. 
In this case, an EU ETS may charge all ships calling at the ports of their member States, 
regardless of the flag that these ships are flying. In other words, the waiver that a flag 
State gives the ships flying its flag based on Regulation 19 of Annex VI may not be 
recognised by an EU ETS. Also, due to waning demand and higher costs resulting from 
the global financial crisis since 2009 and China’s over-capacity, China’s shipping 
industry, in particular its shipbuilding sector, is currently experiencing a recession. In 
2012 China’s completed shipbuilding output and holding orders were 60,210,000 dwt 
and 106,950,000 dwt each, which, compared with 2011, had decreased by 21.4 per cent 
and 28.7 per cent, respectively.230  
 
Under the circumstances, any unilateral reduction actions will increase the shipping cost 
and weaken the development momentum of China’s shipping industry, while at the 
same time the authority of the IMO’s current work will also be diminished.231 To date 
the EU has attributed its unilateral actions to the slow and unsatisfied regulatory process 
of emissions reduction under the relevant international authorities. On 1 January 2012 
the EU included the emissions from the international aviation industry into the EU ETS 
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due to slow progress within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In 
December 2012 the EU suspended this policy either due to the improved performance 
from the ICAO or because of strong opposition from many countries including the US, 
Russia, China and India. In the same year, the EU published a consultation document 
asking for views on how best to reduce GHG emissions from ships so as to finally 
include GHG emissions from international shipping in a EU ETS.232 Once shipping 
GHG emissions are included in the EU ETS, the co-existence of two regulatory 
mechanisms, namely the EU ETS and potential IMO MBMs, will make implementation 
and compliance by developing States shipping industries more challenging.  
 
In summary, China’s shipping industry has taken various measures to reduce its GHG 
emissions from ships. It supports the efforts of the IMO in adopting the EEDI and 
SEEMP measures and has enacted its own rules to incorporate them into China’s ship 
classification, although these measures have not been as successful as expected by 
China’s shipping industry in several respects. Regarding the proposed MBMs, the 
shipping industry in China claims that they are premature at this stage, and if they are to 
be adopted, they should be decided by the UNFCCC rather than the IMO itself. To 
secure benefits to China’s shipping industry, the CBDR principle should be 
incorporated into MBMs to be adopted. To date China’s shipping industry has not 
expressed its preference among the current MBM proposals.  
 
5.4.2 The Republic of Korea 
 
The Republic of Korea, also called South Korea, is located in the southern half of the 
Korean Peninsula in East Asia and has a coast line of more than 1,500 miles. Situated in 
a strategic neighbourhood between Russia, China and Japan, the South Korean 
Government pays much attention to the development of its shipping industry. South 
Korea has become one of the main maritime powers of the world, although the South 
Korean shipbuilding sector only began its development in the early 1970s. As at 1 
January 2013, South Korea controlled the fifth largest owned fleet (dwt) in the world 
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with 764 vessels registered under Korean flags and 812 registered in other flag States.233 
The dwt it owned in that year accounted for 4.65 per cent of the world total.234 The 
South Korean shipbuilding sector has ranked first among South Korean exports since 
2008,235 and is now home to seven of the world’s ten largest shipbuilding companies. 
Of the seven top shipbuilders, Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI), Samsung Heavy 
Industries (SHI) and Daewoo Shipbuilding (DSB), also called the ‘Big 3’, are believed 
to have dominated the global market in terms of output.236  
 
With its booming shipbuilding capability, the Republic of Korea overtook Japan to be 
the world’s largest shipbuilding nation in 2000, after Japan surpassed its European 
counterparts in 1956. This title was taken over by China in 2010 due to China’s better 
performance in exports of ships, but in 2011 the Republic of Korea regained the top 
spot as global shipowners ordered more complex high-technology vessels, in the 
production of which currently the Republic of Korea has an absolute advantage against 
China.237 In 2012 Korean exports of ships decreased by 30 per cent from the 2011 level, 
whereas its Chinese and Japanese counterparts only dropped 10.3 per cent and 14.6 per 
cent, respectively.238 Against this slump, Korean shipbuilders attributed this slump to 
the lack of financial support by the Korean Government and were thus more affected by 
the global economic downturn than China.239 The changes, however, indicate that the 
fierce competition within the global shipbuilding sector has imposed a great challenge 
on the South Korean shipping industry. Although the Republic of Korea has been 
regarded as a developed country by some countries and international organisations,240 it 
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is a UNFCCC non-Annex I State and the views of its shipping industry on the reduction 
of GHG emissions from ships are significant due to its status in the global shipping 
industry. 
 
The main shipping associations in the Republic of Korea are the Korea Shipowners’ 
Association (KSA), the Korea Offshore & Shipbuilding Association (KOSHIPA), the 
Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) and the Korean Register of 
Shipping (KRS). These associations, together with shipping companies, have expressed 
their views towards the reduction of GHG emissions from ships.  
 
The Korean shipbuilding sector believes that innovative technologies and creative 
production processes constitute its core competitiveness.241 Due to its confidence in its 
shipping technologies, the Korean shipbuilding sector has been supportive of the efforts 
of the IMO in reducing GHG emissions from ships. It participated in the IMO 
discussions on the proposed EEDI and provided a new concept approach and formula 
for the EEDI covering the various types of propulsion systems and power generation 
systems through the Korean government.242 Unlike its Chinese counterparts, the Korean 
shipbuilding sector, in particular its large shipbuilding companies, welcomes the 
planned unilateral actions by the EU on strengthening environmental regulations.243 
Korea’s large shipbuilders believe that they can gain more orders for constructing high-
efficiency, eco-friendly ships once various EU technical and operational measures and 
MBMs are in place.244 In contrast to the positive attitudes to reducing GHG emissions 
from ships by Korean shipping associations and large shipbuilding companies, small 
and medium-sized shipping companies, however, are not so supportive of this kind of 
regulation. A survey in 2011 reveals that Korea’s small and medium-sized shipping 
firms were concerned that stricter environmental regulations on ships might increase 
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their manufacturing costs and weaken their price competitiveness, while their Chinese 
counterparts might not be influenced in this way.245 Due to this gap between different 
shipping firms, many small and medium-sized companies have not started their 
preparation for incorporating the EEDI and SEEMP measures,246 while large companies 
have responded quickly to meet the new requirements. For instance, the HHI has been 
keen to develop its environmentally friendly high-value vessels, including drillships, 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, mega containerships and those using LNG as a 
fuel.247 With this strategy, the HHI has achieved remarkable success in getting new 
orders. 
 
The Proposed MBMs at the IMO have been classified by the Korean shipping industry 
into three categories, namely a GHG Fund (or levy), an ETS and hybrid schemes 
combined with the EEDI.248 The strengths and weaknesses of these MBMs have been 
analysed by the Korean Government in collaboration with its shipping industry. 249 
Although the Korean shipping industry has not yet expressed its preference among the 
proposed MBMs, a 2010 survey of Korean shipping firms revealed that most Korean 
shipping firms support a carbon taxation scheme (or a levy) rather than an ETS as a 
MBM for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. In that survey, 
81 per cent of respondents welcomed carbon taxation because it is simple and easy to 
implement and the tax burden can be transferred to shippers.250 In other words, it is 
practical and directly reflects the polluter-pays principle.251 Only four carriers (19 per 
cent) preferred an ETS, and the opponents listed a number of reasons, such as: 
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• ‘inferiority in technology and investment source’; 
• ‘lack of ETS infrastructure and knowhow’; 
• ‘difficulties in fair allocation of CO2 emission rights to carriers’;  
• ‘time and cost burden for calculating CO2 emission amounts from present ships’; 
• ‘complexity in defining responsible bodies about emission rights and obligations’; and 
• ‘uncertainty in ETS market’.252  
 
This result is consistent with the opinions from the Korea Maritime Institute (KMI).253 
At the sixth Seoul International Maritime Forum held on 31 October 2012, the Vice 
President of the KMI asserted that among current proposed MBMs, only the GHG Fund 
scheme meets all the nine principles adopted by the 57th MEPC meeting at the IMO.254 
While supporting the GHG Fund as an appropriate MBM, he also suggested that an ETS 
could be employed simultaneously as a hybrid scheme.255 In this case, the GHG Fund 
serves as the in-sector GHG emissions reduction whereas the ETS will be responsible 
for the out-of-sector emissions reduction.256 Although it seems that this arrangement can 
achieve absolute emissions reduction, the significant administrative cost associated with 
the scheme makes this solution less attractive. 
 
In 2008, the KRS, Korea’s classification society, established an Energy & 
Environmental Business Centre. Its purpose is to incorporate the IMO’s regulations into 
domestic regulations, as well as introducing and operating possible MBMs whenever 
applicable.257 This step, compared with the practice in other UNFCCC non-Annex I 
States where MBMs are not so welcomed, suggests that Korea has attempted to take a 
lead in reducing GHG emissions from ships.258  
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The Korean shipping industry has responded positively to the GHG emissions issue. It 
supports the efforts of the IMO in reducing GHG emissions from ships, and contributes 
to the improvement of the EEDI formula. In contrast to the shipping industries in the 
other main shipping nations, the Korean shipping sector even welcomes the unilateral 
actions to be possibly adopted by the EU. When incorporating and implementing IMO 
regulations, the Korean shipping industry outperforms some of its counterparts and tries 
to take the lead in reducing GHG emissions from ships. Of the current proposed MBMs, 





India is peninsular in nature having a long coastline of about 7517 km and 1197 islands. 
Its natural resources, together with 13 major ports and 176 notified non-major ports,259 
support the development of its seaborne trade and the shipping industry. As at 1 January 
2013, India owned 742 vessels with 584 registered under Indian flags and 158 
registered under other flags, ranking it as a State which has the 16th largest fleet (in dwt) 
in the world. 260 The dwt it owned in that year covered 1.39 per cent of the world 
total.261 Meanwhile, with 1,385 vessels flying its flag, India also ranked as the 18th 
largest registered dwt flag State worldwide.262 With this shipping fleet, around 95 per 
cent of India’s trade in terms of volume and 68 per cent by value are transported by 
sea.263 It is projected that India’s share in global seaborne trade will rise to 9.3 per cent 
by 2020 from 3.66 per cent in January 2011.264 Additionally, India has been keen to 
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expand its global market share in shipbuilding and ship repair. In 2011 India had around 
27 shipyards and 18 commercial dry docks for ship repairs. However, its shipbuilding or 
ship repair only covered about 1 per cent of global share in terms of value.265 In order to 
expand its global market share in the shipping industry, the Indian Government has 
taken various measures, including introducing a shipbuilding subsidy scheme and 
transfer of technology,266 to promote its shipping industry. 
 
The Indian Government has responded to the mounting pressure to reduce GHG 
emissions from international shipping from the international community. It submitted a 
host of proposals to the IMO. Meanwhile, the shipping industry in India has also 
expressed its views towards this GHG issue through its shipping associations and 
shipping companies. They are the Indian National Shipowners’ Association (INSA), the 
Shipyards Association of India (SAI), the Indian Coastal Conference Shipping 
Association (ICCSA) and some large shipping companies. 
 
India is perhaps one of the most active developing countries which strongly support the 
incorporation of the CBDR principle into the global reduction of GHG emissions from 
ships. As the ‘torchbearer’ of the Indian shipping industry, the INSA mainly represents 
the interests of Indian shipowners. It believes that the CBDR principle should apply to 
this GHG issue. Accordingly, it asserts that the UNFCCC which backs the CBDR 
principle should be the central body regulating this GHG emissions issue, while the 
IMO which applies the NMFT principle should be responsible to the UNFCCC.267 This 
argument, regarding the regulation of MBMs, is logical on the basis that MBMs are 
arguably beyond the competence of the IMO, which according to the IMO Convention 
is primarily responsible for technical affairs. 268  As to technical and operational 
measures, the EEDI and SEEMP, which represent the technical and operational 
measures respectively, have been solely regulated by the IMO.269 
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The shipping industry in India takes the view that the newly-adopted EEDI and SEEMP 
are ‘not so benign’ due to its disadvantages in relation to shipping technologies when 
compared with other countries. 270  This might be true with regard to the decreased 
number of orders that India’s shipping industry has obtained in recent years. 
Consequently, the SAI suggested that domestic shipowners support Indian shipyards by 
placing their orders at home so as to change this situation. 271  Aside from its 
shipbuilding sector, the shipping companies in India have also encountered decreased 
business. As at 1 April 2011, Indian flagged vessels only carry 8.4 per cent of Indian 
trade cargo while the majority of seaborne trade was moved by overseas shipping 
companies.272 Facing the stringent EEDI requirements, the Indian shipping associations, 
such as the ICCSA, encourage their member companies to employ qualified vessels. For 
example, the Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. (SCI) has made it a rule that the EEDI 
should be implemented at design stage for its ships so as to reduce GHG emissions from 
ships.273 
 
Similar to its Chinese counterparts, the shipping industry in India does not welcome the 
adoption of any MBMs by the IMO.274 The INSA believes that these proposed MBMs 
will bring about ‘adverse outcomes’ for developing countries.275 The Indian shipping 
industry and its government have provided many reasons for their opposition to the 
proposed MBMs. These reasons include the possible incompatibility between the WTO 
rules and MBMs,276 lack of the CBDR principle,277 uncertainties and problems with 
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current MBMs, 278 an inequitable burden on developing countries 279 and the lack of 
specific and feasible financial, technological and capacity-building support from 
developed countries.280  
 
In summary, the shipping industry in India has a complex attitude towards the reduction 
of GHG emissions from international shipping. It doubts the role of the IMO in 
regulating this GHG emissions issue, but still encourages its shipbuilding and shipping 
companies to meet the EEDI and SEEMP requirements so as to expand its global 
market share. Meanwhile, it opposes the possible adoption of any MBMs by the IMO 
because it is feared that they would jeopardise the interests of the Indian shipping 




The three States examined in this section are all UNFCCC non-Annex I States. The 
responses from the shipping industries in these States on the GHG issue, however, are 
different. The shipping industries in China and the Republic of Korea support the efforts 
of the IMO in regulating the EEDI and SEEMP and have contributed much to the 
improvement of these requirements. The slight difference between them lies in the fact 
that China regrets that the CBDR principle was not fully incorporated into the newly-
amended Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 in July 2011. Nevertheless, the shipping 
industries in both China and the Republic of Korea are ready for the implementation of 
these rules. The shipping industry in India is generally against the EEDI and SEEMP; 
however, some large shipping companies have adjusted themselves to meet the new 
requirements. With regard to the proposed MBMs, the shipping industries in both China 
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and India are opposed to any type of MBMs, whereas the shipping industry in the 
Republic of Korea welcomes the adoption of a MBM to reduce GHG emissions from 
ships. Of the proposed MBMs, the Korean shipping industry prefers a GHG Fund or 
levy-related MBM rather than an ETS. These findings indicate the complexity of the 
regulatory interests of the shipping industries from UNFCCC non-Annex I States as to 
the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. The shipping industries in 
China and India are in a similar development stage, whereas the shipping industry of the 
Republic of Korea, which is an advanced OECD member State, already owns better 
energy-efficient shipbuilding technologies than its Chinese and Indian counterparts. It is 
thus arguable that imbalanced regulatory interests lead to their differing responses to the 




The response from the shipping industry is important for any issues to be regulated by 
the IMO. The industry puts forward suggestions or provides feedback for the 
introduction of a new instrument, and comes up with possible initiatives to implement 
the instrument after it is adopted. 282  This also applies to the reduction of GHG 
emissions from international shipping. 
 
The international and regional shipping organisations support the leading role of the 
IMO in reducing GHG emissions from ships. Although some of them prefer the 
adoption of operational measures rather than technical measures, these organisations 
have come to share a recognition that both measures would help to reduce GHG 
emissions. Currently they are still contributing to the further reduction of GHG 
emissions from international shipping, including extending the coverage of the EEDI to 
include most types of new ships, strengthening the implementation of adopted EEDI 
and SEEMP and enhancing the energy efficiency of international shipping by other 
means. As to the proposed MBMs, most international shipowners and ship operators 
associations prefer a GHG Fund or levy-related MBM be applied to the GHG issue, 
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while the bunker sector supports an ETS. While most of these organisations claim that 
the NMFT principle should be solely applied to the issue, the international shipowners 
association also regards the incorporation of the CBDR principle into such measures as 
acceptable. It appears that the adoption of an MBM for the further reduction of GHG 
emissions from ships is acceptable to international and regional shipping organisations. 
Generally the global shipping industry prefers a GHG Fund or levy-related MBM, 
although it also asserts that a MBM should not be adopted for the time being.  
 
At the national level, the shipping industries from various countries generally support 
the reduction of shipping GHG emissions by regulating the EEDI and SEEMP 
measures. The main disagreement among them occurs with regard to the proposed 
MBMs. Generally, the UNFCCC Annex I States support the adoption of an MBM but 
disagree on their preferred MBMs. Australia and the UK support an ETS and accept the 
application of the CBDR principle in this regard while Greece prefers a GHG Fund or 
levy relevant MBM. Within the UNFCCC non-Annex I States, the Korean shipping 
industry prefers a GHG Fund or levy-related MBM, whereas China and India believe 
that it is still premature to adopt any MBM at this stage. Therefore, it seems that the 
willingness of a country’s shipping industry to accept an MBM depends on the 
development stage of the country. More developed countries possessing better 
technologies tend to accept an MBM more easily. Furthermore, as more developed 
countries and shipping associations accept the application of both the CBDR and the 
NMFT principles to the global regulation of GHG emissions from international 
shipping, it seems that finding ways to incorporate both principles into the issue under 
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The previous chapters have identified the responses of the UN, the IMO and the 
shipping industry to the issue of regulating Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions from 
international shipping. As discussed in Chapter 2, flag States, coastal States and port 
States are also stakeholders in the GHG issue due to their prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction on this matter. Theoretically, a State can be a flag State, a coastal State and 
a port State at the same time. However, in terms of GHG emissions from international 
shipping, coastal State jurisdictional authority over foreign flagged vessels in its 
maritime zones is limited, as compared with port State powers.1 The 2011 amendment 
of Annex VI to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL 73/78)2 secured important roles for flag States and port States in reducing 
GHG emissions from international shipping. The responses from the main flag States 
and port States to this issue are thus worthy of comprehensive assessment. 
 
This chapter first discusses flag State control and the issue of ‘flags of convenience’. 
Having established the central role of the flag State in ensuring the compliance of ships 
under its register with IMO regulations, this chapter then examines the response from 
selected main flag States to the issue of GHG emissions from international shipping. 
The States examined are Greece and Japan under Annex I to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 3  and Panama, China and 
Vanuatu which are not listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC. This chapter then examines 
the response from port States from two perspectives. The views from some influential 
global and regional port State organisations, such as the International Association of 
Ports and Harbors (IAPH) and regional Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) on port 
                                                 
1  A coastal State’s jurisdiction in its territorial sea and archipelagic waters is restricted by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) in order to maintain navigational rights and an equitable balance between 
coastal States and foreign flag States, whereas its enforcement jurisdiction in the EEZ and high seas is generally not 
applicable to GHG emissions from international shipping. In regulating GHG emissions from ships, the LOSC 
provides flag States and port States with more jurisdictional authority. See ch 2, 2.2.  
2 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), signed 2 November 1973, 12 
ILM 1319, as amended by the 1978 Protocol to the 1973 Convention, 1341 UNTS 3, 17 ILM 546 (entered into force 
2 October 1983).  
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 31 ILM 848 (entered 




State control, are examined first. This chapter then briefly examines the response from 
selected port States.  
 
6.2 Flag State Control and the Issue of ‘Flags of Convenience’ 
 
MARPOL 73/78 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)4 
have enabled flag States to have primary prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction over 
the prevention of vessel source pollution, including GHG emissions from international 
shipping. Coastal States and port States have limited jurisdiction over the ships flagged 
by other countries. 5 Theoretically, a flag State will ensure that ships flying its flag 
comply with the technical and operational measures regulated by the IMO, namely the 
Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management 
Plan (SEEMP). However, in practice, a number of flag States are ‘either unable or 
unwilling’ to fulfil their duties in regulating and enforcing standards, similar to other 
vessel-source pollution measures.6 This concern is often attributed to the issue of a ‘flag 
of convenience’ (FOC) or the ‘open registration’ of ships. 
 
The terms FOC and ‘open registration/registry’ emerged in the practice of international 
shipping during the mid-1940s, and have been widely used since 1950.7 Ships registered 
in such States are called ‘ships under a FOC’, and countries trading in their flag are 
called ‘FOC countries’ or ‘open-registry countries’. Accordingly, the countries where 
the registers are open only to ships of their own country are often called ‘close-registry 
countries’. However, in practice almost all registers cater for both national and foreign 
shipowners, and in recent years open registries have been increasingly utilised by 
shipowners.8 Although there is no uniform definition of an FOC,9 some of the features 
                                                 
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 16 November 1994) (‘LOSC’).  
5 Andrew Griffin, 'MARPOL 73/78 and Vessel Pollution: A Glass Half Full or Half Empty?' (1994) 1(2) Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 489, 506.  
6 Ho-Sam Bang, 'Is Port State Control an Effective Means to Combat Vessel-Source Pollution? An Empirical Survey 
of the Practical Exercise by Port States of Their Powers of Control' (2008) 23(4) The International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law 715, 715; See also Amborse Rajadurai, 'Regulation of Shipping: The Vital Role of Port State 
Control' (2004) 18 Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal 83, 86.  
7 Francisco J. Montero Llácer, 'Open Registers: Past, Present and Future' (2003) 27(6) Marine Policy 513, 514; G. S. 
Egiyan, '‘Flag of Convenience’ or ‘Open Registration’ of Ships' (1990) 14(2) Marine Policy 106, 106.  
8 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 'Review of Maritime Transport 2013' (2013) 




normally associated with an FOC have become generally accepted. These features 
include the lack of a ‘genuine link’ between the ship (or shipowner) and the State of 
registration (or ship flag State),10 the shipowners’ incentive of avoiding obstacles or 
restrictions in their own countries so as to obtain maximum financial and administrative 
benefits 11  and the FOC State’s motivation of obtaining income from the ship’s 
registry.12  
 
In terms of the relationship between flag State control and the FOC issue in reducing 
GHG emissions from international shipping, most current academic research indicates 
that the FOC has undermined the effectiveness of flag State control under MARPOL 
73/78 and LOSC.13 This argument is based on three factors. First, MARPOL 73/78 and 
LOSC leave room for flexible flag State enforcement jurisdiction. Article 194(1) of the 
LOSC requires States to take ‘the best practicable means at their disposal and in 
accordance with their capabilities’ to prevent, reduce and control marine pollution.14 
Indeed, this article authorises the flag State, and in practice usually also the ship 
operators, to utilise ‘the best practicable means’ at their discretion. This regulation 
makes it possible for substandard vessel operations to be regarded as legal and 
appropriate under the LOSC. For this reason, a ‘double standard’ among the practice of 
                                                                                                                                               
9 See, eg, Egiyan defines the FOC as ‘national flags of those States in which shipowners register their ships so as to 
avoid: (a) financial obligations; and (b) the nature and conditions of shipping were their vessels registered in their 
own countries’. Egiyan, above n 7, 107; Griffin defines the FOC as ‘flags of certain countries whose laws make it 
easy and attractive for ships owned by foreign nationals or companies to fly these flags’. Griffin, above n 5, 506.  
10 See, eg, Llácer, above n 7, 520. See also LOSC art 91(1). This provision requires a genuine link between the flag 
State and the ship. However, what constitutes the ‘genuine link’ and the effect of its absence has not been addressed 
in the LOSC. Some scholars, such as J.H.W.Verzijl and R.R.Churchill, suggest that the genuine link refers to ‘the 
conditions of attribution of nationality’. Some competent international organisations, such as the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the IMO, underscore that the purpose of the genuine link is to ‘secure 
more effective implementation of the duties of the flag State’ over ships flying its flag. See, eg, J.H.W Verzijl, 
International Law in Historical Perspective, Part V, Nationality and Other Matters Relating to Individuals (A.W. 
Sijthoff-Leiden, 1972) 149; R. R. Churchill, 'The Meaning of the "Genuine Link" Requirement in relation to the 
Nationality of Ships. A Study Prepared for the International Transport Workers' Federation' (2000) 
<http://www.itfglobal.org/seafarers/icons-site/images/ITF-Oct2000.pdf> accessed 1 July 2014, pp39, 69; Vincent P. 
Cogliati-Bantz, 'Disentangling the "Genuine Link": Enquiries in Sea, Air and Space Law' (2010) 79(3) Nordic 
Journal of International Law 383, 406, 411.  
11 Through registering their ships in FOC countries, the shipowners may get such benefits as the easy registration of 
vessels, freedom from income taxes and lower other taxes, uncontrolled use of cash, possibility of hiring low-paid 
crew and reducing their numbers, reduced operating expenses and greater freedom from control by the flag State. 
See, eg, G. S. Egiyan, 'The Principle of Genuine Link and the 1986 UN Convention on the Registration of Ships' 
(1988) 12(3) Marine Policy 314, 315; Egiyan, above n 7, 107; Griffin, above n 5, 506.  
12  Bill Shaw, 'The Global Environment: A Proposal to Eliminate Marine Oil Pollution' (1987) 27(1) Natural 
Resources Journal 157, 160-163.  
13 See, eg, Egiyan, above n 11, 315; Griffin, above n 5, 507; Llácer, above n 7, 520.  




different flag States is established.15 Furthermore, Article 207(4) of the LOSC allows 
developing States to take into account their ‘economic capacity’ and ‘their need for 
economic development’ when they exercise their jurisdiction in relation to marine 
pollution. 16  This article does not incorporate the Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility (CBDR) principle, 17 and it only applies to pollution from land-based 
sources. Nevertheless, the fact that most FOC States are developing countries makes it 
possible for FOC States to utilise this provision to protect their substandard ships.18 
Meanwhile, MARPOL 73/78 also provides flag States with certain flexibility with 
respect to their enforcement jurisdiction. For instance, flag States shall investigate 
discharge violations and punish ships provided there is ‘sufficient evidence’, while the 
judging of ‘sufficient evidence’ is at the discretion of the flag States.19  
 
The second factor for FOC’s undermining flag State control is that, the FOC States do 
not have sufficient incentive to rigorously enforce pollution prevention measures over 
ships under their flag. This is because the primary motivation of an FOC State is to 
obtain income by registration fees. It is for this reason that some FOC States do not take 
their jurisdiction seriously. The third factor is that, most of the developing FOC States 
do not have sufficient capacity and resources to prescribe relevant pollution prevention 
measures, or to enforce, investigate or prosecute violations by ships under an FOC.20 
Partly due to these concerns, the UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships 
(UNCCRS) 21  was adopted in 1986 by a conference of plenipotentiaries under the 
                                                 
15 Erik Jaap Molenaar, Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution (Kluwer Law International, 1998) 53.  
16 LOSC art 207(4).  
17 The CBDR principle requires both developed and developing countries to contribute to addressing environmental 
problems and imposes the primary responsibility on developed countries due to their different historical contributions 
to the problems and the differentiated capability of developed and developing countries. A detailed discussion on the 
CBDR principle is provided in chapter 2, 2.5.  
18 As at 1 January 2012, ships registered in developing countries covered 26.41 per cent of the world fleet by 
deadweight tonnage, and this number reached 56.62 per cent for ships registered in the 10 major open and 
international registries. These 10 FOC countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bermuda, Cyprus, Isle of Man, 
Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Panama, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), 'Review of Maritime Transport 2012' (2012) 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2012_en.pdf> accessed 1 June 2013, p 46, Table 2.8.  
19 MARPOL 73/78 art 6(4)(5); Griffin, above n 5, 508.  
20  Gini Mattson, 'MARPOL 73/78 and Annex I: An Assessment of Its Effectiveness' (2006) 9(2) Journal of 
International Wildlife Law & Policy 175, 191.  
21 United Nations Convention on Conditions for the Registration of Ships, opened for signature 7 February 1986, 26 




auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
This convention aims to strengthen maritime administrations and ship operators’ 
identification through a ‘genuine link’ so as to address the FOC issue. To achieve this 
goal, the UNCCRS defines operator as the owner or any other national or juridical 
person to whom the responsibilities of the owner have been formally assigned.22 Since 
the owner and the operator of a ship are not always the same person, company or 
organisation, the required concepts of genuine link and beneficial ownership remain 
unaddressed under the UNCCRS.23 To date the UNCCRS has not entered into force.24 
 
Although FOC registries undermine flag State control regulations under MARPOL 
73/78 and LOSC, ships under an FOC are not necessarily substandard ships.25 Rather, 
the negative impacts of an FOC could be addressed if mechanisms are strengthened. 
First, the No More Favourable Treatment principle (NMFT),26 as discussed in previous 
chapters, could be applied to the prescription and enforcement of GHG emissions from 
international shipping to minimise the negative impact of an FOC. In this case, it would 
be less likely for ships to avoid the application of IMO GHG regulations by means of 
registering in FOC countries. Nevertheless, the application of the NMFT principle to 
this issue does not necessarily exclude the simultaneous application of the CBDR 
principle. 27  Second, some FOC countries exercise their jurisdiction and enforce 
compliance by ships flying their flags with IMO regulations. Indeed, many of the 
world’s leading shipowners with excellent reputations for concern about environmental 
issues flag their ships with FOC countries, and many charterers with good reputations 
regularly charter FOC ships.28 It is thus asserted by some scholars that substandard 
                                                 
22 UNCCRS art 2.  
23 George Kasoulides, 'The 1986 United Nations Convention on the Conditions for Registration of Vessels and the 
Question of Open Registry' (1989) 20(6) Ocean Development and International Law 543, 566. Kasoulides asserts 
that the link between a State and a ship flying its flag remains one of administrative competence under the 1986 
UNCCRS, and for this reason the convention failed to clarify the most critical issues. Rather, the UNCCRS simply 
reinforced the status quo of the FOC.  
24 Article 19 of the UNCCRS provides that ‘the Convention shall enter into force 12 months after the date on which 
not less than 40 States, the combined tonnage of which amounts to at least 25 per cent of the world tonnage, have 
become Contracting Parties to it’. Nevertheless, as at 9 October 2013, only 15 States have ratified the convention.  
25 See Kasoulides, above n 23.  
26 The NMFT principle refers to ‘port States enforcing applicable standards in a uniform manner to all ships in their 
ports, regardless of flag’. A detailed discussion on the NMFT principle is provided in chapter 2, 2.5.  
27 See ch 2, 2.5.3.  




shipping does not have much to do with the concept of FOC but rather with ‘the manner 
in which individual ship registers are administered’.29 Therefore, to better implement 
the EEDI and SEEMP measures in reducing GHG emissions from ships by flag States, 
the key lies in the commitment of flag States to deal with this issue. The response from 
the main flag States, including an FOC State, is provided in the following section to 
examine the positions of flag States on the GHG issue.  
 
6.3 Response from Main Flag States 
 
As at 1 January 2013, ships registered in developed countries and countries with 
economies in transition accounted for 24.08 per cent of the world fleet by dead weight 
tonnage (dwt), whereas ships flying the flags of developing countries covered 75.49 per 
cent of the world fleet by dwt.30 As at 1 January 2012, the ten major FOC countries 
alone covered 56.62 per cent of the world fleet by dwt.31 However, these figures do not 
reveal the role developing flag States play within the IMO GHG regime. Although 
flagged by most of the world fleet by dead weight tonnage, developing flag States, in 
particular the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS), have rarely expressed their views to the IMO.32 These flag States typically lack 
capacity and resources, but their positions on the GHG issue are worthy of examination 
if uniform enforcement of the IMO’s regulatory initiatives is to be achieved.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
<https://www.parismou.org/Publications/Annual_report/> accessed 28 September 2013, p 31. Based on the 2012 
Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Annual Report on Port State Control, seven out of top 10 FOC States 
were in the ‘White List’. These seven countries are Bahamas, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Panama 
and Antigua and Barbuda. Under the Paris MOU, the ‘White, Gray and Black List’ represents three different levels of 
performance by flags, ranging from quality flags (‘White Listed flags’) to flags with a poor performance that are 
considered high (‘Gray Listed flags’) or very high risk (‘Black Listed flags’). This ranking is based on the total 
number of inspections and detentions over a three-year rolling period for flags with at least 30 inspections in this 
period. Paris MOU, New Targeting Lists Paris MOU (16 June 2014) <https://www.parismou.org/new-targeting-lists-
paris-mou> accessed 1 July 2014.  
29 Ibid.  
30 UNCTAD, above n 8, 57.  
31 UNCTAD, above n 18. These 10 major FOC countries are listed at reference 18.  
32 To date these large developing countries have actively participated in the discussions and negotiations on the GHG 
issue within the IMO, whereas small developing countries and FOC States have not contributed much to the IMO’s 




Developing flag States can be roughly classified into major FOC States, 33  major 
developing flag States, and other developing States. The views from the shipping 
industries in these countries on the GHG issue differ. As discussed earlier, major FOC 
States are often more interested in obtaining income from registering foreign ships than 
effectively managing the ships flying their flags, and the number of ships owned by 
their nationals is negligible. Major developing flag States are usually importing 
countries, such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Saudi Arabia. Most of these 
countries have a large owned fleet, 34  and as major importing countries their 
international trade can be easily affected by the IMO’s regulatory measures. 35 
Therefore, these countries, including their shipping industries, have actively participated 
in the IMO’s regulatory discussions and contributed to this regulatory process. Apart 
from the above two types of developing countries, the remainder of the developing 
countries, including the LDCs and SIDS, are in the third category of other developing 
States. Generally these countries do not have long coastlines or significant shipping 
industries. The interests of the shipping industries in these countries are thus different 
from those of the shipping industries in other developing flag States. To examine the 
responses from the shipping industries in these three types of developing flag States, 
Panama, China and Vanuatu have been selected as illustrative examples. As to the case 
studies from UNFCCC Annex I States on their responses to this GHG issue, Greece and 
Japan have been selected as examples due to their geographical representativeness and 
important roles in global maritime transportation. 
 
6.3.1 The UNFCCC Annex I Flag States 
 
Many flag States under Annex I of the UNFCCC, such as Norway, Denmark and 
Germany, actively participated in the discussions and negotiations that led to the 
adoption of the amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 in 2011. Meanwhile the 
positions of these flag States on the proposed market-based measures (MBMs) also 
                                                 
33 Based on the groupings established by the UNCTAD, major FOC States refer to those countries where more than 
90 per cent of their flagged ships by tonnage are owned by foreign nationals. UNCTAD, above n 8, 46.  
34 For example, as of 1 January 2012 China and South Korea owned the fourth and fifth largest fleets in the world 
respectively while India, Brazil and Saudi Arabia ranked the 16th, 21st and 22nd largest fleets in the world 
respectively. UNCTAD, above n 8, 41.  
35 Tao Wang and Jim Watson, 'China's Carbon Emissions and International Trade: Implications for Post-2012 Policy' 




shaped the direction of MBMs regulation by the IMO. This section examines the 
response of Greece and Japan, the two influential flag States with the largest owned 




Greece is one of the major flag States in the world. As at 1 January 2013, Greece ranked 
sixth in the world among the flags of registration with the largest registered deadweight 
tonnage, following Panama, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Chinese Hong Kong and 
Singapore.36 The dwt of the ships flying the flag of Greece was 75,424,000, which 
accounted for 4.63 per cent of the world share.37 In terms of dwt, 92.60 per cent of the 
ships flying the Greek flag were owned by Greek nationals.38 In the same year, Greece 
owned the largest fleet in the world with 244,850,578 dwt, which covered 15.17 per 
cent of the world fleet.39 Of these Greek owned fleets, 71.56 per cent of them (in dwt) 
flew the flags of foreign States. 40  As a traditional maritime power, Greece has 
participated actively in drafting international maritime regulations and has a solid record 
of complying with them. In contrast to the response from the Greek shipping industry 
discussed in Chapter 5, the position of the Greek Government on the GHG emissions 
issue is slightly different and has experienced an evolution.  
 
Similar to many other countries, Greece acknowledged the need for further reduction of 
GHG emissions from international shipping due to projected growth in world trade and 
seaborne transportation, although it asserted that shipping is the most energy efficient 
mode of transport. 41  Greece strongly supported the leading role of the IMO in 
addressing the GHG issue on shipping due to the IMO’s extensive technical and 
scientific expertise and the global application of the rules developed by the IMO.42 It 
                                                 
36 UNCTAD, above n 8, 56.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid 43.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (16 October 
2008) annex 9, p 8.  




asserted that a reduction target, if it is to be set, should be prescribed by the IMO.43 It is 
still controversial as to whether a reduction target should be set within the global 
shipping industry or global transportation sector, and how and by which international 
organisation such target should be established.44 While insisting that a reduction target 
should be set by the IMO, Greece also underscored that this target should not lead to 
distortions of competition in international trade.45 
 
At the 58th MEPC meeting in 2008, Greece expressed its view that a holistic approach 
should be employed to effectively reduce GHG emissions from ships and protect the 
environment. It asserted that factors such as the availability of technologies to reduce 
emissions, the need to encourage innovation and the economics of world trade should 
be taken into account during the development of regulatory frameworks.46 Additionally, 
Greece advocated that three fundamental principles should be applied to any future 
climate mitigation based regulation of shipping. They were: 
 
• ‘Regulation must be flag neutral to ensure a level playing field for shipping and 
agreed internationally to ensure consistency. 
• Regulation must focus on relative reduction with a view to continuously improving 
efficiency of the individual ship and realize that absolute reduction objectives are not 
within reach given the growth in world trade. 
• Regulation must ensure the free choice of method via goal based standard to 
promote innovation and cost effective solutions.’47 
 
The first principle indicates that Greece supported the application of the NMFT 
principle to this GHG issue, which has received strong support from many countries due 
to the existence of FOCs. The first half sentence of the second principle aims at 
improving the energy efficiency of ships by means of technical and operational 
measures, which is technically appropriate. However, the second half sentence of this 
                                                 
43 Ibid.  
44 See, eg, China and India asserted that a reduction target could be set by the UNFCCC; Norway believed that a cap 
on the shipping industry could be set associated with a market-based measure; the World Shipping Council 
considered a reduction target only applicable to maritime shipping inappropriate in the absence of a broader approach 
to regulating transportation emissions at the national and global level. Report of the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 22, IMO Doc MEPC 60/22 (12 April 2010) p 42. 
A detailed discussion on this issue is provided in Chapter 7.  
45 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (16 October 
2008) Annex 9, p 9.  
46 Ibid.  




principle denies the possibility of absolute emissions reduction by any future regulation, 
which probably ignores the possibility of future adoption of MBMs. Indeed, the 
international community has not reached consensus on whether the technical and 
operational measures can achieve absolute emissions reduction. In 2011, an IMO-
commissioned report concluded that the technical and operational measures adopted by 
the IMO (EEDI and SEEMP) alone would not achieve absolute emissions reduction.48 
Nevertheless, the conclusions of this report were regarded as ‘doubtful’ by China due to 
the ‘significant uncertainties’ and ‘lack of transparency’ relating to the calculation 
process of that study.49 At the 65th MEPC meeting in May 2013, the IMO suspended its 
regulatory discussion on MBMs and attempted to establish attained energy efficiency 
standards for new and existing ships through a phased approach, as proposed by the 
US.50 Therefore, it is premature for Greece to assert the second principle, which may 
reflect its priority in promoting its international trade rather than maximising global 
environmental protection. The third principle underscores the freedom from prescription 
in regulating the GHG issue. This position is consistent with the response from the 
global shipping industry as discussed in Chapter 5, and was adopted by the 2011 
amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78.  
 
Greece has actively participated in the discussions on the improvement of the technical 
measures relating to the EEDI. Greece’s contribution mainly lies in four interrelated 
aspects of the EEDI. These are verification and certification of the EEDI, the EEDI 
formula, the method of calculation of the EEDI and safety issues related to EEDI. First, 
Greece proposed an improved procedure for the verification and certification of the 
EEDI by the Administration (flag State). It asserted that for any verification or even 
certification of the EEDI, sea trials should be conducted first so as to obtain 
measurements data, and then an approval by the Administration would be appropriate.51 
This procedure was adopted by the 2012 Guidelines on Survey and Certification of the 
                                                 
48  Zabi Bazari and Tore Longva, 'Assessment of IMO Mandated Energy Efficiency Measures for International 
Shipping' ( IMO Doc MEPC 63/INF.2, Annex, 31 October 2011) para 12.14.  
49 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Third Session, MEPC 63rd Session, Agenda 
Item 23, IMO Doc MEPC 63/23 (14 March 2012) annex 7, p 1.  
50 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Fifth Session, MEPC 65th Session, Agenda 
Item 22, IMO Doc MEPC 65/22 (24 May 2013) pp 42-43, 47.  
51 Report on the Outcome of the Second Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions 




Energy Efficiency Design Index.52 Second, Greece identified several deficiencies in the 
proposed EEDI formula, such as the EEDI reference line, lack of lifecycle 
considerations and possible misapplication of the EEDI for underpowered ships. 53 
Additionally, Greece proposed improvement to the EEDI formula so as to ensure 
optimisation of ship design for energy efficiency and meeting the needs of an MBM 
with the EEDI as its benchmark.54 These proposals prompted significant discussions 
and contributed to the improvement of the EEDI formula. Third, Greece proposed to 
improve the method of calculation of the attained EEDI for new ships by means of 
including a correction factor to account for shallow water restrictions and innovative 
energy efficiency technologies.55 Fourth, Greece was concerned that the proposed EEDI 
formula would work against safety by penalising safer or more robust structural features 
of ships or ignoring their manoeuvrability in adverse conditions,56 so it suggested an 
improvement of the EEDI formula and regulation of minimum propulsion power.57 
These proposals were discussed within the IMO and were partially adopted by the IMO 
in the amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. 
 
The positions of Greece on the MBMs in tackling GHG emissions from ships have 
experienced an evolution. At the 58th MEPC meeting in 2008, Greece lodged two 
                                                 
52  2012 Guidelines on Survey and Certification of the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), Resolution 
MEPC.214(63), IMO Doc MEPC 63/23/Add.1 Annex 10 (2 March 2012) (‘EEDI Survey and Certification 
Guidelines’) Figure 1.  
53 Comments on the EEDI Baseline Formula, submitted by Greece, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc 
MEPC 60/4/15 (15 January 2010) para 5.  
54 Greece hoped to improve the EEDI formula to meet the requirements of a hybrid MBM. A detailed discussion on 
hybrid MBMs is provided in chapter 3. Further Prospects for EEDI Improvement, submitted by Greece, MEPC 62nd 
Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/6 (5 May 2011) p 2.  
55 Regulations 20 and 21 of the revised Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 divide the EEDI into attained EEDI and required 
EEDI, and both of them are calculated by a formula based on the technical design parameters for a given ship. 
Attained EEDI refers to the EEDI value achieved by an individual ship while required EEDI is the maximum value of 
attained EEDI that is allowed by Regulation 21 of the Annex VI for the specific ship type and size. See ch 4, 4.3.3.1.  
Guidance on the Treatment of Innovative Energy Efficiency Technologies for Calculation and Verification of the 
Attained EEDI, MEPC 64th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 64/4/39 (9 August 2012); Proposal for 
Amendments to the 2012 Guidelines on the Method of Calculation of the Attained Energy Efficiency Design Index 
(EEDI) for New Ships for Inclusion of A Correction Factor to Account For Shallow Water Restrictions, submitted by 
Greece, MEPC 65th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 65/4/17 (8 March 2013).  
56 The proposed EEDI formula might lead to larger ships’ steel weight and smaller deadweight tonnage, which 
involves safety risks. Consideration of Safety Issues Related To EEDI, submitted by Greece, MEPC 61st Session, 
Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/23 (5 August 2010) para 2.  
57 Ibid; Minimum Propulsion Power to Maintain the Manoeuvrability in Adverse Conditions, submitted by Greece, 




statements as Annexes to two IMO reports,58 but these statements expressed the same 
view on the proposed MBMs. Greece asserted that it opposed MBMs and reserved its 
position on MBM proposals until full impact assessments had been conducted and their 
results made available. 59  The assessments should at least address three concerns, 
namely the added value in energy efficiency to be achieved by the world fleet, their 
multifaceted impact on international shipping, and their indiscriminate and smooth 
implementation.60 These views indicate that at that time Greece was not supportive of 
MBMs due to the lack of detailed studies of MBM proposals. However, Greece changed 
its position in less than two years. At the 60th MEPC meeting in 2010, when the three 
concerns had not been addressed, Greece expressed its ‘qualified support’ for the 
proposed MBM on an International GHG Fund as ‘an early indication of its preference’ 
compared with the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).61 It considered a carbon levy as a 
more effective MBM than an ETS, and believed that for the same environmental impact 
a levy would be less costly to world trade. 62  Specifically, Greece treated the 
International GHG Fund as a type of levy scheme. This preference, however, is 
consistent with the view from the Greek shipping industry as discussed in Chapter 5. It 
is possible that the Greek shipping industry lobbied the Greek Government to adopt this 
change of position.  
 
The views of Greece on its preferred MBM were further strengthened by two 
subsequent proposals that Greece submitted to the IMO in 2011. 63  It grouped the 
proposed MBM proposals into four categories, namely a levy scheme (the GHG Fund), 
an ETS, hybrid MBM proposals that include EEDI (including the proposals submitted 
                                                 
58 Report of the Outcome of the First Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Ships, MEPC 58th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4 (4 July 2008) Annex 9, pp 1-2; Report of the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (16 October 2008) Annex 9, 
pp 8-10.  
59 Report of the Outcome of the First Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Ships, MEPC 58th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4 (4 July 2008) Annex 9, p 1.  
60 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (16 October 
2008) Annex 9, p 10.  
61 An International Fund for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, submitted by Greece, MEPC 60th Session, 
Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/49 (29 January 2010) para 3.  
62 Ibid para 5.3.  
63  The two documents are: Grouping and Evaluation of Proposed MBMs, submitted by Greece, Intersessional 
Meeting of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd Session, Agenda Item 3, IMO Doc GHG-WG 3/3 
(24 February 2011); MBM Proposals: A Way Ahead, submitted by Greece, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO 




by Japan, World Shipping Council and the United States), and all other proposals.64 As 
discussed in Chapter 4, as of May 2013 the current MBM proposals can be summarised 
into seven types as follows: 
 
• GHG Fund, one option was proposed by Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall Islands, 
Nigeria and the International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA), and the other option 
was proposed by the Clean Shipping Coalition (CSC);65 
• Port State Levy, proposed by Jamaica;66 
• Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS), proposed by Japan and World Shipping Council 
(WSC);67 
• Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading (SECT), proposed by the United States;68 
• Global Emissions Trading System (ETS) for international shipping, three options 
proposed by Norway (Germany was later added as co-sponsor), United Kingdom, and 
France respectively;69 
• Penalty on Trade and Development, proposed by Bahamas;70 and 
• Rebate Mechanism (RM) for a market-based instrument for international shipping, 
proposed by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)71 
 
Although based on the nature of MBM proposals, the ‘Port State Levy’ and ‘Penalty on 
Trade and Development’ could also be types of levies, Greece put these two MBM 
proposals into the category of ‘all other proposals’. After grouping these MBM 
proposals, Greece narrowed the list of proposed MBMs into two groups, namely the 
                                                 
64 Grouping and Evaluation of Proposed MBMs, submitted by Greece, Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group 
on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd Session, Agenda Item 3, IMO Doc GHG-WG 3/3 (24 February 2011) p 7, para 32.  
65 This proposal is to establish a global reduction target for international shipping, set by either UNFCCC or IMO. 
Emissions above the target line would be offset largely by purchasing approved emission reduction credits. The 
offsetting activities would be financed by a contribution paid by ships on every tonne of bunker fuel purchased.  
66 This proposal aims to levy a uniform emissions charge on all vessels calling at a port based on the amount of fuel 
consumed by the respective vessel on its voyage to that port (not bunker suppliers). The CBDR principle could be 
achieved through a self-administered national or regional fund and/or some international mechanism.  
67 According to this proposal, all new ships, except for those which meet pre-set EEDI thresholds, and existing ships 
are required to make payment contributions based on the amount of the bunker fuel consumed/purchased and the 
degree to which the ship’s efficiency falls short of a specific standard. Funds collected go to an International GHG 
Fund and its Parties decide how to allocate the revenue either to long-term in-sector reduction or to a fund to be 
established under the UNFCCC.  
68 Subject all ships to mandatory energy efficiency standards. As one means of complying with the standard, an 
efficiency-credit trading program would be established, and these standards would become more stringent over time. 
Currently this proposal becomes an optional addition to a phased approach energy efficiency proposal newly-
submitted by the United States. 
69 This proposal aims to set a sector-wide cap on net emissions from international shipping. A number of allowances 
(Ship Emission Units) corresponding to the cap would be released into the market each year via a global auctioning 
process. The units could then be traded.  
70 This proposal holds that the imposition of any costs should be proportionate to the contribution by international 
shipping to global CO2  emissions. The reduction will apply to individual ships and not Member States, and 
developing States will not be faced with a penalty upon trade and development.  
71 This proposal aims to compensate developing countries for the financial impact of an MBM. It could be either 
applied to any maritime MBM which generates revenue (add-on option) or integrated with the International Maritime 




International GHG Fund and an ETS. To justify its argument, Greece first put in 
abeyance the hybrid MBM proposals with the EEDI as the benchmark due to the fact 
that the EEDI cannot be applied to existing ships as well as for other technical 
reasons.72 Then Greece eliminated the category of ‘all other proposals’. It considered 
the Port State Levy proposal could not be implemented in a cost-effective manner due 
to technical uncertainty in monitoring emissions, and that ships may opt for routes 
through ports that lack monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to avoid the levy.73 
The Penalty on Trade and Development proposal was also asserted by Greece to be 
infeasible due to technical difficulty in the universal application of the Energy 
Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI).74 It also argued that the rebate mechanism is a 
‘cumbersome’ measurement of a country’s share of global emissions based on the 
country’s global imports, imposes a high administrative cost, and would potentially lead 
to unfairness and fraud.75 Based on the above analysis, Greece believed that the only 
feasible options were the levy scheme (GHG Fund) and an ETS. While Germany 
concluded that an ETS would be more cost effective than the GHG Fund, Greece 
asserted that a GHG Fund could achieve the same environmental result at half the price 
of an ETS or even less. 76  Its argument was underpinned by analysis from many 
perspectives such as the certainty in relation to a cap compared with that of a price, 
administrative burden, carbon leakage, evasion and fraud and experience from other 
contexts.77 Therefore, the view of Greece that only the GHG Fund and the ETS should 
be further analysed has been supported by a number of countries.78  
                                                 
72 At the time of the analysis by Greece, there were three hybrid MBM proposals that include the EEDI, namely 
Japan’s LIS proposal, WSC’s VES proposal and the US’s SECT proposal. The LIS and VES proposals proposed by 
Japan and WSC respectively later merged into one MBM proposal, which is Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS) as 
listed in the text. However, the nature of this new MBM proposal (EIS) with the EEDI as the benchmark remains, so 
Greece’s analysis on previous three hybrid MBM proposals still applies to current two hybrid MBM proposals that 
include the EEDI. 
73 Grouping and Evaluation of Proposed MBMs, submitted by Greece, Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group 
on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd Session, Agenda Item 3, IMO Doc GHG-WG 3/3 (24 February 2011) paras 43-45.  
74 Ibid para 53.  
75 Grouping and Evaluation of Proposed MBMs, submitted by Greece, Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group 
on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd Session, Agenda Item 3, IMO Doc GHG-WG 3/3 (24 February 2011) paras 46-50.  
76 MBM Proposals: A Way Ahead, submitted by Greece, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/7 
(6 May 2011) para 11.  
77 Grouping and Evaluation of Proposed MBMs, submitted by Greece, Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group 
on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd Session, Agenda Item 3, IMO Doc GHG-WG 3/3 (24 February 2011) pp 10-15.  
78 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Third Session, MEPC 63rd Session, Agenda 





Greece’s comments on current MBM proposals, in particular on their deficiencies from 
technical, operational and financial perspectives, have been underpinned by research79 
and supported by many countries. 80  However, these proposals were comparatively 
rough at that time and might be improved through further development. For this reason, 
Greece’s methodology in narrowing the list of MBM proposals might be helpful in 
finding the most appropriate MBM. However, a re-examination is necessary because 
many of these improved proposals were submitted to the IMO at the 64th MEPC 
meeting and more IMO commissioned research is to be completed in the near future. 
Meanwhile, it is worthwhile to mention that Greece’s views have been supported by 
many developed countries rather than developing countries. This is probably because 
the CBDR principle was not incorporated into its proposals. 81  At the 62nd MEPC 
meeting, Greece underscored that an MBM should be consistent with the LOSC and 
address the concerns from developing countries in order to ensure a global system.82 
Nevertheless, the interests of developing countries are not well reflected in its preferred 
MBM proposal. 
 
It is concluded that as a main flag State under the list in UNFCCC Annex I, Greece 
recognises the need to reduce GHG emissions from international shipping and strongly 
supports the IMO in regulating this issue. It emphasises the application of the NMFT 
principle to the GHG issue and asserts that an absolute emission reduction is impossible 
due to projected growth in international trade. Greece actively participated in the 
discussions and negotiations of the technical and operational measures within the IMO 
and contributed much to the improvement of the EEDI. With regard to the proposed 
MBMs, Greece was originally opposed to any form of MBM due to concern about the 
                                                 
79 See, eg, Harilaos N. Psaraftis, 'Market-Based Measures for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships: A Review' 
(2012) 11(2) WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 211.  
80 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Third Session, MEPC 63rd Session, Agenda 
Item 23, IMO Doc MEPC 63/23 (14 March 2012) para 5.25.2.  
81 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda 
Item 24, IMO Doc MEPC 61/24 (6 October 2010) annex 3. At the 61st MEPC meeting, many developing countries 
lodged their statements to the MEPC meeting report supporting the application of the CBDR principle to MBM 
proposals.  
82 Report of the Third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, MEPC 




potential obstacles to trade. However, as discussions on MBMs have developed, Greece 




Japan is a traditional maritime power and an important flag State. As of 1 January 2013, 
Japan ranked 14th in the world among the flags of registration with the largest registered 
deadweight tonnage.83 The dwt of the ships flying the flag of Japan was 20,409,000, 
which covered 1.25 per cent of the world share.84 Based on the dwt, 99.32 per cent of 
the ships flying the Japanese flag were owned by Japanese nationals.85 In the same year, 
Japan owned the second largest fleet in the world with 223,815,008 dwt, which 
accounted for 13.87 per cent of the world fleet.86 Of these Japanese owned fleets, 92.31 
per cent of them (in dwt) flew the flags of foreign States.87  
 
Japan is one of the most advanced UNFCCC Annex I States. It has pioneered most 
energy-efficient shipping technologies. Japan’s share of world shipbuilding output has 
fallen from around 34 per cent in 1999 to 18 per cent in 2011 due to worsening global 
economic conditions. 88  However, Japan still received many international orders for 
building larger and more complicated vessels with more added value, compared with its 
Chinese and Indian counterparts. Japan’s shipping industry is competitive in the 
international high-level or energy efficient shipbuilding market.89 In recent years, based 
on the expectation of more stringent IMO rules on shipbuilding, international ship 
purchasers have tended to buy ships with better energy efficient technologies. At June 
2012, the shares of the global shipbuilding order book (in Gross Tonnage) by China, 
Republic of Korea and Japan were 38.72 per cent, 33.77 per cent and 16 per cent 
                                                 
83 UNCTAD, above n 8, 56.  
84 Ibid.  
85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid 43.  
87 Ibid.  
88 During this period, China and South Korea both increased their shares of world shipbuilding output and reached 39 
per cent and 31 per cent respectively. Council Working Party on Shipbuilding, 'Peer Review of Japanese Government 
Support Measures to the Shipbuilding Sector' (2013) <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/C-WP6%282012%2926-FINAL-
ENG.pdf> accessed 21 August 2013, p 23.  




respectively.90 However, the shares of the global future shipbuilding order book (2014+, 
in Gross Tonnage) by China, South Korea and Japan are 21.41 per cent, 49.68 per cent 
and 15.24 per cent respectively.91 These statistics indicate that after the adoption of the 
energy efficiency measures by the IMO in July 2011, the shipbuilding orders that China 
receives have dropped significantly, while Japan’s orders are comparatively stable and 
Korea’s orders have increased significantly. This change reveals that energy efficient 
technologies have already played an important role in the international shipbuilding 
market, and also partially justifies why China strongly opposed the adoption of the 
EEDI and SEEMP.92 
 
Japan actively participated in and contributed to almost all discussions in relation to the 
GHG issue within the IMO due to its leading expertise in world shipbuilding. Its views 
on the regulatory principles for addressing GHG emissions from international shipping 
were expressed at the 58th and 59th MEPC meetings. First, Japan supported the role of 
the IMO in regulating the GHG issue and asserted that there should be adherence to the 
NMFT principle. 93  It supported the nine fundamental principles agreed at the 57th 
MEPC meeting.94 However, in view of strong opposition from many countries on the 
second principle (the NMFT principle), Japan, co-sponsored by other States, suggested 
an improved expression of this principle in order to reach consensus. It proposed that 
the future IMO framework should be ‘binding and equally applicable to all ships’ rather 
than ‘binding and equally applicable to all flag States’.95 However, this proposal was 
                                                 
90 Ibid 29.  
91 Ibid.  
92 A statement lodged by China to the 62nd MEPC meeting report provides that ‘the Chinese delegation opposes the 
adoption of this amendment and [is] in no position to acknowledge and accept the amendment’. Report of the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Second Session, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 24, IMO Doc 
MEPC 62/24 (26 July 2011) annex 20, p 2.  
93 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (16 October 
2008) annex 9, p 19.  
94 The 59th MEPC meeting concluded that the use of the word ‘agree’ would not imply approval, adoption or decision. 
Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 59th Session, Statement by the Delegation of China on 
GHG Issues, IMO Doc MEPC 59/24/Add.1 Annex 13 (2009) para 4.48, p 35. At the 57th MEPC meeting, the nine 
fundamental principles were agreed by ‘an overwhelming majority’ but the second principle was opposed by some 
States. Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Seventh Session, MEPC 57th Session, 
Agenda Item 21, IMO Doc MEPC 57/21 (7 April 2008) para 4.77.  
95 Identifying Consensus on IMO Principles on Addressing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping, 
submitted by Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Marshall Islands, Norway, Panama and the United States, 




not accepted by those delegations not supporting the second principle. 96  This was 
probably because this proposal still applied the NMFT principle, and thus was opposed 
by major developing States, in particular major shipbuilding developing States. 
Although these developing States can flag their ships with FOC States, various MOUs 
on port State control will make it difficult to operate and trade with substandard ships.  
 
Second, Japan respects the CBDR principle applied in the UNFCCC, and argued that 
the CBDR principle could be reflected in other ways including through technical 
cooperation in the regulation of the GHG issue.97 Compared with the positions of many 
other developed countries, 98  Japan’s view reveals its willingness to cooperate and 
compromise. Unfortunately, the unsuccessful record within the IMO relating to 
technical cooperation, 99  in particular the transfer of technology from developed 
countries to developing countries, make it unlikely that this proposal will be accepted 
by developing countries. It appears that an innovative approach regarding the transfer of 
technology is needed. Thirdly, Japan took the view that the regulatory package to be 
established by the IMO should consist of the EEDI, the SEEMP, and an MBM.100 It 
asserted that imposing a cap on the total GHG emissions from international shipping is 
not appropriate, but setting reduction targets is helpful for emission reductions.101 These 
views aim at maintaining the growth of the global shipping industry while reducing 
GHG emissions from shipping. 
 
With regard to the proposed technical and operational measures, Japan’s contribution 
involved many aspects of the EEDI and SEEMP. Before the adoption of the energy 
efficiency measures in 2011, Japan proposed regulatory frameworks for mandatory 
application of the EEDI and SEEMP, a draft text for the amended Annex VI to 
                                                 
96 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Seventh Session, MEPC 57th Session, Agenda 
Item 21, IMO Doc MEPC 57/21 (7 April 2008) para 4.76.  
97 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (16 October 
2008) annex 9, p 19.  
98 See, eg, the US asserted that the CBDR principle ‘has no place in the IMO’ and is inconsistent with the actions 
taken by the IMO. Ibid 10.  
99 To date technical cooperation within the IMO, even within the WTO’s TRIPS (Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), is regarded as not successful. See ch 4, 4.3.3.1, ch 7, 7.5.1.  
100 Consideration of Appropriate Targets for Reducing CO2 Emissions from International Shipping, submitted by 
Japan, MEPC 59th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 59/4/35 (8 May 2009) para 17.  




MARPOL 73/78, draft texts for relevant guidelines for implementing these measures 
and draft texts for some MEPC Resolutions. It also developed a work plan with a 
timetable for the development of EEDI frameworks for ships not covered by the draft 
regulations, and provided a form of the International Energy Efficiency Certificate (IEE 
Certificate) for discussion within the IMO. Most of these proposals have been adopted 
by the IMO. After the adoption of the 2011 amendments to Annex VI, Japan submitted 
technical proposals to the IMO to expand the coverage of the EEDI. It also provided 
reports of the Correspondence Group on Energy Efficiency Measures for Ships where 
Japan served as a chair. In response to the US’s proposal of enhancing technical and 
operational measures raised at the 65th MEPC meeting in 2013,102 Japan, co-sponsored 
by five other Annex I States, proposed to establish an Energy Efficiency Data 
Collection System at the 66th MEPC meeting in 2014. It argued that this system would 
better track the energy efficiency gains in the shipping sector and facilitate emissions 
reduction through establishing efficiency baselines and identifying the potential for 
increased efficiency gains. 103  However, this proposal was not adopted due to the 
opposition of many developing countries.104 
 
Through submitting various proposals to the IMO, Japan expressed its technical and 
regulatory preferences relating to the GHG issue, diversified the debate and expedited 
the regulatory process within the IMO. First, Japan respects the views from the shipping 
industry, and asserted that the EEDI should promote efforts by shipowners, 
shipbuilders, suppliers and others by reflecting as accurately as possible the energy 
efficiency when the ship is in actual use.105 Accordingly, at the 59th MEPC meeting, 
                                                 
102 Proposal of the United States to Enhance Energy Efficiency in International Shipping, submitted by the United 
States, MEPC 65th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 65/4/19 (8 March 2013). In this proposal the US 
suggested to establish attained energy efficiency standards for new and existing ships through a phased approach. 
This proposal aroused the interest of many countries and the 65th MEPC meeting in May 2013 thus agreed to suspend 
the scheduled discussion on MBMs. 
103  Further Technical and Operational Measures for Enhancing Energy Efficiency of International Shipping: 
Establishing an Energy Efficiency Data Collection System, submitted by Belgium, Croatia, Denmak, Japan, Norway 
and the United States, MEPC 66th Session, Agenda Item 4.1, IMO Doc MEPC 66/4/19 (24 January 2014) para 4. 
These proponents suggested that this proposed Energy Efficiency Data Collection System could be built through 
amending Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. 
104 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-sixth Session, MEPC 66th Session, Agenda 
Item 21, IMO Doc MEPC 66/21 (25 April 2014) paras 4.1.2-4.1.3. For example, India asserted that the immediate 
priority should be the full and effective implementation of the adopted energy efficiency measures.  
105 Development of An Index for CO2 Emissions Per Unit Shipping Capacity in Actual Operational Conditions, 




based on the views from its shipping industry, Japan proposed a two-stage verification 
procedure for the EEDI, namely the preliminary verification at the design stage, and the 
verification of the Attained EEDI at sea trial. This approach was later adopted by the 
IMO. Second, Japan insisted that the EEDI should be adopted as a new part of Annex 
VI to MARPOL 73/78.106 It explained that Annex VI can provide a similar legal basis 
for the mandatory EEDI scheme with its ‘well-established and workable practices’; and 
it is also the quickest way to make the mechanism work due to the tacit acceptance 
procedure.107 Meanwhile adding a new part to Annex VI addressing this issue under the 
MARPOL 73/78 would differentiate this GHG issue with the issues of S𝑂𝑥 and N𝑂𝑥.108 
This strategy has proved to be effective in expediting the adoption of the EEDI. 
However, it also imposes challenges on the future implementation of the EEDI because 
it was adopted by majority-voting and no consensus was reached.  
 
Thirdly, given that the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the MEPC, China, South Africa 
and some other countries submitted their proposals on the draft MEPC Resolution on 
the transfer of technology to the IMO,109 Japan also submitted its own draft MEPC 
Resolution on the issue in cooperation with some other countries. In its draft Resolution, 
Japan underscored that any technology transfer on this work should be on the basis of 
respect for intellectual property rights, voluntary transfer, and mutually agreed terms 
and conditions.110 This proposal did not reflect the CBDR principle fully, ignored the 
financing issue and imposed no concrete obligations on any State, and was thus opposed 
by many developing countries. In May 2013 a MEPC Resolution on the transfer of 
technology was adopted by the IMO, which in the preamble recognised the CBDR and 
                                                 
106 Mandatory EEDI Requirements--Draft Text for Adding A New Part to MARPOL Annex VI for Regulation of the 
Energy Efficiency of Ships, submitted by Japan, Norway and the United States, MEPC 62th Session, Agenda Item 4, 
IMO Doc MEPC 60/4/35 (15 January 2010) para 6.  
107 A detailed analysis on the tacit acceptance procedure is provided in Chapter 4, 4.3.2. Ibid para 7.  
108 Ibid.  
109 These individuals and countries submitted their draft MEPC Resolution on the transfer of technology as a means 
of facilitating the implementation of regulation 23 of MARPOL Annex VI. Report of the Marine Environment 
Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Fourth Session, MEPC 64th Session, Agenda Item 23, IMO Doc MEPC 64/23 (11 
October 2012) para 4.6.  
110  Draft MEPC Resolution on Capacity-Building, Technical Assistance and Transfer of Technology Related to 
Energy Efficiency Measures for Ships, submitted by Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the Marshall Islands, 
Norway and the United States, MEPC 64th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 64/4/44 (10 August 2012) 




NMFT principles.111 Although the expressions utilise the words ‘being cognizant ’ to 
replace the proposed ‘acknowledging’ by other countries, it was encouraging for most 
developing countries to expect more beneficial measures in facilitating the transfer of 
technologies as regulated in the amended Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. 112  As a 
response to this adoption, Japan, co-sponsored by Australia and the US, lodged a 
statement to the meeting, through which it clarified that the CBDR principle applies in 
the UNFCCC while the NMFT principle applies in the IMO and under the MARPOL 
73/78.113 This statement indicates that Japan did not welcome the application of the 
CBDR principle to this issue from any perspective, although it asserted earlier at the 
58th MEPC meeting that this principle could be reflected in certain ways. At the 66th 
MEPC meeting in April 2014, Japan further asserted that the transfer of technology 
should not be regarded as a condition for developing countries to fulfil their obligations 
in Annex VI.114 It appears that the work on the transfer of technologies from developed 
countries to developing countries, in particular the future funding of these transfers, will 
remain a challenging issue to be addressed. 
 
In terms of MBMs being discussed within the IMO, Japan has been supportive of 
adopting an MBM for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. 
However, Japan’s views on its preferred MBMs have been amended several times. At 
the 59th MEPC meeting in 2009, Japan supported the MBM proposal on the 
International GHG Fund proposed by Denmark, but suggested that under the scheme a 
ship should pay its contributions to the Fund directly through established electronic 
                                                 
111 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Fifth Session, MEPC 65th Session, Agenda 
Item 22, IMO Doc MEPC 65/22 (24 May 2013) Annex 4, Resolution MEPC.229(65), p 1. The preamble paragraphs 
of the Resolution provide that ‘BEING COGNIZANT of’ the NMFT principle, and ‘BEING COGNIZANT ALSO of’ 
the CBDR principle.  
112 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI reg 23.2. This regulation provides that ‘the Administration of a Party shall co-operate 
actively with other Parties, subject to its national law, regulations and policies, to promote the development and 
transfer of technology and exchange of information to States which request technical assistance, particularly 
developing States’.  
113 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Fifth Session, MEPC 65th Session, Agenda 
Item 22, IMO Doc MEPC 65/22 (24 May 2013) annex 5, p 3.  
114 Implementation of Resolution MEPC.229(65) on Promotion of Technical Co-operation and Transfer of Technology 
Relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of Ships, submitted by Belgium, Japan, the United Kingdom and 
the United States, MEPC 66th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 66/4/31 (7 February 2014). This joint 
proposal was made in response to another proposal submitted by China, India and some other developing countries. 
See Implementation of Resolution MEPC.229(65) on the 'Promotion of Technical Co-operation and Transfer of 
Technology Relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of Ships', submitted by Angola, Argentina, Brazil, 
China, Cuba, India, Malaysia, Nigeria and South Africa, MEPC 66th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 




accounts for individual ships instead of paying this contribution via a fuel supplier so as 
to reduce administrative costs.115 This view, however, was modified at the 60th MEPC 
meeting in 2010 when Japan put forward a Leveraged Incentive Scheme (LIS). The LIS 
was based on the International GHG Fund, but treated the performance of a ship as a 
benchmark for partial allocation of contributions. In other words, the contribution is 
collected from all ships with a fixed amount per tonne of purchased fuel, but a part of 
these contributions collected could be refunded to ships labelled as ‘good performance 
ships’.116  
 
At the 63rd MEPC meeting in 2011, Japan provided a cost analysis on the application of 
efficiency improvement measures in the maritime fleet, and concluded that the current 
EEDI and SEEMP measures could be improved through an MBM focusing on in-sector 
GHG emission reductions. 117  At the second Intersessional Meeting of the Working 
Group on GHG Emissions from Ships in 2011, in response to calls from the IMO 
Secretariat for further innovation and consideration of MBMs, the LIS proposed by 
Japan merged with the Vessel Efficiency System proposed by the World Shipping 
Council (WSC) due to their similarities.118 The new consolidated MBM proposal was 
called the ‘Efficiency Incentive Scheme’ (EIS), which entails only ships which do not 
meet the EEDI thresholds making payment contributions to the GHG Fund. This 
scheme was further amended by the co-sponsors in 2012, together with a draft legal 
text.  
 
As discussed earlier, at the 62nd MEPC meeting in 2011, Greece suggested that after 
reducing the number of current MBM proposals, only an ETS and the International 
GHG Fund are worthy of further consideration. Upon Greece’s proposal, Japan asserted 
that it was premature to limit the number of MBM proposals simply based on the 
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analysis of the draft legal texts provided for current MBM proposals.119 This opinion, 
however, did not receive much support from IMO member States.  
 
In summary, as a UNFCCC Annex I State, Japan has been supportive of the IMO’s 
work in regulating GHG emissions from international shipping. Based on its strong 
expertise on shipping-related matters, Japan contributed to the technical and operational 
regulation of the GHG issue. It stuck to the application of the NMFT principle to this 
issue and asserted that the CBDR principle could only be reflected in the regulation of 
this issue through other ways such as technical cooperation. Nevertheless, during the 
course of drafting the MEPC resolution on the transfer of technology, Japan again 
underscored the NMFT principle, which reveals its reluctance to give any effect to the 
CBDR principle in this GHG emissions issue. With regard to the discussions on MBMs 
within the IMO, Japan opined that it was necessary to adopt a MBM, and it has 
modified its view on its preferred MBM several times. Currently Japan’s preferred 
MBM proposal is the EIS co-sponsored by Japan and the WSC. 
 
6.3.2 The UNFCCC Non-Annex I Flag States 
 
This section examines three countries as examples of the responses from the UNFCCC 
non-Annex I flag States to the issue of GHG emissions from international shipping. 
These three States are Panama, China and Vanuatu, which as discussed earlier, 
represent a major FOC State, a major developing flag State, and another developing 




Panama is the southernmost country of Central America and is situated on the isthmus 
connecting North and South America. The revenues from the Panama Canal tolls are a 
significant contribution to its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).120 Another well-known 
income of Panama relates to its role as a FOC State. Partially due to the facilitation from 
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American shipowners, Panama started its open registry in 1916 shortly after its 
independence in 1903.121 Panama has grown into a leading FOC State after many years’ 
development. As of 1 January 2013, Panama ranked first in the world among the flags 
of registration with the largest registered dwt.122 The dwt of the ships flying the flag of 
Panama was 350,506,000, which covered 21.52 per cent of the world share.123 Based on 
the dwt, 99.86 per cent of the ships flying the Panamanian flag were owned by 
foreigners, whereas the ships owned by Panamanian nationals are negligible.124  
 
FOC States are not active participants in the discussions and negotiations on this GHG 
issue within the IMO. As far as Panama is concerned, to date it has only submitted two 
proposals addressing this issue to the IMO. At the 58th MEPC meeting in 2008, Panama, 
together with some other countries, submitted a proposal on the regulatory principles for 
addressing this matter. 125  In this document, Panama generally supported the nine 
fundamental principles that should be applied for future IMO regulations on this GHG 
issue. Meanwhile, to relieve opposition from many developing countries on the second 
principle, Panama suggested that ‘binding and equally applicable to all flag States’ 
should be replaced by ‘binding and equally applicable to all ships’.126 This document 
indicates that Panama, as a developing country, supports the application of the NMFT 
principle to this GHG issue. This position is consistent with the views from another 
FOC State: the Marshall Islands.127 While most developing countries underscore the 
application of the CBDR principle to this issue, Panama’s position lies in the fact that 
the increased cost for ships complying with IMO regulations will not have a direct 
negative impact on its income. Under any circumstance it is the foreign shipowner that 
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bears the increased cost since FOC States rarely have their own fleet. Meanwhile, these 
open registry States do not need to be concerned about a decrease in their client lists due 
to the growing demand for registering with FOC States by foreign shipowners. Indeed 
not only developed countries but also many developing countries, including China, 
India, Saudi Arabia, flag many of their ships with FOC States. 128 Even some FOC 
States, Cyprus as an example, flag some of their vessels with other FOC States.129 
 
With regard to the proposed technical and operational measures (EEDI and SEEMP), 
Panama has not submitted any technical proposals to the IMO which is probably due to 
its lack of regulatory interests or technical expertise. However, at the 62nd MEPC 
meeting in 2011, Panama, as well as Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Malta and other FOC 
States, voted for the adoption of the EEDI and SEEMP by the IMO. Of the top ten FOC 
States, nine States all voted in favour except that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
abstained.130 Indeed both Article 16(2)(d) of the MARPOL 73/78 and Rule 27 of the 
Rules of Procedures of the MEPC provide that an amendment to an Annex to MARPOL 
73/78 shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members entitled to vote, present 
and voting. For this reason, the views of these FOC States influence the fate of the 
proposed regulations. Similarly, the International Convention for the Control and 
Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM Convention)131 provides that 
this convention shall enter into force only when ‘not less than thirty States, the 
combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than thirty-five per cent of the 
gross tonnage of the world’s merchant shipping’ have signed it. 132  Under this 
circumstance, the role of FOC States is decisive due to the significant amount of gross 
tonnages flying with their flags. 
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In terms of proposed MBMs, at the 62nd MEPC meeting Panama asserted that a new 
instrument on MBMs should be adopted within the framework of the IMO.133 This view 
is different from some developing countries, such as China and India which treated the 
regulation of MBMs as being beyond the competence of the IMO. Nevertheless, 
Panama did not justify its comment in its proposal to the IMO. Panama also predicted 
that no MBM proposals could be adopted within less than eight to ten years,134 thus it 
would be better to take the first steps at an early stage rather than waiting for a perfect 
solution.135 It underscored that a cap should not be imposed on the shipping sector so as 
to avoid penalising global trade and growth.136 Concerning current MBM proposals, 
Panama opposed the narrowing-down approach suggested by Greece as discussed 
earlier, but supported Japan in that all current MBM proposals should be treated as 
options for the long term.137 Accordingly it proposed that these MBM proposals should 
be ‘stratified’ based on their feasibility.138 These views generally are more concerned 
with the interests from the shipping industry and international trade, but are also 
consistent with the interests of developing countries. 
 
Of the current MBM proposals, Panama preferred the Penalty on Trade and 
Development proposed by another FOC State, Bahamas.139 As discussed in Chapter 4, 
this MBM proposal stresses that the imposition of any financial penalty or cost should 
be proportionate to the contribution by international shipping to global CO2 emissions, 
and developing States should not be faced with a penalty upon trade and development. 
This proposal incorporates phased mandatory CO2 cut targets for all ships dependent 
upon their age. Panama provided three reasons for its support of this MBM proposal. 
First, this scheme proposes technical and operational measures that are common to all 
the other proposals. Second, it can be progressed relatively quickly without the need for 
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considering the IMO’s competence. Finally, it contains valuable and reliable 
information useful for the IMO and UNFCCC in their impact assessments.140 These 
views indicate that feasibility is one of the key factors for Panama in its judgment on 
MBM proposals. It will be more acceptable to link a MBM to currently-adopted 
technical and operational measures to avoid lengthy discussions and negotiations for 
establishing a totally different measure. The debate on the IMO’s mandate and 
competence in MBMs has not reached a consensus between various developed and 
developing countries. It is thus important that all MBM proposals should be feasible. 
However, apart from feasibility, administrative burden is also important although it does 
not apply to the MBM relating to Penalty on Trade and Development. 141  The 
uncertainty in relation to the Bahamas proposal mainly lies in the technical difficulties 
associated with the ‘data collection’.142  
 
It is concluded that as the largest FOC State in terms of registered deadweight tonnage, 
Panama supported the leading role of the IMO in regulating GHG emissions from 
international shipping. It underscored the application of the NMFT principle to this 
GHG issue and voted for the adoption of the energy efficiency measures by the IMO. 
As to proposed MBMs, Panama recognised the urgency of addressing this issue and 
suggested that all current proposals should be grouped based on their feasibility. 
Currently Panama’s preferred MBM proposal is the Penalty on Trade and Development 




China’s shipping industry, in particular its shipbuilding sector, has achieved a 
significant proportion of the world market in many categories.143 Meanwhile, China is 
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also one of the major flag States in the world. As at 1 January 2013, China ranked ninth 
in the world among the flags of registration with the largest registered dwt.144 The dwt 
of the ships flying the flag of China was 68,642,000, which accounted for 4.21 per cent 
of the world share.145 In terms of the dwt, 98.18 per cent of the ships flying the Chinese 
flag were owned by Chinese nationals. 146 In the same year, China owned the third 
largest fleet in the world with 190,078,835 dwt, which covered 11.78 per cent of the 
world fleet.147 Of these Chinese owned fleets, 64.79 per cent of them (in dwt) flew the 
flags of foreign States.148 Against this backdrop, China actively participated in the IMO 
discussions on the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. The 
response of the Chinese government to this GHG emissions issue reflects the interests 
of China being a developing country and an important shipping nation. Its views are 
examined on five aspects. 
 
6.3.2.2.1 The IMO’s Mandate and Competence to Regulate GHG Emissions from Ships 
and Applicable Principles 
 
It is generally accepted that the varying interpretation of Article 2(2) of the Kyoto 
Protocol by various countries has been the core obstacle to the regulation of the GHG 
issue by the IMO.149 In other words, it is still open to debate whether the IMO has a 
mandate from the Kyoto Protocol to regulate the GHG issue, or whether the CBDR 
principle should be applied to this issue. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the origin of 
the IMO’s mandate in regulating this matter determines what kind of regulatory 
principles apply to this regulation and what type of measures can be taken by the IMO. 
Given the significance of this matter, China has expressed its positions by submitting a 
number of proposals and statements to the IMO since the 52nd MEPC meeting in 2004. 
Through submitting these documents, China has attempted to address three concerns, 
namely: what is the scope of the IMO’s mandate and competence in regulating the GHG 
                                                 
144 UNCTAD, above n 8, 56.  
145 Ibid.  
146 Ibid.  
147 Ibid 43.  
148 Ibid.  




issue; why the CBDR principle should be applied to the GHG issue; and, how the 
CBDR principle could be applied. 
 
From the perspective of China, the scope of the IMO’s competence in regulating the 
GHG issue should be limited to technology or methodology-related matters. 150  In 
China’s view, the proposed MBMs under discussion are beyond the competence of the 
IMO.151 Therefore, China supported the role of the IMO in regulating technical issues 
but asserted that MBMs on this issue should be decided by the UNFCCC if they are to 
be regulated in the future.152 Although this view has been supported by a number of 
developing countries, 153  China did not provide a legal basis for its assertion in its 
submitted documents. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, although the IMO Convention 
provides the IMO with an economic purpose, in practice this function has never been 
allowed to be exercised by the IMO. Meanwhile, China took the view that the GHG 
issue should be addressed through consultations by all parties in the spirit of 
cooperation and opposed any kind of unilateral or arbitrary action. 154 This view is 
consistent with the position of China’s shipping industry.155  
 
Based on documents submitted by China to the IMO, the rationale underpinning the 
application of the CBDR principle to the GHG issue consists of five elements. First, the 
IMO received its mandate to regulate the GHG issue from Article 2(2) of the Kyoto 
Protocol, and this is also its only mandate in regulating the GHG issue.156 Therefore, 
the fundamental principles that the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol have set for 
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regulating climate change, including the CBDR principle, should also apply to the IMO 
in addressing GHG emissions from international shipping.157  
 
Second, the CBDR principle is not just a principle drawn from the UNFCCC and its 
Kyoto Protocol; rather, it represents the fundamental consensus of the international 
community in tackling climate change.158 Thus all relevant international organisations 
should give due respect to the CBDR principle when they contribute to addressing 
climate change, and the IMO is no exception.159  
 
Third, Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol requests UNFCCC Annex I States to work 
through the IMO to pursue the limitation or reduction of GHG emissions from marine 
bunker fuels, which has been ‘recognised’ by the IMO in its Resolution A.963(23) 
adopted at the 23rd Session of the IMO Assembly on 5 December 2003. 160 Indeed 
during the course of deliberations on this resolution, the MEPC recommended that the 
resolution  
 
‘should be based on a common policy applicable to all ships, rather than based on the 
provisions of the Kyoto Protocol which stated that the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions is under the responsibility of the Annex I countries of the Protocol’.161  
 
However, this recommendation was rejected by the IMO Assembly, which in China’s 
opinion proved that the above assertion by the MEPC was ‘wrong’.162 Given that the 
Legal Division of the IMO took the view that the IMO’s mandate in regulating the GHG 
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issue was not from Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol but from the LOSC and the IMO 
Convention, 163 China responded to this view in two ways. On the one hand, China 
argued that Article 2(2) shall only be interpreted by the Conference of the Parties (COP) 
and the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), which 
are the competent bodies in relation to the Protocol rather than any other body.164 On 
the other hand, China agreed that Articles 1 and 64 of the IMO Convention give the 
IMO competence in regulating the GHG issue but underscored that the Kyoto Protocol 
is still ‘the most direct and authoritative’ origin of such authorisation. 165 From the 
perspective of international law, China’s rebuttal of the interpretation of Article 2(2) of 
the Kyoto Protocol by the Legal Division of the IMO is persuasive in that the IMO is 
not the competent organisation for such interpretation. 166  Indeed, the UNFCCC 
Secretariat made a statement in 2010 supporting the application of both the CBDR 
principle and the NMFT principle to the regulation of shipping GHG emissions by the 
IMO.167 However, China’s argument on the relationship between the Kyoto Protocol 
and the IMO Convention in authorising the IMO’s regulatory work lacks sufficient legal 
basis. This is because there is no hierarchy between the Kyoto Protocol and the IMO 
Convention, and it is thus unlikely that there can be any determination of which rules 
should prevail if there is a conflict between the two treaties. For this reason, it is not 
persuasive for China to claim that the Kyoto Protocol is ‘the most direct and 
authoritative’ for the IMO’s work in regulating this GHG issue.168 Meanwhile, China 
also pointed out that the CBDR principle does not apply to the IMO’ s dealing with 
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matters such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.169 
That was because there is not a provision such as Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol in 
that treaty.170 This argument is reasonable in that the different origins of the IMO’s 
mandate in regulating a type of shipping issue will directly lead to differing regulatory 
principles. 
 
Fourth, to apply the NMFT principle and exclude the application of the CBDR principle 
to the GHG issue would be unfair for developing countries. On the one hand, the largest 
share of GHG emissions from international shipping can be attributed to the historical 
development of the shipping industry in developed countries. 171 On the other hand, 
developed countries control the majority of the world deadweight tonnage.172 For these 
reasons, the application of the NMFT principle would place the technologically 
disadvantaged developing countries in a worse position for development due to their 
lack of ‘survival emissions’.173  
 
Finally, as a response to a criticism that the application of the CBDR principle to the 
GHG issue would possibly make most ships exempt from the global reduction 
regulations due to the existence of the FOC, China asserted that this concern could be 
addressed. In China’s view, the beneficially-owned tonnage could be targeted in a way 
that was utilised by the Review of Maritime Transport by UNCTAD, which is based on 
the data supplied by Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay.174 China suggested that the nationality 
of ships (flag State) be defined as the nationality of shipowners for the purpose of 
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applying the CBDR principle in the context of GHG emissions from international 
shipping.175 It seems that in this way the application of the CBDR principle would not 
make the ships, which are owned by the nationals of developed States but are flying the 
flags of developing States, exempt from compulsory reduction commitments. However, 
shipowners may be companies or other business entities in law. It is thus possible that 
the nationals of developed States register their companies in developing States investing 
in ships so as to avoid the stringent regulations. 
 
These five reasons adequately underpin the application of the CBDR principle to the 
GHG issue. However, China has not fully justified why Article 2(2) of the Kyoto 
Protocol is the only mandate in regulating the GHG issue that the IMO has received so 
far. In other words, the reason why the IMO’s mandate in regulating the GHG issue is 
not given by the LOSC and IMO Convention remains unaddressed, although as 
discussed earlier China also agreed that the IMO Convention gives the IMO this 
competence in regulating the GHG matter.  
 
With regard to the approach of the application of the CBDR principle to this GHG 
issue, China asserted that this principle should be applied to all three categories of 
reduction measures, namely technical, operational measures and MBMs. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, in a broad sense the ‘differentiated responsibility’ element of the CBDR 
principle consists of three categories: differentiated central obligations, differentiated 
implementation arrangements, and the granting of assistance including financial and 
technological assistance.176 China made proposals in relation to all these three scenarios 
to the energy efficiency measures being discussed within the IMO, although two of 
these proposals have not received positive responses by other IMO member States. At 
the 61st MEPC meeting in 2010, China proposed an additional paragraph to the draft 
regulatory text on the GHG issue, which provided that, ‘[t]he application of EEDI 
should be mandatory [for] developed countries and voluntary [for] developing 
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countries’. 177  This proposal reflects China’s interpretation on applying the CBDR 
principle to this GHG issue. That is, to impose differentiated central obligations on 
various States. However, this proposal was not considered by the Working Group on 
Energy Efficiency Measures to Ships, a group commissioned by the IMO. At the 62nd 
MEPC meeting in 2011, China, co-sponsored by Saudi Arabia and South Africa, 
proposed a draft text to the IMO. This proposed article provided that, 
 
‘The regulations of EEDI and SEEMP shall apply to ships of developing countries five 
years after the date of their entry into force.’ 
Or  
‘The regulations of EEDI and SEEMP shall be phased in over a period of eight years 
for ships built for developing countries and during the period of phasing in, developing 
countries shall only apply 50% of the required EEDI reduction rate.’178 
 
This proposed article offered a phased-in approach for developing countries in 
implementing the EEDI and SEEMP. This approach belongs to the ‘differentiated 
implementation arrangement’ element of the CBDR principle. These two proposed 
provisions have different implications: the first proposal applies to ships based on their 
registration from developing countries while the second applies to shipowners from 
developing countries. Due to the concern for the FOC, the second proposal seems more 
feasible. However, neither of these proposals was accepted by most countries. Under 
these circumstances, after the adoption of the 2011 amendments of Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78, China turned to the last option of partially incorporating the CBDR 
principle into the energy efficiency measures. The recognition of the CBDR principle 
was eventually written into the MEPC resolution on technical cooperation and transfer 
of technology. Given this outcome, China expressed that it ‘would like to actively 
participate in related discussion under the guidance of this principle’. 179  However, 
whether the CBDR principle can be reflected in the implementation of this resolution is 
still in doubt.180  
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China has been a persistent opponent of MBMs being applied to the GHG issue. 
However, China has suggested that, if a MBM is to be adopted, the CBDR principle 
should apply in a manner that ‘no extra financial responsibility’ will be imposed on 
developing countries.181 To achieve this goal, China has proposed two principles. First, 
the basic principles and key elements of the MBMs should be determined by the 
UNFCCC. Second, any funds generated from any MBM should only be provided to the 
shipping sector in developing countries.182 Through comparing China’s claims with the 
current MBM proposals, it seems that it will not be straightforward to meet China’s 
proposal.  
 
6.3.2.2.2 Technical Aspects of the Energy Efficiency Measures 
 
As asserted by China’s shipping industry, shipping industries in developing countries 
including China are generally technologically disadvantaged. 183  Nevertheless, China 
still contributed to the technical improvement of the energy efficiency measures. Before 
the adoption of the EEDI and SEEMP by the IMO in 2011, China’s involvement in this 
technical work consisted of two aspects. In the first place, China, through conducting 
sea trial tests and technical research, provided technical proposals for improving the 
EEDI formula, the EEDI reference line, and the calculation methods of the EEDI 
reference line. Through conducting this work, China asserted at the 62nd MEPC meeting 
in 2011 that there were still technical uncertainties in relation to the proposed EEDI and 
SEEMP,184 and suggested that more time should be given to address these problems 
before the adoption of these measures. Indeed as early as the 59th MEPC meeting in 
2009, China lodged a statement at the meeting which advocated that various countries 
be patient with technical and technological matters on the grounds that the EEDI is 
technically complicated and time consuming, and thus requires more in-depth study.185 
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Nevertheless, this proposal was not accepted and the amendment was adopted at that 
meeting.  
 
In the second place, China underscored that the weak voices from developing countries 
should be respected. Developed countries should help developing countries to 
strengthen their capability, so that these developing countries could effectively 
participate in the IMO discussions and put forward their own proposals.186 An example 
is the IMO commissioned study on estimated CO2 emission reductions associated with 
the EEDI and SEEMP in 2011. China asserted that this study was not reliable due to its 
uncertainties in future emission projections, inaccuracy of the database used, and other 
deficiencies.187 Since most assessments were conducted by institutions from developed 
countries, China believed that more participation of developing countries in this 
regulatory process would better balance the interests of both developed countries and 
developing countries. Accordingly, China proposed that the requirement for reduction 
rates and applicable target years for the EEDI requirements be lowered. Specifically, 
with regard to the proposed reduction rate being 10 per cent in the first phase, China 
proposed it should be 0 (zero) and a period of five years should be given for 
preparations as phase 0. 188  As a compromise, eventually a two-year phase 0 was 
provided and a 10 per cent reduction at phase 1 maintained. This outcome, however, is 
significant for the shipping industries in developing countries and enables them to 
conduct technological preparations.  
 
After the adoption of the energy efficiency measures, China submitted proposals to the 
IMO in terms of seeking an interpretation of some technical terms, expanding the 
coverage of the EEDI, and improving EEDI guidelines. Meanwhile, as some States 
criticised the SEEMP for its ineffectiveness, China took the view that experience was 
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required of the SEEMP before any amendments could be considered.189 This view is 
logical in that the SEEMP was newly adopted and only entered into force on 1 January 
2013. Only after a measure has been implemented for a period, can certain deficiencies 
be better identified for further amendment.  
 
6.3.2.2.3 The Adoption of the Amendments to Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 
 
There was fierce debate among IMO members on a number of issues during the course 
of negotiations on the proposed energy efficiency measures. Of these issues, the form of 
the legal instrument, circulation procedure, and voting mechanism are worthy of special 
mention in this section due to their significance to the issue under discussion. 
 
Three options were available to the MEPC regarding the form of the instrument to be 
adopted for regulating energy efficiency measures. They are an amendment of Annex 
VI to MARPOL 73/78, Annex VII to MARPOL 73/78, and a new international 
convention.190 China’s position was that proposed energy efficiency regulation should 
remain under voluntary application or only be compulsory for developed countries.191 If 
the regulation was to be compulsory, China supported either a new treaty or a new 
MARPOL protocol.192 China provided three factors to underpin its argument, and in 
particular, why it opposed an amendment of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 as the legal 
format for regulating this GHG issue. First, CO2 is not a pollutant and should not be 
included in the Annex of MARPOL 73/78 where severe air pollutants are addressed.193 
Besides, CO2 is a GHG with cumulative effects, which does not match the definition of 
‘harmful instances’ as regulated under Article 1 of MARPOL 73/78.194 In other words, 
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regulating this GHG emissions issue under the Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 is 
inconsistent with MARPOL’s objectives. 195 Second, regulating the energy efficiency 
measures in Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 would cause ‘tremendous domestic legal 
obstacles’ for some countries, and make future implementation and enforcement of 
these measures questionable.196 Third, Annex VI also contains regulations on other air 
pollutants, which might represent barriers for countries to adopt mandatory energy 
efficiency measures and thus is not the appropriate legal instrument. 197  For these 
reasons, China asserted that the proposed energy efficiency measures should not be 
regulated under Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, although this was the quickest path to 
implementing such requirements as mandatory measures.  
 
GHGs are currently not regulated as a type of pollution in Chinese domestic law. The 
Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law of China (adopted in 1987 and amended in 
1995 and 2000) does not regulate GHGs and is currently under discussion for another 
revision. It is predicted that GHGs will not be regulated in the upcoming revision of this 
law due to pressure from various national industries. This opinion was supported by 
some UNFCCC non-Annex I States when the issue was discussed within the IMO.198 
Nevertheless, given the fact that energy efficiency measures have been adopted, these 
member States will need to update their domestic law so as to comply with the IMO 
instrument. For China, since its classification society has released its Rules for Green 
Ships which has incorporated the energy efficiency requirement, 199  it seems that 
compliance with these IMO rules by China’s shipping industry would not be a 
significant concern.  
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The circulation procedure of the proposed mandatory energy efficiency regulations 
within the IMO is another issue which was opposed by China. Based on the agenda of 
the 62nd MEPC meeting in 2011, this meeting would consider, with a view to adoption, 
draft amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. 200  A drafting group was also 
scheduled to be established for modifying the draft.201 This agenda is consistent with 
MARPOL 73/78, which sets out a two-phased amendment adoption procedure, namely 
submitting the draft to an appropriate body by the IMO for consideration,202 and the 
adoption by the IMO.203 However, at this meeting the MEPC decided to circulate and 
adopt the draft at the same session. From the perspective of China, this decision to have 
the proposed amendments circulated in spite of there being no approval by the MEPC, 
violated the IMO’s customary procedure,204 undermined the founding basis of the IMO, 
and also conflicted with the spirit of collectivism of the United Nations in dealing with 
major global issues. 205  While China’s response to this procedural flaw was 
understandable, the adoption of this regulation appears to have been unavoidable due to 
the support for this regulation by the majority of member countries of Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78.  
 
Both MARPOL 73/78 and the MEPC adopt the majority-voting mechanism.206 Being 
aware of the vital role of the current voting mechanism in regulating GHG emissions 
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from ships, China, as well as many other developing countries, has attempted to replace 
this majority-voting mechanism with a consensus-based arrangement as to future GHG 
regulation. China took the view that a two-thirds majority vote should not be used to 
settle every issue, and the regulation of GHG emissions from ships should be made by 
consensus.207 From China’s perspective, climate change is a common challenge faced 
by the global community and should be addressed through multilateral cooperation 
mechanisms.208 As ‘the essence of the multilateralism lies in the degree of flexibility by 
which the common ground would be reached and the resolution would be accepted by 
all parties’, 209  to date all agreements in relation to climate change, including the 
UNFCCC, its Kyoto Protocol and their relevant decisions, have been reached by 
consensus. GHG emissions from ships are a part of the global climate change issue and 
thus should also be addressed by unanimous agreement.  
 
At the 61st MEPC meeting in 2010, the secretary-general of the MEPC advocated that 
this GHG issue should be addressed by consensus. 210  However, it proved that a 
consensus could not be reached on the adoption of the energy efficiency measures 
within the IMO and thus the majority-voting mechanism was applied to this matter. In 
terms of the regulation of this GHG issue, there is growing diversity in the regulatory 
interests of developing countries,211 as well as those between developed and developing 
countries. For this reason, it seems less likely that the MEPC would change this voting 
mechanism in deciding this GHG issue, although some developing countries are 
currently advocating for this change.212 
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Given that the energy efficiency measures were adopted by a majority vote within the 
IMO in 2011, China opposed the adoption of these measures and lodged a statement to 
the report of the 62nd MEPC meeting in 2011. In this statement China asserted that the 
CBDR principle was not reflected in the amendments to MARPOL Annex VI ‘in a full 
and objective manner’, and thus it opposed this amendment and was ‘in no position to 
acknowledge and accept the amendment’.213 However, the nature of this statement is 
not a reservation but rather an ‘objection’ that is ‘communicated to the Organization’ 
before an amendment is deemed to be accepted. This right of relevant Parties is 
provided by MARPOL 73/78. Article 16(2)(f)(iii) of MARPOL 73/78 provides, 
 
‘an amendment to an appendix to an Annex to the Convention shall be deemed to have 
been accepted at the end of a period to be determined by the appropriate body at the 
time of its adoption, which period shall be not less than ten months, unless within that 
period an objection is communicated to the Organization by not less than 50 per cent 
of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant fleet whichever condition is fulfilled’. 
[emphasis added] 
 
Since this provision does not stipulate what form such an ‘objection’ should take, the 
Chinese statement could be interpreted as an objection to this provision. However, this 
will not be enough to prevent the application of the regulation to China. In order to be 
exempted from this regulation, China could have made a ‘declaration’ that it did not 
accept this amendment. Article 16(2)(g)(ii) of the MARPOL 73/78 provides that, 
 
‘…the amendment deemed to have been accepted in accordance with the foregoing 
conditions shall enter into force six months after its acceptance for all the Parties with 
the exception of those which, before the date, have made a declaration that they do not 
accept it or a declaration under subparagraph (f)(ii), that their express approval is 
necessary.’ [emphasis added] 
 
It is customary that a declaration is communicated in writing to the IMO and then 
circulated to the Parties by the Secretariat.214 Therefore, there is a procedural difference 
between the above ‘objection’ and the ‘declaration’. As discussed in Chapter 5, China’s 
shipbuilding sector has a growing role in China’s shipping industry and China’s 
                                                 
213 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Second Session, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda 
Item 24, IMO Doc MEPC 62/24 (26 July 2011) annex 20, pp 1-2.  
214 MARPOL 73/78 art 16(9). This provision provides that ‘[a]ny declaration of acceptance or of objection to an 
amendment under the present article shall be notified in writing to the Secretary-General of the Organization. The 




economy. In order to meet the requirements from its current and potential customers, 
China’s shipbuilding sector will also need to meet the energy efficiency measures 
adopted by the IMO. Probably, for this reason, China did not object to the 2011 
amendments to Annex VI by means of a declaration as regulated under Article 
16(2)(g)(ii) of the MARPOL 73/78, although the latter allows it to do so to avoid the 
application of the amendments to China.  
 
6.3.2.2.4 Technical Cooperation and Transfer of Technology 
 
China has been a strong supporter of including effective transfer of technology from 
developed countries to developing countries into the regulation of GHG emissions 
reduction from ships. From China’s point of view, the wide application and transfer of 
energy efficiency technologies will significantly strengthen the capability of developing 
countries so as to help them effectively implement energy efficiency measures adopted 
by the IMO.215 The UNFCCC, the Bali Action Plan and the Cancun Agreements all 
stipulate the transfer of technology requirements,216 and this mechanism should also be 
included in the amended Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78.217  
 
Before the adoption of the 2011 amendments of Annex VI, China, co-sponsored by 
Saudi Arabia and South Africa, proposed a draft legal provision entitled ‘promotion of 
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‘In order to promote the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping, 
transparency of technology shall be increased in the implementation of technical 
measures of the EEDI. All new ship designs and technology which reduce the attained 
EEDI value of a ship shall be open to the public. Developed countries shall transfer 
their technology and provide financial support to developing countries for their 
capacity building so as to enhance their ability to satisfy these new requirements.’218 
[emphasis added] 
 
This proposal underscores the transparency of energy efficiency technologies, the 
transfer of technology and financial support from developed countries to developing 
countries. Indeed these proposals, if adopted, would address the main concern from 
developing countries in complying with the proposed energy efficiency measures. 
However, in developed countries there are various domestic regulations on intellectual 
property protection, 219 and most energy efficient technologies are owned by private 
shipping companies. Therefore, it would be difficult for developed countries to accept 
this proposal. Indeed, the finally adopted Regulation 23 of the amended Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78 ignored these expressions in relation to the transparency of 
technologies and financial support, and instead added that any transfer of technology 
should be subject to national laws, regulations and policies.220 
 
After the adoption of energy efficiency measures, China advocated the adoption of an 
MEPC resolution on technical cooperation and transfer of technology relating to the 
improvement of energy efficiency of ships. It took the view that without such a 
resolution the MEPC could not make any smooth progress in reducing GHG emissions 
from ships,221 and this resolution should be adopted prior to entry into force of the 
amendments to Annex VI. 222  Meanwhile, China grouped technology transfer 
transactions into five categories,223 and emphasised that the role of the public sector 
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should be strengthened although most of the technological transfer occurs in the private 
sector.224 It provided approaches for facilitating technology transfer, and asserted that 
the terms of reference should at least include: 
 
• ‘Nature and composition and location of the team managing the process; 
• Nature of technology transfer projects to be supported; 
• Identification and cataloguing of available energy efficiency technologies; 
• Procedures for managing requests for technology transfer; 
• Sources of funding and financing; and 
• Evaluation and reporting.’225 
 
Based on these arguments, China, supported by some developing countries, proposed a 
draft MEPC resolution on this issue to the IMO. In this proposal, China underscored the 
CBDR principle and suggested establishing an Ad Hoc Expert Working Group on 
Technology Transfer with a mandate to facilitate this work.226 As summarised by the 
chairman of the MEPC, the main debate on the proposed MEPC resolution involved 
three issues, namely: the CBDR principle, technology transfer and funding.227 These 
three issues were recognised in the adopted MEPC resolution on technical cooperation 
and transfer of technology in May 2013. As discussed in Chapter 4, although there were 
no concrete obligations on any State, it was a breakthrough for developing countries to 
have the recognition of the CBDR principle in the preamble paragraphs of this 
resolution. Regarding this achievement, China asserted that the CBDR principle 
provided ‘a sound foundation and guidance for further discussion on GHG emissions 
under [the] IMO’, and thus it would like to actively participate in the IMO discussions 
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under the guidance of this principle.228 Nevertheless, China was also concerned about 
the provision on intellectual property protection which from the perspective of China 
would seriously impair the transfer of technology.229  
 
Since this was the first time that the IMO had introduced the CBDR principle in its 
resolution, 230 it is believed that this achievement was largely due to the consensus 
approach adopted by the Working Group on Draft MEPC Resolution on Promotion of 
Technical Cooperation and Transfer of Technology relating to this energy efficiency 
issue.231 At the 64th MEPC meeting in 2012, China and some other developing countries 
suggested that this consensus approach should be employed to deal with all decisions of 
the MEPC in relation to this GHG issue, but the discussion of this proposal has been 
postponed. At the 66th MEPC meeting in 2014, China, supported by many other 
developing countries, proposed to facilitate the implementation of MEPC resolution on 
technical cooperation and transfer of technology. 232  They treated the effective 
implementation of this resolution as ‘a top priority’ of the IMO’s work in addressing 
this GHG issue, and suggested that further technical and operational measures for 
enhancing energy efficiency of international shipping should not commence until this 
resolution has been effectively implemented.233 This request, however, was not agreed 
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6.3.2.2.5 Market-based Measure Proposals 
 
As discussed earlier, China asserted that the regulation of MBMs in relation to this 
GHG issue is beyond the competence of the IMO, and claimed that the IMO should 
only study the methodology and operational feasibility while leaving the regulatory 
principles for the UNFCCC.234 Apart from these positions, China’s views on current 
MBM proposals mainly consist of two aspects. On the one hand, China asserted that 
currently MBM proposals on tackling GHG emissions from ships are premature and 
thus should not be adopted. It argued that there are many uncertainties in relation to the 
carbon market, the calculation of the emissions, and the impacts of these measures on 
the shipping industry and world trade. 235 Meanwhile, these MBM proposals do not 
incorporate the CBDR principle well and may potentially distort competition.236 With 
regard to specific MBM proposals, China treated the global levy on the marine bunker 
fuel proposal as an international tax and asserted that this MBM violates the CBDR 
principle, and if adopted would have a range of legal implications.237 As to the proposed 
ETS, China asserted that an ETS would violate the consensus achieved within the 
UNFCCC by applying this scheme to all ships. It believed that under this scheme, 
resources would flow from the poor to the rich by penalising developing countries.238 
On the other hand, China also took a compromise position that if MBMs are to be 
adopted, the CBDR principle should be incorporated. China held the view that an MBM 
for international shipping should include three objectives.239 They are encouraging and 
promoting UNFCCC Annex I States to reduce GHG emissions from ships; using the 
market as a means to enhance actions relating to financial support and the transfer of 
technologies; and contributing to the sustainable development of the shipping industries 
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in developing countries.240 Overall these objectives underscore the CBDR principle, in 
particular the capacity building of developing countries. Furthermore, China stressed 
that the discussions of MBMs must await the improvement of adopted energy efficiency 
measures.241 The consensus approach adopted for the MEPC resolution on technical 





In contrast to maritime powers or newly-emerged shipbuilding developing nations 
which have important interests in regulating the GHG issue, some developing countries, 
in particular Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS), do not have a significant commercial fleet or shipping capability. However, 
some of these countries, Vanuatu as an example, have actively participated in this 
regulatory process. As an island archipelago, Vanuatu is made up of around 80 
relatively small islands of volcanic origin occupying an area of 12,000 square 
kilometres.243 It is located in the South Pacific Ocean and has a population of 251,784 
people. 244  Many SIDS, including Vanuatu, are among the most vulnerable to the 
adverse impacts of climate change. In particular the lowest lying Atolls, with the least 
capacity to effectively respond, suffer even more from climate change.245 As such, the 
response of this category of developing flag States is different from the other two 
categories of developing flag States that are discussed in previous sections. 
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At the 58th MEPC meeting in 2008, Vanuatu lodged a statement to the report of the 
meeting. In this statement, Vanuatu asserted that some Pacific Micro States are already 
predicted to be submerged due to sea level rise as a result of global warming. 246 
Therefore, Vanuatu is in favour of a global regulation on reducing GHG emissions from 
international shipping, and this position was echoed by the Cook Islands,247 another SID 
in the South Pacific. Accordingly, in terms of regulatory principles Vanuatu supported 
the position that any future regulations on this GHG issue should be binding and equally 
applicable to all flag States in order to avoid evasion,248 or in other words, the NMFT 
principle. This position relates to its view that climate change needs ‘urgent action’.249 
 
Vanuatu actively participated in the discussions within the IMO and expressed its 
opinions with regard to the proposed technical and operational measures,. At the 60th 
MEPC meeting in March 2010, Vanuatu suggested an alternative approach for the IMO 
to provide a short-term contribution to reducing GHG emissions from ships, namely 
using methane to power auxiliary machinery and explained that the technology is 
available.250 However, this proposal did not arouse much attention from the member 
States, which was probably because this proposal indeed provided a technological 
option or method to meet the EEDI rather than a technical measure.251  
 
At the 61st MEPC meeting in September 2010, Vanuatu submitted a proposal on 
possible exemptions for ships trading to the LDCs and SIDS from EEDI 
requirements.252 This proposal was widely discussed within the IMO. Nevertheless, the 
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majority of delegations present at the IMO did not support this proposal. They were 
concerned that the adoption of this provision could mean that ‘the least efficient ships 
would serve these trades/routes indefinitely’, and would prejudice the benefits of 
developing countries due to higher transportation costs resulting from this.253 Indeed 
current research indicates that under mandatory global emission reduction equally 
applying to all ships, the cost increases to large developing countries are small while the 
increased international trade costs for SIDS are significant. 254 For this reason, it is 
important to address the special needs and circumstances of these LDCs and SIDS. 
However, no steps have been taken by the IMO to address this issue, although the 
significance of this issue has been recognised.255 
 
At the 62nd MEPC meeting in 2011, Vanuatu voted for the adoption of the EEDI and 
SEEMP by the IMO. Meanwhile, it also put forward two proposals to the IMO 
underscoring the importance of the safety of future ship design so as to ensure the safety 
of seafarers, ships and the environment through the application of the amendments.256 In 
contrast to its active participation in the discussions on the technical and operational 
measures, Vanuatu has not expressed its positions or views on MBM proposals within 
the IMO.  
 
Vanuatu is extremely vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change as a LDC and 
a SIDS. Accordingly, Vanuatu fully supports the IMO in regulating the GHG issue 
under discussion and has asserted that this regulation should be undertaken urgently. In 
terms of the proposed EEDI and SEEMP, Vanuatu suggested an exemption from these 
regulations for ships trading to the LDCs and SIDS so as to protect the economic 
interests of these countries. Although Vanuatu has not voiced its view on proposed 
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MBMs, its vulnerability to climate change indicates that it would support any global 
solution which can reduce GHG emissions from ships in a quick and effective manner. 
 
6.4 Port State Control  
 
Port State jurisdiction consists of prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction,257 whereas 
port State control generally only involves the enforcement dimension of this jurisdiction 
excluding judicial jurisdiction. The IMO provides a definition of port State control: 
 
‘[p]ort State [c]ontrol is the inspection of foreign ships in national ports to verify that 
the condition of the ship and its equipment comply with the requirements of 
international regulations and that the ship is manned and operated in compliance with 
these rules.’258 
 
It appears that the key distinction between port State control and port State jurisdiction 
is that, under port State control, the port State only takes administrative measures of 
control rather than prosecuting the vessel for an alleged breach of its legislation.259 
However, the enforcement jurisdiction of the port State includes prosecution for 
offences committed in its ports or coastal State maritime zones, or outside the internal 
waters, territorial sea or EEZ of the port State.260 
 
While flag States have been allocated primary responsibility for ensuring the 
compliance of ships on their registers with all applicable international and domestic 
regulations and standards, port States significantly complement the work of flag States 
in addressing substandard ships. 261 The legal basis of port State control lies in the 
customary international law that foreign vessels do not have a general right of access to 
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ports. 262  To date port State control has been incorporated in many international 
conventions which confirm that port States are entitled to inspect ships in their ports or 
at off-shore terminals to verify whether they comply with these conventions. The 
principal conventions are MARPOL 73/78, 263 1974 International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),264 1976 ILO Convention (No. 147) concerning Minimum 
Standards in Merchant Ships (ILO Convention No.147), 265  1966 International 
Convention on Load Lines (Load Lines), 266  and 1978 International Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW 
Convention). 267  Accordingly, ships that do not meet the safety and anti-pollution 
thresholds contained in these conventions, and which pose a significant risk of harm to 
seafarers on board, to other ships, and to the marine environment, have been regarded as 
substandard or unseaworthy ships. 268  Meanwhile, IMO Resolutions A.787 (19) and 
A.882 (21) provide basic guidance on the conduct of port State control inspections.269 In 
accordance with these resolutions, port State authorities may conduct the inspections on 
their own initiative, at the request or on the basis of, information about the ship 
provided by a third party.270 
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MARPOL 73/78 and its Annex VI, 271  as well as relevant IMO guidelines, 272  have 
provided a general framework regarding the role of port State control relating to GHG 
emissions from international shipping. Generally, port State inspection is limited to 
verifying whether there is a valid IEE Certificate on board.273 The inspections by the 
port State control officer (PSCO) consist of initial inspections and more detailed 
inspections. Initial inspections mainly aim to check if there is a valid certificate on 
board, whereas more detailed inspections occur when the PSCO has clear grounds for 
believing that the condition of the ship or its equipment do not correspond substantially 
with the particulars of the certificates or the documents.274 During the inspections, the 
PSCO should use professional judgment to determine whether to detain the ship until 
any noted deficiencies are corrected or to allow it to sail with certain deficiencies which 
do not pose an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment.275 Additionally, 
the NMFT principle should be applied to port State control so that ships of non-Parties 
to the applicable conventions should also comply with the energy efficiency measures.  
 
6.5 Response from Global and Regional Port States Organisations 
 
Port State control activities have been regarded as being of a regional nature.276 It is 
thus necessary to examine the response from global and regional port State 
organisations to GHG emissions reductions from international shipping. This section 
takes the International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) and regional MOUs on 
port State control as examples to examine their responses to this GHG issue. 
 
6.5.1 The International Association of Ports and Harbors 
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The IAPH was established on 7 November 1955, and is currently the only international 
organisation representing the voice of the world’s port industry. 277  The IAPH has 
achieved consultative status as a non-governmental organisation (NGO) within the 
IMO. As a non-profit global alliance of ports, the IAPH represents roughly 200 ports 
from 85 countries, and these ports deal with more than 60 per cent of the world 
seaborne trade and nearly 80 per cent of the world’s container traffic.278 Although the 
IAPH has not actively participated in the discussions and negotiations on GHG 
emissions reductions from international shipping within the IMO, its views are reflected 
in its various programs and new releases.  
 
The IAPH recognised the growing contribution of GHG emissions from port related 
activities to global climate change, and asserted that ports should ‘take practical and 
effective measures to create a clean air environment’,279 and that the development of 
guidance for such measures would be included in a so called ‘Tool Box for Port Clean 
Air Programs’. This tool box aims to provide ports, members and non-members of the 
IAPH with quick access to information, options and tools for addressing port-related air 
quality and climate change related issues.280  
 
The IAPH categorised port-related GHG emissions into three scope groups under the 
IAPH Tool Box for Port Clean Air Program (Figure 6.1). Scope 1 refers to direct GHG 
emissions from a port’s directly-controlled stationary and mobile sources. Scope 2 is 
indirect GHG emissions with the import and consumption of purchased electricity by a 
port for its directly-controlled sources. Scope 3 refers to GHG emissions relating to the 
operation of port tenants, including those from international shipping. The IAPH 
asserted that of these three scope categories, GHG emissions under Scope 3 cover ‘the 
vast majority of the port-wide [GHG] emissions’.281 In other words, GHG emissions 
                                                 
277  International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH), History/NGO Consultative Status (2011) 
<http://www.iaphworldports.org/AboutIAPH/HistoryNGOConsultativeStatus.aspx> accessed 23 September 2013.  
278 Ibid.  
279 Resolution on Clean Air Programmes for Ports, submitted by the International Association of Ports and Harbors 
(IAPH), MEPC 56th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 56/INF.14 (11 May 2007) annex.  
280 the International Association of Port and Harbors (IAPH), IAPH Tool Box for Port Clean Air Programs (2008) 
<http://iaphtoolbox.wpci.nl/DRAFT%20IAPH%20TOOL%20BOX%20%20dea.pdf> accessed 23 September 2013, p 
1.  
281  The International Association of Port and Harbors (IAPH), IAPH Tool Box for Greenhouse Gases (2008) 




from international shipping serve as an important source of GHG emissions in relation 
to port related GHG emissions. This also provides a vital incentive for ports to support 
the IMO’s work in regulating GHG emissions from ships. Furthermore, the IAPH 
requested ports to take early action to address this GHG issue in that early action will 
‘ameliorate the future effects of increased costs’ associated with possible MBMs.282 
 
 
Figure 6.1 GHG Emissions Scopes relating to Port Operations283 
 
In April 2008 the IAPH requested its Port Environment Committee to work out a 
mechanism for assisting ports to tackle climate change. As a result, in July 2008 at the 
C40 World Ports Climate Conference the World Ports Climate Initiative (WPCI), which 
included 55 ports from the world, came into being to facilitate GHG mitigation. Also at 
this conference the World Ports Climate Declaration was adopted.284 This declaration 
outlined the positions of the IAPH in regulating GHG emissions from international 
shipping. Based on this declaration, the IAPH expressed its support for developing 
technical and operational measures to address the GHG issue. On the one hand, the 
IAPH supported the development of clean shipping by means of improving ship fuel, 
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ship engine and ship design.285 On the other hand, it believed that speed reduction and 
environmental indexing would be effective operational measures in improving ships’ 
energy efficiency. 286  It also urged the IMO to accelerate the incorporation of best 
practices into the IMO’s proposed amendment of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. 287 
Although these proposals did not explicitly mention the EEDI and SEEMP, these views 
underpin the regulatory efforts of the IMO on this GHG issue. 
 
The IAPH provided a news release stating its position on the 2011 amendments of 
Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. According to this statement, the IAPH regarded this 
regulation as ‘significant policy developments’ by the IMO. It asserted that these 
measures, together with the IAPH’s global air quality improvement initiatives (such as 
the WPCI), demonstrate that the IAPH can collaborate with the IMO ‘at the port-to-port 
technical level and at the international regulatory level’ in achieving greater GHG 
emissions reductions from international shipping.288 With regard to proposed MBMs 
within the IMO, the IAPH has not expressed its official position. However, some of its 
member States have responded to this issue, which is examined in section 6.6 of this 
chapter. 
 
6.5.3 Regional Memoranda of Understanding on Port State Control 
 
As discussed earlier, the 1976 ILO Convention No. 147 aimed to inspect the vessels 
calling at the ports of its member States. To follow up this convention, eight European 
countries signed a MOU in 1978 with the intent of ensuring an effective enforcement of 
the requirements stated under the ILO Convention No. 147.289 For this reason, port State 
control is also asserted to originate from the 1978 MOU.290 Regional MOUs on port 
State Control have become a dominant means of facilitating effective port State control 
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at the regional level.291 In accordance with the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, a treaty is ‘an international agreement concluded between States in written 
form’. 292 However, MOUs on port State Control are reached between the maritime 
authorities of the States concerned, and were regarded as ‘an agreement based on 
trust’.293 Therefore, MOUs are not legally binding, and this has also been recognised by 
some regional MOUs.294 In practice an MOU, rather than a legally binding treaty, has 
been widely chosen by port States. This is probably because the ratification and 
amendment procedure of a treaty is too lengthy and less efficient than an MOU.295 
 
Currently there are nine regional MOUs on port State control,296 which if combined 
with the United States Coast Guard (USCG)’s port State control program,297 cover all 
the regions of the world. 298  Since all these MOUs have their own organisational 
structures and secretariats, these MOUs can be deemed as not only agreements but also 
institutions on regional port State control.299  
 
While regional MOUs are playing vital roles in port State control, it is worthwhile to 
mention that these MOUs do not give any new powers to member States.300 Rather, 
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these MOUs provide a means of coordinating the exercise of the powers that these port 
States have received from various international conventions, so existing rules and 
standards in these conventions can be enforced in an effective and harmonised 
manner. 301  However, given the differing ratification status of States for specific 
conventions and distinct inspection mechanisms of regional MOUs, it is still difficult to 
ensure uniform enforcement of standards contained in various conventions.302 
 
With regard to the proposed technical and operational measures and MBMs within the 
IMO, regional MOUs on port State control have not officially expressed their positions 
on these issues. The fact that these MOUs have no official status within the IMO might 
be one reason. Another reason is that the role of port State control/inspection in 
enforcing technical and operational measures has been generally limited to verifying 
whether there is a valid certificate on board. In this case, as regional agreements on port 
State control, MOUs illustrate a lack of sufficient expertise and incentive in contributing 
to these regulatory initiatives. However, this does not mean that these MOUs do not 
have any impact on the IMO’s regulatory process. Indeed, the NMFT principle that runs 
through all MOUs on port State control was eventually incorporated in the amended 
Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 in 2011, although many developing countries opposed 
it.303 This outcome, however, would not have been achieved without the current widely-
accepted practice of various MOUs on port State control of which many developing 
countries are also members. 
 
Regulations 20 and 21 of the 2011 amendments to Annex VI provide that the EEDI 
applies to new ships, new ships that undergo a major conversion, and new or existing 
ships that undergo a major conversion as defined in Regulation 2 of Annex VI. 
Regulation 2.23.3 of Annex VI stipulates that based on the date of the ship’s delivery, 
new ship means that the delivery of the ship is on or after 1 July 2015. Since this 
regulation entered into force on 1 January 2013 and the major conversion of existing 
ships may also take substantial time, it is anticipated that the earliest date for MOU 
member port States to inspect the IEE Certificate of a new ship will possibly be around 
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July 2015. 304 Nevertheless, many MOUs, including the Paris MOU and the Tokyo 
MOU, have already included the IEE Certificate into their ‘List of MOU Deficiency 
Codes’,305 which serve as the main basis for the port State control of their member port 
States. This prompt response by MOUs on port State control can be regarded as 
demonstrating their strong support for the IMO’s initiatives in regulating GHG 
emissions from international shipping. In recent years, the effectiveness and 
harmonisation of regional MOUs on port State control has been strengthened through 
the establishment of the ‘White-Grey-Black Lists’,306 the new inspection regime (NIR) 
based on ship risk profile,307 the recognised organisations (RO) performance lists,308 as 
well as the cooperation between different MOUs. 309  However, a gap between the 
performance of the Paris and Tokyo MOUs and other MOUs in terms of numbers of 
annual inspections and the length of time that they have operated still exists,310 and 
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in the Asia-Pacific Region' (2012 2012) <http://www.tokyo-mou.org/doc/ANN12.pdf> accessed 25 September 2013.  




there are still many substandard ships engaged in international shipping.311 It is arguable 
that current data suggest that current MOUs on port State control are successful, but it 
appears that it is necessary to improve their current enforcement mechanisms.312  
 
6.6 Response from Main Port States 
 
Technical and operational measures and MBMs are three routes of regulating GHG 
emissions from international shipping within the IMO. 313  As discussed earlier, the 
response from flag States to this GHG issue generally involves all these three aspects. 
Since port States are generally also flag States, to distinguish the port State response 
from flag States response to this issue, this section only examines the port State 
response in relation to the ports. In the context of GHG emissions from international 
shipping, port States are generally interested in the enforcement of technical and 
operational measures, and some of them may also be interested in some MBM 
proposals. For this reason, this section canvasses the response from port States listed in 
Annex I to the UNFCCC and those which are not listed therein generally rather than 
containing specific case studies as in previous sections.  
 
6.6.1 The UNFCCC Annex I Port States 
 
Generally port States listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC are supportive of the IMO’s role 
and work in regulating GHG emissions from international shipping. Of these countries, 
the European Commission, which is an observer of the IMO on behalf of the European 
Union (EU), has been pushing the IMO in expediting this regulatory process.314 Other 
                                                 
311 For example, within the Paris MOU area, in 2012 there were 669 detentions of ships, which accounted for 3.65 per 
cent of all ship inspections. Compared to the year of 2003 when there were 1431 detentions covering 7.05 per cent of 
all ship inspections, the numbers in 2012 have decreased a bit. Whereas within the Tokyo MOU area, in 2012 there 
were 1421 detentions of ships accounting for 4.59 per cent of all ship inspections. Compared to the year of 2002 
when there were 1307 detentions covering 6.67 per cent of all ship inspections, the numbers in 2012 were 
comparatively stable and the number of detentions were even higher. Paris MOU, above n 28, 24-25; Tokyo MOU, 
above n 309, p 20.  
312 Bang, above n 259, 116.  
313 See ch 4, 4.3.3.  
314 See, eg, at the 57th MEPC meeting, the European Commission reiterated its strong preference for global solutions 
to this GHG issue, and asserted that if it is not possible for the IMO to maintain the established timelines, it would 
retain ‘the right to initiate appropriate action to protect the environment’. Report of the Marine Environment 
Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Seventh Session, MEPC 57th Session, Agenda Item 21, IMO Doc MEPC 57/21 (7 




countries, such as Norway and the United States of America (US), have also been 
contributing to this work of the IMO. 
 
With regard to the proposed technical and operational measures (EEDI and SEEMP), 
aside from the survey and certification, there was only one proposed new regulation 
related to port State control. An earlier version of this regulation in 2010 provided that, 
 
‘A ship to which this part of the annex applies may, when in a port or offshore terminal 
of another Party, be subject to inspection by officers duly authorized by that Party for 
the purpose of determining whether the ship is in compliance with this part of the 
Annex. Any such inspection is limited to verifying, when appropriate, that there is on 
board an International Certificate on the Energy Efficiency on the ship.’315 
 
Norway underscored that this proposed regulation on port State control should be 
reconsidered in that it partly repeats Article 5 of MARPOL 73/78 and thus might lead to 
confusion and misinterpretations.316 This view was echoed by the working group on 
energy efficiency for ships at the 61st MEPC meeting in 2010.317 At the 62nd MEPC 
meeting in 2011, a new regulation 10.5 was adopted without too much debate, which 
reads: 
 
‘In relation to chapter 4, any port State inspection shall be limited to verifying, when 
appropriate, that there is a valid International Energy Efficiency Certificate on board, 
in accordance with article 5 of the Convention.’ 
 
The smooth adoption of this regulation was probably because this regulation has 
become a standard phrase for port State control,318 although it indeed excludes possible 
unilateral actions by port States in dealing with shipping GHG emissions. 319 
Additionally, at the 61st MEPC meeting, Norway also proposed to develop a new 
                                                 
315 Report of the Outcome of the Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Energy Efficiency Measures for 
Ships, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/3 (7 July 2010) annex 1, p 6.  
316 Comments on the Draft Regulatory Text on Energy Efficiency for Ships, submitted by Norway, MEPC 61st Session, 
Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/6 (16 July 2010) para 2.  
317 Report of the Working Group on Energy Efficiency Measures for Ships, MEPC 61st Session, IMO Doc MEPC 
61/WP.10 (30 September 2010) para 4.15.  
318 See, eg, MARPOL 73/78 art 5(2); Paris MOU, Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (23 
May 2013) 
<http://www.guardiacostiera.it/servizi/documents/sicurezzanavigazione/MOU,%20incl.%2029th%20Amendment.pdf
> accessed 26 September 2013 (‘Paris MOU’) annex 9, sec 2.  




chapter in the 2009 Guidelines for Port State Control under the Revised MARPOL 
Annex VI to provide basic guidance for port State control in relation to the energy 
efficiency regulations.320 Due to the different nature of air pollutants (eg, SOx, NOx) and 
GHG emissions (eg, CO2) and their different certificate requirements, this proposal is 
significant although it has not yet been addressed.  
 
Many port States made prompt responses to the adopted energy efficiency measures by 
the IMO in 2011, such as including the IEE Certificate in their port inspection 
requirements. In December 2012, the USCG amended its Vessel Inspection Alternative 
Regulations to add the IEE Certificate to the list of certificates that a recognised 
classification society may issue on behalf of the USCG.321 In May 2013, the USCG 
released the MARPOL Annex VI IEE Certificate Implementation Guidance, which 
provided interim guidance to ensure compliance with the IEE Certificate by the US 
flagged ships and foreign ships calling on US ports.322 It appears that as a port State 
which is not a participating member of any regional MOU,323 the US still properly 
exercises its obligations under the Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78.324 
 
In terms of proposed MBM proposals, port States under Annex I to the UNFCCC have 
revealed more interest than UNFCCC non-Annex I States. Among these States, 
Norway, the UK, France and Germany supported a global ETS,325 while the European 
Commission provided the IMO with specific information on the EU-ETS.326 However, 
                                                 
320 Comments on the Draft Regulatory Text on Energy Efficiency for Ships, submitted by Norway, MEPC 61st Session, 
Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/6 (16 July 2010) para 7.2.  
321  United States Coast Guard (USCG), Adding International Energy Efficiency (IEE) Certificate to List of 
Certificates A Recognised Classification Society May Issue (10 December 2012) 
<https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/12/10/2012-29749/adding-international-energy-efficiency-iee-
certificate-to-list-of-certificates-a-recognized> accessed 27 September 2013.  
322  United States Coast Guard (USCG), MARPOL Annex VI International Energy Efficiency (IEE) Certificate 
Implementation Guidance (5 May 2013) <http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USCG-2012-1095-0002> 
accessed 27 September 2013.  
323  The US is an observer to some regional MOUs, such as the Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU, Caribbean MOU, 
Mediterranean MOU, Black sea MOU, and Latin American MOU. 
324  Another example is that the US has not ratified the 2004 International Convention for the Control and 
Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM Convention), but it has adopted more stringent rules than 
the BWM Convention.  
325 See ch 4, 4.3.3.2.  
326 See, eg, Key Design Elements for Designing A 'Cap and Trade' Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), 
submitted by the European Commission, Intersessional Meeting of the Greenhouse Gas Working Group 1st Session, 




the European Commission also asserted that if the IMO could not achieve satisfactory 
progress in regulating this GHG issue, the EU would possibly take unilateral actions. 
Namely, the EU might include GHG emissions from international shipping into its 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). Indeed, the EU has taken unilateral measures in the 
international aviation sector and attributed its actions to slow and unsatisfied work 
under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). On 1 January 2012 the EU 
included the emissions from the international aviation industry into the EU-ETS. In 
December 2012 the EU suspended this policy due to the improved performance from 
the ICAO, or perhaps because of strong opposition from many countries including the 
US, Russia, China and India. In the same year, the EU published a consultation 
document asking for views on how best to reduce GHG emissions from ships so as to 
finally include GHG emissions from international shipping in an EU-ETS.327 Although 
EU’s unilateral actions have been opposed by many developing countries, and some 
developed countries,328 these actions objectively have also pushed the IMO’s work in 
accelerating the regulation of this issue.  
 
Compared with Norway and the European Commission, the US first put forward its 
own MBM proposal on the SECT, but at the 64th MEPC meeting in 2012, the US 
proposed an establishment of attained energy efficiency standards for new and existing 
ships through a phased approach while the SECT became an optional addition. In other 
words, the US suggested suspending the MBM discussions and instead focusing on the 
further improvement of ship’s energy efficiency through technical and operational 
measures. This view aims to reduce the transportation cost for the shipping industry, 
and thus was supported by many countries. Meanwhile, this view is also consistent with 
the interests of port States since these States cannot receive direct economic benefits 
                                                                                                                                               
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) and the Carbon Market, submitted by the European Commission, 
Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd Session, Agenda Item 2, IMO Doc 
GHG-WG 3/INF.3 (25 February 2011).  
327  Will Nichols, EU Launches Attempt to Deliver Shipping Emissions Trading Scheme (24 January 2012) 
<http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2140997/eu-launches-attempt-deliver-shipping-emissions-trading-scheme> 
accessed 26 September 2013.  
328 For example, China’s shipping industry is against any unilateral actions in regulating GHG emissions from 
international shipping, and Greece and the UK also opposed any attempt to jeopardise IMO’s work on this issue. 
Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (16 October 




generated by MBMs, although their environmental benefits may be secured for the long 
term. 
 
6.6.2 The UNFCCC Non-Annex I Port States 
 
Port States from either Annex I or non-Annex I to the UNFCCC have similar interests 
in reducing GHG emissions from international shipping so as to protect the environment 
of the ports. However, in terms of the means to achieve the emissions reduction from 
ships, port States from non-Annex I to the UNFCCC have slightly different positions. 
Singapore is a port State under non-Annex I to the UNFCCC, 329  and is also an 
important flag State.330 At the 62nd MEPC meeting in 2011, Singapore proposed some 
refinements to the draft Regulation 19 of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. Under the draft 
amended Annex VI by the IMO Secretariat in 2010, Regulation 19 included three 
clauses stipulating that this chapter only applies to all ships 400 gross tonnage and 
above, and does not apply to domestic shipping and ships which have diesel-electric 
propulsion, turbine propulsion or hybrid propulsion systems.331 The exclusion of any 
exemption for any flag State and grace period under this proposed regulation indeed 
revealed the regulatory interests of most UNFCCC Annex I States. In this way not only 
the NMFT principle would be thoroughly exercised but also the regulation could be 
implemented sooner after it enters into force so as to achieve the best environmental 
effect. However, due to strong opposition from many developing countries, it appeared 
less likely that this proposed regulation could be adopted.  
 
Under these circumstances, Singapore proposed an extra four paragraphs to add to the 
proposed Regulation 19 of Chapter 4. These four paragraphs constituted two key points. 
One was to provide a waiver clause for all flag States to postpone their commencement 
                                                 
329  But Singapore is regarded as a developed country based on the OECD criteria. See OECD, Geographical 
Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries: Disbursements, Commitments, Country Indicators (2013) 
<http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/4313023e.pdf?expires=1380277397&id=id&accname=ocid53013930&checksum=8
AACEBAA8DAD0ABE76999F69BE37B75E> accessed 27 September 2013, p 6.  
330 For example, as of 1 January 2012, Singapore ranked fifth in the world among the flags of registration with the 
largest registered deadweight tonnage. Meanwhile Singapore controls the 11th largest owned fleets (dwt) in the world 
with 712 vessels registered in Singapore and 398 registered in other flag States. UNCTAD, above n 8, 41,44.  
331 Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI - Inclusion of Regulations on Energy Efficiency for Ships, note by the 




date to four years after the entry into force of the regulation based on the building 
contract of a new ship, or six and a half years based on the delivery date of a new 
ship.332 This proposal was a compromise solution. It provided a grace period for all flag 
States, in particular for developing flag States.333 Meanwhile, it also applied the NMFT 
principle and excluded the application of the CBDR principle.334 For this reason, this 
proposal was agreed by a large number of States and finally adopted by the IMO. The 
other point of Singapore’s proposal was to give port States the entitlement to deny 
ships’ port entry based on whether they comply with the EEDI. 335  Based on 
international law principles, port States have sovereignty over their ports or internal 
waters and are thus entitled to utilise this right.336 However, Singapore’s proposal was 
not agreed by member States of the MEPC. Indeed, the denial of ships’ port entry solely 
based on their noncompliance with the EEDI is inconsistent with various regional 
MOUs, conflicts with other international regulations on places of refuge for ships in 
distress, 337  and may also distort international trade. The purpose of Singapore’s 
proposal on conditioning ships’ port entry was to strengthen the enforcement of port 
State control of the IMO’s energy efficiency measures. It is thus argued by Singapore 
that this goal can be achieved at the cost of safety or trade related benefits. It appears 
that innovative mechanisms or improvement in current mechanisms for port State 
control are necessary in order to improve the effectiveness of port State control on this 
issue.338 
                                                 
332 Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI - Inclusion of Regulations on Energy Efficiency for Ships, submitted by 
Singapore, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 6, IMO Doc MEPC 62/6/21 (20 May 2011) annex, p 1.  
333  Due to differentiated economic and technical situations and enforcement capacities between developed and 
developing States, this waiver clause is most likely to be used by some developing flag States. See also ch 4, 4.3.1.  
334 However, Singapore supported the further study on the feasibility of applying the CBDR principle in international 
shipping so as to explore all possible options. Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th 
Session, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (16 October 2008) annex 9, p 12.  
335 Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI - Inclusion of Regulations on Energy Efficiency for Ships, submitted by 
Singapore, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 6, IMO Doc MEPC 62/6/21 (20 May 2011) annex, p 1. Singapore’s 
proposed regulation in relation to the port State’s entitlement provided that, 
‘Subject to the provisions of international law, a Party to the present Convention shall be entitled to deny entry of 
ships operating in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 of this regulation into the ports or offshore terminals 
under its jurisdiction, except when this is necessary for the purpose of securing the safety of the ship or saving life at 
sea. In such cases, that party shall communicate to the Organization for circulation to the Parties to the present 
Protocol particulars thereof for their information.’ 
336 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 3rd ed, 1999) 61.  
337 Anthony Morrison, Places of Refuge for Ships in Distress: Problems and Methods of Resolution (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2012) 96-106, 144, 166.  





Of the current seven types of MBM proposals, the Port State Levy proposed by Jamaica 
is most related to the interests of port States. This proposal levies a uniform emissions 
charge on all vessels calling at their respective ports based on the amount of fuel 
consumed by the respective vessel on its voyage to that port.339 Port States collect the 
levy on their own behalf or through regional mechanisms, and they are also responsible 
for allocating the respective revenues associated with the levy through a self-
administered national or regional fund or an international mechanism. Under this 
proposal, the CBDR principle can also be achieved through access by developing 
countries to the fund. Chapter 4 of this thesis discussed the fact that this proposal has 
shortcomings in its measurement of emissions solely by fuels consumed, enforcement 
difficulties and high administrative costs. However, this proposal protects the interests 
of flag and port States by enabling their participation in this scheme. Meanwhile this 
scheme can be grouped into either in-sector or out-of-sector reduction, 340  which 
provides more options and would thus be attractive for some flag and port States. As 
discussed in previous chapters, Greece and Republic of Korea, and their shipping 
industries, as well as the International Chamber of Shipping, have expressed that their 




Flag States and port States are two vital stakeholders in the global regulation of GHG 
emissions from international shipping, and they are involved in both the legislative and 
implementing process of this issue. Of the flag States under Annex I to the UNFCCC, 
both Greece and Japan have strongly supported the leading role of the IMO in 
regulating this GHG issue and contributed to the adoption of energy efficiency 
measures by the IMO. They have both insisted that the NMFT principle should apply to 
this issue. Although Japan asserted that the CBDR principle could be reflected in the 
                                                 
339 See ch 4, 4.3.3.2.  
340 The third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships grouped the MBMs 
proposals into two categories, namely ‘focus on in-sector’ and ‘in-sector and out-of-sector’. Report of the Third 
Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda 
Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/1 (8 April 2011) annex 3.  




energy efficiency measures, this view was supplanted by its subsequent statement. 
Currently both Greece and Japan welcome the adoption of an MBM to reduce GHG 
emissions from ships, but they have different preferred MBMs. It is concluded that flag 
States under UNFCCC Annex I have similar positions towards the adoption of technical 
and operational measures by the IMO. Their attitudes towards proposed MBMs are also 
positive, although they have different preferences on the form MBMs should take. 
 
In comparison with UNFCCC Annex I flag States, non-Annex I flag States have a more 
diverse response towards this GHG issue due to their differing regulatory interests. 
Based on the case studies, Panama supported the leading role of the IMO in tackling 
this issue and underscored the urgency of this work. Meanwhile, Panama emphasised 
the application of the NMFT principle to this matter, and welcomed the MBMs. Of the 
current MBM proposals, Panama preferred the Penalty on Trade and Development 
proposed by the Bahamas. As the largest developing country, China supported the IMO 
in regulating the shipping GHG emissions. However, China has insisted on the 
application of the CBDR principle to all three measures for regulating the GHG issue 
and is dubious about the IMO’s competence in regulating the MBMs. Although China 
opposed the adoption of the energy efficiency measures by the IMO in 2011, China did 
not object to this regulation due to its desire for expanding its international shipbuilding 
market. China believes that MBMs are premature at this stage, but it has also accepted 
the compromise position that if a MBM is to be adopted, the CBDR principle should be 
incorporated. Vanuatu is a LDC and SIDS which is extremely vulnerable to the adverse 
impacts of climate change. It supported the IMO’s regulatory initiatives but suggested 
that an exemption for ships trading to the LDCs and SIDS be provided from these 
regulations. Due to similar economic and shipping situations, Panama, China and 
Vanuatu can be grouped into three categories representing the regulatory interests of 
major FOC States, major developing flag States, and other developing States 
respectively. Therefore, it can be deduced that major developing flag States and some 
other developing States are the main supporters of the application of the CBDR 
principle to the regulation of this GHG issue and these States pay more attention to their 
needs in capacity building and technology transfer rather than the regulation itself. 
Nevertheless, major FOC States support the NMFT principle and tend to welcome most 





With regard to the response from port States to GHG emissions from international 
shipping, global and regional port States organisations, as well as various port States, 
have all recognised the importance of regulating this issue and asserted that ports should 
take practical and effective measures to address this problem. Among them, the IAPH 
has taken some initiatives in tackling this matter, which can be regarded as a 
supplement to the IMO’s regulatory outcomes. Various regional MOUs on port State 
control have also added the IEE Certificate to their ‘List of MOU Deficiency Codes’ in 
support of the IMO’s work. Currently various port States generally support the 
reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping, and have asserted that current 
port State control on this GHG issue could be strengthened. However, disagreements 
remain as to the means to achieve this reduction. Generally port States under non-
Annex I to the UNFCCC require more grace periods and assistance in capacity building 
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The regulatory framework for the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 
international shipping has come into being through the continuous efforts of the 
international community, particularly through the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO). The most significant achievement is the adopted technical and operational 
measures in the form of 2011 amendments to Annex VI to the International Convention 
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78).1 During this regulatory 
process, the UN, the IMO, the shipping industry, and various flag and port States have 
responded differently according to their respective interests. Given the deficiencies in 
current legal and institutional frameworks for regulating GHG emissions from 
international shipping analysed in previous chapters, it is necessary to find ways to 
improve the adopted technical and operational measures, possibly including adopting 
market-based measures (MBMs). However, it is challenging to balance the interests of 
various stakeholders in the development of future regulatory efforts regarding the 
smooth adoption of these measures and the compliance by the global shipping industry. 
 
This chapter consists of four parts. The first part discusses the influence and interaction 
of key actors in regulating and implementing GHG emissions from international 
shipping. The second part outlines the current international regulatory framework for 
the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. Based on these findings in 
the first and second parts and the analysis from previous chapters, the third part 
identifies and examines these deficiencies and identifies gaps in current legal and 
institutional frameworks on the GHG issue. The fourth part proposes recommendations 
for addressing these deficiencies and gaps with a view to strengthening current 
regulatory frameworks on the GHG emissions issue from five different perspectives. 
These five perspectives are: expanding the coverage and strengthening the effectiveness 
of technical measures, strengthening the effectiveness of operational measures, 
improving the enforcement of energy efficiency measures by flag and port States, 
adopting an MBM and optimising institutional arrangements.  
                                                 
1 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), signed 2 November 1973, 12 
ILM 1319, as amended by the 1978 Protocol to the 1973 Convention, 1341 UNTS 3, 17 ILM 546 (entered into force 





7.2 Influence and Interaction of Various Stakeholders in Regulating and 
Implementing GHG Emissions from International Shipping 
 
GHG emissions from international shipping are a type of ‘conditional’ pollution.2 They 
contribute to global climate change and have been partially regulated by the IMO. 
Various stakeholders have participated in this regulatory process and contributed to the 
adoption of energy efficiency measures in July 2011. To identify the roles of these key 
actors and balance their different regulatory interests would facilitate the improvement 
of current energy efficiency measures, as well as the future development and adoption 
of MBMs. 
 
Regarding the regulation and enforcement of GHG emissions from international 
shipping, key actors include flag States, port States, national shipping industries, 
international shipping associations, the UN, the IMO, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Figure 7.1 
depicts the interaction of these actors in regulating and enforcing GHG emissions from 
international shipping. The first step in the process is that national shipping industries of 
various States express their views or suggestions on approaches to reducing shipping 
GHG emissions to their governments (flag States or port States) and relevant global 
shipping associations of which they are members. The driving forces of the responses 
by these national shipping industries are the efforts of the international community, in 
particular pertaining to the requirements from the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)3 and its Kyoto Protocol.4 Given that flag 
States, port States and some global shipping associations are either member parties or 
observers of the IMO,5 the second step is that these IMO member parties and observers 
                                                 
2 See ch 2, 2.1.2.  
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 31 ILM 848 (entered 
into force 21 March 1994) (‘UNFCCC’). 
4 The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC includes the reduction of GHG emissions from domestic shipping into national 
commitments of the UNFCCC Annex I States, and empowers the IMO to regulate GHG emissions from international 
shipping. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
16 March 1998, 37 ILM 22 (entered into force 16 February 2005) (‘Kyoto Protocol’) arts 2(1)(vii), 3(1), 10(b)(i); and 
2(2).  
5  Within the IMO, observers can be Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) with observer status, or Non-




contribute to the adoption of these proposals through either submitting proposals or 
participating in discussions and negotiations on behalf of their States or shipping sectors 
within the IMO. The third step is that regulations, such as the Energy Efficiency Design 
Index (EEDI) and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP),6 are adopted 
within the IMO through either a consensus or a majority-voting mechanism. The whole 
process involves complicated interaction and competition between flag States, port 
States and global shipping associations. Nevertheless, only contracting flag States and 
port States are qualified to vote, whereas international shipping associations may 
influence the decision-making process through other means such as submitting 
proposals and speaking at the MEPC meetings. 7  At the time of voting for the 
amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 on 15 July 2011, there were 64 
contracting States and 59 of them registered to attend the 62nd MEPC meeting. 8 
However, as of 2 December 2013, the number of contracting States had increased to 75 
and accounted for 94.77 per cent of the world tonnage (by gross tonnage).9 As the IMO 
received its specific mandate in relation to regulation of GHG emissions from 
international shipping through Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol,10 any updates in the 
global climate change regime, such as a scheduled climate change agreement by 2015,11 
are also likely to influence the regulatory process within the IMO. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
shipping associations are generally NGOs in consultative status. IMO, Member States, IGOs and NGOs (2013) 
<http://www.imo.org/About/Membership/Pages/Default.aspx> accessed 30 October 2013.  
6 The EEDI and SEEMP represent the main technical measure and operational measure respectively adopted by the 
IMO in July 2011 aiming to reduce GHG emissions from international shipping. See ch 4, 4.3.3.1.  
7 See International Maritime Organization (IMO), Basic Documents Volume I (International Maritime Organization, 
2010), pp 157-158, Rules Governing Relationship with Non-Governmental International Organizations, Rules 6-7. 
These rules provide that a non-governmental international organization with a consultative status has the right to 
submit written statements on items of the agenda of different committees, the right to be represented by an observer 
at relevant sessional meetings, and shall speak on relevant items of the agenda on the invitation of the Chairman and 
with the approval of the body concerned.  
8 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Second Session, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda 
Item 24, IMO Doc MEPC 62/24 (26 July 2011) para 6.110.  
9  IMO, Summary of Status of Conventions (2 December 2013) 
<http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx> accessed 3 January 2014.  
10 See ch 4, 4.2.  





Figure 7.1 Interactions of Various Stakeholders in Regulating and Enforcing GHG 
Emissions from International Shipping 
[Note: R represents ‘Regulatory Proposals’; E represents ‘Enforcement Requirements’] 
 
There are two main steps involved in the enforcement process for adopted measures. 
First, any State which accepts and ratifies new IMO regulations must ensure that its 
shipping industry complies with these regulations. To achieve this goal, these States 
may need to enact domestic legislation to incorporate IMO rules. Alternatively, the 
classification society employed by a Contracting State may adopt its rules incorporating 
these IMO rules and apply them to shipping companies of the State.12 Global shipping 
associations will be informed of any new regulations from the IMO, and will usually 
provide sample guidelines for their members on implementing these regulations. 
Secondly, national shipping industries will adhere to their domestic legislation or 
classification society rules in building ships and operating shipping. The shipping 
industry of a State which is not a contracting Party to IMO regulations may recognise 
and follow the regulations on a voluntary basis. Otherwise, Regional Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs) on port State control enforcement regimes may result in these 
substandard ships becoming less competitive in the global shipping market. 
 
                                                 
12  For example, China’s Classification Society has released its own rules incorporating EEDI and SEEMP 
requirements, whereas the Chinese Government has not updated its domestic legislation due to legal barriers. See ch 




The regulatory and enforcement process which has occurred in relation to GHG 
emissions from international shipping reveals the importance of flag States and port 
States. Although a flag State can also be a port State, the port State’s enforcement role 
is limited to verifying the International Energy Efficiency Certificate (IEE Certificate). 
As flag States have been allocated primary responsibility for ensuring the compliance of 
ships on their registers with all applicable international and domestic regulations and 
standards, it is reasonable to assert that flag States have more influence than port States 
as to the regulation and enforcement of this GHG issue. National shipping industries do 
not directly participate in the discussions and negotiations within the IMO or have the 
right to vote. However, the shipping industry of a country not only initiates the 
implementation process for IMO regulations but is also the enforcement body for 
receiving the benefits or bearing the costs of these regulations. For this reason, no 
regulation can be adopted or implemented without the support of the shipping 
industry.13 From the regulation and enforcement perspective, the order of importance of 
these stakeholders can be roughly ranked from high to low as the shipping industry, flag 
States and port States. Meanwhile, both MARPOL 73/78 and the IMO’s Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) have adopted a two-thirds majority voting 
mechanism,14 which is supplemented by a tonnage-based arrangement.15 This voting 
arrangement, when combined with the diverse regulatory interests of States not under 
Annex I to the UNFCCC, would make developing flag or port States disadvantaged in 
the negotiations and adoption of IMO regulations.16 These findings can be utilised to 
                                                 
13 See G. P. Pamborides, International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 
145. Pamborides asserts that ‘shipping is too valuable to the world’s economy to jeopardise’, and even powerful port 
States cannot exercise port State control ‘without the prior consent of the [shipping] industry’.  
14 MARPOL 73/78 art 16(2)(d). This provision provides that amendments to MARPOL 73/78 shall be adopted by a 
two-thirds majority of only the Parties to the Convention present and voting. International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), above n 7, 113. Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedures of the MEPC provides that, ‘decisions of the Committee 
and of its subsidiary bodies shall be made and reports, resolutions and recommendations adopted by a majority of the 
Members entitled to vote, present and voting’.  
15 MARPOL 73/78 art 16(2)(f)(ii)(iii). These two provisions of Article 16 provide that under some circumstances, to 
prevent an amendment to an Annex or to an amendment to an appendix to an Annex from being accepted, the 
combined merchant fleet of some opponent States should constitute not less than 50 per cent of the gross tonnage of 
the world’s merchant fleet. 
16 Generally Annex I States under the UNFCCC have similar regulatory interests in terms of regulating GHG 
emissions from international shipping. Nevertheless, non-Annex I States, including major Flag of Convenience 
(FOC) States, major developing flag States, and other developing States, have different positions towards the 
regulation of this GHG issue in particular towards the CBDR principle. It is thus difficult for developing States to 
ensure the incorporation of their interests into IMO regulations. An IMO regulation could be passed without the 




analyse the gaps in current regulatory frameworks for the GHG issue and underpin gap-
filling options if there are conflicts between the interests of stakeholders. 
 
7.3 Formation of the International Regulatory Framework for Reducing GHG 
Emissions from International Shipping 
 
The international effort to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping can be 
traced back to 1995 when the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) 17  ’s Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) were requested to examine 
the allocation and control of emissions from international bunker fuels.18 In 1996 the 
SBSTA identified five options from the eight options provided by the UNFCCC 
Secretariat as the basis for future work on the allocation of emissions from aviation and 
marine bunker fuels.19 Since the IMO started its regulatory work on GHG emissions 
from international shipping in 1997,20 two parallel regimes, the global climate change 
regime and the IMO GHG emissions regime, have been contributing to the international 
regulatory process on this GHG issue. Figure 7.2 depicts how these two regimes interact 
and contribute to the development of the current international regulatory framework for 
the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping.  
 
                                                 
17 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 31 ILM 848 
(entered into force 21 March 1994).  
18  Methodological Issues, Decision 4/CP.1, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, 
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (28 March - 7 April 1995) art 1(f), p 16.  
19 These options are: no allocation; allocation to the country where the bunker fuel is sold; allocation to the country of 
the transporting company, the country of registration of registration of the aircraft/vessel, or the country of the 
operator; allocation to the country of departure or destination of the aircraft/vessel; and allocation to the country of 
departure or destination of the passenger/cargo. Sebastian Oberthür, 'Institutional Interaction to Address Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions from International Transport: ICAO, IMO and the Kyoto Protocol' (2003) 3(3) Climate Policy 191, 
193.  
20 In 1997 the IMO adopted Resolution 8 on ‘CO2 emissions from ships’, which requested the IMO to undertake a 
study on GHG emissions from ships and consider feasible CO2  reduction strategies. See International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO), 'Main Events in IMO's Work on Limitation and Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
International Shipping' (2011) 
<http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/resources/Pages/Greenhouse%20gas%20emissions.aspx> accessed 5 November 





Figure 7.2 International Regulatory Framework for Reducing GHG Emissions 
from International Shipping 
 
The first regime is the global climate change regime21 where the SBSTA worked on the 
allocation and control of international bunker fuels from 1995 to 1996, and since 1998 
has been collaborating with the IMO.22 The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), established as a subsidiary body under the UNFCCC 
in 2007, had worked on the issue of international bunker fuels before 2012. Given no 
substantial outcomes on the GHG emissions issue had been achieved by the AWG-
LCA, 23  this working group finalised its work at the 2012 Doha Climate Change 
Conference as mandated. Currently the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform 
for Enhanced Action (ADP), established as a new subsidiary body under the UNFCCC 
                                                 
21 See ch 3, 3.3.  
22 Since the IMO received its specific mandate from Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol, the regular progress report 
submitted by the IMO to the SBSTA could be regarded as a type of obligation that the IMO bears under the Kyoto 
Protocol. But Hackmann has asserted that this cooperation between the UNFCCC and the IMO is a ‘reciprocal 
exchange of information and a reciprocal participation in relevant meetings’, and both institutions are independent in 
their decisions. Bernd Hackmann, 'Analysis of the Governance Architecture to Regulate GHG Emissions from 
International Shipping' (2012) 12(1) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 85, 95. 
See also ch 4, 4.2.  
23 Although no outcome has been achieved under the AWG-LCA, some of the options could possibly be adopted by 
the 2015 Climate Change Agreement. For instance, at the 14th Session of the AWG-LCA in June 2011, member States 
put forward six options to address GHG emissions from international aviation and shipping. The second option was 
that the UNFCCC set global emissions targets of 20 per cent below 2005 levels in 2020 for international shipping on 
a scale consistent with the agreed 2 degree Celsius objective, and the use of MBMs may contribute to achieving this 
target. See Work of the AWG-LCA Contact Group at AWG-LCA 14.2, AWG-LCA 14th Session (2nd part), Agenda Item 




at the Durban Climate Change Conference in 2011, is working on negotiating a global 
climate change agreement that will be adopted by 2015 and will enter into force from 
2020. Whether the 2015 climate change agreement will involve GHG emissions from 
international shipping remains unclear; however, this agreement is linked to the second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. Since the IMO received its specific GHG 
mandate from Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol, this forthcoming climate change 
agreement will not change the origin of the IMO’s GHG mandate, but it may clarify or 
limit the IMO’s regulatory competence so as to influence the IMO’s current regulations 
on the GHG issue.  
 
The second regime is the IMO GHG emissions regime24 where the IMO has adopted 
conventions, codes, resolutions and guidelines to regulate GHG emissions from 
international shipping. Of these various regulatory initiatives, Resolution 8 and 
Resolution A.963 (23) 25 were adopted by the IMO in 1997 and 2003 respectively, 
which have underpinned the subsequent actions of the IMO. At the 57th MEPC meeting 
in 2008, the IMO adopted nine fundamental principles on which to base its future 
regulation of the GHG emissions issue. Under the IMO GHG emissions regime to date, 
technical and operational measures have been adopted by the IMO to regulate the GHG 
emissions from international shipping in the form of amendments to Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78, as well as its guidelines and resolutions, whereas MBM proposals are 
still under discussions within the IMO. 
 
Aside from these two parallel regimes that are tackling GHG emissions from 
international shipping, some international instruments on maritime safety and labour, 
international trade and environment, also contribute to addressing the issue. Some 
international environmental instruments, such as the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development (Rio Declaration), 26  and the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD),27 have provided general regulatory principles for the regulation of the GHG 
                                                 
24 See ch 4, 4.3.  
25 IMO Policies and Practices Related to the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, IMO Assembly 
23rd Session, Agenda Item 19, IMO Doc Res A.963(23) (5 December 2003).  
26 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 ILM 874 (14 June 1992) (‘Rio Declaration’).  
27  Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 31 ILM 818 (entered into force 29 




issue. With regard to the adopted technical and operational measures, maritime safety 
and labour related treaties, such as the Convention on the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG),28 International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 29  and International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), 30  will apply to the issue. 
Additionally, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS)31 can be applied to the transfer of technology issues incorporated in Regulation 
23 of the amended Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. Concerning the proposed MBMs 
which are currently being discussed within the IMO, whether these proposed MBMs are 
compatible with WTO rules is also an issue in debate.32  
 
Although the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997, the international regulatory 
framework for the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping has only 
been developing in recent years with the adoption of energy efficiency measures by the 
IMO as the main achievement. Furthermore, the lack of a consensus in adopting this 
regulation indicates the existence of substantially different views between countries. 
Therefore, it is important to identify and address the divergence so as to ensure 
widespread and effective compliance with these regulations by all countries.  
 
7.4 Gaps in Current Legal and Institutional Frameworks for GHG Emissions Issue 
 
Although GHG emissions from international shipping have been partially regulated by 
the IMO in the form of amendments to Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78, deficiencies still 
                                                 
28 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, opened for signature 20 October 
1972, UKTS 77 (entered into force 15 July 1977) (‘COLREG’).  
29 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, opened for signature 1 November 1974, 1184 UNTS 2 
(entered into force 25 May 1980) (‘SOLAS’).  
30 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, opened for 
signature 7 July 1978, 1361 UNTS 2(entered into force 28 April 1984), as amended by the 1995 Protocol, 1969 
UNTS (entered into force 1 February 1997) (‘STCW’).  
31  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 33 ILM 1125 (entered 
into force 1 January 1995) (‘TRIPS’).  
32 See, eg, Possible Incompatibility between WTO Rules and A Market-based Measure for International Shipping, 
submitted by India, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/27 (20 May 2011); Possible 
Incompatibility between the WTO Rules and Market-based Measures for International Shipping, submitted by India 




exist in this regulation.33 Based on the objective of achieving absolute GHG emissions 
reduction from international shipping, there are still gaps in the current legal and 
institutional framework for the reduction of shipping GHG emissions. This part 
identifies these deficiencies and gaps from three perspectives, namely: deficiencies in 
current technical and operational measures, lack of MBMs and a lack of consensus in 
applying regulatory principles.  
 
7.4.1 Deficiencies in Current Technical and Operational Measures 
 
The revised Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 adopted in July 2011 is a significant advance 
in regulating GHG emissions from international shipping. In particular, the amendments 
make mandatory the EEDI for new ships, and the SEEMP for all ships. The IMO-
commissioned research has indicated that the EEDI and SEEMP will achieve significant 
GHG emissions reduction from international shipping. 34  Nevertheless, some 
deficiencies remain and create challenges for future implementation of these 
measures. 35  This section identifies these deficiencies from international law and 
stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 
The adopted EEDI and SEEMP do not fully incorporate relevant international 
environmental law principles. First, these measures do not adequately reflect the 
principle of environmental liability for transboundary harm. Based on this principle, 
flag States have a duty to prevent, reduce and control transboundary harm resulting 
from cumulative GHG emissions from international shipping, and port States also have 
a duty to cooperate in mitigating transboundary environmental risks.36 However, the 
new paragraph 5 of Regulation 10 of Annex VI limits port State inspection to verifying 
if there is a valid IEE Certificate on board. This limitation excludes possible unilateral 
                                                 
33 See, eg, James Harrison, 'Recent Developments and Continuing Challenges in the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from International Shipping' (2012) University of Edinburgh Research Paper Series 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037038> accessed 5 November 2013, pp 25-26; Md. Saiful Karim, 'IMO Mandatory 
Energy Efficiency Measures for International Shipping: The First Mandatory Global Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Instrument for an International Industry' (2011) 7(1) Macquarie Journal of International and Comparative 
Environmental Law 111, 113.  
34  Zabi Bazari and Tore Longva, 'Assessment of IMO Mandated Energy Efficiency Measures for International 
Shipping' ( IMO Doc MEPC 63/INF.2, Annex, 31 October 2011) p 8.  
35 See Harrison, above n 33, 2. See also ch 4, 4.3.3.1.  




actions or more stringent rules by port States. Given that there is no uniform 
enforcement of standards by various regional Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) on 
port State control, port State control has often been regarded as ineffective.37 In this 
sense, a comparatively flexible port State control, such as the United States Coast Guard 
(USCG)’s port State control program, would facilitate effective port State control in 
addressing this GHG issue38 and thus better reflect environmental liability for possible 
transboundary harm. 
 
Second, the EEDI and SEEMP are not fully consistent with the polluter-pays principle. 
Under the EEDI and SEEMP not all polluters are responsible for the environmental 
cost. The 2011 amendments of Annex VI only made the EEDI applicable to certain 
types of new ships. This accounted for 70 per cent of emissions from new ships, but 
existing ships are not covered. 39  Having realised this problem, the IMO has been 
refining the application scope of the EEDI. Eventually at the 66th MEPC meeting in 
April 2014, amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 were adopted to extend the 
application scope of the EEDI to include an extra five types of ships. They are Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) carriers, roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) cargo ships (vehicle carriers), ro-ro 
cargo ships, ro-ro passenger ships, and cruise passenger ships having non-conventional 
propulsion. 40  However, this extended application scope of the EEDI still does not 
include all types of new ships. In particular, the 2014 amendments of Annex VI 
exempts ships not propelled by mechanical means, platforms including Floating 
Production Storage and Offloading Facilities (FPSOs) and Floating Storage Units 
(FSUs) and drilling rigs, regardless of their forms of propulsion, as well as cargo ships 
having an ice-breaking capability.41 Passenger ships other than cruise passenger ships 
will also remain unregulated by the EEDI. Therefore, the EEDI requirements do not 
                                                 
37 Ho-Sam Bang, 'Is Port State Control an Effective Means to Combat Vessel-Source Pollution? An Empirical Survey 
of the Practical Exercise by Port States of Their Powers of Control' (2008) 23(4) The International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law 715, 726. See also ch 6, 6.5.3.  
38  The USCG is the maritime safety authority of the US, and is responsible for maritime safety, security and 
environmental stewardship of the US. The US is not a formal member of any MOUs (except as an observer to some 
MOUs), but its unilateral port State control measures under the USCG has been generally regarded as effective and 
successful. Bang, above n 37, 741.  
39 IMO, above n 20, 12. The types of ships being regulated by the EEDI in 2011 included bulk carrier, gas carrier, 
tanker, container ship, general cargo ships, refrigerated cargo carrier, and combination carrier.  
40 Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI and the NOx Technical Code 2008, IMO Doc Res MEPC.251(66) (4 April 
2014) reg 21 (‘MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI (2014 amendments)’).  




make all polluters (shipowners in this context) pay for the environmental cost of their 
GHG emissions. Furthermore, the adopted EEDI only regulates the design of new ships, 
which diminishes its effectiveness as well as decreasing its accuracy as an emissions 
indicator.42 It can thus be deduced that the cost-bearing mechanism under the EEDI 
could be improved. Indeed the SEEMP makes all ship operators engaged in 
international voyages liable for the preparation and implementation of the SEEMP. 
However, the lack of reduction target-setting and monitoring weakens the effect of this 
measure,43 and actually renders polluters (ship operators in this context) exempt from 
liabilities. 
 
The adopted EEDI and SEEMP lack full support from stakeholders in emissions 
reductions from international shipping. Under the UNFCCC process the Parties have 
mainly discussed regulatory principles in relation to GHG emissions from shipping, 
whereas the discussion of technical and operational measures falls into the work of the 
IMO. In the IMO discussions, national shipping industries from both developed and 
developing States have generally supported the adoption of technical and operational 
measures. However, the shipping industries in many developing countries have insisted 
that the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) be incorporated 
into the EEDI and SEEMP.44 As the main regional ship designers and shipbuilders 
association, the Community of European Shipyards’ Association (CESA) preferred the 
SEEMP to the EEDI in that it believed that the SEEMP would be more effective than 
the EEDI. 45 Clearly the adopted EEDI and SEEMP have not fully incorporated the 
                                                 
42 Stathis Palassis, 'Climate Change and Shipping' in Robin Warner and Clive Schofield (eds), Climate Change and 
the Oceans: Gauging the Legal and Policy Currents in the Asia Pacific and Beyond (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 2012) 200, 218; See also S.M.Rashidul Hasan, Impact of EEDI on Ship Design and Hydrodynamics: A Study 
of the Energy Efficiency Design Index and Other Related Emission Control Indexes (Master of Science Thesis, 
Chalmers University of Technology, 2011) <http://publications.lib.chalmers.se/records/fulltext/151284.pdf> accessed 
2 December 2013, pp66-67. Hasan takes the view that under current EEDI regulations the EEDI is only used as a 
design parameter, and may cause ‘the sister vessel dilemma’ or ‘destroy the sister vessel concept’. For example, keel 
lay of two sister vessels is in Phase 0 (1 January 2013 – 31 December 2014) and Phase 1 (1 January 2015 – 31 
December 2019) respectively. Based on Regulation 21 of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, the first vessel meets the 
EEDI requirement, while the second vessel has to be modified to achieve the EEDI requirements of Phase 1. These 
two vessels are thus not sisters anymore.  
43 See ch 4, 4.3.3.1.  
44  See, eg, Anil Devli, Overview of the Shipping Sector in India (1 April 2011) 
<http://www.ahlers.com/images/news/2011/overview%20of%20the%20shipping%20sector%20in%20india%20%28
mr%20anil%20devli%29.pdf> accessed 26 November 2013, p 8; see also ch 5, 5.4.  
45  Development of a CO2 Design Index for New Ships, submitted by the Community of European Shipyards' 
Association (CESA), MEPC 58th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4/12 (1 August 2008) para 5. See also 




CBDR principle, and the SEEMP is also not as effective in reducing shipping GHG 
emissions as CESA expected.  
 
Flag States under Annex I to the UNFCCC generally support the adopted EEDI and 
SEEMP by the IMO. Nevertheless, many non-Annex I flag States opposed the adoption 
of these measures due to their differing regulatory interests. For example, some major 
developing countries, such as China and India, insisted on the application of the CBDR 
principle to these measures. They asserted that these measures should not be regulated 
in the form of an amendment to Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78 due to the different nature 
of air pollutants (eg, SOx, NOx) and GHG emissions (eg, CO2). Some less developed 
countries, such as Vanuatu, suggested that an exemption for ships trading to the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) be provided 
from the EEDI and SEEMP. Furthermore, many developing countries proposed that 
effective transfer of technology and financial assistance from developed countries to 
developing countries be strengthened so as to enhance their capability to implement 
these measures. There are differing views among commentators as to whether the EEDI 
and SEEMP should be amended to take into account these requests from developing 
countries based on the CBDR principle. However, it is generally accepted that current 
mechanisms on financial assistance and transfer of technology in relation to this GHG 
issue are weak.46 Some scholars even argue that the implementation of the EEDI might 
‘trigger another migration of [the] shipbuilding industry in the future’ if the current 
transfer of technological and financial resources from developed countries to developing 
countries cannot be improved.47  
 
In contrast to active participation of most flag States in discussing proposed technical 
and operational measures, most port States have not made timely responses to the 
regulatory initiatives by the IMO. Nevertheless, some port States agree that current port 
State control on the GHG issue could be strengthened so as to ensure compliance with 
                                                 
46 See, eg, Harrison, above n 33, 16-18; Derya Aydin Okur, The Challenge of Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from International Shipping and the Complicated Principle of 'Common but Differentiated Responsibilities' (2012) 
<http://web.deu.edu.tr/hukuk/dergiler/dergimiz13-1/2-deryaaydinokur.pdf> accessed 26 November 2013, p 45.  
47 Jianing Zheng, Hao Hu and Lei Dai, 'How would EEDI Influence Chinese Shipbuilding Industry?' (2013) 40(5) 
Maritime Policy & Management 495, 499,509. The authors assert that China might possibly lose its leading 
shipbuilding position in the world since it achieved this position with regard to three major indicators (ship deliveries, 




the EEDI and SEEMP by shipping companies. While some UNFCCC Annex I States 
suggested maintaining the current port inspection mechanism,48 Singapore, as a non-
Annex I port State, proposed a more stringent port State control measure which was not 
adopted by the IMO.49  
 
7.4.2 Lack of Market-based Measures 
 
Whether MBMs should be adopted by the IMO to tackle GHG emissions from 
international shipping has been controversial since this type of measure was formally 
put forward in the 2000 IMO GHG Study. 50  Various countries, international 
organisations and scholars have expressed their differing views on this issue. At the 65th 
MEPC meeting in May 2013, the discussion of MBMs was suspended due to a proposal 
of the US on furthering technical and operational measures. However, it is predicted 
that in the long term, certain MBMs should be adopted as a supplementary method of 
reducing shipping GHG emissions in addition to the current energy efficiency measures.  
 
First, studies have indicated that using EEDI and SEEMP alone would not achieve 
absolute emissions reduction from international shipping. 51  Although the IMO is 
currently working on the improvement of the technical aspects of the EEDI, it is 
difficult for the IMO to achieve technical breakthroughs in a short time due to the 
intricacies of ship types and shipping features. Achieving an increase of no more than 
two degrees Celsius in the global average temperature by 2100 has become the goal of 
international community in tackling climate change.52 However, a recent study suggests 
                                                 
48 See, eg, Comments on the Draft Regulatory Text on Energy Efficiency for Ships, submitted by Norway, MEPC 61st 
Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/5/6 (16 July 2010) para 2; Report of the Working Group on Energy 
Efficiency Measures for Ships, MEPC 61st Session, IMO Doc MEPC 61/WP.10 (30 September 2010) para 4.15. See 
also ch 6, 6.6.1.  
49 See Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI - Inclusion of Regulations on Energy Efficiency for Ships, submitted by 
Singapore, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 6, IMO Doc MEPC 62/6/21 (20 May 2011) annex, p 1.  
50 See Kjell Skjølsvik et al, 'Study of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships' (International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), 2000).  
51 See, eg, Bazari and Longva, above n 34, executive summary, p 8; Palassis, above n 42, 220; Aydin Okur, above n 
46, 39. See also ch 4, 4.3.3.2.  
52 The two degrees Celsius goal was first put forward by the G-8 in 2009, and later agreed in the Copenhagen Accord. 
In 2010 this goal was formally incorporated into the UNFCCC process. Nevertheless, the specific reduction targets 
and time frame for achieving this goal have not yet been agreed under the UNFCCC process. Lavanya Rajamani, 'The 
Cancun Climate Agreements: Reading the Text, Subtext and Tea Leaves' (2011) 60(2) The International and 




that international shipping needs to make its ‘fair and proportionate contribution’ so as 
to reach the two degrees goal, which means CO2 emissions from international shipping 
need to be cut within the next decade and fall by at least 80 per cent by 2050 compared 
to their 1990 levels. 53 Against this background, it is important for the international 
shipping industry to examine the possibility of adopting MBMs for more GHG 
reductions rather than waiting for the effects of applying energy efficiency measures to 
be identified. Given the EEDI and SEEMP only entered into force on 1 January 2013 
and there is a waiver clause that some flag States may choose,54 it may take a long time 
for the international community to identify the precise effectiveness of these measures 
in terms of a reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. While a delay in 
introducing MBMs to international shipping would be more costly for future 
implementation,55 it would be more cost-effective for the international shipping industry 
to adopt MBMs at an early stage. 
 
Second, the adoption of MBMs could incorporate international law principles in a full 
and objective manner. The CBDR principle and the No More Favourable Treatment 
(NMFT) principle are two important international law principles. 56  The debate on 
applying these principles to GHG emissions from international shipping has been a 
constant theme running through the international regulatory process in the IMO. 
Consequently, the energy efficiency measures were adopted by a majority vote in 2011 
rather than by a consensus. The main opposition came from some developing countries 
which criticised that the CBDR principle was not reflected in these measures ‘in a full 
and objective manner’.57 Compared with adopted energy efficiency measures, proposed 
MBMs could potentially address the conflict between these two principles. Of the 
current seven types of MBM proposals submitted to the IMO, the rebate mechanism for 
                                                 
53 A. Bows-Larkin et al, 'High Seas, High Stakes: High Seas Project Final Report' (Tyndall Centre for Climate 
Change Research, University of Manchester, 2014) 
<http://www.mace.manchester.ac.uk/media/eps/schoolofmechanicalaerospaceandcivilengineering/research/centres/ty
ndall/pdf/High_Seas_High_Stakes_High_Seas_Project_Final_Report.pdf> accessed 8 July 2014.  
54 Regulation 19 of the 2011 amended Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 provides that flag States may postpone their 
actual commencement date of the EEDI to six and a half years from 1 January 2013.  
55 Rachael Dillon, 'The Growing Challenge of Climate Change for the Maritime Industry and the Role of Market-
Based Measures to Reduce Emissions' (2012) 79(2) Journal of Transportation Law, Logistics & Policy 139, 151.  
56 See ch 2, 2.5.  
57 See, eg, Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Second Session, MEPC 62nd Session, 




a market-based instrument for international shipping, the port State levy, and some 
other proposals all incorporate elements reflecting both the CBDR and the NMFT 
principles. There is a higher possibility that these MBMs will be accepted by both 
developed and developing countries, if both these principles can be adequately 
incorporated into future MBMs.  
 
MBMs are also consistent with the polluter-pays principle.58 MBMs can be designed to 
internalise the external cost of GHG emissions from international shipping through a 
GHG Fund, different emissions trading schemes, or other means. That is to set a price 
on the external cost and thereby internalise it so as to address the market failure for 
GHG emissions.59 Consequently, the polluters,60 namely ship owners or ship operators, 
would pay for their ships’ GHG emissions. 61  Indeed this mechanism provides an 
economic incentive for the polluters to reduce their GHG emissions. Additionally, it is 
arguable that a ‘universally applied and uniformly regulated’ global MBM would be 
‘fully compatible with’ the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO).62 
 
Third, the adoption of MBMs reflects a majority view among the main stakeholders in 
the GHG issue. Generally speaking, the international shipping industry supports the 
adoption of MBMs by the IMO in reducing GHG emissions from international shipping. 
For instance, as an influential shipowners’ and ship operators’ association, the Round 
Table of International Shipping Associations asserted in 2012 that MBMs might be 
                                                 
58 See ch 2, 2.6.  
59  Erika Ekström, Market Based Measures to Regulate CO2 Emissions from International Shipping (2009) 
<http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1557129&fileOId=1586238> accessed 27 
December 2013, pp 25-26. In this context, market failure refers to ‘environmental externalities’. See OECD, 
Environmental Externalities (4 March 2003) <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=824> accessed 4 April 
2014. Environmental externalities ‘refers to the economic concept of uncompensated environmental effects of 
production and consumption that affect consumer utility and enterprise cost outside the market mechanism’. See also 
ch 4, 4.3.3.2.  
60  GHG emissions from international shipping can be regarded as a type of ‘conditional’ pollution, and GHG 
emissions have been regulated as a type of pollution in some countries such as the US, Germany and Australia. See 
ch 2, 2.1.2.  
61 See Harilaos N. Psaraftis, 'Market-Based Measures for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships: A Review' (2012) 
11(2) WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 211, 213.  
62 Within the IMO, the WTO secretariat and an IMO Expert Group asserted that MBMs are compatible with WTO 
rules, whereas India argued that the view of WTO secretariat could not represent the WTO and MBMs are conflicted 
with relevant rules of the WTO. Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, 
MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 24, IMO Doc MEPC 61/24 (6 October 2010) annex 8, p 3; Possible Incompatibility 
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eventually introduced for shipping although it also commented that MBMs ‘are not 
justified at this particular time’.63 The Community of European Shipyards’ Associations 
(CESA) is the main regional shipping NGO representing the interests of shipbuilders 
within the IMO. CESA asserted that the EEDI cannot achieve any short-term emissions 
reduction from ships, but it regarded MBMs as a ‘more effective solution’ to address the 
issue under discussion.64 Additionally, except for the shipping industries in a few large 
developing countries such as China and India, most national industries of various 
countries welcome the adoption of MBMs although they have different preferences on 
the form MBMs should take.65  
 
Flag States have made similar responses to the proposed MBMs. The position of the 
large developing States on MBMs is also not intransigent. For example, China opposes 
the adoption of MBMs by the IMO at this stage but it would also accept a compromise 
position provided that the CBDR principle could be incorporated in the proposed 
MBMs to be adopted in the future.66 Due to their less important role in the proposed 
MBMs, most port States have not expressed their opposition to them. Developing port 
States are generally more concerned about the assistance that they can obtain in 
strengthening their capacity building for implementing IMO regulations on the GHG 
emissions issue. 
 
Fourth, the adoption of MBMs by the international shipping industry is consistent with 
the practice in the international aviation industry, and would raise revenue for climate 
finance.67 Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol delegates the regulation of GHG emissions 
                                                 
63 Round Table of International Shipping Associations, Round Table Associations Position Paper on GHG+MBMs 
(22 February 2012) 
<https://www.bimco.org/About/Press/Press_Releases/2012/2012_02_22_Round_Table_MBM.aspx> accessed 27 
December 2013.  
64 Phase-in Implementation of the Energy Efficiency Design Index for Standard and Complex Ship Types, submitted 
by the Community of European Shipyards' Associations (CESA), MEPC 59th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc 
MEPC 59/4/38 (20 May 2009) para 3.  
65 See ch 5, 5.3-5.4.  
66 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda 
Item 24, IMO Doc MEPC 61/24 (6 October 2010) annex 3, p 3.  
67 To date there has been no universally agreed definition of ‘climate change finance’ or ‘climate finance’ as it is often 
called. Generally speaking, climate finance refers to ‘financial flows for reducing emissions, i.e. mitigation’, and 
‘measures for adapting to the consequences of climate change’, in particular funding for tackling climate change in 
developing countries. However, many scholars assert that climate finance should also include ‘resources for activities 
supporting low-carbon development and energy infrastructure transitions’, including ‘capacity building, research and 




in their respective sectors to the IMO and the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO). Similar to the IMO’s three-pillar reduction strategy (technical, operational, and 
market-based measures), the ICAO has agreed its four-pillar reduction strategy, namely 
aircraft technology, operational improvement, sustainable alternative fuels, and 
MBMs. 68  In particular, at the 38th ICAO Assembly held from 24 September to 4 
October 2013, a consensus agreement was reached on the development of a global 
MBM scheme for international aviation. This MBM scheme is to be decided by the 39th 
ICAO Assembly in 2016, and to be implemented from 2020.69 Given that both the 
international aviation and shipping industries received their GHG mandate from the 
Kyoto Protocol and that they are facing similar regulatory barriers, 70 the successful 
practice of the ICAO in adopting a future MBM will provide useful experience for the 
IMO. Meanwhile, MBM-generated revenues from international aviation and shipping 
industries could be utilised for climate finance in other sectors through the UNFCCC 
process.71 Additionally, a recent report concludes that the economic impacts of MBMs 
for international shipping on developing countries are likely to be small, and 
undesirable economic impacts can be addressed through a combination of appropriate 
measures.72 
 
Although there is mounting recognition that MBMs should be adopted to reduce GHG 
emissions from international shipping, opposition from some developing countries 
                                                                                                                                               
namely it refers to ‘financial flows for reducing [GHG] emissions’. Luis Gomez-Echeverri, 'The Changing 
Geopolitics of Climate Change Finance' (2013) 13(5) Climate Policy 632, 635.  
68 Information Relevant to Emissions from Fuel Used for International Aviation and Maritime Transport, UNFCCC 
SBSTA 39th Session, Warsaw, Doc FCCC/SBSTA/2013/MISC.20 (10 November 2013) p 3.  
69 At the 38th ICAO Assembly, EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) was rejected as an option for MBM to be 
adopted by ICAO by 2016.  
70 For example, how to reconcile the conflict between the IMO and ICAO’s non-discrimination principle with the 
UNFCCC’s CBDR principle has been at the heart of these debates as to the regulation of these GHG issues within the 
IMO and the ICAO. A detailed analysis of the similarities and differences between the international aviation and 
shipping industries is provided by: Michael Keen, Ian Parry and Jon Strand, 'Market-Based Instruments for 
International Aviation and Shipping as a Source of Climate Finance' (2012) 
<http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5950> accessed 27 December 2013, pp 10-16.  
71 Ibid 52. However, it is often argued by the aviation and shipping industries that these industries should not be 
targeted as a source of such revenue in a disproportionate manner. See Information Relevant to Emissions from Fuel 
Used for International Aviation and Maritime Transport, UNFCCC SBSTA 39th Session, Warsaw, Doc 
FCCC/SBSTA/2013/MISC.20 (10 November 2013) p 6.  
72 Annela Anger et al, 'Research to Assess Impacts on Developing Countries of Measures to Address Emissions in the 
International Aviation and Shipping Sectors' (2013) <http://www.climatestrategies.org/research/our-
reports/category/69/376.html> accessed 28 December 2013, p 4. See also United Nations Conference on Trade and 
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remains. Nevertheless, since the main reasons for their opposition are the uncertainties 
surrounding the form of MBMs and their economic impacts, lack of the CBDR 
principle, and the lack of competence of the IMO to regulate MBMs,73 these barriers 
can potentially be addressed through well-designed mechanisms and better institutional 
arrangements.  
 
7.4.3 Lack of Consensus in Applying Regulatory Principles 
 
The lack of consensus on the regulatory principles applicable to reducing GHG 
emissions from international shipping constitutes the main barrier for the international 
community to regulate this GHG issue.74 Two issues are dealing with the CBDR and 
NMFT principles and institutional governance during the international regulatory 
process. The IMO has partially regulated this GHG issue from technical and operational 
perspectives. Nevertheless, it is arguable that under the current regulations the interests 
of the UNFCCC Annex I States and non-Annex I States are not balanced, and the 
current institutional governance of the issue is fragmented and ineffective. This section 
summarises these two deficiencies, which if addressed would provide a sound 
foundation for future regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping. 
 
7.4.3.1 Imbalance of Interests between the UNFCCC Annex I States and Non-Annex I 
States 
 
To date no substantial outcomes in relation to global shipping emissions reductions 
have been achieved within the global climate change regime, whereas the main outcome 
within the IMO GHG emissions regime is the amended Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, as 
well as related guidelines and relevant resolutions. As discussed earlier, the adopted 
EEDI and SEEMP lack full support from the relevant stakeholders in GHG emissions 
reduction from international shipping. It is arguable that a disproportionate burden in 
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reducing shipping GHG emissions from a technical perspective has been imposed on 
developing countries, mainly UNFCCC non-Annex I States. This situation imposes 
challenges on the future implementation of these measures.75 
 
The incorporation of the CBDR principle in the regulatory measures adopted by the 
IMO on GHG emissions from international shipping would comply with the mandate 
that the IMO received from the Kyoto Protocol, and it would also be feasible for the 
IMO to incorporate both the CBDR and the NMFT principles into its regulation of this 
issue.76 In ICAO Assembly Resolution A38-18 which was adopted in October 2013, the 
CBDR principle has been explicitly incorporated and treated as one of the guiding 
principles for the design and implementation of MBMs for international aviation.77 
Although some developed countries, such as Australia, Japan and the US, have 
reservations on some of the ICAO provisions, it is unlikely that the final ICAO MBMs 
will completely ignore the CBDR principle. Taking the ICAO experience as an 
example, it appears likely that the CBDR principle will also be incorporated in the 
MBMs to be adopted by the international shipping industry in reducing shipping GHG 
emissions. This is also because most stakeholders in this GHG issue, in particular the 
shipping industries of some developed flag and port States,78 as well as some developed 
countries, 79  have expressed their willingness to incorporate the CBDR principle in 
possible future MBMs. The strong influence of the shipping industry in the regulatory 
process of the IMO, as discussed early in this chapter, will be an important factor in the 
final outcome on MBMs.80 Nevertheless, it is important to clarify that the application of 
                                                 
75 See ch 4, 4.3.3.1.  
76 See ch 4, 4.2.  
77  See Information Relevant to Emissions from Fuel Used for International Aviation and Maritime Transport, 
UNFCCC SBSTA 39th Session, Warsaw, Doc FCCC/SBSTA/2013/MISC.20 (10 November 2013) Appendix, ICAO 
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78 For example, in 2009 the shipping industries in the UK, Australia, Belgium and Sweden co-released their MBM 
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Association et al, A Global Cap-and-Trade System to Reduce Carbon Emissions from International Shipping (2009) 
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the CBDR principle to the regulation of this GHG issue does not mean that developing 
countries would be exempt from obligations in reducing shipping GHG emissions.  
 
Firstly, ‘differentiated responsibility’ consists of three categories, namely differentiated 
central obligations, differentiated implementation arrangements, and the granting of 
assistance, including financial and technological assistance.81 The appropriate forms of 
the differentiated responsibilities vary with the types of measures that the IMO would 
adopt. In the technical and operational measures that the IMO has adopted, developing 
countries and developed countries have the same obligations to comply with these 
measures. There is some granting of financial and technological assistance but this 
needs to be strengthened.  
 
Secondly, under the CBDR principle developing countries still have ‘common 
responsibility’ and the status of non-Annex I States to the UNFCCC (developing 
countries) should be regularly reviewed and updated. From an economic perspective, 
two options are available to States for achieving absolute GHG emissions reductions, 
namely to reduce their Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and to reduce their emissions 
intensity.82 Since emission intensity is defined as emissions per GDP,83 to reduce GHG 
emissions from international shipping under both options means to slow down 
economic development which is particularly difficult for developing countries. The fact 
that most current pollution from international shipping can be attributed to the historical 
contribution of ships from developed countries and there are differentiated capacities of 
developed and developing countries, justifies the application of the CBDR principle in 
regulating this issue. Under the CBDR principle, developing countries that are parties to 
the UNFCCC have a responsibility to take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent 
or minimise the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects on a voluntary 
basis.84 However, as their economy develops, some developing countries’ capacity and 
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emissions have expanded significantly and they should thus be treated differently from 
other developing countries under the UNFCCC or IMO process. As discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, major developing countries, major Flag of Convenience (FOC) 
countries and other developing countries all have different regulatory interests and 
capacities. Some Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
member countries, such as the Republic of Korea and Israel, are still non-Annex I 
countries under the UNFCCC. Singapore, as a non-Annex I country, is often recognised 
as a developed country. From this perspective, it appears necessary to review and 
update the country list of Annex I to the UNFCCC and/or create a new list for industrial 
developing countries so as to reflect their updated per capita emissions and the 
economic capacity of these countries. As the obligations of these countries under the 
Annexes differ, it would encourage more developed countries, such as the US and 
Japan, to support the application of the CBDR principle to the regulatory process of 
either the IMO or the UNFCCC.85 This could be conducted through either future MBMs 
by the IMO or the international climate change agreement which is to be adopted by 
2015. It is also anticipated that the current weak situations of developing countries in 
the amended Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, including the arrangement for financial and 
technological transfer, could thus be strengthened so that ‘another migration of 
shipbuilding industry in the future’ would not be triggered.86 
 
7.4.3.2 Institutional Fragmentation 
 
Generally ‘fragmentation’ refers to the ‘isolation and disconnect between regimes and 
institutions’ which may lead to overlapping and conflicting legal and policy mandates.87 
Fragmentation has been regarded as ‘leading to inefficiencies, a lack of 
synergy…inconsistent or contradictory standards’,88 but it has also been described as 
reflecting an ‘unprecedented normative and institutional expansion of international 
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law’.89 Accordingly, fragmentation is often referred to in the analyses of international 
law or international environmental law. Institutional fragmentation generally has a 
crucial impact on the effectiveness and performance of international environmental 
institutions.90 However, this impact might be either positive or negative depending on 
the degree of fragmentation.91 
 
In the context of GHG emissions from international shipping, institutional 
fragmentation is one of the main reasons for the lack of consensus of different countries 
in adopting applicable regulatory principles. The UNFCCC and the IMO are the main 
institutions governing this GHG issue, and they represent the global climate change 
regime and the IMO GHG emissions regime respectively. Additionally, the European 
Union (EU) and the WTO are also involved in the regulatory process in relation to 
MBMs. Generally speaking, the institutional fragmentation of this GHG reductions 
issue consists of the following three aspects. 
 
First, the precise roles of the UNFCCC and the IMO in regulating GHG emissions from 
international shipping are ambiguous, and the coordination of negotiation within these 
two fora has been weak. Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol delegates the regulation of 
this GHG issue to the IMO, but it does not explicitly provide the types of measures that 
the IMO can adopt, in particular whether the IMO can regulate the issue by prescribing 
MBMs. Also there are divergent interpretations of this article as to whether it means 
that only Annex I States have reduction obligations in the IMO’s subsequent 
regulations,92 or whether the CBDR principle should apply to this GHG issue or not. 
Although the UNFCCC secretariat has supported the application of the CBDR principle 
to this issue, the Conference of Parties (COP), which is the competent body for 
interpretation, 93  has not clarified its views. Meanwhile, while the IMO has been 
                                                 
89 Gerhard Hafner, 'Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law' (2004) 25(4) Michigan Journal 
of International Law 849, 856.  
90 Hackmann, above n 22, 93.  
91 Ibid.  
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discussing the regulation of this GHG issue, the UNFCCC has also been working on 
this matter under its SBSTA, AWG-LCA and the ADP. Given that regulatory principles 
and methodology issues, including reduction targets and measures, have been generally 
discussed within the UNFCCC process, IMO member States are unlikely to commit 
themselves to mandatory instruments before decisions on regulatory principles and 
targets are taken under the UNFCCC process.94 As a result, these issues were discussed 
under both the UNFCCC and IMO processes. The duplication of discussions and 
processes, together with the lack of ongoing mechanisms for consultation between the 
UNFCCC and the IMO, makes the global regulation of this shipping GHG emissions 
issue lengthy and ineffective. Furthermore, negotiators within the UNFCCC are 
generally climate change experts who do not fully understand the specificities of 
international shipping. 95  This fragmentation between the two fora requires better 
coordination.  
 
Second, possible unilateral actions by the EU on regulating GHG emissions from 
international shipping are consistent with international law, but might diminish the 
authority of the IMO’s current work. It is thus important for the two institutions to have 
better coordination and collaboration. The EU and its member States are Parties to both 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, so they should be bound by Article 2(2) of the 
Kyoto Protocol. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,96 the term 
‘working through’ in Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol should not be interpreted as 
‘exclusively working through’ based on its ‘ordinary meaning’. Therefore it is 
legitimate for the EU to take unilateral measures under the Kyoto Protocol. A number of 
studies have supported the EU’s unilateral actions under international law.97 It is argued 
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that unilateral measures of the EU in tackling GHG emissions from international 
shipping will be consistent with international law provided they are regulated  
 
‘in accordance with the principles of non-discrimination, good faith and non-abuse of 
right, and designed in ways that minimise impact on the right of innocent passage and 
freedom of high seas and respect the sovereignty of other countries’.98 
 
To date the EU has attributed its unilateral actions in regulating GHG emissions to the 
slow and unsatisfactory regulatory process of international authorities. On 1 January 
2012 the EU included the emissions from the international aviation industry into the 
EU-ETS due to slow progress within ICAO. In December 2012 the EU suspended this 
policy due to improved performance by ICAO, or perhaps because of strong opposition 
from many countries, including the US, Russia, China and India.99 In the same year, the 
EU published a consultation document asking for views on how best to reduce GHG 
emissions from ships so as to finally include GHG emissions from international 
shipping into an EU ETS.100 Once shipping GHG emissions are included in the EU-
ETS, the co-existence of two regulatory mechanisms, namely the EU-ETS and potential 
IMO MBMs, will make implementation and compliance by developing States shipping 
industries more difficult. Additionally, unilateral actions, such as unilateral levy or 
taxation, would probably ‘harm local tourism, commerce, and the competitiveness of 
national carriers, raise import prices and reduce the demand for exports’.101 It is also 
possible that ship operators may change their usual shipping routes so as to avoid the 
unilateral measures, which will diminish the effectiveness of these measures. Currently 
the European Commission (EC) is an observer to the IMO on behalf of the EU but there 
is no consultation or coordination mechanism between the two. Due to the limited 
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authority accorded to an observer,102 more efforts should be made to strengthen the 
coordination between the IMO and EU.  
 
Third, it is argued that current MBM proposals in the IMO would have a negative 
influence on international trade, and there is concern that these measures might violate 
WTO rules. However, the WTO has not contributed to this regulatory process. In 2012 
the IMO Council instructed the Secretariat to seek comments from the WTO on this 
issue, which was triggered by a proposal submitted by India and Saudi Arabia asserting 
the incompatibility between WTO rules and MBMs for international shipping. 103 
Meanwhile, the Secretary-General of the IMO also wrote to the Director General of the 
WTO in November 2012 requesting the views of the WTO on this matter. However, the 
WTO has not responded. Rather it provided a neutral document which sets out the most 
relevant WTO disciplines to the types of MBMs that the IMO is considering on the 
ground that the WTO Secretariat is not authorised to interpret WTO rules.104 Therefore 
the problem remains unaddressed. Indeed whether the seven types of proposed MBMs 
comply with WTO rules needs to be analysed on a case-by-case basis. However, there is 
no doubt that these measures involve international trade and some of them involve 
different sectors rather than just the shipping sector.105 It is thus necessary for the WTO 
to be more actively involved in regulating MBMs for international shipping, so that a 
consensus on this compatibility issue can be achieved.  
 
In 2011 the IMO partially regulated the GHG issue from the technical and operational 
perspectives. Nevertheless, it took the IMO 14 years to develop this regulation since it 
adopted Resolution 8 on ‘CO2 emissions from ships’ in 1997, and the regulation was 
adopted by a majority vote rather than by a consensus which has imposed challenges on 
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its future implementation. Future steps in regulating the GHG issue, in particular the 
regulation of possible globally uniform MBMs, could be expedited if the institutional 
fragmentation which characterises current relationships between the IMO and other 
relevant treaty bodies and organisations such as the UNFCCC, EU and WTO could be 
better managed.106 
 
7.5 Future Improvement of the Current Regulatory Framework for Reduction of 
GHG Emissions from International Shipping 
 
Having identified the gaps existing in the current legal and institutional framework for 
reducing GHG emissions from international shipping, this part aims to provide concrete 
approaches for filling these gaps. These approaches include expanding the coverage and 
strengthening the effectiveness of technical measures, strengthening the effectiveness of 
operational measures, improving the enforcement of energy efficiency measures by flag 
and port States, adopting MBMs, as well as optimising current institutional 
arrangements.  
 
7.5.1 Expanding the Coverage and Strengthening the Effectiveness of Technical 
Measures 
 
The EEDI is the main technical measure that the IMO has adopted in tackling GHG 
emissions from international shipping. However, this technical measure needs to be 
improved so as to reduce GHG emissions more effectively and efficiently. This 
improvement could be achieved through the following four means. 
 
First, the EEDI only applies to certain types of new ships and excludes existing ships, 
which has limited its reduction effectiveness and this coverage should be expanded. 
Although the application of the EEDI is projected to be extended from seven types of 
new ships to eleven types of new ships by April 2014, a number of types of new ships 
would remain unregulated by the EEDI. In this case two strategies could be utilised to 
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address this problem. One is to expand the coverage of the EEDI’s application to 
include most types of new ships through technological innovation. Indeed this step-by-
step approach was utilised by the IMO to counter strong opposition from developing 
countries and expedite the regulation process.107 It is likely that as technologies develop, 
the current EEDI formula could accommodate more types of ships including existing 
ships, although the EEDI has been recognised as ‘inappropriate’ by the MEPC for 
application to existing ships. 108  The other strategy is to consider other enhanced 
technical measures based on the current EEDI. For example, the US has proposed 
establishing attained energy efficiency standards for new and existing ships through a 
phased approach. This proposal would be implemented by means of amendments of 
Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 and aroused wide attention within the MEPC at the 65th 
MEPC meeting in May 2013.109 The IMO suspended the discussion of MBMs at the 
65th MEPC meeting, which was probably due to the attraction of this new proposal on 
technical measures to many countries.  
 
Second, the EEDI applies at the design stage of a ship and there are limits to what can 
be achieved at a later stage. The sole use of the EEDI as a design parameter may lead to 
‘the sister vessel dilemma’ or the ‘destroy the sister vessel concept’.110 The EEDI would 
be more effective in reducing GHG emissions if the current EEDI formula could be 
optimised taking shipping operation and the EEDI’s implementation phases, as 
indicated in Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, into account. However, this possibility 
depends on the availability of relevant technologies. 
 
Third, given that the granting of financial and technological assistance constitutes one 
way of implementing differentiated responsibility under the CBDR principle,111 it is 
                                                 
107 See ch 4, 4.3.3.1.  
108 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Third Session, MEPC 63rd Session, Agenda 
Item 23, IMO Doc MEPC 63/23 (14 March 2012) para 5.54.  
109  See Further Details on the Proposal of the United Nations to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
International Shipping, submitted by the United States of America, MEPC 64th Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc 
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Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping, submitted by the United States of America, MEPC 64th 
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important to ensure a smooth transfer of technologies from developed countries to 
developing countries as required in Regulation 23 of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78. In 
this way, the capacity of developing countries in building cost-effective ships could be 
strengthened, which would be helpful in ensuring globally uniform enforcement of 
these measures including both the EEDI and SEEMP. However, neither Regulation 23 
of Annex VI nor the subsequent MEPC Resolution on Promotion of Technical Co-
operation and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency 
of Ships112 has imposed concrete obligations to transfer such technology on any State. 
Rather, this Resolution underscores respect for intellectual property rights. 113  Since 
most energy efficient technologies are owned by private shipping companies in 
developed countries, it appears that a market-based approach to technology acquisition 
might be a better option for developing countries. Indeed, Article 66(2) of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)114 requires 
developed country parties to ‘provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their 
territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least 
developed country members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable 
technological base’. However, research indicates that even based on comparatively lax 
criteria, only 22 per cent of reported initiatives by developed countries fulfilled Article 
66(2).115 Accordingly, this mechanism has been criticised for its lack of effectiveness in 
transferring technologies from developed countries to developing countries. 116 
Insufficient financial incentives are one of the key factors among many reasons behind 
                                                 
112 Promotion of Technical Co-operation and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency 
of Ships, IMO Doc Res MEPC.229(65) (17 May 2013) (‘Resolution MEPC.229(65)’).  
113 Resolution MEPC.229(65) art 4.  
114  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 33 ILM 1125 (entered 
into force 1 January 1995).  
115 The commencement year for developing countries that are party to the WTO to adopt TRIPS has been postponed 
from 2006 to 2013, and even to 2016 for some countries as it relates to protections for pharmaceuticals. It is thus 
difficult to get relevant data on the TRIPS-based transfer of technologies from developing countries. Amanda Watson, 
'Does TRIPs Increase Technology Transfer to the Developing World? The Empirical Evidence' (2011) 20(3) 
Information & Communications Technology Law 253, 271,273.  
116 See, eg, Wei Guo, 'The TRIPs Agreement Does Little to Promote the Development of Technology Transfer to 
Developing Countries' (2009) 3(3) Management Science and Engineering 20, 22-26; Nitya Nanda and Nidhi 
Srivastava, 'Clean Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights' (2009) 9(3) Sustainable Development Law & 
Policy 42, 46. But Navraj Singh asserts that intellectual property rights protection is only a relatively peripheral factor 
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this lack of effectiveness.117 For this reason, the establishment of a global technology 
acquisition fund118 financed by developed countries, either within the shipping industry 
or under a broader UNFCCC regime, might contribute to addressing this problem. 
Alternatively this fund could also be linked to the MBM proposal in the IMO on the 
International GHG Fund. However, it remains unclear whether this proposal is feasible 
and cost-effective, and to what extent it would be accepted by most countries. 
 
Fourth and finally, the amended Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 provides that the IMO 
must review the status of technological developments regularly. Based on the results of 
these reviews, the time period, reference line parameters for relevant ship types and 
reduction rates of the EEDI could possibly be upgraded.119 Since the shipping industries 
in some developing countries are concerned that these upgraded technical thresholds 
would become a form of trade barrier for them,120 it is important to make this reviewing 
process fair and equitable for developing countries. Since such reviews have been 
scheduled for around 2015 and 2022 by the IMO, it is important that a certain 
percentage of reviewers should be from major developing countries. In this way the 
technological disadvantages of developing countries can be taken into account in the 
reviewing process.  
 
7.5.2 Strengthening the Effectiveness of Operational Measures 
 
Compared with the EEDI, the SEEMP has received less attention from the international 
community. This is probably because of their different roles in tackling GHG emissions 
from international shipping. The EEDI can reduce GHG emissions and influence global 
shipbuilding migration directly, and influence international trade indirectly. In contrast, 
the SEEMP has no impact on international trade, and its reduction potential is 
dependent on the performance of individual ship operators due to its lack of mandatory 
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(IPR) protection in developing countries and the monopoly created by IPR-based market power. Nanda and 
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reduction targets and monitoring requirements. However, three approaches could be 
adopted to strengthen the effectiveness of the SEEMP. 
 
A way to improve the effectiveness of the SEEMP would be to set a reduction target. 
However, an IMO-commissioned report asserts that it is less likely to have a target-
based regulatory framework for the SEEMP ‘in the foreseeable future’.121 The SEEMP 
applies to all existing and new ships of 400 gross tonnage and above, and applies to 
various types of ships. The Guidelines for the Development of a Ship Energy Efficiency 
Management Plan (SEEMP Guidelines) in 2012 provide for procedures and measures at 
the stages of planning, implementation, monitoring, and self-evaluation and 
improvement, and incorporate best practices for the fuel-efficient operation of ships.122 
However, different types of ships may have differing ‘best practices’ on each 
international voyage based on the different purposes of the voyages. It is thus 
technically difficult to set these reduction targets at an agreed level for most 
stakeholders. Given that the main objective of the SEEMP is to minimise shipping GHG 
emissions by means of reducing fuel consumption, to provide some other incentives 
might be more effective.123 These incentives include: 
 
• ‘high fuel and carbon prices; 
• more vigorous awareness building and cultural change on board ships; 
• more collaboration between industry stakeholders and a solution to the issue of split-
incentives; and 
• effective monitoring of SEEMP implementation via rigorous audits and reviews.’124 
 
Currently monitoring of the SEEMP mainly relies on the voluntary use of the Energy 
Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI) or other performance indicators that ship 
operators choose. However, as a monitoring tool and a benchmark tool for ship and fleet 
efficiency performance, 125 the EEOI was initially introduced for trial purposes on a 
voluntary basis in 2009. 126  Given that the SEEMP was regulated as a mandatory 
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operational measure in 2011 and the EEOI has now been generally accepted by the 
shipping industry,127 it would be a natural progression for the EEOI to be mandated. It 
is likely that now that the SEEMP has been regulated as a mandatory measure, it will 
achieve more reduction potential. It is arguable that the EEOI would provide a ‘more 
accurate and verifiable measurement of fuel consumption that could pave the way for 
CO2 foot printing and data verification in the future’.128 Indeed a penalty on trade and 
development proposal by the Bahamas in the IMO seeks to collect emission statistics 
from either the EEOI or ship funnels using a suitable sensor.129 
 
Generally the SEEMP provides an approach for monitoring ship and fleet efficiency 
performance, and it is advantageous for ship operators to adopt new technologies and 
allied practices when they seek to optimise the performance of the ship. In this sense, 
successful financial and technological transfer from developed countries to developing 
countries, which has been discussed in the previous section, would also facilitate the 
enforcement of these measures by shipowners or ship operators from developing 
countries. 
 
7.5.3 Improving the Enforcement of Energy Efficiency Measures by Flag and Port 
States 
 
The enforcement of energy efficiency measures (EEDI and SEEMP) mainly relies on 
flag States and port States.130 Flag States have primary responsibility for ensuring the 
compliance of ships on their registers with all applicable international and domestic 
regulations and standards, whereas port States significantly complement the work of 
flag States in addressing substandard ships.131 In practical terms, the main approach for 
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127 See ch 5, 5.3.2.  
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Means to Deliver Cuts in CO2 Emissions, submitted by the Bahamas, Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group 
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130 C. Pisani, 'Fair at Sea: The Design of A Future Legal Instrument on Marine Bunker Fuels Emissions within the 
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flag State enforcement is through survey and certification, while port States exercise 
their enforcement via port State control. 
 
Chapters 2 and 6 discussed the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of flag States 
and port States on the GHG emissions issue. For most countries, the first step in 
enforcing energy efficiency measures is to incorporate these measures into their 
domestic law and policy or, in some countries, into rules made by classification 
societies. These rules would thus be applicable to the ships registered in these flag 
States. After the adoption of the EEDI and SEEMP in 2011, some non-Annex I flag 
States, such as South Korea and China, either incorporated these rules into their 
domestic legislation and classification rules or are currently engaged in doing this 
through their national regulatory process. However, it is worthwhile to note that only 49 
out of 64 Parties of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 voted for the amendments to Annex 
VI in July 2011.132 As of 2 December 2013, 75 countries, which represent 94.77 per 
cent of the world tonnage (by gross tonnage), had ratified Annex VI to MARPOL 
73/78.133 Some significant dissenters, including Brazil, Chile, China, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia, voted against this regulation. Therefore, it is argued that ‘these dissents could 
have a significant impact on the implementation and application of the Regulation’.134 
Furthermore Brazil and Finland objected to this amendment so these energy efficiency 
measures would not apply to them. It is possible that some substandard ships may seek 
suitable routes to avoid the regulation. In this sense, it is necessary for the IMO to 
continue to improve these energy efficiency measures, in particular the regulation on 
technological and financial transfer from developed countries to developing countries, 
so that more flag States might be attracted to ratify Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78.  
 
Regarding those flag States which have ratified Annex VI, it is important that these 
States or the Recognised Organisations (RO)135 that they nominate, verify and issue the 
                                                                                                                                               
eradicate substandard ships by means of imposing pressure on flag States, shipowners, classification societies, and 
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International Energy Efficiency Certificate (IEE Certificate) stringently in accordance 
with relevant IMO regulations and guidelines. Additionally, to overcome the possible 
‘laziness’ of some flag of convenience (FOC) States in complying with the EEDI and 
SEEMP requirements, establishing a compulsory self-assessment scheme to assess the 
ability of flag States to enforce these IMO measures may also be necessary.136 In 2005 
the IMO adopted a voluntary Member State Audit Scheme, based on which the IMO 
would assess whether a Member State has complied with an IMO convention once such 
an audit was requested by that State.137 However, this scheme was regarded as less 
effective due to its optional nature.138 At the 66th MEPC meeting in April 2014, the 
IMO adopted amendments to Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78 which makes the IMO Audit 
Scheme mandatory through adding a Chapter 5 entitled ‘verification of compliance with 
the provisions of this annex’. Based on these amendments, the IMO shall conduct 
periodic audits in accordance with the audit standard as specified in IMO Instruments 
Implementation Code (III Code)139 to verify compliance with and implementation of 
this Annex by flag States, coastal States and port States which have ratified the 
amendments.140 The amendments will impose some pressure for States, in particular 
FOC States, to exercise their obligations and responsibilities contained in this Annex. 
Nevertheless, as only States which have ratified these amendments are legally bound by 
them, it appears vital to push more States to ratify the revised Annex VI to MARPOL 
73/78. Furthermore, the audit covers nine categories of administrative, legal and 
technical issues. 141 How to ensure the smooth auditing and good cooperation from 
relevant party States seems challenging. However, a proposed compulsory self-
assessment scheme for assessing the ability of flag States may not be necessary 
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provided that the newly-adopted mandatory IMO Audit Scheme be effectively 
implemented. 
 
The role of port States in enforcing the EEDI and SEEMP has also been controversial. 
Chapter 6 discussed the debate within the IMO in which Singapore suggested giving 
port States the right to deny ships port entry based on whether they comply with the 
EEDI. However, Singapore’s proposal was not agreed by the MEPC and the adopted 
regulation limits port State inspection to verifying if there is a valid IEE Certificate on 
board.142 This regulation excludes possible unilateral actions by port States, and has 
actually become a standard phase for port State control. The purpose of this provision 
appears to be to establish a globally uniform port State control regime, in which the 
NMFT principle can be uniformly applied. However, this goal is less likely to be 
achieved in the foreseeable future due to the diverse financial and technological 
capacity of ports in different regions, in particular those regions where most ports are 
developing countries. The current imbalance of performance among nine regional 
MOUs on port State control has confirmed this situation.143 Under these circumstances, 
a differentiated strategy might be helpful in improving the enforcement of energy 
efficiency measures by port States. This strategy would consist of two elements. On the 
one hand, the gaps in performance among nine regional MOUs on port State control 
should be narrowed. This goal could be achieved through the assistance provided by 
developed State PSC MOUs to developing State PSC MOUs.144 The assistance may 
include strengthening the exchange of information by organising joint ministerial 
meetings, coordinating activities by hosting regular port State control Committee 
meetings, training inspectors and increasing technical and financial assistance.145 It has 
also been suggested that the IMO should develop uniform MOUs on port State control 
management techniques.146 On the other hand, currently some States, such as the US, 
exercise more stringent unilateral port State control measures than IMO rules, which in 
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the context of the EEDI and SEEMP would overcome the ineffectiveness of some IMO 
rules and thus should be allowed. The number of ships trading with the US has 
remained stable after the US Coast Guard (USCG) adopted its own port State control 
program.147 This is evidence for the proposition that this type of unilateral action does 
not lead to a mass shift of shipping routes but rather improves ‘the quality of 
shipping’.148 
 
Aside from further improvement of MOUs and unilateral actions on port State control, 
it has been suggested that the IMO should update the 2009 Guidelines for Port State 
Control under the Revised MARPOL Annex VI (2009 Guidelines). 149  The 2009 
Guidelines were enacted to meet the needs of port State control on air pollution (eg, 
SOx, NOx). Since MARPOL Annex VI has been amended to include GHG emissions 
(eg, CO2) which are of a different nature to air pollutants, the 2009 Guidelines should 
be updated to reflect the differing Certificate requirements. This proposal was first put 
forward by Norway. At the 61st MEPC meeting in 2010, Norway proposed developing a 
new chapter in the 2009 Guidelines to provide basic guidance for port State control in 
relation to the energy efficiency regulations.150 However, this issue has not yet been 
addressed. 
 
7.5.4 Adopting a Market-based Measure 
 
As discussed early in this chapter, the adoption of MBMs is a necessary step in 
achieving absolute GHG emissions reductions from international shipping in the long 
term. The key question faced by the international community is what type of MBMs to 
adopt. Although this choice is mostly a political decision, other factors such as the cost 
of regulation and the compatibility of the MBMs with international law principles will 
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also play a role in the final decision.151 This section considers options for the most 
suitable MBMs to address the GHG emissions issue through grouping and analysing 
current MBM proposals, and proposing relevant mechanisms for selected MBMs. 
 
7.5.4.1 Grouping of Proposed Market-based Measures 
 
To date, various MBM proposals have been discussed and debated within the IMO and 
further modified by countries and NGOs. Currently seven MBM options are 
available.152 They are: 
 
• GHG Fund, one option was proposed by Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall Islands, 
Nigeria and the International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA), and the other option 
was a Speed-based GHG Fund proposed by the Clean Shipping Coalition (CSC);153 
• Port State Levy (PSL), proposed by Jamaica;154 
• Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS), proposed by Japan and the World Shipping 
Council (WSC);155 
• Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading (SECT), proposed by the United States;156 
• Global Emissions Trading System (ETS) for international shipping, three options 
proposed by Norway (Germany was later added as a co-sponsor), United Kingdom, 
and France, respectively;157 
                                                 
151 See Fredrik Carlsson and Henrik Hammar, 'Incentive-Based Regulation of CO2 Emissions from International 
Aviation' (2002) 8(6) Journal of Air Transport Management 365, 365.  
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of chapter 4.  
153 This proposal is to establish a global reduction target for international shipping, set by either UNFCCC or IMO. 
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156 Subject all ships to mandatory energy-efficiency standards. As one means of complying with the standard, an 
efficiency-credit trading programme would be established, and these standards would become more stringent over 
time. Currently this proposal becomes an optional addition to a phased approach energy-efficiency proposal newly 
submitted by the United States. 
157 This proposal aims to set a sector-wide cap on net emissions from international shipping. A number of allowances 
(Ship Emission Units) corresponding to the cap would be released into the market each year via a global auctioning 




• Penalty on Trade and Development (Bahamas), proposed by Bahamas;158 and 
• Rebate Mechanism (RM) for a market-based instrument for international shipping, 
proposed by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). It consists of 
integrated RM and add-on RM.159 
 
There are different ways of grouping MBM proposals based on diverse criteria. For the 
purpose of this chapter, two types of groupings are provided. These groupings are used 
to assist the analysis of these MBM proposals in the following sections. 
 
These MBM proposals can be grouped into three categories, namely environmental fee-
related MBM proposals, tradable permit scheme-related MBM proposals, and hybrid 
MBM proposals.160 Of these seven MBM options, GHG Fund, PSL, Bahamas’s Penalty 
on Trade and Development, and the integrated RM belong to the category of 
environmental fee-related MBMs. They provide the polluter with an incentive to reduce 
GHG emissions in order to pay lower fees which take the form of a contribution, a levy, 
or a penalty. The three types of ETS are tradable permit scheme-related MBMs, which 
seek to reduce GHG emissions through setting a global cap/reduction target and 
allocating emissions allowances. The EIS and SECT can be regarded as hybrid MBMs 
with the EEDI as a benchmark, whereas the add-on RM is a hybrid MBM built into any 
other MBM.  
 
Based on the areas in which the reduction of GHG emissions from ships will mainly 
take place, these MBM proposals could be classified into two categories: focus on in-
sector, and focus on both in-sector and out-of-sector. This type of categorisation was 
agreed at the third intersessional meeting of the working group on GHG emissions from 
ships in 2011. It was noted that this grouping aims to ‘simplify future assessment and 
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facilitate the decision making process of MEPC’.161 The grouping of current MBM 
proposals based on this criterion is provided in Table 7.1. Furthermore, the proponents 
of these MBM proposals, as well as some other countries, have identified the strengths 
and weaknesses of these MBM proposals in each group as identified in Table 7.1.162 
There has been no clear tendency within the IMO as to which group of MBMs suits 
international shipping most but it has been suggested that in-sector reduction MBMs 
should only be treated as ‘a transitory policy’ while a MBM that covers all sectors 
should be adopted in the longer term. 163  From the perspective of reduction 
effectiveness, an IMO-commissioned report has revealed that the majority of reductions 
estimated for ten MBM proposals are achieved by ‘in-sector and out-of-sector’ MBM 
proposals.164 
 
Table 7.1 Grouping of the MBM Proposals Based on the Reduction Sectors165 
MBM Proposals GHG 
Fund 










Yes Yes   (Yes3)  Yes Yes 
Note: ‘1’ represents that the add-on RM can be applied to both groups but cannot be used with all MBM 
proposals; ‘2’ represents that the Speed-based GHG Fund proposed by the CSC can be used as an in-
sector MBM; ‘3’ represents the possible use of revenues for out-of-sector reductions, but this is not 
clearly defined in document MEPC 60/4/40.  
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7.5.4.2 Criteria and Methodology for Selecting Market-based Measures 
 
It is difficult to select the most suitable MBMs for further reducing GHG emissions 
from international shipping. Having described the current MBM proposals and their 
characteristics, this section continues to address two relevant issues: the setting of 
criteria, and the methodology for utilising these criteria to analyse the suitability of 
current MBM options for further reducing GHG emissions from international shipping.  
 
The IMO has commissioned some studies166 and organised a number of discussions and 
debate on the proposed MBMs. At the 60th MEPC meeting in 2010, the Committee 
agreed, by majority, to the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Expert Group on 
Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment of Possible MBMs. These TOR provide the 
criteria for the Expert Group to assess the feasibility and impact of these MBM 
proposals. These nine criteria (‘nine criteria’) are: 
 
(1) ‘ the environmental effectiveness, e.g., the extent to which the proposed MBM is effective 
in contributing to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping; 
(2) the cost-effectiveness of the proposed MBM and its potential impact(s) on trade and 
sustainable development; 
(3) the proposed MBM’s potential to provide incentives to technological change and 
innovation-and the accommodation of current emission reduction and energy efficiency 
technologies; 
(4) the practical feasibility of implementing the proposed MBM; 
(5) the need for technology transfer to, and capacity-building within, developing countries, in 
particular the least developed countries (LDCs) and the small island developing States 
(SIDS), in relation to implementation and enforcement of the proposed MBM, including the 
potential to mobilize climate change finance for mitigation and adaptation actions; 
(6) the MBM proposal’s relation with other relevant conventions such as UNFCCC, Kyoto 
Protocol and WTO, as well as its compatibility with customary international law, as 
depicted in UNCLOS; 
(7) the potential additional administrative burden, and the legal aspects for National 
Administrations by implementing and enforcing the proposed MBM; 
(8) the potential additional workload, economic burden and operational impact for individual 
ships, the shipping industry and the maritime sector as a whole, of implementing the 
proposed MBM; and 
(9) the MBM’s compatibility with the existing enforcement and control provisions under the 
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Impact Assessment Report, and an ongoing study on possible impacts on consumers and industries in developing 
countries which is to be finalised in 2014. See Skjølsvik et al, above n 50; ø. Buhaug et al, 'Second IMO GHG Study 
2009' (International Maritime Organization (IMO), 2009); Scientific Study on International Shipping and Market-
based Instruments, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 60/INF.21 (15 January 2010); Full Report 
of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment of Possible Market-based 




IMO legal framework.’167 
 
The delegations of China, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, South Africa, India and Venezuela 
made statements on the establishment of the expert group on MBMs and these nine 
criteria. They reserved their rights to not agree with the conclusions of the expert group 
and one of their main reasons was that the CBDR principle was not clearly stated in 
these criteria.168 However, based on a broad interpretation of the CBDR principle, the 
fifth criterion above could be regarded as one type of differentiated responsibility. 
Clearly many developing countries, in particular major developing countries, were not 
satisfied with these criteria. Indeed at the 57th MEPC meeting, the Committee agreed 
‘by an overwhelming majority’ to take the following nine principles as its reference for 
further debate on GHG emissions from international shipping including proposed 
MBMs.169 These nine principles (‘nine principles’) are: 
 
(1) ‘effective in contributing to the reduction of total global greenhouse gas emissions; 
(2) binding and equally applicable to all flag States in order to avoid evasion; 
(3) cost-effective; 
(4) able to limit, or at least, effectively minimize competitive distortion; 
(5) based on sustainable environmental development without penalizing global trade and 
growth; 
(6) based on goal-based approach and not prescribe specific methods; 
(7) supportive of promoting and facilitating technical innovation and R&D in the entire 
shipping sector; 
(8) accommodating to leading technologies in the field of energy efficiency; and 
(9) practical, transparent, fraud free and easy to administer.’170 
 
The second of these principles was opposed by many developing countries, such as 
China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Venezuela and Barbados. The second principle is the 
incorporation of the NMFT principle, but it excludes the CBDR principle in this 
context. Although the chairman of the MEPC proposed to use ‘ships’ to replace ‘flag 
States’ in the second principle, this suggestion was not accepted by those States not 
                                                 
167 Full Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment of Possible 
Market-based Measures, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/INF.2 (13 August 2010) para 1.2.  
168 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, MEPC 60th Session, Agenda Item 
22, IMO Doc MEPC 60/22 (12 April 2010) annex 9.  
169 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Seventh Session, MEPC 57th Session, Agenda 
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supporting principle 2.171 These nine principles were later condensed into four by the 
2009 Second IMO GHG Study, namely equal applicability to all flag States, 
minimisation of competitive distortion, environmental effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness, and non-prescriptive.172 Since the draft of nine criteria was based on the 
nine principles, these nine principles can be used as background information in 
interpreting the nine criteria.  
 
Based on the spirit of the nine principles, the nine criteria as endorsed by the IMO can 
be summarised into five in order to simplify understanding of the analysis to be 
conducted in the following section. These five criteria are: 
 
(1) environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness;  
(2) the incentive to technological change;  
(3) practical feasibility of implementation;  
(4) compatibility with international law and IMO legal framework; and 
(5) financial and technological transfer.  
 
The first criterion is condensed from the IMO’s Criteria 1, 2, 7 and 8. The ‘cost’ in this 
proposed first criterion includes both the costs of the emission-reduction measures and 
the administrative costs and economic burden associated with MBMs. The second and 
third criteria are condensed from the IMO’s Criteria 3 and 4 respectively. The fourth 
criterion is drawn from the IMO’s Criteria 6 and 9, whereas the fifth criterion is 
condensed from the IMO’s fifth criterion. If we take the second principle of the nine 
principles reached at the 57th MEPC meeting into account, the fifth criterion above 
actually excludes the full application of the CBDR principle to this GHG emissions 
issue. In particular, these two means of differentiated responsibility—differentiated 
central obligations and differentiated implementation—are excluded from any future 
MBMs. 
 
Given that the ICAO has reached a consensus agreement on developing a global MBM 
scheme for international aviation, a general examination of their criteria for assessing 
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MBMs is helpful for the IMO to follow due to their similar mandate from Article 2(2) 
of the Kyoto Protocol. At the 37th ICAO Assembly meeting in 2010, ICAO adopted 
Resolution A37-19 which provides 15 guiding principles for the design and 
implementation of MBMs for international aviation. Although the preamble of this 
resolution acknowledges both the CBDR principle and the non-discrimination principle, 
the CBDR principle was not explicitly stated in these guiding principles. Principle n 
stipulates that ‘it is strongly recommended that’ the MBM-generated revenues should be 
applied ‘in the first instance to mitigating the environmental impact of aircraft engine 
emissions, including mitigation and adaptation, as well as assistance to and support for 
developing countries’.173 However, three years later, an updated 16 guiding principles 
for MBMs of international aviation were adopted by Resolution A38-18 of the ICAO in 
October 2013. An added Principle p provides that ‘MBMs should take into account the 
CBDR principle and the principle of non-discrimination and equal and fair 
opportunities’.174 Also in this Resolution a consensus agreement on setting a global 
MBM for international aviation was confirmed. 175  It can be deduced from these 
references that the incorporation of the CBDR principle in principles related to future 
MBMs in international aviation played some role in facilitating the achievement of this 
consensus although what type of MBMs will be adopted in the international aviation 
sector still remains unclear. Therefore, it is arguable that to achieve a similar consensus 
in the international shipping sector the criteria for selecting MBMs for reducing GHG 
emissions from international shipping should be: 
 
(1) environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness;  
(2) the incentive to technological change;  
(3) practical feasibility of implementation;  
(4) compatibility with international law and IMO legal framework; and 
(5) incorporation of the CBDR and NMFT principles.  
 
Having established the criteria for selecting MBMs, there are two methods of utilising 
these criteria to analyse the proposed MBMs. One is to examine each MBM option 
against these criteria, and to compare the outcomes. This approach was adopted by the 
                                                 
173 Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and Practices Related to Environmental Protection-Climate 
Change, Assembly 37th Session, ICAO Doc Res A37-19 (8 October 2010) annex, prin n.  
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2010 IMO Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment Report, but it simply assesses each 
MBM proposal in accordance with the earlier mentioned ‘nine criteria’. Consequently, 
no detailed comparison and policy recommendations were provided, and the conclusion 
that ‘all proposals could be implemented’ is not substantiated.176 The other method is to 
narrow the list of current MBM proposals based on certain criteria, such as the practical 
feasibility of implementation. The most appropriate MBM option would appear after 
infeasible MBM options are removed from the list. This approach was put forward by 
Greece in one of its proposals to the IMO in 2011. Based on this approach, Greece 
grouped the MBM proposals into four categories, and only the GHG Fund and ETS 
were left after it removed other infeasible options.177 Greece asserted that its preferred 
MBM option was the GHG Fund after it compared these two MBM schemes 
carefully. 178  Although Greece’s approach was not agreed by all countries, 179  this 
narrowing-down method appears to be a more practical way of finding the most suitable 
MBM options. The next section will utilise the narrowing-down approach to analyse 
current MBM proposals. 
 
7.5.4.3 Selection of the Most Suitable Market-based Measure 
 
Studies on the pros and cons of current MBM proposals have been conducted by 
various States and research institutions.180 However, no MBM proposal has been widely 
accepted by most countries. Countries’ preferences for different MBM options vary 
widely. While Chapter 4 provides a general assessment of the current seven types of 
                                                 
176 Full Report of the Work Undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment of Possible 
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4.3.3.2.  
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on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd Session, Agenda Item 3, IMO Doc GHG-WG 3/3 (24 February 2011) p 10. See 
also ch 6, 6.3.1.1.  
178 Ibid 15.  
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MBM proposals, this section re-examines these MBM options based on five criteria and 
the narrowing-down methodology discussed in the previous section.  
 
Step 1: Remove hybrid MBMs with the EEDI as a benchmark 
 
The EIS and SECT are two hybrid MBMs with the EEDI as a benchmark. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, both of these MBM proposals have been modified by their proponents 
several times. Regarding the SECT, the main problem with this proposal is that all 
ships, including existing ships, would be subject to mandatory energy efficiency 
standards which embed the EEDI within their formulation. Under this scheme, a ‘good 
EEDI’ ship sells credits to a ‘bad EEDI’ ship.181 However, the EEDI has been widely 
regarded as only applying to new ships. Just as asserted by the International Association 
of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), the EEDI ‘does not apply to, and hence it 
cannot and should not be used for, existing ships’.182 It is thus infeasible for the SECT 
MBM to be practically applied to the whole shipping industry, which is also not 
consistent with the third criterion of selecting MBMs, i.e., practical feasibility of 
implementation. At the 64th MEPC meeting in 2012, the US modified its SECT MBM 
and made it an enhanced energy efficiency measure, or in other words, an enhanced 
technical and operational measure, rather than a MBM. Based on this new proposal, the 
SECT becomes an optional addition to a phased approach where it provides ‘standards 
that encourage feasible improvement in technical and operational energy efficiency’.183 
Therefore the SECT as an independent MBM does not meet the five criteria outlined 
above and should be removed from this selective process. 
 
Under the EIS scheme co-sponsored by Japan and the WSC in 2011, the EEDI applied 
to both new and existing ships,184 which is infeasible due to the limitation of the EEDI’s 
application scope. In 2012, as a response to these concerns on the EEDI’s application to 
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existing ships, Japan and the WSC updated the EIS. Based on the updated EIS, the 
EEDI only applies to new ships whereas existing ships are required to continue to pay 
the contribution. 185  However, those existing ships which have undergone a major 
conversion should be treated as new ships in accordance with Regulation 5.4.3 of 
revised Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78.186 In this case it appears that there is no technical 
difficulty with the EEDI. However, the revenues generated by this scheme are mainly 
allocated to cover the costs and expenses of administration, adaptation projects under 
the UNFCCC, R&D projects with the aim of reducing the shipping industry’s CO2 
emissions, and the IMO’s technical cooperation program.187 The failure to incorporate 
the CBDR principle into this scheme is not consistent with the fifth criterion for 
selecting MBMs (the incorporation of the CBDR and NMFT principles).  
 
These two hybrid MBMs are also not ‘cost-effective’. Given that the EEDI already 
applies to new ships under the 2011 amendments of Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, the 
adoption of either of these two hybrid MBMs would lead to a ‘great cost to society’.188 
This is because if either of these MBMs were adopted, new ships would be doubly 
regulated and impacted in two ways: firstly they would be directly impacted by a 
technical measure, and secondly they would be indirectly impacted by a hybrid 
MBM.189 Although existing ships under the EIS would not be impacted by a hybrid 
MBM, a combination of these factors would ‘accelerate the marginalization of the 
majority of older ships’ in the international shipping industry.190 This consequence is 
not consistent with the first criterion of selecting MBMs (the incentive to technological 
change). Therefore, it appears reasonable to remove these two hybrid MBMs from the 
list of most suitable MBMs for the international shipping industry on the basis that they 
are practically infeasible.  
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Step 2: Eliminate a Penalty on Trade and Development MBM by the Bahamas 
 
The Penalty on Trade and Development MBM raised by the Bahamas in 2010 is an 
incomplete MBM, or a ‘do-nothing’ proposal. 191 Essentially the Bahamas suggested 
some regulatory principles for designing MBMs. For example, the imposition of any 
costs should be proportionate to the contribution by international shipping to global CO2 
emissions; care must be taken to avoid restricting world trade; and developing States 
should not be faced with a penalty upon their trade and development. However, these 
principles could also constitute a MBM in that they suggest a scheme based on the 
contribution paid by international shipping for the purpose of reducing global CO2 
emissions. This scheme might work on the ground that fuel price would serve as ‘a key 
driver’ for the reduction of GHG emissions as fuel prices rise.192  
 
In 2011 the Bahamas submitted an updated proposal and its draft regulation. It proposed 
a phased reduction program for the MBM based on the age of new and existing ships.193 
The Bahamas also argued that ‘technical and operational measures are the only direct 
and effective means to deliver cuts in C O2  emissions’. 194  This amendment to the 
Bahamas proposal does not develop any further mechanism in terms of being a fully 
developed MBM. The fact that the Bahamas original MBM was incomplete and has not 
been developed as a fully-fledged MBM proposal justifies its exclusion from the list of 
suitable MBM options at least at this stage. 
 
Step 3: Put on hold the ETS proposals 
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To date some studies have been conducted on the effectiveness of an ETS,195 as well as 
a comparative analysis of a global ETS and an international GHG Fund. 196  The 
examined aspects of these two MBMs include the certainty in cap or price, 
administrative burden, carbon leakage, evasion and fraud, and experience in other 
contexts. Although no clear preference has been given in most of these studies, it seems 
that a global ETS and an international GHG Fund are the MBM proposals which are 
favoured by most commentators. The two schemes (a global ETS and an international 
GHG Fund) both provide the incentive to technological change (the first criterion),197 
leave room for potential incorporation of the CBDR and NMFT principles (the fifth 
criterion),198 and can be compatible with international law and IMO legal framework 
(the fourth criterion).199 Therefore, this section only examines the ETS against two of 
the five criteria outlined above, i.e., environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
(the first criterion), and practical feasibility of implementation (the third criterion). 
 
Firstly, it is practically infeasible for a global ETS to be implemented due to the lack of 
support from its main stakeholders. The relationship between a global ETS and its main 
stakeholders is complex. While the design of an ETS can influence decisions of 
stakeholders, the interaction of stakeholders also impacts the effectiveness of the 
ETS.200 Chapters 5 and 6 have identified the responses from main stakeholders on the 
proposed ETS MBMs. The international shipping industry, in particular shipowners and 
ship operators, prefer a levy or compensation fund-based MBM and oppose any ETS 
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proposals in that a global ETS is ‘unworkable’ for the shipping industry.201 Indeed, this 
opposition mainly concerns the setting of a cap within the ETS, which from the point of 
view of the shipping industry would distort international trade and impede the benign 
development of the industry.202 Furthermore, it is argued that a global emissions cap is 
‘extremely unlikely at least in the short run’ due to expected opposition from 
developing countries. 203  The responses from national shipping industries of various 
countries are more complex. Most national shipping industries in developing countries 
have not expressed their views on preferred MBMs. While shipping industries in Greece 
and South Korea oppose an ETS, Australia and the UK’s shipping industries support 
it.204 It can be deduced that the overwhelming majority of the global shipping industry 
opposes the future adoption of an ETS by the international shipping industry. Compared 
with the shipping industry, flag and port States have more diverse views on their 
preferred MBMs. Based on the case studies in Chapter 6, Greece and Japan’s preferred 
MBMs are GHG Fund and EIS respectively, whereas Panama prefers the Bahamas’ 
proposal, China dislikes any MBM, and it appears that Vanuatu tends towards accepting 
any MBM.  
 
There is no consensus on a preferred MBM among the main stakeholders in the GHG 
emissions issue. However, there is an overwhelming trend in global shipping industry 
for opposing any ETS, which if combined with the different weighting of these 
stakeholders as discussed in the first part of this chapter,205 would make the ETS less 
likely to be feasible for future implementation. In other words, it is most likely that the 
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proposed ETS proposals would violate the third criterion of selecting MBMs (practical 
feasibility).  
 
Secondly, current ETS proposals have incorporated both the CBDR and the NMFT 
principles, but the approaches to this incorporation would make this regulation costly 
and less effective. The main approach for Norway’s ETS proposal to incorporate the 
CBDR principle is to provide two exemptions from applying the scheme, namely ships 
below certain sizes and ships on international voyages to SIDS and/or LDCs.206 To 
ensure that the criteria for exemption are always fulfilled, this ETS scheme also has a 
time limitation (eg, five years), and a new application is required to prolong the 
exemption after this required period expires.207 However, the second exemption would 
probably make some shipowners and ship operators opt for certain shipping routes 
through the SIDS or LCDs so as to get emission exemptions.208 This evasion would 
significantly diminish the effectiveness of this MBM. Furthermore, it is argued that if a 
global ETS only applies to the shipping industry rather than other transport modes (such 
as aviation, rail, road and inland waters), the shipping industry would become ‘more 
costly’ and trade may shift to other modes of transport.209 The fact that some global 
trade can only be conducted by ships does not justify the ETS’s sole application to the 
shipping industry. Currently it remains uncertain whether a global ETS would apply to 
other transport modes. While both of these two potential problems constitute carbon 
leakage210 and would possibly lead to evasion and fraud,211 these ETS proposals are 
clearly not consistent with the first criterion of selecting MBMs (environmental 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness). However, it is suggested that these problems 
could be resolved if the CBDR principle were to be incorporated in other ways such as a 
phased application of an ETS.212  
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It is thus arguable that current MBM proposals for an ETS would violate the first and 
third criteria of selecting MBMs. Indeed, the violation of the first criterion could be 
addressed through further modification of the scheme. However, the setting of a cap on 
total emissions from the shipping industry, which as a core feature of an ETS constitutes 
the primary reason for violating the third criterion in the international shipping context, 
can never be addressed. For these reasons, it is suggested that the MBM proposal on a 
global ETS should be put on hold.  
 
Step 4: Balance three environmental fee-related MBM proposals 
 
Environmental fee-related MBM proposals have been favoured by the international 
shipping industry and many national shipping industries. Of the three MBM proposals 
left from the previous selection, the GHG Fund and the PSL can be used either for ‘in-
sector’ reduction or ‘in-sector and out-of-sector’ reduction whereas the integrated RM 
can only be used for ‘in-sector and out-of-sector’ reduction (see Table 7.1).  
 
To further narrow the list of most-suitable MBM proposals, the Speed-based GHG Fund 
should be removed first for its conflict with several of the five proposed criteria for 
selecting MBMs. The Speed-based GHG Fund, as an in-sector MBM, requests an 
additional speed levy or speed compensation fund contribution based on shipping 
emissions generated at these higher than average speeds.213 However, speed limits or 
slow steaming may affect the supply chain, competition in the shipping market, and 
safety. 214  Indeed speed reduction has become one of the widely-used operational 
measures in relation to the SEEMP.215 It is thus dubious whether a speed-based GHG 
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Fund is a suitable MBM, let alone the technical complexity involved in finalising an 
average speed for various types and sizes of ships. Furthermore, as acknowledged by 
the Clean Shipping Coalition (CSC), this MBM proposal lacks sufficient incentives for 
technological innovation. Thus the CSC has suggested that this could be addressed by 
providing an extra incentive beyond the emissions-related speed levy.216 For example, 
ships with a better EEDI might pay less. However, if the scheme is linked to the EEDI, 
it becomes an MBM with the EEDI as a benchmark, as discussed in the first step of this 
section. Thus it will not be applicable to all ships in the international shipping industry. 
The above two factors make this scheme inconsistent with the second (the incentive to 
technological change) and third (practical feasibility of implementation) criteria for 
selecting MBMs. Additionally, the proposal does not describe the use of revenues, and 
it seems also difficult to incorporate the CBDR principle into this scheme. This is 
because the speed-based GHG Fund only applies to the shipping sector, and it would be 
very challenging for the IMO to apply both the CBDR and NMFT principles within the 
same sector. 
 
The GHG Fund, the PSL and the integrated RM are all levy-related MBMs based on the 
amount of bunker fuels that ships purchase or consume. Although it is not accurate to 
measure a ship’s emissions solely based on the fuels that it purchases or consumes, 
GHG emissions emitted by bunker fuels cover the overwhelming majority of all sources 
of these emissions from ships engaged in international voyages. 217 Indeed, both the 
GHG Fund and PSL recognise that the CBDR principle could be reflected by the 
differentiated use of revenues rather than full incorporation of this principle. It is thus 
important to compare these two measures against other criteria, in particular the first 
criterion of selecting MBMs (environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness). 
According to the IMO feasibility study and impact assessment report in 2010, under a 
range of scenarios, the total reduction achievable from a GHG Fund is 13-40 per cent 
while the number for PSL is 2-8 per cent. 218  Meanwhile, the cost of an MBM is 
estimated to be 50 $/tonne CO2 abated for a GHG Fund, but 770 $/tonne CO2 abated for 
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a PSL.219 On the basis of this assessment, the GHG Fund is much more environmentally 
effective and cost-effective than the PSL. In view of this difference, it would be 
reasonable to put on hold the PSL at this stage. 
 
The next step, also the final step, is to compare the GHG Fund and an integrated RM 
and choose one of them as the most suitable MBM proposal for addressing the issue 
under discussion. Generally speaking, these two schemes are very similar except for 
two main differences. One is that the integrated RM better incorporates the CBDR 
principle so as to ensure ‘no net incidence’ on developing countries. Based on its 
disbursement mechanism, a bank (fund) established under an integrated RM would 
collect the market-driven levy from ships and first rebate it to developing countries.220 
Whereas under a GHG Fund, the CBDR principle is only reflected by allocating 
revenues to mitigation and adaptation activities in developing countries and in particular 
in LDCs, SIDS, and the Land Locked Developing Countries (LLDCs).221 However, this 
lack of full incorporation of the CBDR principle could be addressed by including an 
add-on RM.  
 
The other main difference between these two schemes is their different registers or 
institutional arrangements. The GHG Fund provides two options for the payment of the 
contribution.222 Under the first option, the ships must buy fuel at a registered bunker 
fuel supplier which is required to collect information on all fuels sold on a ship specific 
basis, and to collect and transfer GHG contributions to the International GHG Fund 
Administrator.223 The Administrator maintains a global registry of registered bunker 
fuel suppliers and of GHG Contributions received, where each ship has its own 
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account. 224 The second option allows the contribution to be paid to the GHG Fund 
directly by shipowners. Under the integrated RM, ships report the fuel bunkered to a 
central Emissions Registry (ER) which holds an emission account for each ship, and a 
predetermined global bank (Bank/Fund) provides a payment account for each ship.225 A 
ship is required to report fuel bunkered to ER and pay the levy to the Bank directly. The 
Bank will disburse the revenues after it gets the feedback from the ER on certification 
and enforcement by flag and port States.226 While the compliance by shipowners with 
the payment to the GHG Fund under the second option mainly relies on the 
documentation and national administrations, the establishment of registered bunker fuel 
suppliers under the first option, together with the International GHG Fund 
Administrator would to a significant extent reduce the possibility of evasion and fraud. 
However, under the integrated RM, the fact that ships report and pay to different 
institutions individually increases the risks of evasion and fraud significantly. The cost 
of the integrated RM was not determined by the 2010 IMO feasibility study and impact 
assessment report.227 However, it is predicted that the cost of this integrated RM would 
be higher than the GHG Fund in that there are two independent international institutions 
(ER and Bank) under the integrated RM while there is only one such institution under 
the GHG Fund (Administrator). It is concluded that the GHG Fund would be more 
environmentally effective and cost-effective than the integrated RM. 
 
Through comparing these two MBM proposals, it is argued that based on current MBM 
proposals the most suitable MBM for international shipping is an add-on RM built into 
a global GHG Fund. It is likely that there would be a concern on the part of stakeholders 
that the administrative costs of this new MBM proposal would be higher due to the 
possible increased number of administrative bodies. However, it is likely that through 
the setting of proper mechanisms, this proposal could be environmentally effective, 
cost-effective and feasible, and its incorporation of economic incentives and the CBDR 
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and NMFT principles would be attractive for developing countries. Since all MBM 
proposals need to comply with international law and the IMO legal framework, and this 
issue could be further clarified by the participation of relevant international 
organisations, the fourth criterion of selecting MBMs (compatibility with international 
law and IMO legal framework) is not discussed in this section. 
 
7.5.4.4 Proposed Mechanisms for the Selected Market-based Measure 
 
Given that an add-on Rebate Mechanism (RM) built into a global GHG Fund is 
proposed as the most suitable MBM for furthering the reduction of GHG emissions 
from international shipping, the question of how to properly establish mechanisms for 
this MBM is significant for its future implementation. This section briefly introduces 
this measure and discusses five elements of this scheme. The institutional arrangements 
in relation to this scheme are discussed in the next section. 
 
7.5.4.4.1 Overview of the Add-on RM Built into a Global GHG Fund 
 
Ships over certain tonnages (eg, 400 Gross Tonnage (GT)) must pay GHG contributions 
based on the bunker fuel they purchase. This payment could be paid either by 
Registered Bunker Fuel Suppliers or the shipowners to the International GHG Fund. 
The contributions collected by the GHG Fund should first be rebated to developing 
countries based on their share of global seaborne imports by value. This share should be 
reviewed and adjusted annually to reflect the true situations of these developing 
countries and thus ensure ‘no net incidence’ on developing countries. The remaining 
revenues should be allocated through the mechanisms under the UNFCCC process. This 
scheme would establish a global reduction target for international shipping, set by either 
the UNFCCC or the IMO. Therefore, these revenues would then be used to offset 
excessive GHG emissions above the target line (see Figure 7.3). Figure 7.3 reveals that 
GHG emissions under a business as usual scenario will increase significantly due to the 
predicted growth in international trade. Since the effectiveness of technical and 
operational measures is not sufficient to achieve combined GHG emissions reductions 
for the sector, the GHG Fund could be utilised to offset excessive emissions so as to 




mitigation and adaptation activities via the UNFCCC and R&D, and financial and 
technological transfer within the IMO framework. 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Meeting a Global Reduction Target through Offsetting Mechanism in 
an International GHG Fund for GHG Emissions from Ships228 
 
7.5.4.4.2 The Fulfilment of the CBDR Principle 
 
Each developing country Party to the UNFCCC would be entitled to obtain an 
unconditional payment (rebate) equal to the cost incurred due to an add-on RM built 
into a global GHG Fund. The amount of rebate would be calculated annually in 
proportion to a key. The proposed key is a country’s share of global seaborne imports 
by value. Under this scheme, once the contributions are collected by the International 
GHG Fund, these revenues should be disbursed in two steps. In the first step, any 
economic costs incurred by a developing country Party participating in this scheme is 
paid/rebated unconditionally, however, a developing country could decide to forego a 
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part of or the entire rebate. In the second step, the remaining revenue is disbursed 
through the operating entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC.229  
 
The first step of revenue disbursement makes consumers in developed countries 
exclusively responsible for the net revenue, so that there would be ‘no net incidence’ on 
developing countries. This consequence is the same as that of the differentiated central 
obligations category of the CBDR principle. Developing countries would not bear any 
mandatory obligations under this scheme although the NMFT principle also applies in 
this process. Furthermore, the second step of revenue allocation provides an extra bonus 
for the most vulnerable countries, which can be regarded as the granting of financial and 
technological assistance under the CBDR principle. Through these means, both the 
CBDR and the NMFT principles are fully incorporated in this proposed MBM. 
 
It is also worthwhile to mention that the list of countries in Annex I to the UNFCCC 
was adopted in 1992 and has been one of the main criteria for identifying developed 
States and developing States. It is anticipated that this list will be updated and 
maintained in the 2015 international climate change agreement. As discussed earlier, 
there are divergent regulatory interests and economic situations among developing 
countries. Therefore, it will be necessary to review and update the list for developing 
countries while also reviewing the share of these countries in global seaborne imports. 
 
7.5.4.4.3 Application Threshold of the Scheme 
 
This scheme is a merger of two current MBM proposals. Concerning the application 
threshold of this scheme, the proposers of the International GHG Fund have suggested 
that it apply to ships over 400 GT,230 while the IUCN have proposed a much higher 
threshold, such as over 4,000 GT.231 The reason for the IUCN suggesting a higher 
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threshold for an MBM is to favour these SIDS and LDCs since the ports of these 
developing countries can only receive smaller ships.232 It has also been argued that a 
higher threshold could encourage the modal shift from some land-transport to more 
energy efficient coastal shipping in many countries, as well as facilitating the 
implementation of this scheme by reducing the number of ships subject to it.233 Since 
the threshold of 400 GT has become common for IMO-regulated treaties, it is 
reasonable to maintain this threshold if future regulation on this proposed MBM rests 
solely with the IMO. However, there would be fewer barriers to achieving such a 
convention which stipulates a higher application threshold for the scheme if this scheme 
is reached through an independent international convention under the auspices of the 
IMO and/or other competent international bodies. This convention, if adopted, would be 
beneficial for ensuring the interests of the most vulnerable developing countries.  
 
7.5.4.4.4 The Setting of Reduction Targets 
 
Reduction targets have been a topic for discussion and debate within the IMO since the 
59th MEPC meeting in 2009. 234 As an ‘integral and obvious part of any emissions 
reduction plan’,235 reduction targets are different from a reduction cap. While imposing 
a cap on the total GHG emissions from international shipping has been opposed by the 
shipping industries and many States, the setting of reduction targets compatible with the 
selected MBM has been widely accepted. 236  A phased reduction target has been 
regulated for the EEDI in the revised Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78.237 However, how to 
set a global reduction target for the selected add-on RM built into a global GHG Fund is 
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not so straightforward. Two issues need to be properly addressed, namely, who sets the 
target and what the target is.  
 
First, should the reduction target be set by the UNFCCC or the IMO? Given that the 
GHG Fund proposal provides two options, a decision needs to be made in the future. 
Taking into account the different expertise and mandate of these two organisations, it 
would be reasonable to propose that the UNFCCC decides the reduction target for 
MBMs involving ‘in-sector and out-of-sector’ reductions, while the IMO decides the 
target for in-sector MBMs. Based on this criterion, the reduction target of this proposed 
MBM would be decided by the UNFCCC process, including the scheduled global 
climate change agreement to be adopted in 2015.  
 
Second, what will the reduction target be? Regarding this question, the draft text of the 
Convention on the International GHG Fund only provides that ‘international shipping 
shall reduce its emissions of CO2 by x% [in 20xx] compared to [20xx]’.238 While the 
proposers of the GHG Fund suggested that this target should be set based on emissions 
levels in 2007,239 some NGOs proposed that this target should reflect the emissions 
reductions target in developed countries.240 The setting of reduction targets is a complex 
and technical matter. However, it has been suggested that three elements should be 
taken into account in deciding an appropriate global reduction target for this proposed 
MBM.241 They are the prospects for the growth in the global economy before 2020, the 
long life time of ships, and the reduction potential and reduction efforts of other sectors 
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in particular the international aviation sector which is currently working on a MBM to 
be adopted by 2016 and to be implemented by 2020.242  
 
7.5.4.4.5 The Timing for Adopting the Scheme and its Legal Instrument 
 
The discussions in Chapter 5 indicated that the international shipping industry believe 
that MBMs are ‘not justified at this particular time’ although it agrees that MBMs are 
necessary for achieving absolute emissions reduction from ships.243 Given that there are 
ongoing discussions on furthering the improvement of current energy efficiency 
measures within the IMO, and the effectiveness of technical and operational measures 
has not been assessed yet, it is likely that a proposed MBM will be not adopted in the 
short term. The scheduled 2015 global climate change agreement may involve the 
setting of new global reduction targets, which if combined with the possible adoption of 
a global MBM by the international aviation section in 2016, may enable the adoption of 
a MBM by the international shipping sector in or after 2016. As to the legal instrument, 
it is likely that the add-on RM built into a global GHG Fund MBM would be adopted by 
means of an international convention under the auspices of the IMO and the UNFCCC 
if it finds support among States. 
 
7.5.5 Optimising Institutional Arrangements 
 
Similar to relevant laws, regulations and policies, institutional arrangements are also an 
integral part of a regulatory framework. However, not all international environmental 
institutions have been regarded as effective and legitimate,244 and the degree of this 
fragmentation has a ‘crucial impact on the effectiveness and performance of a 
governance system’. 245  Given that institutional fragmentation exists in current 
international regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping, how to 
effectively manage this fragmentation is significant for the smooth implementation of 
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technical and operational measures, as well as the future adoption and enforcement of a 
selected MBM. This section provides some approaches for improving institutional 
arrangements for the GHG emissions issue. 
 
7.5.5.1 Technical and Operational Measures 
 
It has been suggested that the institutional fragmentation existing in global regulation of 
the GHG issue has significantly delayed the regulatory process.246 The vagueness and 
overlap of the mandates of the UNFCCC and the IMO has been at the centre of most of 
these discussions. Technical and operational measures have been adopted after fourteen 
years of discussions and negotiations within the IMO, and the IMO is the sole regulator 
of these measures. However, there is still room for improving the institutional 
arrangements for these technical and operational measures. Currently the MEPC is 
improving the regulation on the transfer of technologies from developed countries to 
developing countries. However, neither Regulation 23 of the revised Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78 nor the subsequent Resolution on the transfer of technologies in May 
2013247 has provided a good solution to addressing this issue. As discussed earlier, a 
market-based approach to technology acquisition might be a better option for 
developing countries. Strengthening the communication and coordination between the 
IMO, UNFCCC and WTO may assist in resolving this issue. This is particularly the 
case because the TRIPS has accumulated experience in relation to technological transfer 
via certain incentives, and the financing mechanism under the UNFCCC, or perhaps a 
future MBM, would possibly provide funds for a market-based approach to technology 
acquisition.  
 
7.5.5.2 Market-based Measure 
 
For the proposed add-on RM built into a global GHG Fund, institutional arrangements 
could be established in the following two ways.  
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First, which institutions have the mandate in regulating this proposed add-on RM built 
into a global GHG Fund? To date the IMO has been the sole forum in which the 
regulation of MBMs for the international shipping industry has been discussed. 
However, the competence of the IMO in regulating MBMs has not been widely 
accepted. Many developing countries opposed the IMO’s role in regulating MBMs 
based on its technical competence from the IMO Convention and the lack of a clear 
mandate from the Kyoto Protocol.248 The proposed add-on RM built into a global GHG 
Fund is an MBM which involves in-sector and out-of-sector emissions reduction, as 
well as international trade. It is thus less feasible for the IMO to exclusively regulate 
this proposed MBM. Furthermore, it has been suggested that under this scheme a global 
reduction target should be decided by the UNFCCC process, including the scheduled 
global climate change agreement to be adopted in 2015. Therefore, it is arguable that 
this scheme could be established jointly by the UNFCCC and the IMO. However, it is 
also crucial to make a clear mandate division between these two international 
organisations. For example, the UNFCCC could set the global reduction target and 
coordinate the work among different sectors, while the IMO could be responsible for 
technical issues in relation to the shipping sector. This could be achieved through a 
future convention on this proposed MBM and better coordination of the negotiations 
between these two fora.  
 
The 63rd MEPC meeting in 2012 invited international organisations, such as the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations World 
Food Programme (WFP), to ‘provide appropriate information’ on the GHG emissions 
issue.249 While it is useful for these organisations to provide necessary information, 
some of these organisations as stakeholders in this GHG issue could have played more 
important roles. For example, currently the EU is attempting to find ways to include 
GHG emissions from international shipping into an EU ETS as it did for the aviation 
sector. This possibility is potentially harmful to the uniform global regulation of the 
shipping GHG issue, it is thus important for the IMO and UNFCCC to have better 
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coordination and communication with the EU in the regulatory process for a future 
MBM. Meanwhile, due to the nature of this scheme being a trade-related MBM, the 
involvement of the WTO in either the working group or relevant discussions on 
regulating this scheme is also necessary. In this way, the compatibility of this proposed 
MBM could be clarified by the WTO so as to clear possible legal barriers and facilitate 
the smooth adoption and implementation of this measure in the future.  
 
Second, which institutions should be established to exercise the functions of this 
proposed MBM scheme? Based on current MBM proposals on the GHG Fund and the 
add-on RM, there should be at least one central body (International GHG Fund) 
established under a convention on the international GHG Fund, and another body (RM 
administrator) established to exercise the role of rebating revenues to developing 
countries. As the international GHG Fund must be independent of the UN and the 
IMO,250 Denmark has suggested establishing the Assembly and the Secretariat for this 
Fund so as to fulfil the relevant responsibilities. The proposers of the GHG Fund 
provided two options to address the question of who should be entrusted with 
administering the GHG Fund: a new division created within the IMO Secretariat, or a 
completely new body.251 It may be advisable to establish a new body to administer this 
GHG Fund, which could be established within the UNFCCC, due to the different nature 
of this GHG issue from other pollution related matters.  
 
The main role of the RM element built into the international GHG Fund is to calculate 
and rebate the share of developing countries according to global seaborne imports by 
value. It is expected that the administrative burden could be significantly reduced if the 
proposed new MBM scheme merges these two bodies into one, namely, incorporates 
the functions of a RM administrator into the GHG Fund. Then the functions of the add-
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on RM could be fulfilled within the GHG Fund through the administration of a new 
body within the UNFCCC.  
 
While this section proposes a MBM merged from two current MBM proposals, it is also 
possible that an in-sector MBM could be adopted by the shipping industry in the future 
provided that a similar MBM is adopted by the international aviation sector in 2016. If 
that occurs, the institutional arrangements would be different from those envisaged 
under the proposed add-on RM built into a global international GHG Fund. In that 
circumstance it is possible that the IMO would be the sole regulator of the GHG 
emissions issue due to the nature of the MBM and the mandate of the IMO as discussed 
in Chapter 4. 252  As things stand at this time, it appears important for various 
stakeholders to raise their awareness and knowledge of current MBM options, facilitate 
the political will and cooperate closely with various States in adopting an MBM suitable 




Stakeholders play a vital role in the formation and improvement of the regulatory 
framework of GHG emissions from international shipping, and the order of importance 
of these stakeholders from the regulation and enforcement perspectives can be roughly 
ranked from high to low as the shipping industry, flag States and port States. To date the 
global climate change regime under the UNFCCC process and the IMO GHG emissions 
regime have formed and been contributing to the development of this regulatory 
framework. Based on the analyses of previous chapters, this chapter has identified three 
main deficiencies in current legal and institutional frameworks for reducing GHG 
emissions from international shipping. They are deficiencies in the EEDI and SEEMP, 
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lack of MBMs and lack of consensus in applying regulatory principles. It has been 
further suggested that these deficiencies could be improved through five means:  
 
• to improve the EEDI through expanding its scope of application, improving the EEDI 
formula, and establishing a market-based approach for technological transfer;  
• to strengthen the effectiveness of the SEEMP through providing other incentives for 
ship operators, making the EEOI a mandatory tool and the granting of more effective 
financial and technological transfer from developed countries to developing countries;  
• to improve flag State control through attracting more flag States to ratify Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78 and ensure the smooth enforcement of the mandatory IMO Audit 
Scheme by flag States, coastal States and port States which are parties to Annex VI; 
and to strengthen port State control through narrowing the gaps in performance among 
nine regional MOUs on port State control, allowing certain unilateral actions on port 
State control and updating the 2009 Guidelines for Port State Control under the 
Revised MARPOL Annex VI;  
• to adopt an MBM based on an add-on RM built into a global GHG Fund; and 
• to optimise institutional arrangements for these adopted technical and operational 
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[We] seek solutions that benefit the environment. A differentiated deal is 
better for the environment than no deal at all, and time is short… 
 






The process to regulate the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping is 
comprehensive and controversial. It involves political, historical, economic and 
technical considerations and cuts across international maritime law, international 
environmental law, and international trade law. It has been necessary to find political 
compromises and develop innovative regulatory efforts. The purpose of this thesis is to 
identify gaps in the current regulatory framework for the reduction of GHG emissions 
from international shipping, and to identify options and recommendations for improving 
this framework. This thesis synthesised applicable international environmental law 
principles and examined the responses of the main stakeholders.  
 
This concluding chapter consists of three parts. The first part examines the application 
of selected international environmental law principles to the GHG emissions issue. The 
second part identifies the responses to this issue from the UN, the IMO, the shipping 
industry, flag States and port States. The gaps and gap-filling recommendations are 
provided in the last part.  
 
8.2 Applicable International Environmental Law Principles 
 
                                                 
1 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (16 October 





Chapter 2 examined the applicability of international environmental law principles to 
the reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping. It was argued that GHG 
emissions from international shipping, in particular CO2, are a type of ‘conditional’ 
pollution. From this perspective, GHG emissions are pollutants on the basis that they 
engender ‘deleterious effects’ or lead to ‘significant’ environmental impact. This view is 
consistent with the definition of marine pollution in the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (LOSC) and with the national legislation of a number of countries. 
GHG emissions from international shipping, being a type of pollution, trigger the 
application of many marine pollution-related treaties. This argument and the principles 
relating to flag State, coastal State and port State jurisdiction also underpin the 
application of international environmental law principles to GHG emissions from 
international shipping. 
 
In customary international law, States are obliged to prevent, reduce and control 
transboundary harm resulting from activities under their jurisdiction or control where 
transboundary harm occurs. States also have a duty to cooperate in mitigating 
transboundary environmental risks and emergencies, through notification, consultation, 
negotiation, and in appropriate cases, environmental impact assessment. It was argued 
that GHG emissions from international shipping might lead to transboundary harm 
under four scenarios, namely: 
 
• The harm is caused to the high seas and the deep seabed, or international airspace which is 
the airspace above the high seas and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of coastal States; 
• The harm is caused between the flag State and the coastal State or port State; 
• The harm is caused between the flag State and a third State; or 
• The harm is caused between two flag States. 
 
On this basis, the duties associated with transboundary harm would apply in the context 
of GHG emissions from international shipping. These include a flag State’s primary 
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction and responsibility to prevent, reduce and 
control transboundary harm resulting from GHG emissions from the ships entitled to fly 
its flag. To achieve this goal, flag States need to adopt national legislations on the 
reduction of such emissions, taking into account the amended Annex VI to the 





irrespective of whether they have ratified this amendment. Flag States need to conduct 
regular surveys, issue or empower other parties to issue the International Energy 
Efficiency Certificate to ships flying their flags, as well as impose administrative 
penalties or institute proceedings in relation to offences. Furthermore, coastal States and 
port States also have a duty to cooperate in mitigating transboundary environmental 
risks arising from excessive GHG emissions from international shipping. 
 
The precautionary principle is a customary international law principle that has been 
incorporated into many international treaties. Although GHG emissions from ships have 
been recognised as harmful, there is not yet scientific proof that they have caused 
specific impacts. The application of the precautionary principle to this context would 
justify the action of States in taking proactive steps to tackle shipping GHG emissions. 
In contrast to the precautionary principle, the polluter-pays principle aims to address 
three relevant questions, namely: who is the polluter? what should the polluter pay for? 
and, how to pay? It was argued that in the context of the GHG emissions issue the 
polluter should include ship owners, ship operators, and flag States under certain 
circumstances. The cost should be put in a global context through adopting uniform 
measures, whereas the means of payment could include various technical, operational, 
and market-based measures (MBMs). In particular, MBMs which involve the global 
emissions reduction of different sectors may better reflect the polluter-pays principle. 
 
The Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) principle is an important 
international environmental law principle, and has been widely incorporated into global 
climate change regulations. The No More Favourable Treatment (NMFT) principle is a 
principle which has been consistently applied to all IMO treaty instruments. The 
reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping involves measures taken by 
both the global climate change regime and IMO regulations. While the NMFT principle 
underscores the uniform application of applicable standards to all ships calling at ports 
of port States, the CBDR principle emphasises differentiated treatment towards 
developed States and developing States in the course of tackling climate change. It is 
thus controversial whether the two principles should be applied to the GHG emissions 





these principles and asserted that both principles should be applied to the issue. 
However, it is difficult to devise methods to incorporate the CBDR and NMFT 
principles into the IMO’s regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping. 
While it is easier to apply the NMFT principle, the main challenge is in the application 
of the CBDR principle. It was suggested that differentiated treatment should be broadly 
interpreted to cover differentiated central obligations, differentiated implementation 
arrangements, and the granting of assistance including financial and technological 
assistance. Accordingly, the CBDR principle could be applied to the GHG issue in 
different ways depending on the nature of various measures for addressing this issue.  
 
The findings in Chapter 2 were then discussed in Chapters 3 to 6 in relation to the 
responses from the main stakeholders. These responses, together with the findings in 
Chapter 2, underpinned the identification of gaps and gap-filling options in relation to 
the regulatory framework for the reduction of GHG emissions from international 
shipping as discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
8.3 Findings on Main Stakeholders in GHG Emissions from International Shipping 
 
The main stakeholders of GHG emissions from international shipping, including the 
UN, the IMO, the shipping industry, and various flag States and port States, play 
significant roles in the regulation and enforcement of global regulatory initiatives. 
Chapters 3 to 6 assessed the responses from these stakeholders to the GHG emissions 
issue.  
 
The UN has provided legal and institutional responses to the reduction of GHG 
emissions from international shipping. Chapter 3 focused on these responses. This GHG 
emissions issue has been discussed under both the international climate change regime 
(the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process) 
and the IMO GHG Emissions regime. Regarding the international climate change 
regime, the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA) started to address this problem in 1995 before the IMO received its GHG 





reach consensus in adopting the allocation of emissions from marine bunker fuels, the 
subsequent Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) 
under the UNFCCC had not achieved any breakthrough in terms of regulatory 
principles on this issue before it was terminated at the Doha Climate Change 
Conference in 2012. Currently regulatory measures to reduce shipping GHG emissions 
mainly rely on the work of the IMO. Nevertheless, it is possible that the scheduled 2015 
universal climate agreement, if adopted, might influence the regulation of GHG 
emissions from international shipping. In particular, the way that the CBDR principle 
will be incorporated into this agreement will have an effect on the further regulation of 
the GHG emissions issue within the IMO. 
 
A number of UN institutions have been established to address climate change. Among 
them, the IPCC has emphasised the necessity and urgency of tackling GHG emissions 
from shipping by releasing five assessment reports. The United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) and World Meteorological Organization (WMO) raised public 
awareness on the need to tackle the issue and implement the outcomes within the 
international climate change regime; the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol and their 
conferences of the parties of the UNFCCC (COPs) and COPs serving as the Meeting of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMPs), as well as the UNFCCC’s SBSTA and AWG-
LCA, have provided crucial platforms for different countries to negotiate the regulatory 
principles and reduction targets in relation to global regulation on marine bunker fuels, 
the main source of emissions from international shipping.  
 
Chapter 4 examined the regulatory initiatives achieved within the IMO. It was argued 
that the Convention on the International Maritime Organization (IMO Convention) and 
the LOSC provide the IMO with general competence to regulate GHG emissions from 
ships, while the Kyoto Protocol gives the IMO a specific mandate to regulate this 
matter. These competences enable the IMO to apply both the CBDR and NMFT 
principles to address GHG emissions from international shipping, which recalled the 
discussion of the two principles in Chapter 2. It was also argued that the IMO has an 
exclusive role in regulating technical and operational measures and non-exclusive role 





shipping. This chapter continued to examine the amendments to Annex VI to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78). 
These amendments partially regulate this GHG emissions issue by making mandatory 
the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for new ships, and the Ship Energy 
Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) for all ships. It was argued that these adopted 
technical and operational measures are a significant advance in regulating GHG 
emissions from ships. These measures were a breakthrough in the lengthy deadlock on 
negotiations between various countries on shipping GHG emissions within the IMO, 
and also confirmed the leading role of the IMO in regulating this issue. Scenario 
modelling has demonstrated that the estimated C O2  emissions reduction due to 
combined EEDI and SEEMP will lead to significant emissions reduction, if projected 
growth in world trade is not taken into account. However, some deficiencies also exist 
in these technical and operational measures. Their effectiveness needs to be improved 
and strengthened, and the lack of sufficient support from major developing countries 
also imposes challenges for their future implementation. Furthermore, it was anticipated 
that MBMs would in time be adopted by the IMO and/or other competent international 
institutions as a supplement for the EEDI and SEEMP to reduce GHG emissions from 
ships. To date seven types of MBM proposals have been submitted to the IMO for 
further discussion and debate. However, no MBM proposals have been widely accepted.  
 
The shipping industry plays a crucial role in the reduction of GHG emissions from 
international shipping. The industry puts forward suggestions and provides feedback for 
the introduction of a new instrument, and develops initiatives to implement the 
instrument after it is adopted. Chapter 5 canvassed the response of the shipping industry 
to this GHG emissions issue. At the international and regional level, global shipping 
organisations support the leading role of the IMO in regulating GHG emissions from 
ships, and agree that both technical and operational measures would help to reduce 
GHG emissions. It was argued that a GHG Fund or levy-related MBM is more 
acceptable to international and regional organisations. Although most of these 
organisations assert that the NMFT principle should be solely applied to this GHG 
emissions issue, the international shipowners association accepts the incorporation of 






At the national level, shipping industries from various countries generally welcome the 
EEDI and SEEMP except that some insist that the CBDR principle should be 
incorporated into these measures. The divergence of these shipping industries mainly 
lies in their differing views on the proposed MBMs. Case studies indicated that 
UNFCCC Annex I States support the adoption of a MBM but disagree on their 
preferred MBMs. For example, Australia and the UK support a global Emissions 
Trading System (ETS) for international shipping and accept the application of the 
CBDR principle in this regard while Greece prefers a GHG Fund or levy relevant 
MBM. Within the UNFCCC non-Annex I States, the Korean shipping industry prefers a 
GHG Fund or levy-related MBM, whereas China and India believe that it is still 
premature to adopt any MBM. It was thus argued that the development status of a 
developing country, in particular its technological capability, determines the willingness 
of its shipping industry to accept an MBM. Emerging non-Annex I economies 
possessing better technologies, such as South Korea and Singapore, tend to accept an 
MBM more easily.  
 
Flag States and port States are two vital stakeholders in the GHG emissions reduction 
from international shipping issue, and they are involved in both the legislative and 
implementing processes around this issue. Chapter 6 identified the responses of flag 
States and port States. Case studies on Greece and Japan revealed that flag States under 
the UNFCCC Annex I have similar positions towards the adoption of technical and 
operational measures by the IMO. Their attitudes to the proposed MBMs are also 
positive, although they have different preferences on the form MBMs should take. In 
comparison with the UNFCCC Annex I flag States, non-Annex I flag States have more 
diverse responses towards this GHG issue due to their differing regulatory interests. 
Case studies on Panama, China and Vanuatu indicated that major developing flag States 
and some other developing States are the main supporters of applying the CBDR 
principle to the regulation of this GHG issue and these States pay more attention to their 
needs in capacity building and technology transfer rather than the regulation itself. 





Nevertheless, major ‘flag of convenience’ (FOC) States support the NMFT principle 
and tend to welcome most relevant regulatory measures.  
 
The role of port States in implementing the adopted EEDI and SEEMP has been limited 
to verifying the International Energy Efficiency Certificate (IEE Certificate). However, 
many port States have voiced their views. They have recognised the importance of 
regulating this issue and asserted that ports should take practical and effective measures 
to address this problem. While the International Association of Ports and Harbors 
(IAPH) has taken initiatives in tackling this matter, regional Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs) on port State control have also added the IEE Certificate to 
their ‘List of MOU Deficiency Codes’ to support the IMO’s work. However, it was 
argued in Chapter 6 that current port State control on this GHG issue should be 
strengthened. This is because the current MOUs on port State control are not sufficient 
in achieving effective reduction of GHG emissions from ships, and disagreements 
remain among these port States as to the means to achieve this reduction. For instance, 
some port States under non-Annex I to the UNFCCC require more grace periods and 
assistance in capacity building for implementing the IMO regulations on addressing the 
GHG issue while other port States disagree with this view.  
 
8.4 Gaps and Gap-Filling Recommendations 
 
The global regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping is a process in 
which various stakeholders interact and contribute to the formation and improvement of 
the regulatory framework. The order of importance of these stakeholders from the 
regulation and enforcement perspectives can be roughly ranked from high to low as the 
shipping industry, flag States and port States. To date two parallel regimes, namely the 
global climate change regime under the UNFCCC process and the IMO GHG emissions 
regime, have contributed to the regulation of this GHG issue. Currently GHG emissions 
from international shipping have been partially regulated through technical and 
operational measures in the form of a revised Annex VI to MARPOL 73/78, and seven 







Based on the analysis in previous chapters, Chapter 7 identified three main deficiencies 
in the current legal and institutional framework for reducing GHG emissions from 
international shipping. Firstly, the adopted technical and operational measures do not 
fully incorporate international environmental law principles and lack full support from 
the main stakeholders in GHG emissions reduction from international shipping. 
Secondly, the absence of MBMs in the current regulatory framework for GHG 
emissions reduction from ships cannot achieve absolute reductions in the long term and 
does not reflect the widely held views in support of MBMs among the main 
stakeholders of the GHG issue. Thirdly, the lack of consensus in applying regulatory 
principles has caused the imbalance of interests between the UNFCCC Annex I States 
and non-Annex I States, as well as institutional fragmentation. 
 
It was further argued in Chapter 7 that the gaps existing in the current regulatory 
framework of this GHG emissions issue could be addressed in five ways. Firstly, to 
improve the EEDI in three respects, namely: to expand the application scope of the 
EEDI through technological innovation and other enhanced technical measures based on 
current EEDI; to improve the EEDI formula; and, to establish a market-based approach 
for technological transfer. Secondly, to strengthen the effectiveness of the SEEMP 
through three approaches, which are providing other incentives for ship operators, 
making the EEOI a mandatory tool, and the granting of more effective financial and 
technological transfer from developed countries to developing countries. Thirdly, to 
improve flag State control through attracting more flag States to ratify Annex VI to 
MARPOL 73/78 and ensure the smooth enforcement of the mandatory IMO Audit 
Scheme by flag States, coastal States and port States which are parties to Annex VI. In 
addition, to strengthen port State control through narrowing the gaps in performance 
among nine regional MOUs on port State control, allowing certain unilateral actions on 
port State control and updating the 2009 Guidelines for Port State Control under the 
Revised MARPOL Annex VI. Fourthly, to adopt an MBM based on an add-on Rebate 
Mechanism (RM) built into a global GHG Fund. Fifth and finally, to optimise 
institutional arrangements for these adopted technical and operational measures, and a 





communication and coordination between the IMO, UNFCCC and WTO so as to 
address the institutional fragmentation existing in the regulation and implementation of 
energy efficiency measures. Whereas under a proposed add-on RM built into a global 
GHG Fund, it is crucial to clarify the institutional mandates of the UNFCCC and the 
IMO, and merge unnecessary administrative bodies to make this scheme cost-effective.  
 
It is anticipated that the path toward the improvement of the current regulatory 
framework of GHG emissions from international shipping, including the enhancement 
of current technical and operational measures and the ultimate selection of an MBM for 
international shipping, would be long. Limiting an increase of two degrees Celsius in 
the global average temperature by 2100 has become the goal of the international 
community. 2 However, a recent report by Asian Development Bank reveals that an 
increase of two degrees Celsius by 2050 is ‘almost unavoidable’. 3  Given the tight 
schedule of achieving this goal, the reduction of GHG emissions from international 
shipping as an important contribution to achieving that target has drawn mounting 
attention from the international community. To date the IMO has been refining the 
adopted technical and operational measures. At the 66th MEPC meeting in April 2014, 
the amendments to Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78 were adopted to expand the EEDI 
application to include an extra five types of ships.4 Meanwhile the Working Group on 
Further Technical and Operational Measures for Enhancing Energy Efficiency of 
International Shipping was established to facilitate the enhancement of further technical 
and operational measures. However, more needs to be done to tackle the rising GHG 
emissions from international shipping. As more developed countries and global 
shipping organisations come to accept the application of both the CBDR and NMFT 
                                                 
2 The two degrees Celsius goal was first put forward by the G-8 in 2009, and later agreed in the Copenhagen Accord. 
In 2010 this goal was formally incorporated into the UNFCCC process. Nevertheless, the specific reduction targets 
and time frame for achieving this goal have not yet been agreed under the UNFCCC process. Lavanya Rajamani, 'The 
Cancun Climate Change Agreements: Reading the Text, Subtext and Tea Leaves' (2011) 60(2) The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 499, 501.  
3 Michael Westphal, Gordon Hughes and Jorn Brommelhorster (eds), Economics of Climate Change in East Asia 
(Asian Development Bank, 2013) executive summary, xvi.  
4 Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI and the NOx Technical Code 2008, IMO Doc Res MEPC.251(66) (4 April 
2014) reg 21. These five added ships are LNG carriers, ro-ro cargo ships (vehicle carriers), ro-ro cargo ships, ro-ro 





principles to the GHG issue, in particular the MBM proposals, it seems that finding 
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